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Abstract 
 
The thesis adopts a doctrinal approach to consider how a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review by the CJEU could be applied to shared competences, and 
the criteria that the CJEU should take into account in balancing competing 
interests when determining the residency rights of EU citizens.  It will identify 
limits to the competences of the EU through subsidiarity analysis, including how 
this should constrain the reasoning of the CJEU, but this has a consequence of 
better legitimising such genuinely European standards that do have a clear legal 
basis.  Adhering to the rule of law is an important issue for the CJEU to 
demonstrate its respect for as a core value commonly associated with democracy 
and with the validity of law itself.  A subsidiarity review undertaken by the CJEU 
involving the CJEU checking whether the Union has competence to act 
(conferral) and in cases concerning areas of shared competence would also serve 
to legitimise the CJEU’s ruling to the Member States and address the problem of 
ultra vires EU action lacking legitimacy in the perspective of the Member States 
eyes.  Adopting a normative approach it considers how a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review could be anchored in EU law to address competence issues 
when the CJEU is striking a balance between fundamental principles of EU law, 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the residency rights of migrant EU citizens 
who are economically inactive. As subsidiarity in these types of cases relates to 
the cross border requirement, the CJEU should be explicit about departing from 
the purely internal rule as well as explaining the substance of rights of EU 
citizens. The proportionality element of the review relates to the actual 
consideration and weighing up by the CJEU of the competing interests identified 
in this context.  This requires the CJEU to identify explicitly in its reasoning any 
competing interests that have been weighed up as well as stating any other 
particular factors involved in the balancing and the weight accorded to those 
factors.  Although such an approach would not necessarily result in a change in 
the outcome of the case, it would help to improve the quality of the reasoning of 
the CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Anchoring a subsidiarity and proportionality review by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union in the context of residency rights and shared 
competence: a legal, doctrinal and critical analysis.
1
 
  
1. Introduction to thesis 
2. Competence, conferral and the principle of subsidiarity 
3. Scope of thesis 
4. Sources and methods 
5. Chapter overview 
6. Preliminary conclusions 
 
1. Introduction to thesis 
 
EU citizenship has been proclaimed by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) to have fundamental status in EU law
2
 despite the modest 
provisions in the Treaty which include requiring having national citizenship as a 
prerequisite for having EU citizenship.
3
 Furthermore, the rights attaching to EU 
citizenship under the Treaty are closely allied to those who are economically 
active when exercising their right of free movement
4
 with the most extensive 
                                                             
1 See also a conference presentation by the author of this thesis entitled, ‘Subsidiarity, an inherent 
respect for localism and the Court of Justice of the European Union’, at the Socio-Legal Studies 
Association Conference 26-28 March 2013 at York Law School, York University. For the 
purposes of that paper and For the purposes of that paper and this thesis ‘localism’ is taken as 
defined as meaning law-making at a local level this thesis ‘localism’ is taken as defined as 
meaning law-making at  Member State level. 
2 Grzelczyk v Centre public D’Aide Sociale D’Ottignies-Louvan-La-Neuve (Case C-184/99) [2002] 
1 CMLR 19 para 1. 
3 Article 20 TFEU. 
4 Article 21 TFEU. 
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residency rights being given to those citizens who are workers.
5
  Despite such 
Treaty limitations, the CJEU has in a series of cases gradually expanded the rights 
of EU citizens even where those citizens are non-economically active.
6
  Sala is 
one of the most radical of the early case examples where the CJEU adopted such a 
teleological approach to the interpretation of the citizenship provisions and, in 
particular, made significant inroads into the idea that nationals of the Member 
States exercising their right of free movement must be economically self-
sufficient and must not become a burden on the host Member State.
 7
  This has led 
to claims of judicial activism
8
 and the consequent risk of damaging the legitimacy 
of the CJEU.  As Everson explains, ‘The systematic legitimacy of European law is 
undermined as the Court responds sympathetically, but arbitrarily, to adverse 
individual circumstance. The credibility of European law is strained as the Court 
acts as a unilateral constitutional actor, transforming EU citizenship from a status 
that is ancillary to national citizenship to one which has substance of its own.’ 9 
On the other hand, one could argue that the EU should not be driven solely by 
economic concerns. The Preamble to the Treaty on the European Union confirms 
the EU’s ‘attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law’.10 Furthermore, 
the quest for enhancing the legitimacy and democracy of the EU and its citizens’ 
demands recognition of the fundamental status of EU citizenship
11
 and the CJEU 
is expressing this but without elaborating in much detail what such a status should 
entail. 
With this in mind, this thesis undertakes a legal, critical and doctrinal analysis of 
the determination of the residency rights of EU citizens who are economically 
                                                             
5 See also the discussion of the distinction drawn between economically active and economically 
inactive EU citizens in relation to residency rights given to EU citizens in Directive 2004/38 in 
chapter 4 of this thesis.   
6 See for example Case C-85/96 María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691 and 
the discussion of this case in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
7 Case C-85/96 María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691.  
8 The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Integration Process: A Contemporary and 
Normative Assessment’, (2010) 6(1) Hanse Law Review 3-26 at 7: < 
http://www.hanselawreview.org/pdf9/Vol6No01Art01.pdf > last accessed 14.1.14 
9 M.Everson, ‘A very cosmopolitan citizenship; but who pays the price?, in M.Dougan, N.Nic 
Shuibhne, E.Spaventa, (eds), Empowerment and Disempowerment of the European Citizen, (2012, 
Hart publishing) 147-8.   
10 Preamble to the Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union OJ C 83, 30.3.2010 
reproduced in K.Shaw, European Law Statutes, (2nd ed., Pearson Education Limited, 2014) at 3. 
11 See chapter 5 for discussion of how citizenship is a fundamental political concept at national 
level. 
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inactive in the context of regulating shared competence
12
 i.e. where both the EU 
and the Member States share power to legislate in particular policy area.  This will 
involve a consideration of what can be agreed at European level not only in terms 
of protecting the fundamental status of EU citizenship in this context but also 
looking at this in the broader constitutional principles of the EU's legal system.  In 
particular, this includes considering not only the role that the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights should play but also how the CJEU could enhance the 
legitimacy of its decision making by including in its judgement how it has 
balanced the supranational concern with integration
13
 in policy areas where it 
shares competence with the Member States
14
 with other consitututional values, 
including democracy and respect for localism.   
Pivotal in the context of regulating the EU’s exercise of shared competence in all 
shared policy areas are the constitutional principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. These key constitutional principles governing the EU’s exercise 
of competence in all shared competence areas currently find expression as legal 
rules in Article 5 TEU. This latter provision provides in Article 5 (3) and (4) TEU 
that, 
 ‘under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can 
rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level. The institutions of the Union shall apply the 
principle of subsidiarity as laid down in the Protocol on the application of 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National Parliaments 
ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the 
procedure set out in that Protocol. 4. Under the principle of proportionality, 
                                                             
12 Article 5 TEU. 
13 For the purposes of this thesis, the definition of European legal integration offered is namely 
‘the gradual penetration of EU law into the domestic law of its Member States’, A.M.Burley and 
W.Mattli, ‘Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’, (1993) 47(1) 
International Organisation 41-76 at 43. See also  P.Craig and G. de Búrca, EU law Text, Cases and 
Materials, (5th. Ed., Oxford, OUP, 2011) at chapter 1 for a discussion of the evolution of European 
integration and the theories put forward to explain this evolution as a series of distinct phases.  For 
account of the rival theories of European legal integration and a discussion of their differing 
ontological scope i.e. how they differ in what they mean by integration see, for egs, A.Wiener and 
T.Diez, (eds) European Integration Theory, (2nd ed., OUP, 2012). 
14 Article 4(2) of the Treaty Establishing the European Union (TEU). 
11 
 
the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the Treaties. The institutions of the Union shall 
apply the principle of proportionality as laid down in the Protocol on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality’. 
 Article 5 (3) TEU, in conjunction with a Protocol on subsidiarity and 
proportionality
15
, thus sets out a test that the EU institutions should carry out 
before exercising competence in all shared competence areas, specifically that if 
the Member States cannot exercise competence efficiently enough then the EU 
should take action.  The Protocol further requires the EU to provide justification 
for legislation in terms of subsidiarity, as a mechanism to guide the exercise of 
competence by the EU 
However, despite subsidiarity and proportionality being key constitutional 
principles and rules in EU law governing the exercise of EU competence in all 
areas of shared competence,
 16
 this thesis will point out how the CJEU has failed 
to engage with subsidiarity and proportionality applied to competences as a tool of 
judicial review
17
 when interpreting cases in shared policy areas involving the 
residency rights of EU citizens who are economically inactive.   
Adopting a doctrinal approach
18
 and agreeing and building upon arguments by de 
Búrca
19
 and Kumm
20
 the central question in this thesis is how the CJEU could 
operationalise a subsidiarity and proportionality review applied to competences in 
this specific context. For the determination of residence rights of EU citizens who 
are economically inactive is an area which involves both EU competence and the 
Member States competence i.e. shared competence.  Consequently in these types 
of cases, including cases which also touch upon policy areas which are designated 
as supporting competences,
21
  the CJEU needs to undertake a subsidiarity 
                                                             
15 (Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Consolidated 
Texts of the EU Treaties as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, pages 204 to 207 (Cm 7310). 
16 Article 5 TEU. 
17 M.Kumm,  (2006) ‘Constitutionalising subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: the Case of Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Union’ (12(4)  ELJ 503-533. 
18 See T.Hutchinson and N.Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research’, (2012) 17 (1) Deakin Law Review, 84-119 and section 4 of this chapter for further 
discussion of doctrinal legal research and the rationale for the choice of this approach in this thesis. 
19 G.De Búrca, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional Actor’, 
(1998) 36(2) Journal of Common Market Studies pp. 217-35. 
20 M.Kumm,  (2006) ‘Constitutionalising subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: the Case of Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Union’ (12(4)  ELJ 503-533. 
21 Article 2 (5) TFEU provides that ‘in certain areas and under the conditions laid down in the 
Treaties, the Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or 
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review.  The fact that questions relating to EU citizenship sometimes also touch 
upon some issues in policy areas which are on the edge of the EU's competence
22
 
or involve supporting competences
23
,  this, it is submitted, further strengthens the 
argument for the CJEU to undertake a subsidiarity review in areas involving EU 
citizenship.  Not only is the EU  acting on the edge of its competence when 
considering questions relating to EU citizenship in those areas but more generally 
such supporting competences are also more protective of State sovereignty  in that 
Member State competence is meant to be preponderant. Even where there is no 
change in case outcomes an explicit explanation of how the CJEU had considered 
subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning would help to improve the quality of the 
reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the  legitimacy of the CJEU’s 
ruling.
24
 
Thus the question of how the CJEU could operationalise a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review applied to competences in when determining the residency 
rights of EU citizens are economically inactive is an important doctrinal legal 
question.  For subsidiarity has recently been reaffirmed in the Treaty of Lisbon as 
a key constitutional principle of EU law to guide EU law-making in shared 
competence areas.
25
  Its use by the EU law making institutions when law-making 
in shared policy areas helps to demonstrate the democratic and efficient function
26
 
of the exercise of the EU’s legislative power to the Member States.  The EU also 
acts on the basis of defined competence rules which demonstrate the EU 
                                                                                                                                                                       
supplement the actions of the Member States, without thereby superseding their competence in 
these areas.  Legally binding acts of the Union adopted on the basis of the provisions in the 
Treaties relating to these areas shall not entail harmonization of Member States’ laws or 
regulations’.  Article 6 TEU specifies these areas as being industry, culture, tourism, education, 
vocational training, youth and sport, civil protection and administrative co-operation. 
22 E.g. immigration (Article 79 and 80 TFEU) or welfare (Article 3(3) TFEU) 
23 Article 2 (5) TFEU  provides that ‘in certain areas and under the conditions laid down in the 
Treaties, the Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or 
supplement the actions of the Member States, without thereby superseding their competence in 
these areas.  Legally binding acts of the Union adopted on the basis of the provisions in the 
Treaties relating to these areas shall not entail harmonization of Member States’ laws or 
regulations.’ This type of competence is discussed further in section 2 of this chapter. 
24 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 at 
1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their decisions.’ 
 
25 Article 5 TEU and in particular Article 5 (3) which refers to competence outside exclusive 
competence when it provides that ‘Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall 
within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at 
regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved at Union level. 
26 See the Preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon which includes ‘DESIRING to enhance further the 
democratic and efficient functioning of the institutions so as to enable them better to carry out, 
within a single institutional framework, the tasks entrusted to them’. 
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institutions adherence to the rule of law,
27
 the latter being enshrined in Article 2 
TEU.  The EU rule of law itself is also argued by Weiler to be a constitutional 
principle of EU law 
28
  despite the fact that, ‘the Court of Justice, as the ultimate 
guardian of the Union legal order, is free to give an autonomous meaning to the 
EU principle of the rule of law even though the Court generally seeks to identify a 
common denominator in the constitutional traditions of the Member States when 
making use of a concept which was first developed at the national level'.
29
 
 
The rule of law is also a widely recognised aspirational principle at national
30
 and 
international level
31
 as evidenced in both the European Convention of Human 
Rights
32
 and the preamble to the Statute of the Council of Europe.
33
   Furthermore, 
although the rule of law
34
 is not a universal concept with a clear definition
35
, ‘the 
                                                             
27 For further discussion see B.Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
28 J.Weiler, The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union', Jean Monnet 
Working Paper No 4 (New York, 2009) at 7 and at 3 where he also refers to how the CJEU itself 
has referred to the EC as a 'community based on the rule of law'' in Case 294/93, Les Verts v 
Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para 23 and at 4 how 'Indeed the rule of law, which is regularly 
equated with the idea of a "government of laws, not men", is generally assumed...to be a "good 
thing".  This undoubtedly explains why the court of Justice, in stressing the importance of the rule 
of law as a defining element of the EC's constitutional character, did not encounter much 
criticism’. 
29 J.Weiler, The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union', Jean Monnet 
Working Paper No 4 (New York, 2009) 47 and at 15 where he points out that AG Mancini in Case 
294/93, Les Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339 'seems to equate it with the notion of judicial 
protection or control.' 
30 See the recent case AXA General Insurance Limited and others (Appellants) v the Lord Advocate 
and Others) (respondents) (Scotland), [2011] UKSC 46 where Lord Hope emphasises the 
importance of the rule of law for the judiciary when he states at para 51 that ‘the rule of law 
requires that the judges must retain the power to insist that legislation of that extreme kind is not 
law which the courts will recognise’. 
31 See also the Lord Chief Justice, the Right Honourable, the Lord Thomas of Cwagiedd, 
‘Welcome Address: Global Law Summit’,< http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/gls-speech-feb-2015.pdf> accessed 5.3.15 and who points out how ‘the 
rule of law is the foundation stone on which a just society has grown and flourished’. 
32 European Treaty Series No 5. 
33 European Treaty Series No 1. 
34 For the seminal definition of the core components of the rule of law see A.Dicey, Introduction to 
the Study of the Law of the Constitution, (7th ed. London/New York: Macmillan and Co, 1907).  
These include firstly at 198 ‘absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the 
influence of arbitrary power, [which] excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or 
even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the government’.  Secondly at 198, ‘equality 
before the law, or the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by 
the ordinary law courts’.  Thirdly, at 199 ‘with us under the law of the constitution, the rules which 
in foreign countries, naturally form part of a constitutional code, are not the source but the 
consequence of the rights of individuals, as defined and enforced by the courts’.  For a more recent 
discussion of the rule of law see B.Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004) and Lord Bingham, The Rule of Law, (Penguin, 2011). 
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fundamental issue that the rule of law seeks to address is: who guards the 
guardians: Who ensures that they use the powers we have granted them to protect 
us, in an appropriate, just and fair manner, and that we never need to be protected 
from them?’36 
The rule of law has been widely recognised from a procedural viewpoint
37
 as 
including government under the law
38
 and encompassing various formal 
characteristics entailed in the objectivity of the law. As Fallon argues such formal 
characteristics include,  
 ‘The capacity of legal rules, standards or principles to guide people in the 
conduct of their affairs; Efficacy.  The law should actually guide people; 
Stability.  The law should be reasonable stable, in order to facilitate 
planning and coordinated action over time; Supremacy of legal authority.  
The law should rule officials, including judges as well as ordinary citizens; 
Impartial justice. Courts should be available to enforce the law and should 
employ fair procedures’.39  
The rule of law and its key tenet of government under the law is specifically 
provided for in relation to the EU in Article 2 TEU in that the EU is bound by 
the principle of conferral which denotes a system where the EU institutions 
can exercise only competence attributed to it. 
On the other hand, despite their importance as key constitutional principles 
governing the EU’s exercise of shared competence, judicial review of subsidiarity 
                                                                                                                                                                       
35 See F.Amtenbrink,  Observing the Rule of Law in the European Union, (2009) Erasmus Law 
Review at Vol 2(1 ) who argues, ‘the concept of the rule of law is anything but well-defined, 
despite its wide acceptance and application….different approaches have been identified in the 
relevant literature which categorise the several and sometimes rather diverse elements into formal, 
substantive and functional definitions of the rule of law’. 
36 Dr P Marsden, ‘Checks and balances: EU competition law and the rule of law’, (February 2009) 
Competition Law International at 1. 
37 See also D.Kochenov, The EU Rule of Law: Cutting Paths Through Confusion’, (2009) Erasmus 
Law Review at 8, who argues that in addition to a formal or procedural approach to the rule of law, 
there is also a wider substantive approach to the rule of law.  This approach goes beyond looking 
at procedural matters but also considers that ‘the rule of law can only exist if the legal system in 
question embraces a particular public morality, the laws being valued for the content: namely a 
clear distinction is made between good and bad laws’. 
38 See further the Rt Hon Lord Bingham of Cornhill KG, House of Lords, Sixth Sir David 
Williams Lecture: the Rule of Law (2006) University of Cambridge, Centre for Public Law 
Available at <   
http://www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/past_activities/the_rt_hon_lord_bingham_the_rule_of_law.php> 
accessed 14.7.14 and  also K.Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press). 
39 R.Fallon, ‘The rule of Law as a concept in Constitutional Discourse’, (1997) Columbia law 
Review 1-56 at 1. 
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and proportionality applied to competences has been argued to be frequently light 
touch
40
 and in cases in some shared policy areas there has been no explicit 
subsidiarity review at all.  So, for example, the current author points out that to 
date the CJEU has paid little attention to subsidiarity and proportionality applied 
to competences and a respect for localism in citizenship cases concerning the 
rights of EU citizens who are economically inactive
41
 even though in such cases 
there are frequently sensitive immigration issues or entitlement to welfare issues 
on the borderline of EU competences.
42
  However, if the CJEU were to undertake 
a subsidiarity and proportionality review which involved a consideration of the 
limits and scope of EU competence in a particular shared competence area, even 
where there is no change in case outcomes an explicit explanation of how the 
CJEU had considered subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning would help to improve 
the quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy 
of the CJEU’s ruling.43 It would also demonstrate its adherence to the rule of 
law,
44
 the latter being enshrined in Article 2 TEU.
45
  Adhering to the rule of law is 
an important issue for the CJEU to demonstrate its respect for a core value 
commonly associated with democracy
46
 especially when considering cases which 
involve societal change where there are differing legal regimes and views such as, 
for example, in the context of cases concerning same sex marriage,
47
 cases 
involving the interpretation of the concept of a human embryo for the purposes of 
Directive 98/44
48
 or cases involving maternity leave protection.
49
 The rule of law 
                                                             
40 See chapter 3 for further discussion. 
41 See for example Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern, [1998] ECR I-2691 
42 See Chapter 4 and 5 for further discussion. 
43 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 at 
1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their decisions.’ 
 
44 For further discussion see B.Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
45 See also K.Lenaerts, ‘Upholding Union Values in Times of Societal change: the Role of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union’. 
<https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/deli/events/annual%20lecture%202014/Lenaerts_2014_Durham
.pdf >accessed 1.7.14. 
46 For further discussion see B.Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
47 See also K.Lenaerts, ‘Upholding Union Values in Times of Societal change: the Role of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union’. 
<https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/deli/events/annual%20lecture%202014/Lenaerts_2014_Durham
.pdf >accessed 1.7.14 at 9 citing Case C-267/06 Maruko [2008] ECR I-1757 and Case C-147/08 
Romer [2011] ECR I-3591. 
48 Ibid., at 11 citing  case C506/06 Mayr [2008] ECR I-1017. 
49 Ibid., at 7citing case C-104/09 Roca  Álvarez [2010] ECRI-8661. See also more generally a case 
note on Case C-104/09 Roca Álvarez 30 Sept 2010 [2010] 1-08661 by K.Shaw ‘The case of 
Álvarez and the boomerang effect of maternity leave’,  (2013) 19 (2)  Web Journal of Current 
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is a neutral arbiter; it avoids the judiciary having to make substantive moral 
choices themselves. It would also help to counter claims that the CJEU has an 
unjustified emphasis on an ever closer Union and ignores the Member States local 
law especially in cases involving sensitive immigration
50
 or entitlement to welfare 
issues.
51
  Where the EU has competence to act in an area of shared competence, 
Article 5 TEU provides that the EU must observe the principles of conferral, 
subsidiarity and proportionality.
52
  All three of these principles are therefore 
conceptually linked. Furthermore, all three principles succeed each other and as 
Kumm argues, all these principles have a central constitutional role in the 
protection of federalism values in the EU: they decide the balance of authority and 
power.
53
 Subsidiarity review undertaken by the CJEU involving the CJEU 
checking whether the Union has competence to act (conferral) and in cases 
concerning areas of shared competence would serve to legitimise the CJEU’s 
ruling in the eyes of the Member States by demonstrating its respect for Member 
State autonomy.  This is consistent with the EU’s overarching aim to have 
democratic, transparent and efficient institutions through the adherence to values 
commonly associated with democracy.  For, and as expressed in the Laeken 
Declaration 
 ‘The European Union derives its legitimacy from the democratic values it 
projects, the aims it pursues and the powers and instruments it possesses.  
However, the European project also derives its legitimacy from 
democratic, transparent and efficient institutions’.54  
Efficiency and democracy work together here: the EU should only act when it can 
add value, since lower-level decision-making is more democratic if there is no 
efficiency advantage at EU level. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Legal Issues; E.Caracciolo di Torella, ‘Brave New Fathers for a Brave New World? Fathers as 
Caregivers in an evolving EU’, 20(1) 2014 European Law Journal 88-106. 
50 C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de L’Emploi (ONEM), [2011] ECR I-1177. 
51 See for example Case 333/13, Elisabeta Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig. 
52 Subsidiarity is most important re shared competences because of the major impact of the latter – 
when exercised, shared competence eliminates Member State competence in the same area.  
53 M.Kumm,  (2006) ‘Constitutionalising subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: the Case of Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Union’ (12(4)  ELJ 503-533 at 531. 
54 Laeken Declaration <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-01-902_en.htm > accessed 
4.7.14.  
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With this in mind, this thesis adopts a doctrinal approach to consider how a 
subsidiarity and proportionality review applied to competences could be anchored 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union when determining the residency 
rights of EU citizens'.  It includes an examination of the use of subsidiarity and 
proportionality
55
 as key twin concepts in EU law for mediating the balance of 
power between the EU and the Member States in areas of shared competence
56
 in 
the context of residency rights of EU citizens.
57
 It also includes an argument that 
although subsidiarity is an essentially contested concept, applying Gallie’s criteria 
for determining essential contestation, that it is possible to anchor as a meaningful 
tool of legal reasoning in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU)
58
 when dealing with cases determining the residency rights of EU 
citizens by determining what could be agreed at European level.   On the other 
hand, where there is conceptual dissonance, this, it will be further argued, favours 
judicial discretion on how it should be applied.   This raises the question of how 
subsidiarity, as a contested concept could be anchored in EU law by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to help ensure not only the proper respect 
for local law-making in areas of shared competence but also determining what 
could be agreed upon at European level in terms of protecting the fundamental 
status of EU citizenship when dealing with cases involving the residency rights of 
EU citizens. To date, the CJEU has not elaborated on how it exercises this 
discretion. 
                                                             
55 Subsidiarity and proportionality currently find expression as legal rules in Article 5 TEU.  Under 
the principle of proportionality, which is discussed in further detail in chapter 2, the content and 
form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties. 
The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of proportionality as laid down in the 
Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality’. Article 5 (3) 
TEU, in conjunction with a Protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality (Protocol on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Consolidated Texts of the EU 
Treaties as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, pages 204 to 207 (Cm 7310), thus sets out a test that 
the EU institutions should carry out, specifically that if the Member States cannot exercise 
competence efficiently enough then the EU should take action.  The Protocol further requires the 
EU to provide justification for legislation in terms of subsidiarity, as a mechanism to guide the 
exercise of competence by the EU. 
56 Chapter 2 of this thesis focuses on exploring subsidiarity and proportionality as twin 
constitutional principles in EU law making in shared areas of competence. 
57 See further ‘The Stockholm Programme – an open and secure Europe serving and protecting 
citizens’, OJ 2010/C 115/01 where it is stated that ‘The right to free movement of citizens and 
their family members within the Union is one of the fundamental principles on which the Union is 
based and of European citizenship’. See also chapter 5 of this thesis for a discussion of how a 
subsidiarity review could address competence issues when the CJEU is considering competing 
fundamental principles of EU law such as an EU citizens’ right to residency. 
58 W.B.Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, (1956) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
167-98. 
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So the thesis seeks to identify limits to the competences of the EU
59
 through 
subsidiarity analysis, including how this should constrain the reasoning of the 
CJEU, but this has a consequence of better legitimising such genuinely European 
standards that do have a clear legal basis as an explicit explanation of how the 
CJEU had considered this would help to improve the quality of the reasoning of 
the CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s 
ruling.
60
Adopting a doctrinal perspective and agreeing with and building upon 
literature by De Búrca
 61
 and Kumm
62
, the primary objective of this thesis 
therefore is to put forward an original argument at the level of synthesis and 
application as to how this could be achieved.   Firstly by agreeing with and 
developing an argument in chapter 3 by Kumm of how the CJEU could 
operationalise subsidiarity by employing subsidiarity and proportionality applied 
to competences as a tool of judicial review.
63
  As Kumm argues a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review involves considering whether there should be a legitimate 
purpose for Union intervention explicitly stated and evidenced as required by 
Article 5(2) TEU.  The latter article requires that ‘the Union shall act only if and 
insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
Member States…but rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved at the Union Level.’64   
 
Furthermore, Kumm argues, with reference to the Tobacco Advertising and 
Working Time cases,
65
 that a subsidiarity and proportionality review involves 
considering whether that the Union internal market measure decided upon by the 
                                                             
59 For a recent discussion of how competences could be restored to the Member States see R. 
Zbíral, ‘Restoring Tasks from the EU to the Member States: A Bumpy Road To An Unclear 
Destination’, (2015) Common Market Law Review 51-84. 
60 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 at 
1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their decisions.’ 
 
61 G.De Búrca, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional Actor’, 
(1998) 36(2) Journal of Common Market Studies pp. 217-35. 
62 M.Kumm,  (2006) ‘Constitutionalising subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: the Case of Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Union’ (12(4)  ELJ 503-533. 
63 Kumm Op.Cit. 519 
64 Kumm Op.Cit. 519. 
65 Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising case); Case C-84/94 
UK v Council [1996] ECR 1-5755. 
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EU law-making institutions is the minimum necessary to deal with the problem 
identified.
66
   
Finally, Kumm argues that  a subsidiarity and proportionality review involves 
considering the extent of the effect of a Union measure on autonomy of the 
Member State and the practical effect on the legal systems of the Member States 
and that this should not be out of proportion to the result achieved by the Union 
measure. 
67
 This inevitably requires the CJEU to undertake a balancing test.  But 
as Kumm points out, citing the example of the Swedish Match case
68
, the CJEU 
has failed to undertake a balancing test.
69
  As he writes, ‘even though Article 5 (3) 
specifically mentions the principle of proportionality in the context of the 
conferral of powers and the commitment to subsidiarity, the Court of Justice did 
not engage proportionality as part of the jurisdictional enquiry…it did not connect 
that analysis to the legitimate purpose of federal intervention.’70 
Nevertheless, despite the importance Kumm places on undertaking such analysis, 
Kumm does not consider how the CJEU should undertake such a balancing 
exercise or whether different policy areas require different considerations.  Nor 
does he specify exactly what the criteria should be or what factors the CJEU 
should take into account when undertaking such a balancing exercise. This is a 
significant omission as ‘balancing represents a different kind of thinking.  The 
focus is directly on the interests or factors themselves.  Each interest seeks 
recognition of its own and poses a head to head comparison with competing 
interests’.71  This thesis therefore seeks to identify the sector specific criteria that 
the CJEU would need to weigh up when employing subsidiarity and 
proportionality as an aspect applied to competences when determining the 
residency rights of EU citizens.  Chapter 5 therefore adopts a normative approach 
and explores how a subsidiarity and proportionality review could be anchored in 
EU law to address competence issues when the CJEU is striking a balance 
between fundamental principles of EU law and residency rights of EU citizens. 
Even where there is no change in case outcomes an explicit explanation of how 
                                                             
66 Kumm Op.Cit. 521. 
67 Kumm Op.Cit at 522. 
68 Case C-210/03. Swedish Match AB and Swedish Match UK Ltd. v. Secretary of State for 
Health. 
69 Kumm Op.Cit 522. 
70 Kumm Op.Cit. at 523. 
71 T.Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’, [1987] 96 Yale Law Journal 943 at 
945. 
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the CJEU had considered subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning would help to 
improve the quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the 
legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling.72 
2. Competence, conferral and the principle of subsidiarity 
The question of determining exactly how power between the EU and the Member 
States is divided is an important and current issue for Member States in the 
European Union.
73
   For powers which have not been ceded to the EU remain with 
the Member States i.e. under the principle of conferral.  Powers given to the EU 
by the Treaty and which give the EU power to act in a particular policy field and 
the power enjoyed by the EU in that area are known as competence.
74
  EU 
competences can only arise through specific Treaty provision although as Craig 
points out, ‘the reality is that EU competence has resulted from the symbiotic 
interaction of four variables: Member State choice as to the scope of EU 
competence, as expressed in Treaty revisions; Member State, and since the Single 
European Act 1986, European Parliament acceptance of legislation that has 
fleshed out the Treaty articles; the jurisprudence of the Community courts; and the 
decisions taken by the institutions as to how to interpret, deploy, and prioritize the 
power accorded to the EU.’75  However, academic critique has pointed out how 
there has been a competence creep which has posed challenges to Member State 
competence in various shared competence policy areas.
76
  This is especially 
relating to the internal market Article 114 TFEU and as illustrated by the CJEU in 
Viking where it stated, ‘even if, in the areas which fall outside the scope of the 
Community’s competence, the Member State are still free, in principle, to lay 
down the conditions governing the existence and exercise of the rights in 
                                                             
72 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 at 
1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their decisions.’ 
 
73 See further the recent Foreign and Commonwealth Review of the Balances of Competences 
between the UK and the EU, Cm 8415, (2012) < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/35431/eu-balance-
of-competences-review.pdf >accessed 29.1.14. 
74 See further W.Hofeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial reasoning.  With 
an introduction by Nigel Simmonds, edited by D.Campbell and P.Thomas (Dartmouth, 2011) at 21 
and who defines legal competence or power as ‘a change in a given legal relation [which] may 
result from some superadded fact or group of facts not under the volitional control of a human 
being (or human beings); or from some superadded fact or group of facts which are under the 
volitional control of one or more human beings’. 
75 P.Craig, The Lisbon Treaty, Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, (Oxford, OUP, 2010) 156. 
76 See S.Prechal, ‘Competence Creep and general principles of law’, (2010) 31 Review of 
European Administrative law’, 5-11. 
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question, the fact remains that, when exercising competence, the Member States 
must nevertheless comply with Community law’.77 
On the other hand, the EU is bound by the principle of conferral which denotes a 
system where the EU institutions can exercise only competence attributed to it.
78
  
There are also different categories Union powers set out in the Article 2 TFEU 
and an extensive array of competences provided for in Articles 2-6 TFEU. 
Firstly, there is exclusive competence in Article 2(1) TFEU which gives the EU 
exclusive power to legislate.  This means that the EU alone is able to bring in 
legislation.  Article 3 TFEU defines the scope of the European Union's sphere of 
exclusive competences explicitly in areas such as competition rules and provisions 
relating to the customs union.  Such an explicit definition of the meaning of 
exclusive competence has brought about obvious advantages of clarity.  So for 
example the House of Lords 10
th
 Report records that ‘The Lisbon Treaty makes a 
welcome attempt to set out with greater clarity the demarcations of responsibility 
between Member States and the EU.’79  On the other hand, Craig is critical and 
points out how there ‘may also be difficult borderline problems between 
provisions relating to the customs union, and other aspects of the internal market, 
since the customs union falls within exclusive competence, while the internal 
market is shared competence’.80 
 
Article 2 (2) TFEU provides for the second type of competence i.e. shared 
competence. This provides that ‘the Member States shall exercise their 
competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence’.  As 
Barnard and Peers point out though, the ‘use of the term shared is obviously not 
appropriate, in that it implies that the Member States remain competent to act in 
respect of matters which are already governed by Union legislation, whereas this 
                                                             
77 See S.Prechal, ‘Competence Creep and general principles of law’, (2010) 31 Review of 
European Administrative law’, 5-11 at 5 citing Case C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR 1-10779. 
78 Article 2  TFEU. 
79 House of Lords Constitution Committee, 6th Report of Session 2007–08, European Union 
(Amendment) Bill and the Lisbon Treaty: Implications for the UK Constitution, Report with 
Evidence, Ordered to be printed 19 March 2008 and published 28 March 2008 at para 134. 
80 P.Craig, The Lisbon Treaty, Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, (Oxford, OUP, 2010) 161.  See 
also  chapter 18 of P.Craig and G. de Burca, EU law Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University 
Press, 5th ed, 2011) ch 18 for examples of cases. 
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is not the case.  While the term concurrent might have been more accurate, the 
choice of shared was almost certainly deliberate and politically motivated.’81   
 
On the other hand, Schütze outlines that following the Treaty of Lisbon, these 
shared competences ‘remain the ordinary competences of the European Union. 
Unless the Treaties expressly provide otherwise, an EU competence will be 
shared.’82   Furthermore, Barnard and Peers point out that Member States may 
‘exercise their competence to the extent the Union has not exercised its 
competence.  Once the Union has adopted rules on a particular matter, the 
Member State action is said to be pre-empted and they may no longer legislate.  
Given the nature of Union competences, however, pre-emption may only cover 
those elements of the Union action in question and not the whole area of the 
activity being regulated’.83 This is provided for in Article 2(2) TFEU states ‘When 
the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in a 
specific area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally 
binding acts in that area. The Member States shall exercise their competence to 
the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence. The Member States 
shall again exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has decided to 
cease exercising its competence’. Protocol No.25 on the Exercise of Shared 
Competence also states that ‘With reference to Article2 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union on shared competence, when the Union has 
taken action in a certain area, the scope of this exercise of competence only covers 
those elements governed by the Union act in question and therefore does not 
cover the whole area.’ 
There are many examples of shared competences
84
 especially in the social policy 
context and in particular relating to the approximation of internal market rules 
which include Article 115 TFEU (ex Article 94 TEC), Article 114 TFEU (ex 
                                                             
81 K.Bradley, ‘Legislating in the European Union’, in C.Barnard and S.Peers, EU law, (OUP, 
2014) at 108. 
82 P.Craig, The Lisbon Treaty, Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, (Oxford, OUP, 2010) at 5. 
83 P.Craig, The Lisbon Treaty, Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, (Oxford, OUP, 2010) at 108. 
84 Article 4 TFEU lists these as ‘the internal market, social policy for the aspects defined in this 
Treaty, economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and fiseries, excluding the 
conservation of marine biological resources, environment, consumer proection, transport, trans-
European networks, energy, area of freedom, security and justice, common safety concerns in 
public health maters for the aspects defined in this Treaty’. 
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Article 95 TEC) and Article 352 TFEU (ex Article 308 TEC).
85
 These Articles not 
only provided the generalised powers necessary for the attainment of the common 
market and the internal market, they have also been relied upon as competence for 
the enactment social policy legislation by the EU.  So, for example,  in 1974 
Directive 75/117 on equal pay 
86
 was adopted on the basis of Article 115 TFEU 
(ex Article 94 TEC) and Directive 79/7 on equal treatment in matters of social 
security
87
 was adopted on the basis of Article 352 TFEU (ex Article 308 TEC). 
Another example of shared competence is Article 147 TFEU (Article 127 TEC)) 
which provides that ‘the Union shall contribute to a high level of employment by 
encouraging co-operation between Member States and by supporting and, if 
necessary, complementing their action.  In doing so, the competence of the 
Member States shall be respected.’88 Social policy, which is relevant in this thesis 
because of its link with EU citizenship, is much more contestable as a competence 
than the internal market, but flexible use of Article 114 TFEU and Article 352 
TFEU potentially brings social policy matters within exclusive and shared 
competences.  
The third type of competence listed in paragraph 3 of Article 2 TFEU is co-
ordinating competence.  Paragraph 3 of Article 2 TFEU provides that ‘The 
Member States shall coordinate their economic and employment policies within 
arrangements as determined by this Treaty, which the Union shall have 
competence to provide.’ 
 
The final category of competence is set out in Article 2 (5) TFEU. This article  
provides that ‘in certain areas and under the conditions laid down in the Treaties, 
the Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or 
supplement the actions of the Member States, without thereby superseding their 
competence in these areas.  Legally binding acts of the Union adopted on the basis 
of the provisions in the Treaties relating to these areas shall not entail 
harmonization of Member States’ laws or regulations’.  Article 6 TEU specifies 
these areas as being industry, culture, tourism, education, vocational training, 
                                                             
85 Now following the Treaty of Lisbon articles 114, 115 and 352 TFEU. 
86 OJ [1979] L44/19 
87 OJ [1979] L6/24 
88 See further  S.Wetherill  ‘Competence Creep and Competence Control (2004) 23 Yearbook of 
European Law 1-55 for discussion on how institutions tend in practice to move beyond their 
explicit competence. 
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youth and sport, civil protection and administrative co-operation. This latter 
competence Schütze terms complementary competence.
89
 These latter 
competencies are categories where the EU has a much weaker competence.  
Furthermore the treaty does not use this term in Article 2 (5) TFEU, so it is a non-
legislative competence according to Schütze.
90
 Arguably, however, the CJEU 
could draw upon subsidiarity to recognise complementary competences in a 
particular part of a policy area especially where a policy area already includes 
shared competences.   
There also seems to be an overlap between the three categories to some extent but 
especially between shared and complementary competences where the EU is 
acting on the edge of shared competences such as when considering residency 
rights of EU citizens who are non-economically active, considered further in 
chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.  Furthermore, as Craig points out, the Lisbon 
Treaty has not clarified competences completely.  Here arguably subsidiarity, 
which is a key legal principle
91
 in EU law governing the exercise of EU law-
making in shared competence areas,
92
 pushes towards recognising shared and 
complementary competences when in doubt.  For subsidiarity encompasses the 
principle that the EU institutions demonstrate that not only is there a need for 
legislative action at supranational level but that there are distinct advantages of 
                                                             
89 S.Wetherill  ‘Competence Creep and Competence Control (2004) 23 Yearbook of European 
Law 1-55. 
90 R.Schütze, ‘Lisbon and the Federal Order of Competences: a Prospective Analysis’, (2008) 
European Law Review, 709-722.  
91 Although principles are frequently associated with publicised abstract ideas or values of import, 
defining legal principles and how these differ to legal rules in jurisprudential theory has been the 
subject of considerable academic debate.  For further discussion on the difference between legal 
rules and principles see R.Dworkin,'The Model of Rules I', in: idem, Taking Rights 
Seriously (Harvard University Press Cambridge 1987) 14 at 25-26. For discussion of the wider 
context of the competing jurisprudential debates regarding the relationship of law to morality that 
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necessarily connected see H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law, (1994, Oxford, Clarendon Press) at 
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that laws reproduce or satisfy demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so’, and at 
268 that ‘though there are many different contingent connections between law and morality there 
are no necessary conceptual connections between the content of law and morality’.  This latter 
approach has been termed a positivistic theory.  See further discussion in chapter 2. 
92 Article 5 TEU.  See also the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, Consolidated Texts of the EU Treaties as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, pages 
204 to 207 (Cm 7310) and House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee ‘Subsidiarity, 
National Parliaments and the Lisbon Treaty’ Thirty–third Report of Session 2007–08 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmeuleg/563/563.pdf> last 
accessed 12.7.12. for discussion of this Protocol. See also chapters 2 and 3 for further discussion 
of this principle with reference to relevant academic debate in EU law. 
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legislative action at supranational level over and above Member State legislative 
action or inaction at a national level. 
On the other hand, as the EU is not a state but rather an association of 28 Member 
States where the EU is competent to act in the first two categories it is  therefore 
in need of new governing principles which help to ensure the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU when exercising competence.  The first of these new 
principles, established at Maastricht, is the principle of conferral in article 5(2) 
TEU which provides that the ‘Union can only act within the limits conferred upon 
it by the Member States in the Treaties in order to attain the objectives set out 
therein.    
This is related to the importance of adherence to the rule of law as provided for in 
the Preamble, Article 2 of the TEU and Article 21 of the TEU and Article 263 of 
the TFEU. The rule of law is not defined in these provisions. Furthermore, more 
widely, although the rule of law has been argued to be an essentially contested 
concept,
93
 there are certain accepted tenets of the rule of law, as noted above 
where Fallon focuses on its procedural character.  Consistently with this, 
Waldron, for example, argues that the key tenet of the rule of law is that of formal 
legality.
94
 Tamanaha too has emphasised the importance of formal legality as well 
as pointing out, relatedly, that there is a link between democracy and the rule of 
law in that there is a requirement for judges to follow the law in order to give 
effect to the will of the law-making institutions.
95
 As Conway explains, ‘this 
notion of following the law entails predictability in the law.  Predictability entails 
relatively clear, shared criteria of interpretation.  On this conception, the law-
maker can be relatively certain how the judiciary will interpret the law and how 
the law will take practical effect.  Without predictability, the significance of the 
publication of laws and of the prohibition on retroactivity breaks down…’96 Thus, 
predictability is an important consequence of an adherence to the rule of law and 
consistent with a widely acknowledged key tenet of democracy namely 
                                                             
93 See G.Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice, (CUP, 2012) 
at 90 and W.B.Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, (1956) 56 Proceedings of the Aristolelian 
Society, 167-198. 
94 J.Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Forida)’, (2002) 21(2) Law 
and Philosophy, 137-164, 148-149. 
95 B.Tamanaha,  On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, (Cambridge University Press, 
2004) at 119. 
96 See G.Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice, (CUP, 2012) 
at 93. 
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representation by a parliamentary system.
97
 This context is with competence, 
because political representation is about the exercise of power over citizens. 
It is also important to emphasise how the rule of law is a widely recognised 
aspirational principle as evidenced in both the European Convention of Human 
Rights
98
 and the preamble to the Statute of the Council of Europe.
99
   All the 
Member States are signatories to these Treaties and thus bound by these 
Treaties.
100
  Furthermore, although the rule of law was not expressly referred to in 
the original Treaty of Rome, currently the Treaty of Lisbon includes various 
references to the rule of law and democracy.  These references are to be located 
right from the outset of the Treaty alongside democracy, thus evidencing its 
importance and its link with democracy.  For example, in the Preamble to the 
TEU which provides that ‘drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and 
humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values 
of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, 
equality and the rule of law’.   In the main body of the Treaty itself in Article 2 
that ‘the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights….’  There are 
also other references located in Article 21 of the TEU and Article 263 of the 
TFEU, the latter specifically relating to the CJEU providing that, 
 ‘the Court of Justice of the EU shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in 
actions brought by a Member State, the European Parliament, the Council 
or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an 
essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any 
rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers’.  
 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU also includes in its preamble that 
‘the Union is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law’. What 
rights of EU citizens are sacrosanct in light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
                                                             
97 G.Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice, (CUP, 2012) at 
92.  For a general discussion of the contested nature of democracy see D.Collier,  F.D. Hidalgo,  
and A.Maciuceanu  ‘Essentially contested concepts: Debates and applications’, (2006) 11 (3), 
Journal of Political Ideologies 211-246 at 222-224. 
98 European Treaty Series No 5. 
99 European Treaty Series No 1. 
100 See  Ilia and Appeal Court in Athens, [2015] England and Wales High Court (Admin) para 50 
where Lord Justice Aikens ruled that there ‘is a strong, albeit rebuttable presumption that EU 
Member States will abide by their Convention obligations’. 
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when dealing with cases involving the residency rights of EU citizens is therefore 
an important question.  This is particularly so in light of the impending accession 
of the EU to the ECHR and which Betten and Grief have argued ‘would be 
consistent with the development of a legal order which is no longer directed at 
economic operators but at citizens of the Union’.101  It also feeds into wider 
discussions about the judicial approach to fundamental rights post Lisbon
102
 and 
how respect for human rights fits into a subsidiarity analysis and whether the 
CJEU may apply a human rights review in a way that oversteps its normal 
competence.   
 
The second new principle established at Maastricht is the principle of 
subsidiarity.
103
 This is a key legal principle in EU law governing the exercise of 
EU law-making in shared competence areas.
104
 It can be connected with the rule 
of law and conferral, as well as democracy. Such a principle Schütze argues is a 
constitutional device which has been pivotal in the EU’s construction of a 
philosophy of co-federalism, the latter encompassing the idea that two 
governmental bodies work together in a shared legal sphere.
105
 It finds legal 
                                                             
101 L.Betten and N.Grief,   EU law and Human Rights, (European Law Series, Longman, 1998) at 
119 referring to a point made by the European Parliament in its observations to the CJEU in 
Opinion 2/94, Report for the Hearing. 
102 See S. Morano-Foadi and S.Andreadakis, ‘Reflections on the Architecture of the EU after the 
Treaty of Lisbon: The European Judicial Approach to Fundamental Rights’, (2011) pp 595-610 at 
595 and who argues that the post-Lisbon era is characterized by firstly the impact of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights following Article 6(1) of the TEU and secondly the future accession to the 
ECHR of the EU pursuant to Article 6(2) TEU. 
103 See literature by G.A. Berman, ‘Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European 
Community and the United States’, (1994) 94(2) Columbia Law Review 331 at 339 of how 
subsidiarity, as a mediating concept guiding competences in multi-level governance,  has also been 
utilised in a variety of different theoretical federal, political and economic contexts.  See also 
Chapter 2 of this thesis which focuses on exploring subsidiarity and proportionality as twin 
constitutional principles in EU law making in shared areas of competence. 
104 Article 5 TEU.  See also the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, Consolidated Texts of the EU Treaties as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, pages 
204 to 207 (Cm 7310) and House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee ‘Subsidiarity, 
National Parliaments and the 
Lisbon Treaty’ Thirty–third Report of Session 2007–08 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmeuleg/563/563.pdf> last 
accessed 12.7.12. for discussion of this Protocol. See also chapters 2 and 3 for further discussion 
of this principle with reference to relevant academic debate in EU law. 
105 See further R.Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of 
European Law, (2009, OUP) at 284 for a consideration of the federal philosophy that informs the 
EU’s legal structure and in particular an argument of how the EU legal system has evolved from 
dual federalism (which encompasses the philosophical idea of dual sovereignty where both 
governmental bodies are co-equals) to co-operative federalism (which encompasses the 
philosophical idea that two governmental bodies work together in a shared legal sphere). 
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expression
106
 in Article 5(3) TEU, the latter containing the principle that the EU 
institutions need to demonstrate that not only is there a need for legislative action 
at supranational level but that there are distinct advantages of legislative action at 
supranational level over and above Member State legislative action or inaction at 
a national level. Its placing in the Treaty in this way indicates its status as a 
general constitutional principle. 
On the other hand, although subsidiarity is a key constitutional principle of EU 
law, it was not originally included in the Treaty of Rome
107
.  However, increasing 
political cooperation beyond a common market gathering pace during the 1980’s 
challenged more directly the concept of political sovereignty of Member States.
108
  
This had been happening subtly through the case law of the CJEU, 
109
 but the 
issue became more explicit following the Single European Act
110
, where 
subsidiarity was included as a legal principle in respect of the environment.  
Article 130r (4) of the EEC Treaty (inserted by the SEA) read as follows:  
 
‘The Community shall take action relating to the environment to the extent 
to which the objectives referred to in paragraph 1(i) to preserve, protect 
and improve the quality of the environment; (ii) to contribute towards 
protecting human health; (iii) to ensure a prudent and rational utilization of 
natural resources can be attained better at Community level than at the 
level of the individual Member States. Without prejudice to certain 
measures of a Community nature, the Member States shall finance and 
implement the other measures’.  
 
 Thus, the thrust of this particular subsidiarity test was directed more towards 
ensuring that where the EU is best placed to act it should act. In 1991 Jacques 
                                                             
106 It is widely acknowledged that legal systems are composed of rules and principles and that in 
adjudication judges apply rules by subsumption and apply principles by balancing.  See in 
particular R.Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, translated by J.Rivers, (Oxford, 2002) 44. 
In respect of the latter means of adjudication,   Alexy argues at 50 in favour of balancing principles 
in adjudication on the grounds that principles are ‘optimising commands’ and therefore ‘are 
essentially determined by competing principles, implying that principles can and must be balanced 
against one another’. This is discussed further in chapter 2 of this thesis. 
107 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. [], 298 U.N.T.S. 
11, at [] [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. 
108 G.De Búrca and P.Craig, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, (5th ed., OUP, 2011) at chapter 1 
for a history and development of the common market. 
109 See for egs Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein 
[1979] ECR 649 at para 5. 
110 Single European Act, 1987 O.J. L 169/1,[hereinafter SEA] (amending Treaty Establishing the 
European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]). 
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Delors also proposed using subsidiarity, although he proposed using subsidiarity 
as a useful mediating concept for balancing, on the one hand, the EU’s quest for 
ever increasing European legal integration following the Treaty of Rome
111
 and, 
on the other, a respect for the cultural diversity of the individual legal systems of 
the 28 Member States.
112
   
 
However, it was not until the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 that subsidiarity was 
officially introduced into the Treaties as a formal legal and constitutional principle 
generally in EU law. Here, subsidiarity was to be used to guide the determination 
of the level at which legislative action should take place in policy areas where the 
EU and the Member States share competence by requiring the Union institutions 
to state clearly why there is a need for Union legislative action.
113
   
Most recently, it has been confirmed as a constitutional principle in Article 5(3) 
Treaty Establishing the European Union (TEU). This provision includes that,  
‘Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can 
rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level.’ 
Thus the latter article continues to emphasise that the EU law and policy 
making institutions should only act in areas of shared competence where the 
objectives of any proposed EU policy action cannot sufficiently be achieved 
by the Member States and that the EU law-making institutions should justify 
                                                             
111 For the purposes of this thesis, the definition of European legal integration offered is namely 
‘the gradual penetration of EU law into the domestic law of its Member States’, A.M.Burley and 
W.Mattli, ‘Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’, (1993) 47(1) 
International Organisation 41-76 at 43. See also  P.Craig and G. de Búrca, EU law Text, Cases and 
Materials, (5th. Ed., Oxford, OUP, 2011) at chapter 1 for a discussion of the evolution of European 
integration and the theories put forward to explain this evolution as a series of distinct phases.  For 
account of the rival theories of European legal integration and a discussion of their differing 
ontological scope i.e. how they differ in what they mean by integration see, for egs, A.Wiener and 
T.Diez, (eds) European Integration Theory, (2nd ed., OUP, 2012).  
112 See J.Delors et al, Subsidiarity: the Challenge of Change: (Maastricht, European Institute of 
Public Administration, 1991). The use of subsidiarity to guide EU law-making will be discussed 
further in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
113 Article 5 TEU. 
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what the benefits are from Union intervention as opposed to each individual 
Member State bringing in legislation or policy or alternatively failing to bring 
in legislation or perhaps, looser intergovernmental cooperation at the Council 
of Europe level where the ERTA
114
 doctrine does not rule this out.
115
  In 
addition, there is a criterion for applying subsidiarity set out in Article 5 of 
Protocol No 2 on the applications of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality annexed to the Treaties which requires the EU to provide 
justification for the use of subsidiarity as a mechanism to guide the exercise of 
competence by the EU.
116
 It further requires the Commission
117
 to send with 
all draft legislative acts an explanation of how the proposal complies with 
subsidiarity not just to the Union institutions for scrutiny but also to the 
national Parliaments.
118
  This will be considered further in chapter 2. 
A further important and related innovation is that the Lisbon Treaty strengthens 
the idea of protecting local identities. For the Lisbon Treaty has enhanced the old 
Article 6(3) TEC by including a revised Article 4(2) TEU which requires the 
Union to respect not only the national identity of Member States but also the 
political, constitutional and legal regimes of those Member States.  The placing of 
this provision between the principle of conferral and the principle of sincere co-
operation at the outset of the TEU emphasises the central importance of such a 
principle in EU law in trying to balance the supranational concern with integration 
with the continuing competences and sovereignty of the Member States.  It points 
against a one-sided automatic preference for integration and further indicates the 
                                                             
114 Case 22/50 Commission v Council (Re European Road Transport Agreement) (ERTA) 1971 
ECR 263. 
115 R. Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law, 
(2009, OUP) 
 316-317. 
116 See also the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
Consolidated Texts of the EU Treaties as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, pages 204 to 207 (Cm 
7310) and House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee ‘Subsidiarity, National Parliaments 
and the Lisbon Treaty’ Thirty–third Report of Session 2007–08 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmeuleg/563/563.pdf> last 
accessed 12.7.12. for discussion of this Protocol.. 
117 For further discussion of assessing the impact of Commission proposals see EC Impact 
Assessment Guidelines (2009) <http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/commission_guidelines/docs/iag_2009_en.pdf > last accessed 01.08.15. 
118 Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Consolidated 
Texts of the EU Treaties as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, pages 204 to 207 (Cm 7310)  article 
5(3).    
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importance of justifying the usefulness of the exercise of EU competence. 
Utilising subsidiarity is an important practical way to apply Article 4(2) TEU. 
The existence of the national identity clause
119
 and its respect for Member States 
legal regimes and the Preamble and Article 1 of the revised TEU also further 
emphasise that decisions regarding EU law-making are taken as closely as 
possible to the citizens of Europe.  One of the arguments of the thesis is that there 
is considerable potential for the CJEU to make greater use of these provisions to 
inform and support its reasoning when determining the residence rights of EU 
citizens.  This is particularly so when undertaking a subsidiarity review where 
proportionality is treated as an aspect of subsidiarity applied to competences.
120
 
This will be considered further in chapter 2 of this thesis.  This is especially 
relevant in light of criticism of the CJEU as an activist court
121
 and, more 
generally, the importance of the CJEU sufficiently justifying to its audience that 
in their decisions they are applying valid law given the enactment of the principles 
at Treaty level.
 122
 Relatedly, it is also important bearing in mind on the one hand 
the wider and related concerns on the part of the Member States of loss of 
competence and, on the other, the need of all law-making EU institutions (the 
Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, and the European Commission) to 
claim democratic legitimacy
123
 when legislating in areas of shared competence. 
Subsidiarity, and the related idea of proportionality, are therefore central to the 
character of the EU as a legal and political entity mediating the continued 
                                                             
119 See further K. Nicolaidis, ‘We the Peoples of Europe’, (2004) 83 Foreign Affairs 97-110 at 102 
and who writes, ‘today’s constitution does not call for a homogenous community or for laws 
grounded on the will of a single European demos.  Rather it makes mutual respect for national 
identities one of its foremost principles’. 
120 M.Kumm,  (2006) ‘Constitutionalising subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: the Case of Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Union’ (12(4)  ELJ 503-533 at 531. 
121 See for example P.Neill,  The European Court of Justice: A Case Study in Judicial Activism,  
(London: European Policy Forum, 1995) at 2; T.Hartley, ‘The European Court, Judicial 
Objectivity and the Constitution of the European Union’, (1996) 11 (2) Law Quarterly Review 
411-423; R.Herzog and L.Gerken: ‘Stop the European Court of Justice’, EU Observer.com, (2008) 
<http://euobserver.com/9/26714 >last accessed 20.6.12. 
122 J.Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice,  (OUP, 1993) 114.  For a 
more general discussion on the importance of courts justifying their decisions through their 
judicial reasoning see R.Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory of Rational 
Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification (trans by R.Adler and N.MacCormack), (Clarendon 
Press, 1989) 221; N. MacCormick ‘Argumentation and Interpretation in Law’, (1993) 6(1) Ratio 
Juris 16-29. 
123 For further discussion see for example J. Bohman, ‘Institutional reform and democratic 
legitimacy: deliberative democracy and transnational constitutionalism’, Revue européenne des 
sciences sociales [En ligne], XLV-136 | 2007, < http://ress.revues.org/90 ; DOI : 10.4000/ress.90> 
accessed 3.12.13. 
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existence of distinct Member States with a sometimes competing supranational 
authority. 
Thirdly is the principle of proportionality, considered further in chapter 2. This 
concerns the intensity of any EU legislative action. In EU law, proportionality is 
defined in Article 5 TEU. It requires that when the EU is bringing in legislation in 
areas of shared competence that ‘the content and form of Union action shall not 
exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties’.  The criteria 
for applying proportionality are set out in Article 5 of Protocol No 2 on the 
applications of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the 
Treaties. 
  ‘The reasons for concluding that a Union objective can be better achieved 
at Union level shall be substantiated by qualitative and, wherever possible, 
quantitative indicators.  Draft legislative acts shall take account of the need 
for any burden, whether financial or administrative, falling upon the Union, 
national governments, regional or local authorities, economic operators and 
citizens, to be minimised and commensurate with the objective to be 
achieved’.  
Thus all three principles – conferral, subsidiarity, proportionality - succeed each 
other: conferral is about whether the EU can exercise power, subsidiarity is about 
whether it should be exercised and proportionality is about how much it should be 
exercised. Furthermore, as Kumm argues, all these principles have a central 
constitutional role in the protection of federalism values in the EU.
124
 This will be 
considered further in chapter 2. In particular, it will be pointed out that the use of 
proportionality by the CJEU also needs to be accompanied by a clear, consistent 
and principled approach to its content and structure in order to provide a clear 
doctrinal test that the CJEU can utilise in its case law. This relates to the rule of 
law, principles of certainty and predictability.
125
 For as Rasmussen argues, where 
there is judicial activism displayed by the CJEU, this ‘may severely hamper and 
strain the Community/State relationship of co-operative enforcement of the 
Community’s laws and judgements.  Even though widespread opposition to a 
                                                             
124 M.Kumm,  (2006) ‘Constitutionalising subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: the Case of Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Union’ (12(4)  ELJ 503-533 at 531. 
125 B.Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) 
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deep and wide ranging judicial involvement in the conduct of the political affairs 
of government might never see the light of day, it may cause a sneaking erosion of 
judicial authority and legitimacy’.126  Such an erosion, he argues, inevitably leads 
to a ‘predictable loss of judicial authority and legitimacy’127 and ‘is dangerous to a 
cohesive and effective promotion of the vision of the Founding Fathers, since this 
has been dependent on the cumulative efforts of all branches of Community 
government.’128  
 
3. Scope of thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is not to consider literature on the philosophical 
foundations of the EU
129
 and, in particular, the question of how autonomous 
should the EU be from that of the Member States.
130
 Nor is the purpose of this 
thesis to consider jurisprudential literature which seeks to theorise the differing 
constitutional conceptions of the EU
131
 or to consider the extent to which concepts 
such as democracy
132
 and justice
133
 should be applicable to the EU law-making 
institutions within this new EU legal order.
134
 This thesis takes as its base the 
                                                             
126 Rasmussen, On Law and Policy (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1986) at 8. 
127 Ibid at 9. 
128 Ibid at 8. 
129 For a recent discussion of see for example J.Dickson and P.Eleftheriadis, The Philosophical 
Foundations of the EU, (OUP, 2012).  See also A.Williams, The Ethos of Europe, Values, Law 
and justice in the EU, (CUP, 2010) for a discussion in chapter 1 of how there has been 
philosophical uncertainty about the ‘soul of Europe’ since its beginning and at 5 the ‘need for an 
identity of and for the Union’. 
130 See also  R. Barents, The Autonomy of Community law, (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 
2004); N.Walker, ‘The idea of Constitutional Pluralism, (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317-59; 
J.Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: Do the new clothes have an Emperor and other essays on 
European Integration, (Cambridge University press, 1999) 238-263. 
131 See for example J.Weiler,The transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403; 
P.Craig, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union, (2001) 7(2) 125-150; and 
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critical summary of the existing academic debates into a new line of academic enquiry into the 
conceptual nature of the EU’s constitutional authority. 
132 For further discussion see for example L.Siedentop, Democracy in Europe, (London: Penguin 
2000) and A.Williams, The Ethos of Europe, Values, Law and justice in the EU, (CUP, 2010) pp 
165-196.  
133 A.Williams, The Ethos of Europe, Values, Law and justice in the EU, (CUP, 2010) and who 
writes at 549-77 at 552, ‘a satisfactory theory of justice needs to be constructed and adopted 
constitutionally if EU law is to be perceived as the guardian of an ideal constitution which possess 
a coherent ethical vision for the EU’.  See also more generally J.Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971) and his arguments relating to the idea of a 
natural duty of justice being essential to support political institutions at 3 and 7 where he writes 
that ‘justice is the first virtue of social institutions’ and ‘For us the primary subject of justice is the 
basic structure of society or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation’. 
134 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
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existence of the EU and of shared competences as expressed in the Treaties and 
that democracy and the rule of law are accepted values. 
It is also beyond the scope of this thesis to consider in depth the wealth of 
literature on the theoretical debates on the European integration process and the 
role of the CJEU in that process.
135
  Instead the intention of this thesis rests on an 
assumption.  If the EU and the Member States have adopted subsidiarity in the 
Treaties as a guide to EU law-making in shared policy areas, then the EU 
institutions should pay attention to subsidiarity when law-making.   
More generally, the question of the role of subsidiarity as a restraint on the Union 
legislature in shared policy areas has been the subject of various academic 
discussion and will be discussed further in chapter 2 of this thesis.
136
  In addition, 
as a key institution involved with law-making is that of the CJEU, it has also been 
argued that the CJEU as an EU institution ‘should seek a way of addressing the 
complex concerns which underpin the subsidiarity principle when it chooses a 
particular policy direction in interpreting an open-ended Treaty provision’.137 
With this latter argument in mind this thesis includes a critical review both 
descriptive and normative of the extent of the judicial use of subsidiarity when 
reviewing EU institutional action. The argument in the thesis, therefore, applies 
across the institutional activity of the EU in the exercise of shared competence 
                                                             
135 For a general discussion of both the theoretical and the legal dimension of European legal 
integration, see K.A.Armstrong, ‘Legal Integration: Theorizing the Legal Dimension of European 
Integration’, (1998) 36(2) Journal of Common Market Studies,  155-174.  For account of the key 
theories of European legal integration and a discussion of their ontological scope i.e. what they 
mean by integration see A.Wiener and T.Diez, (eds) European Integration Theory, (2nd ed., OUP, 
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the EU, Swabian Housewives, Rawls and Ryanair’ EU1 working Paper LAW 2013/11, 2013 
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the American Federal Experience: Vol 1: Methods, Tools and Institutions (Berlin/New York: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1985) 86. 
136 G.Davies, ‘Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time’, (2006), 
43(1) Common Market Law Review, pp 63-84; M. Kumm, ‘Constitutionalising Subsidiarity in 
Integrated Markets: the Case of Tobacco Regulation in the European Union’, (2006), 12(4) 
European Law Review, 503-33; R.Schütze, ‘Subsidiarity after Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards 
of Federalism?’, (2009), 68(3) Cambridge Law Journal pp. 525-36. 
137 G.De Búrca, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional Actor’, 
(1998) 36(2) Journal of Common Market Studies pp. 217-35 at 217. 
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and especially concerning the Court of Justice, which ultimately reviews the 
application of subsidiarity. 
On the other hand, the CJEU has frequently not paid attention to subsidiarity and 
respect for localism in its interpretation of shared policy areas.  This thesis 
therefore divides selected case law in this context into two distinct categories.  
Firstly cases where the CJEU engages in judicial review of the actions of the 
political institutions when law-making in chapter 3. Secondly, other cases in 
chapter 5 which involve the CJEU interpreting EU law in shared policy areas 
where there are other competing EU principles at issue. Here it will be argued that 
there is a compelling argument for judicial reasoning to engage more fully with 
how the CJEU should deal with such dissonance and operationalise subsidiarity to 
help ensure the proper respect for the division of power between the EU and the 
Member States in areas of shared competence. As this thesis will argue, there 
often significant cultural diversity in law making regimes throughout the 28 
Member States and therefore, arguably, a strong case for deploying a mediating 
concept such as subsidiarity to guide the CJEU when determining the residency 
rights of EU citizens. 
The thesis argues that subsidiarity could be anchored in EU law by the CJEU to 
help ensure the proper respect for local law-making in cases when determining the 
residence rights of EU citizens and determine what can be agreed upon at 
European level. This is an important issue as even if in the past the CJEU has 
tended to approach interpretation from a pro-union perspective, the adoption of a 
subsidiarity and proportionality review would help to to improve the quality of the 
reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s 
ruling.
138
Such a question is especially important following the Treaty of Lisbon as 
there is now a greater clarity concerning the division of competence. The relevant 
provision which evidences this renewed interest is Article 5 TEU (ex Article 5 
TEC) with Article 5 (3) TEU providing that subsidiarity is only relevant where the 
EU shares competence with the Member States in respect of law-making.  Article 
5 (3) TEU, in conjunction with the Protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality,
139
 
                                                             
138 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
 
139 See also the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
Consolidated Texts of the EU Treaties as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, pages 204 to 207 (Cm 
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then sets out a test that the EU institutions should follow, that that if the Member 
States cannot exercise competence efficiently enough then the EU should take 
action.   
 
Furthermore, and for the first time and as part of the response to calls from the 
national Parliaments for more democratic legitimacy,
140
 the Protocol also requires 
the EU to provide justification for the use of subsidiarity as a mechanism to guide 
the exercise of competence by the EU.
141
 It requires the Commission to send with 
all draft legislative acts an explanation of how the proposal complies with 
subsidiarity not just to the Union institutions for scrutiny but also to the national 
Parliaments.
142
 So, for example in Article 2 of the Protocol the Commission is 
required to undertake a consultation prior to proposing any legislation and in 
Article 5 to provide detailed written evidence as to how they have complied with 
the subsidiarity test including ‘some assessment of the proposal's financial impact 
and, in the case of a Directive, of its implications for the rules to be put in place 
by Member States, including, where necessary, the regional legislation’ as well as 
‘the reasons for concluding that a Union objective can be better achieved at Union 
level shall be substantiated by qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative 
indicators.’ The subsidiarity monitoring undertaken by national Parliaments is 
promoted as ‘help[ing] the EU reconnect with the citizen and to improve the 
democratic legitimacy of EU legislation’143 even though as Cygan has pointed out 
‘the representative function of national Parliaments is towards its own government 
                                                                                                                                                                       
7310) and House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee ‘Subsidiarity, National Parliaments 
and the Lisbon Treaty’ Thirty–third Report of Session 2007–08 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmeuleg/563/563.pdf> last 
accessed 12.7.12. for discussion of this Protocol. 
140 J.Mayoral, ‘Democratic improvements in the EU under the Lisbon Treaty, (2011) 
<http://www.eui.eu/Projects/EUDO-Institutions/Documents/EUDOreport922011.pdf >accessed 
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141 See also the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
Consolidated Texts of the EU Treaties as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, pages 204 to 207 (Cm 
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Texts of the EU Treaties as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, pages 204 to 207 (Cm 7310)  article 
5(3) at article 5(3). 
143A.Cygan, ‘National Parliaments within the EU polity – no longer losers but hardly victorious’, 
(2012) ERA Forum 517-533 at 525. 
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and not the Council.  National Parliaments do not exist to legitimise EU 
legislation and the procedural requirements of subsidiarity monitoring do not alter 
this’.144 Furthermore, both the EU institutions and the national Parliaments are 
also able to submit a reasoned opinion if they have concerns that the proposal 
does not comply with subsidiarity.
145
 Such reasoned opinions, Dougan argues, 
provide ‘the potential for the CJEU to scrutinize the EU’s legislative process for 
compatibility of EU legislation with subsidiarity’.  Such an innovation creates a 
new and potentially dynamic role for national Parliaments in the subsidiarity 
assessment in that national Parliaments will now be able to challenge proposed 
EU action in shared competence areas on the grounds of breach of subsidiarity.  
As Dougan explains, ‘with such a wealth of material, argumentation over 
subsidiarity could metamorphose from the politically subjective into the readily 
justiciable.’ 146 
Furthermore, there is also a renewed emphasis on the use of subsidiarity with its 
inherent respect for local law-making to guide the EU law-making institutions 
when legislating in areas of shared competence
147
 in conjunction with the national 
identity clause.  Alongside the principle of proportionality, it is a corollary of the 
principle of conferral.
148
 This latter principle is set out in Article 5 (2) TEU and 
provides that the EU can only exercise competence attributed to it.  Such a 
principle Craig argues ‘captured not only the idea that the EU should act within 
the limits of the powers attributed to it, but also carried the more positive 
connotation that the EU should be accorded the powers necessary to fulfil the 
tasks assigned to it by the enabling Treaties’.149 
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145  Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Consolidated 
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146 M.Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning minds, not hearts’, (2008) Common Market 
Law Review 45 617-701 at 661.  See more generally R. Schütze, ‘Lisbon and the Federal Order of 
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147 This issue was the subject of a conference presentation by the author of this thesis entitled, 
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the Society of Legal Scholars Conference 26-28 March 2013 at York Law School, York 
University. 
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149 P.Craig, The Lisbon Treaty, Law, Politics and Treaty Reform, (OUP, 2010) 156-159 158. 
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With this in mind, this thesis adopts a doctrinal perspective and agrees with and 
develops firstly the argument by De Búrca that as the CJEU is a law-making 
institution it should employ subsidiarity to guide its reasoning when interpreting 
areas of shared competence.  This means accepting a meta-teleological view of the 
CJEU’s interpretative role in areas of shared competence.150  For as Maduro 
explains,  
‘teleological interpretation in EU law does not, [therefore] refer exclusively 
to a purpose driven interpretation of the relevant legal rules.  It refers to a 
particular systemic understanding of the EU legal order that permeates the 
interpretation of all its rules.  In other words, the Court was not simply been 
concerned with ascertaining the aim of a particular legal provision.  It also 
interpreted that rule in the light of the broader context provided by the EC 
(now EU) legal order and its constitutional telos.  There is a clear association 
between the systemic (context) and teleological elements of interpretation in 
the Court are reasoning.  It is not simply the telos of the rules to be 
interpreted that matters but also the telos of the legal context in which those 
rules exist.  We can talk therefore of both a teleological and a meta-
teleological reasoning in the Court’.151 
In respect of the frequent use by the CJEU of a teleological approach, a few 
commentators have argued that ‘teleological interpretation can also be seen as 
more faithful to the democratic outcomes since it prevents textual manipulation of 
the legal rules. ’152 However, this is a debateable point of view and against the 
weight of analysis in the literature where a more general charge is that teleological 
interpretation is more open to manipulation because of the issue of varying levels 
of generality.
153
  
The frequent use by the CJEU of a teleological approach has led a few 
commentators to argue that ‘teleological interpretation can also be seen as more 
faithful to the democratic outcomes since it prevents textual manipulation of the 
                                                             
150 The interpretative approach of the CJEU will be discussed further in chapter 3 section 2.2. 
151 M.Maduro ‘Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional 
Pluralism’ 1 (2) European Journal of Legal Studies <http://www.ejls.eu/2/25UK.pdf>   last 
accessed 3.1.15 at 5. 
152 Ibid at 10. 
153
 See for example Lasser, M., Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Transparency 
and Legitimacy (OUP, 2004) at 288.   
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legal rules. ’154 However this is a debatable point of view and against the weight 
of analysis in the literature where a more general charge is that teleological 
interpretation is more open to manipulation because of the issue of varying levels 
of generality.
155
 So rather than the CJEU just looking at the spirit and purpose of 
the Treaty rules the CJEU goes further and also considers the Treaty rule in light 
of the broader context of the EU legal order – a meta-teleological approach.  A 
classic example of the latter approach is evidenced in CILFIT 
156
 where the CJEU 
stated that ‘every provision of Community law must be placed in its context and 
interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole, regard 
being had to the objective’s thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on 
which the provision in question is to be applied’.157  
In respect of academic criticism of the meta-teleological approach,
158
   one of the 
most stringent critics is by Conway.  In particular, he has pointed out how the 
CJEU rarely explains its interpretative method preferring instead a broad 
purposive approach and an emphasis in its reasoning on the importance of the 
effectiveness of EU law.
159
 Furthermore, he explains the CJEU does not follow 
the Vienna Convention to the extent that it does not prioritise textual 
interpretation over teleological interpretation. This he points out is ‘incompatible 
with a universal conception of legal reasoning’.160 
The consistent failure by the CJEU to make explicit its reasoning and 
interpretative assumptions he concludes makes inconsistency between cases less 
                                                             
154 M.Maduro ‘Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional 
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obvious and ‘focuses attention on outcomes rather than processes’.161  This does 
mean that the CJEU is able to promote a pro-Union stance without explicitly 
stating as such.  However, the use of a meta-teleological approach by the CJEU 
runs the risk of claims of judicial activism and a lack of impartiality and 
objectivity which challenges the legitimacy of the CJEU in the eyes of the 
Member States.
162
   
This is of particular concern in rulings which have significant impact on national 
rules such as in the case of Zambrano
163, where as Lansbergen explains ‘the 
potential impact upon national immigration policy is notable and any unilateral 
redefinition of the bounds of Union law in such high political sensitivity calls into 
question the legitimacy of the Court’s action’.164 The quality of the CJEU’s 
reasoning in Zambrano has also been questioned by De Witte and who writes, ‘the 
quality of the court’s reasoning has become in the eyes of many observers, more 
uneven and unpredictable.  It also feels free to ignore argument which an 
intervening State or commission has submitted to it.  A recent example of this is 
Ruiz Zambrano judgement in which the Court of Justice mentioned that all 8 
intervening States, as well as the Commission, proposed an interpretation, but 
then went on to adopt another interpretation, without discussion the arguments of 
the States and the Commission’.165 
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162 See also  G.Beck, G., The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU, (Hart Publishing 
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163 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de L’Emploi (ONEM), [2011] ECR I-1177. 
164 A. Lansbergen, Recent CJEU decisions: A case-study in judicial activism’, (2012) European 
Policy Brief <www.fedtrust.co.uk> accessed 6.7.14. 
165 B de Wite, E Muir and M.Dawson, (eds) Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice, 
(2013, Edward Elgar Publishing) at 2 citing  C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office National 
de L’Emploi (ONEM), [2011] ECR I-1177 at paras 37 and 39-45.  This case is further discussed in 
chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
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Secondly, what rights of EU citizens are sacrosanct in light of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights when dealing with cases involving the residency rights of EU 
citizens.  
As in the current author’s view that each shared policy area requires different 
criteria to be taken into account when undertaking any review in order to take 
account of the different policy contexts, there is a consideration of the specific 
criteria that should be identified by the CJEU when considering the right of 
residence cases for non-economically active citizens where there is no cross 
border element with reference to three particular cases of Zambrano
166
, Dereci
167
 
and MacCarthy
168
.   For if the CJEU adopted such an approach, this will enable 
the CJEU to anchor subsidiarity and proportionality and help ensure the proper 
respect for the division of power between the EU and the Member States. In 
particular, the CJEU needs to identify the limits to the EU’s competences through 
subsidiarity analysis.  In the context of EU citizenship cases,  the CJEU has done 
this in its case law on on substance of rights (Zambrano) and the relaxation of the 
requirement of a cross border element. However, this is problematic as the 
relaxation of a cross border element, especially when identifying the limits to its 
competences through subsidiarity analysis, has the potential to affect the quality 
of its reasoning and undermine any recommendation to anchor a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review.  Furthermore, any pro-union interpretative tendency by the 
CJEU when considering the legitimate objectives of the Member States against 
the general interest of the internal market  also has the potential to affect the 
quality of its reasoning and undermine any recommendation to anchor a 
subsidiarity and proportionality review. This runs counter to the recent affirmation 
by the Treaty of Lisbon of subsidiarity and a respect for localism'.  
The CJEU also needs to explain why it is important to protect the symbolic status 
of EU citizenship.
 169
  For example, it could have explained that EU citizenship 
plays an important role in helping to foster a perception of shared European 
identity, the latter being identified as a ‘pre-requisite for a functioning democratic 
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European Policy’.170  This would include highlighting the symbolic status of EU 
citizenship and how it has close ties to equality of treatment for all EU citizens in 
respect of core civil, political and social rights.
171
   
On the other hand, it would also need to justify why in any particular matter, EU 
citizenship should be allowed to take priority over national citizenship.  This 
would include elaborating in its reasoning as to what the substance of the EU 
citizenship rights were in this case.  It would then need to justify in its ruling that 
in this case that the substance of the right was so compromised so as not to need 
to consider any cross-border element.  In other words, the CJEU needs to identify 
a threshold of seriousness in respect of breach of the substance of an EU 
citizenship right.   
Furthermore, it is proposed that the CJEU should then include in its reasoning the 
factors in any particular case that it had used to inform its judgement and to justify 
it concluding that the substance of an EU citizens rights was so compromised 
there was no need to consider any cross-border element.  
Finally, and more generally, it is proposed that the CJEU in the future in 
citizenship cases concerning residency rights needs to do as a minimum is to 
outline the core substance of rights that is to be protected regardless of the degree 
of EU competence. For the CJEU to decide on a minimum floor of rights, though, 
is difficult.  However, the rights contained in the European Convention of Human 
Rights
172
  could be a basis for the CJEU to rely upon.  For the rights in the 
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European Convention provide a set of minimum standards
173
 in a Convention that 
all the Member States of the EU have signed up to.  In addition, the EU too is 
currently in the process of acceding to the European Convention of Human 
Rights.
174
  Thus, it is submitted that CJEU as a minimum should outline the core 
substance of rights
175
 that are to be protected in EU citizenship cases regardless of 
the degree of EU competence drawing upon the rights contained in the European 
Convention of Human Rights, even though recently CJEU’s opinion 2/13176 
regarding the EU’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights has 
emphasised the need to preserve the autonomy of EU law when considering 
human rights protection.
177
   
 
4. Sources and Methods 
 
It is widely acknowledged that traditionally the lawyer has been reluctant to 
articulate the process by which he or she has adopted when analysing law and 
                                                             
173 For a more general  discussion of the European Convention on Human Rights and the approach 
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g=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=40247> accessed 8.1.15. 
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preserve the autonomy of EU law. For further discussion see S.Peers, ‘The CJEU and the EU’s 
accession to the ECHR: a clear and present danger to human rights protection’,  
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15.1.15. In particular, he argues that such amendments pose a ‘clear and present danger to human 
rights protection’ and that ‘quite frankly, EU accession to the Convention in the terms defined 
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legal reasoning.
178
  However, there is currently an increasing interest in 
articulating more fully the doctrinal legal research process by which lawyers 
analyse the law and legal reasoning. Hutchinson, for example, has described the 
doctrinal method of legal research involving two distinct stages.
179
  Firstly the 
researcher needs to identify, locate, read and consider the type of law at issue e.g. 
whether it is statutory or case law and thereby ‘determine an objective reality, that 
is, a statement of the law encapsulated in legislation or an entrenched common 
law principle’.180 Such a determination is an essential part of doctrinal legal 
method even where though, as Hutchinson points out, there can be contestation as 
to what a legal norm entails.
181
 
Secondly, the researcher needs to analyse the relevant law for ‘doctrinal research 
focuses on legal principle generated by the courts and the legislature’.182 It is to 
some extent an internal perspective, rather than a socio-legal approach of looking 
empirically at the societal impact of the law. Such analysis of the law should 
involve a consideration of any relevant academic critique or academic discussion 
of contestation as to what a legal norm entails. It should also involve 
contextualising the relevant law within the wider legal and theoretical framework. 
So, for example, in the context of EU law examination of a particular Directive 
would require the researcher to consider the particular Treaty article that the 
Directive was adopted under.  Furthermore the researcher might also consider the 
broader theoretical framework of European integration that a particular EU law is 
situated within.   
However, ‘doctrinal research focuses on legal principle generated by the courts 
and the legislature’183 even though, as Hutchinson points out, lawyers frequently 
do not articulate how they analyse the cases and judicial reasoning, ‘those 
studying the methodologies of lawyers point to a number of techniques used 
within the synthesizing process once the documents are located and read.’184  
Firstly he explains how a researcher undertaking complex analysis and synthesis 
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of cases and considering judicial reasoning should outline whether the doctrinal 
approach they are adopting is ‘conceptual, evaluative or explanatory’ and whether 
the researcher has utilised analysis which involves ‘the use of deductive logic, 
inductive reasoning and analogy’.185  For example, he argues when analysing 
legal reasoning the approach adopted by a researcher is frequently deductive in 
that the law is fixed in the form of statute
186
 or in the case of EU law a Treaty.  On 
the other hand, where cases are examined, the legal researcher is involved in 
inductive reasoning which ‘uses a process of arguing from specific cases to a 
more general rule’ or analogy which ‘involves locating similar situations 
arising’.187 
With the above two stage process to doctrinal method, initially deductive and then 
using both deductive and inductive reasoning and the differing methods of 
analysing judicial reasoning in mind, the research in this thesis draws on a wide 
range of source material that has been located by the researcher to answer the 
fundamental research questions outlined in this chapter. This includes a variety of 
primary and secondary sources.  The first type of primary source materials 
examined are the conventional legal Treaties and secondary EU legislation. Thus 
the research in this thesis uses standard doctrinal sources, but also relies to some 
extent on Treaty-based constitutional principle rather than just internal logic or 
reasoning the case law of the CJEU. 
As this thesis includes research which is qualitative in nature
188
 and involved in 
exploring and critiquing various cases in a variety of policy contexts this also 
involves an analysis and synthesis of a selection of the case law of the CJEU. The 
cases chosen for analysis are cases concerning shared policy areas and are used as 
primary sources in this research as they have been selected and considered by the 
researcher as established precedents as it is widely accepted that the CJEU uses 
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precedent as a way of developing its own authority.
189
  Cases are an important 
source in various parts of the thesis because of its focus on the CJEU as a law-
making institution and because generally speaking the CJEU has the final say on 
the interpretation of EU law, apart from suggestions of ‘rebellion’ by some 
constitutional courts. In contrast, texts written by others and referred to and 
analysed by the researcher in support of this research are referred to as secondary 
sources and will form another.  Whilst space precludes a full exploration of the 
merits and the drawbacks of each source material used in this thesis, it is 
important to explain how such cases have been selected either for examination or 
to illustrate particular precedents.  The focus of such case examination is 
qualitative and therefore primarily on analysis and synthesis of the judgments of 
the CJEU with some reference to the opinions of the Advocates General.  
However, as the opinions of the Advocate General are only advisory, rather less 
emphasis is placed on these unless they help to explain or criticize a particular 
point of the CJEU’s judgment in any case.190   
In the discussion on subsidiarity in chapter 3, it is explained how the Treaty itself 
establishes subsidiarity as a constitutional principle and one that has general 
application.  There is also an analytical review of significant cases where the 
CJEU has paid attention to subsidiarity in respect of reviewing the actions of the 
political institutions when law-making.  This examination also reveals how the 
CJEU has been prepared to pay some attention to subsidiarity more generally but 
that this needs development. In particular, outside of judicial review cases the 
CJEU has frequently not paid attention to subsidiarity and respect for localism in 
its interpretation of shared policy areas.  This thesis therefore divides selected 
case law in shared policy areas in this context into two distinct categories for 
comparative purposes.  Firstly cases where the CJEU reviews the actions of the 
political institutions when law-making in chapter 3.  Secondly, the case study in 
chapter 5 which explores how a subsidiarity review could be anchored in EU law 
to address competence issues when the CJEU is considering the residency rights 
of EU citizens who are economically inactive which could arise under the 
preliminary reference procedure.  This will also include a discussion of the criteria 
that needs to be taken into account by the CJEU when undertaking a subsidiarity 
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and proportionality review in this particular shared policy context. The reason 
why the case study in chapter 5 was chosen for examination was on account of the 
fact that it concerns a shared policy area which involves the CJEU interpreting EU 
law where there are other competing EU law principles such as fundamental rights 
and because political symbolism of it links closely to subsidiarity and national 
identity. 
Finally, in support of the analysis of the primary source material, a variety of 
other documentary sources are referred to throughout the thesis. Such sources 
include primary sources such as, European Commission reports which have been 
influential historically in developing the idea of subsidiarity as a political 
principle. Furthermore, there is also consideration of a variety of secondary 
sources. Such sources mainly consist of academic writings and in particular 
published academic literature on subsidiarity and proportionality which is referred 
to for a range of perspectives.  So, for example, this includes in a review of 
academic literature which critiques the EU’s concept of subsidiarity and its use in 
EU law-making. 
 
5. Chapter overview 
Chapter 2 explores subsidiarity and proportionality as twin constitutional 
principles in EU law making in shared areas of competence and its inherent 
respect for Member State law-making. It argues that despite subsidiarity being a 
key constitutional concept in EU law making for mediating the balance of power 
between the EU and the Member States, it is also an essentially contested concept 
with reference to Gallie’s theory of essentially contested concepts.  Such 
conceptual dissonance, it has been argued, favours judicial discretion on how it 
should be applied.  Consequently, it concludes that there is a compelling argument 
for judicial reasoning to engage more fully with how the CJEU should deal with 
such dissonance and determine what can be agreed upon at European level 
thereby anchoring subsidiarity. Article 5 also includes that the EU institutions 
when exercising shared competence should comply with the principle of 
proportionality.  This concerns the intensity of any EU legislative action.  
Proportionality is also defined in Article 5 TEU. It requires that when the EU is 
bringing in legislation in areas of shared competence that ‘the content and form of 
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Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
Treaties’. Proportionality provides a further safeguard to support subsidiarity and 
localism in that it ensures that any regulatory freedom of the EU in areas of shared 
competence is limited to what is necessary to achieve any particular Treaty 
objective. 
The chapter introduces in section 2 subsidiarity as a key constitutional and legal 
principle and rule in EU law for mediating the balance of power between the EU 
and the Member States
191
 and in section 3 proportionality as a widely recognised 
concept used in judicial review. In section 4 the development of the use of 
subsidiarity alongside proportionality in EU law-making in areas of shared 
competence is traced.  Here it is argued that despite subsidiarity being adopted as 
a formal constitutional principle to guide EU law-making in areas of shared 
competence, it is not a neutral arbiter between the EU level and national level, but 
inherently pushed towards a respect for local law-making and the legal regimes of 
the Member States.  It is then argued in section 5 that subsidiarity is an example 
of an essentially contested concept with reference to Gallie’s theory of essentially 
contested concepts
192
 and that such conceptual dissonance has the potential to 
favour judicial discretion on how it is applied. Section 6 then concludes the 
chapter by further explaining how despite the essentially contested nature of 
subsidiarity following the Treaty of Lisbon there is a further renewed emphasis on 
the use of subsidiarity with its inherent respect for local law-making to guide the 
EU institutions when legislating in areas of shared competence.  Such a renewed 
emphasis is further supported by the introduction of a system of ex ante 
monitoring by the national Parliaments
193
 following the Treaty of Lisbon.   
                                                             
191 For an account of the origins and historical development of subsidiarity see K.Endo,  ‘The 
Principle of Subsidiarity: From Johannes Althusius to Jacques Delors’, A paper  initially submitted 
in June 1992 as a thesis entitled "Principle of Subsidiarity: Its Origin, Historical Development, and 
Its Role in the European Community" for the European Studies Programme, Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven <http://eprints.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2115/15558/1/44(6)_p652-
553.pdf> last accessed 20.1.14 and also at  613 for a discussion of  how  in 1949 here was a 
‘fusion of subsidiarity with federalism’ with subsidiarity ‘used to explain the relationship between 
territorial organisations; the supranational polity, the State, the Region and the Local Community 
…… in the Grundgesetz, the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany’. 
192 W.B.Gallie,  ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, (1956)  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
167-98. 
193 Article 12 (b) TEU provides that ‘National Parliaments shall contribute actively to the good 
functioning of the Union […] by seeing to it that the principle of subsidiarity is respected in 
accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. See also Article 7 of Protocol No 2 on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
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The innovative setting up of such an ex ante review procedure illustrates how it is 
possible to anchor subsidiarity sufficiently to operationalize subsidiarity as a 
principle of EU law.  
Chapter 3 considers whether subsidiarity and proportionality, as twin 
constitutional principles in EU law-making, should bind the CJEU as law-maker 
in its interpretation of shared competence areas and, if so, what can be agreed at 
European level.  The chapter also includes in section 2 an introduction to the 
CJEU as a unique supranational court with particular reference to relevant 
academic literature which highlights the pro-union interpretative tendency of the 
CJEU.  It also reviews existing case law regarding subsidiarity where it will be 
pointed out how the CJEU has been prepared to undertake a subsidiarity review in 
respect of the actions of the political institutions in the context of law-making.  
Section 2.4 will also firstly revisit, agree with and develop literature in light of the 
Treaty of Lisbon by De Búrca et al which has argued that the CJEU as a law-
making institution it should be bound by subsidiarity when interpreting in areas of 
shared competence.
194
   
Secondly, it will explain how Kumm treats proportionality as an aspect of 
subsidiarity applied to competences.
195
  Building on this argument, he then 
proposes a subsidiarity and proportionality test that the CJEU should employ in 
the context of the internal market.  Such a test, he argues, should include three 
requirements: ‘federal intervention has to further legitimate purposes, has to be 
necessary in the sense of being narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose, and has 
to be proportionate with regard to costs or disadvantages relating to the loss of 
Member States’ regulatory autonomy’.196 Kumm does not, however, give much 
detail as to how the CJEU should undertake a subsidiarity and proportionality 
review in practice or specify how the CJEU should undertake a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review involving a balancing exercise or whether different policy 
areas require different considerations.  Nor does he specify exactly what the 
criteria should be or what factors the CJEU should take into account when 
undertaking such a balancing exercise. This is problematic as it was argued in 
                                                             
194 G.De Búrca, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional Actor’ 
(1998) 36(2) Journal of Common Market Studies,  217-23. 
195 M.Kumm, ‘Constitutionalising Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Union’, (2006) 12(4) European Law Journal 503-533 at 505. 
196 Ibid at 519. 
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chapter 2 that subsidiarity is an essentially contested concept, using Gallie’s 
theory of essentially contested concepts.
197
  Such conceptual dissonance, it was 
argued, favours judicial discretion on how it should be applied.
198
 For rule of law 
reasons, a more specific and articulated approach is desirable.  Furthermore, the 
CJEU also has the sole responsibility for interpreting the Treaties.
199
 The CJEU 
surely, therefore, has a responsibility to explain in its reasoning how it has dealt 
with such dissonance when undertaking a subsidiarity review and the criteria that 
has informed its reasoning.
200
   
By adopting such an approach, this would help to evidence that its interpretation 
has taken place within explicitly articulated boundaries. Adopting a normative 
approach, the final section considers whether it is possible to identify more fully 
ex ante criteria for the application of subsidiarity thereby enabling the CJEU to 
engage more meaningfully with subsidiarity in its judicial reasoning.   
In particular, it will be argued firstly that as a minimum the CJEU should 
explicitly address competence issues in its reasoning in every case concerning an 
area of shared competence.  For this could help to counter claims that the CJEU 
displays an unjustified emphasis in its case law on the need to pursue an ‘ever 
closer Union’ which deprives Member States of their competencies and is at the 
expense of the legal systems of the Member States.
201
  It would also be consistent 
with subsidiarity and its inherent respect for localism in conjunction with the 
national identity clause in Article 4 (2) TEU.  Secondly, it is proposed that the 
criteria in a balancing test employed by the CJEU should be sector-specific and 
                                                             
197 W.B.Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, (1956)  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
167-98. 
198 For further discussion on literature which highlights out disagreement and dissonance are 
present in the law more than judicial reasoning sometimes suggests and calls for judicial reasoning 
to engage more fully with such disagreement and dissonance see for example J.Waldron, Law and 
Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999), C.Finkelstein, ‘Introduction to the Symposium on 
conflicts of Rights’, (2001) 7(3) Legal theory 235-238;  J.Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty: The 
Image of balance’, (2003) 11(2) Journal of Political Philosophy 191-210. 
199 See further B.Vesterdorf, ‘A constitutional court for the EU?’ President of the Court of First 
Instance of the European Communities 
<http://www.ecln.net/elements/conferences/book_berlin/vesterdorf.pdf>accessed 1.8.13 who has 
also pointed out, the CJEU when performing this role frequently carries out constitutional tasks. 
200 Relatedly see also M.Schwartzman, ‘The Principle of Judicial Sincerity, (2008) Virginia Law 
Review, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=931435> accessed 14.1.14 for an 
argument for the principle of judicial sincerity and at 25 a key element of which is ‘that judges 
have a duty to conform with a principle of public legal justification.  They must have sufficient 
reasons for their decisions and they must give those reasons in public’. 
201 M.Schwartzman, ‘The Principle of Judicial Sincerity, (2008) Virginia Law Review, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=931435> accessed 14.1.14. 
51 
 
that different criteria should apply for different shared policy sectors where the 
CJEU is undertaking a subsidiarity review in shared policy areas.  Such an 
approach is necessary in order to take account of the different policy contexts and 
the particular interests relevant to a particular policy sector, especially where there 
are competing interests at issue at a supranational level as well as a wide diversity 
of legal regimes in a particular shared policy area at national level involved.  This 
thesis focuses on the determination of residency rights of EU citizens. 
Chapter 4 therefore explores how a subsidiarity review could address competence 
issues when the CJEU is considering competing fundamental principles of EU law 
when considering an EU citizens’ right to residency. The chapter includes in 
section 2 a contextualised discussion of the wider concept of citizenship which 
highlights not only the symbolic importance of the citizenship concept at national 
level and its association with a set of fundamental political, civil and social 
rights
202
 but also the important role in fostering a sense of allegiance to a 
particular Member State.
203
 Secondly, it then reviews literature which reveals how 
EU citizenship, on the other hand, differs sharply to national citizenship in that 
EU citizenship was primarily focused on the market rights of citizens as well as 
being parasitic on national citizenship.  For it is only by being a national citizen of 
a Member State can one acquire EU citizenship.  Citizenship cases could therefore 
be taken as an excellent example of shared competence.  
 
Section 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 review literature which considers the limits of EU 
citizenship and in particular literature which highlights that there has been critique 
of EU citizenship on the grounds that different categories of EU citizens when 
exercising their residency rights have varying levels of protection from expulsion 
and this undermines the fundamental status of EU citizenship.
204
  Section 2.4 
considers literature which highlights the problems of differing levels of protection 
from expulsion for different categories of EU citizens. 
                                                             
202 For further discussion see D.Held, Models of Democracy, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996) at 
176 
203 See further T.Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1950) 28-29. 
204
 P.Craig and  G.de Búrca, EU Law: Test, Cases and Materials. (5th ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 757. 
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Chapter 4 also considers the introduction of EU citizenship provisions into EU 
law following the Treaty of Maastricht with section 3.3 explaining how the 
residency rights of EU citizens were subsequently strengthened in Directive 
2004/38.  Section 3.4 also considers the provisions in Directive 2004.38 
concerning the expulsion of EU citizens where they have a right of permanent 
residence.
205
  This also includes a discussion of how such provisions have led to 
the CJEU being called to adjudicate on expulsion of EU migrant citizens’ cases 
which also raise fundamental rights matters that have previously either been the 
preserve of national constitutional courts at a national level or fundamental human 
rights at internal level.  Such issues have included considering how even though 
the Charter represented a major step in fundamental rights protection for EU 
citizens, there are difficulties for EU citizens when seeking to rely on fundamental 
protection in that ‘ Article 51 of the Charter ‘restricts the incorporation of these 
European fundamental rights to the implementation situation’. 206 
Section 3.5 considers the Treaty of Lisbon and the giving of legal effect to a Bill 
of Rights for EU citizens in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and questions 
whether the giving of legal effect to the Charter following the Treaty of Lisbon 
requires that the CJEU at least engages on the grounds of fairness and justice in its 
reasoning with the practical realisation of EU citizenship for all EU citizens and 
their family members irrespective of whether they have crossed a border or not 
with reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights? On the other hand, this 
section also explains how EU citizenship is unique in that not only is it parasitic 
on national citizenship it is constrained by the limits of the EU’s competence 
imposed by the Treaties in areas of shared competence and subsidiarity.  The key 
research question of section 4 is to consider whether the reasoning in the CJEU 
                                                             
205 Article 28(2) of Directive 2004/38.  This provision provided that, ‘2. The host Member State 
may not take an expulsion decision against Union citizens or their family members, irrespective of 
nationality, who have the right of permanent residence on its territory, except on serious grounds 
of public policy or public security. 
3. An expulsion decision may not be taken against Union citizens, except if the decision is based 
on imperative grounds of public security, as defined by Member States, if they: 
(a) have resided in the host Member State for the previous ten years; or 
(b) are a minor, except if the expulsion is necessary for the best interests of the child, as provided 
for in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989.’ 
206 R. Schütze, in G.De Búrca,  D.Kochenov,  and A.Williams, ‘Debating Europe's Justice Deficit: 
The EU, Swabian Housewives, Rawls, and Ryanair’,  (November 14, 2013).EUI Working Paper, 
LAW 2013/11, 2013. < http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2354568 > last accessed 1.4.14. at 44. 
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cases selected for examination concerning the residency rights EU citizens reveal 
a failure of the CJEU to undertake a subsidiarity and proportionality review, and, 
if so, if a subsidiarity /proportionality review by the CJEU could be useful/helpful 
here?  
But on the other hand, when the CJEU scrutinises aspects of Member State 
regulatory regimes which also concern fundamental rights is there is a need for it 
to act as an arbiter between respect for Member States law and protecting the 
residence rights of EU citizens with reference to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.  This is to examine the competence of the CJEU and its institutional 
placing at a supranational level as suited to adjudication of citizenship residency 
rights. 
The main contribution of chapter 4 is to argue firstly that as there is a need for the 
CJEU to act as an arbiter that specific criteria should be identified in this context 
in order to anchor subsidiarity and proportionality and help ensure the proper 
respect for the division of power between the EU and the Member States.  
Secondly, to acknowledge that even though engaging more meaningfully with 
subsidiarity will not necessarily prevent the CJEU from displaying a pro-Union 
interpretative tendency
207
 the adoption of a subsidiarity and proportionality review 
would help to to improve the quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and 
consequently enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling.208This would help to 
legitimise the CJEU’s ruling to the Member States and address the problem of 
CJEU rulings lacking legitimacy.
209
  
 
Chapter 5 forms a case study which develops a normative approach as the critique 
in chapter 4 is based on normative considerations.  It explores how a subsidiarity 
review could be anchored in EU law to address competence issues when the 
CJEU is considering fundamental principles of EU law and residency rights of EU 
citizens who are economically inactive. It proposes a sequence of how the CJEU 
                                                             
207 This is discussed in section 2.2 of chapter 3. 
208 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
 
209 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
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should apply a subsidiarity and proportionality review in the reasoning of the 
CJEU.  As subsidiarity is prior to proportionality the CJEU should include first in 
its reasoning in these types of cases a clear justification of EU competence in this 
context so as to draw out the limits of EU competence.  As subsidiarity in these 
types of cases relates to the cross border requirement, the CJEU should be explicit 
about departing from the purely internal rule as well as explaining the substance 
of rights of EU citizens. The proportionality element of the review relates to the 
actual consideration and weighing up by the CJEU of the competing interests 
identified in this context.  This requires the CJEU to identify explicitly in its 
reasoning any competing interests that have been weighed up as well as stating 
any other particular factors involved in the balancing and the weight accorded to 
those factors. 
This discussion also includes a consideration of the criteria that might inform the 
CJEU when undertaking a balancing test as part of a subsidiarity review in cases 
involving the residency rights of non-economically active EU citizens. The case 
for determining the specific criteria in order to anchor a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review in this context is compelling. In particular, it raises difficult 
questions as to the intensity of any proportionality review and how the CJEU 
should justify in its reasoning how it has struck a balance between any competing 
issues. The improvement of the quality of the CJEU’s reasoning is becoming an 
increasingly important matter in light of the impending accession of the EU’s 
accession to ECHR.
210
  For following accession of the EU to the ECHR, the CJEU 
will be measured against human rights standards in its case law and does not want 
to be found lacking in its reasoning when balancing conflicting issues.  However, 
on the other hand, the CJEU must demonstrate that it is respecting localism and 
the wording and purpose of the Treaties.
211
 It would also involve the CJEU citing 
                                                             
210 Council of Europe, Accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, < 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/default_en.asp> accessed 14.1.14. 
See also the CJEU’s opinion 2/13 Opinion 1/13 8.12.14 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=160882&pageIndex=0&doclan
g=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=40247> accessed 8.1.15.regarding the EU’s 
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Editorial comments, ‘The EU’s Accession to the ECHR – a No from the ECJ’, (2015) Common 
Market Law Review, 1-16. 
211 See the recent speech by the UK Attorney General < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-future-of-europe-opportunities-and-challenges >  ] 
accessed 15.1.14 and who states that, ‘The EU can only be effective, successful and above all 
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in its reasoning the specific criteria it used when undertaking a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review.  Judicial discussion of these issues would also benefit 
from being supported by greater access to information and empirical research in 
this context.
212
  By being explicit in its judicial reasoning about the nature of the 
key issues and tensions in this context and how the CJEU had balanced these, this 
would help to justify the CJEU’s ruling. It would also ensure that the CJEU 
reasoning goes beyond a merely theoretical and abstract level of judicial reasoning 
when striking the balance between competing issues. Thus, the thesis helps to 
address the complexity of the factors to be taken into account. Furthermore, even 
though engaging more meaningfully with subsidiarity will not necessarily prevent 
the CJEU from displaying a pro-Union interpretative tendency
213
 the adoption of a 
subsidiarity and proportionality review would help to to improve the quality of the 
reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s 
ruling.
214
 
 
6. Preliminary Conclusions 
The contributions of this thesis are threefold:- 
From a theoretical point of view, it adds to existing academic debate concerning 
the contested nature and scope of subsidiarity by testing whether subsidiarity is a 
contested concept with reference to a set of conditions put forward by Gallie that 
he argues must be satisfied in order for a concept to be deemed essentially 
contested.
215
 The result of such examination is that the subsidiarity concept clearly 
meets the various conditions that Gallie has argued must be fulfilled but that it can 
be anchored. 
                                                             
212 A similar idea has been mooted in the context of the European Court of Human Rights where 
there has been discussion of creating a Research Division within the ECHR’s Registry by S.Greer, 
The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects (2006) 189. 
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From a doctrinal perspective it agrees with and develops an argument by De 
Búrca that the CJEU is a law-making institution by proposing that following the 
Treaty of Lisbon and in light of the national identity clause there is now an even 
greater need for the CJEU
216
 to utilise subsidiarity in its interpretation of shared 
policy areas. This raises the question of how subsidiarity, as a contested concept, 
could be anchored in EU law by the CJEU to help ensure the proper respect for 
the division of power between the EU and the Member States in areas of shared 
competence by determining what could be agreed upon at European level i.e. 
contestation does not prevent a workable anchoring of the principle. 
Finally, adopting a normative perspective the thesis then considers how the CJEU 
could operationalise a subsidiarity review by developing a proposal by Kumm of 
how the CJEU could employ subsidiarity and proportionality as an aspect of 
subsidiarity applied to competences generally or shared competences as a tool of 
judicial review.
217
 This includes relating de Búrca's key argument that as the 
CJEU interpretation itself constitutes law-making that it should be informed by 
subsidiarity when exercising that power
218
 to an observation made by Kumm 
regarding the operatationalisation of a subsidiarity and proportionality test. This 
observation by Kumm is that although there is an important role for the judiciary 
in applying a subsidiarity and proportionality test 'the subsidiarity and 
proportionality framework clearly does not establish simple and easy to apply 
rules that produce uncontentious, easy to derive conclusions in the great majority 
of cases'.
219
  Thus this thesis includes considering whether there is a single test in 
different areas or whether more sector specific criteria can be identified, 
especially where there are policy areas which already involve the CJEU 
considering other EU law concepts that are essentially contested such as EU 
citizenship. It then proposes that each shared policy area requires different criteria 
                                                             
216 For  a discussion of the role of the CJEU and European legal integration see for example 
J.Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick,  and L.Moral Soriano, ‘Integration and Integrity in the Legal 
Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’ in de Búrca, G. and Weiler, J.H.H. (eds) The 
European Court of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 43- 86; M.Cappelletti, 
M.Seccombe, J.H.H.Weiler,  Integration through Law: European and the American Federal 
Experience: Vol 1: Methods, Tools and Institutions (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1985) 
86. 
217 M.Kumm, ‘Constitutionalising Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Union’, (2006) 12(4) European Law Journal 503-533 at 505. 
218 G. De Búrca, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional Actor’ 
(1998) 36(2) Journal of Common Market Studies,  217-23. 
219 M.Kumm, ‘Constitutionalising Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Union’, (2006) 12(4) European Law Journal 503-533 at 525. 
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to be taken into account by the CJEU when undertaking any review in order to 
take account of the different policy contexts and whether there are any competing 
interest relevant to a particular policy sector that require balancing.  In 
developing the criteria for subsidiarity the approach is to try and specify it and 
make it rule-bound as much as possible, as this would relate it back to the rules-
principles distinction.
220
  This relates to the rule of law, principles of certainty and 
predictability
221
  and, by adopting such an approach, this should better legitimize 
genuinely European standards that have a clear legal basis. Subsidiarity, as it 
stands, is presented as more of an incommensurable principle by its critics,
222
 and 
thus not so suited to adjudication.
223
 
 
The thesis then focuses on one particular shared policy context – determining the 
rights of EU citizens in chapter 4 - as a lens to explore how a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review could address competence issues.  A final chapter 5 then 
adopts a normative approach.  It proposes a sequence of how the CJEU should 
apply a subsidiarity and proportionality review in the reasoning of the CJEU.  As 
subsidiarity is prior to proportionality the CJEU should include first in its 
reasoning in these types of cases a clear justification of EU competence in this 
context so as to draw out the limits of EU competence.   The proportionality 
element of the review relates to the actual consideration and weighing up by the 
CJEU of the competing interests identified in this context.  This requires the 
CJEU to identify explicitly in its reasoning any competing interests that have been 
weighed up as well as stating any other particular factors involved in the 
balancing and the weight accorded to those factors. It also includes consideration 
of the criteria involved in any judicial balancing that the CJEU would need to take 
into account when undertaking a review in this particular shared policy context 
and how intensive such a review should be.  
                                                             
220 For further discussion on the difference between legal rules and principles see R.Dworkin,'The 
Model of Rules I', in: idem, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press Cambridge 1987) 
14 at 25-26. 
221 B.Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) 
222 See for example K. Möller, ‘Proportionality: Challenging the critics, (2012) 10 (3) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 709-731 at 730; P.G.Carrozza,  ‘Subsidiarity as a structural 
principle of international human rights law’, (2003) 97 The American Journal of International law, 
38 at 78. 
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It is also emphasised in chapter 5 that any subsidiarity and proportionality review 
undertaken by the CJEU in cases concerning the residence rights of EU citizens 
including those who are economically inactive should at the very least involve the 
CJEU making explicit reference in its reasoning to, on the one hand, how it has 
respected subsidiarity and demonstrated a respect for localism in the particular 
case at issue.  This should include considering the financial implications and what 
potential impact might be on immigration for that particular Member State of 
ruling that particular national legislation is contrary EU law. Access to socio-
economic data or discussion with the national referring court could be helpful here 
in informing the CJEU’s consideration of this issue224 and being more specific 
about ‘unreasonable burden’.  The CJEU has ignored Rasmussen’s critique of its 
role in this respect, but it has all the more relevance in a subsidiarity context. Far-
reaching economic effects, for example, would suggest the CJEU is intruding 
upon fiscal competence, which remains with the Member States. Any views of the 
EU institutions in this context and their reasons for favouring local law-making 
over centralised action should be explicitly stated.  For, and as Kumm has pointed 
out, the advantages of local law-making over centralised action are three fold and 
encompass efficiency, democracy and preserving the identities of citizens of the 
Member State which is easier at a local level than a European level.
225
 
But on the other hand, in cases concerning a the residence rights of economically 
inactive EU citizens and their family members, the CJEU would also need to 
demonstrate that it had taken account of Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights as well as considering if the substance of an EU citizens rights had been 
compromised such that it does not need to consider any actual cross-border 
element.  By explicitly including in its judgement the sector-specific criterion it 
had employed when weighing up such issues in citizenship cases where there are 
issues relating to Article 7 and the weight given by the CJEU to each criterion, 
this would anchor subsidiarity.   
It will also be proposed that the sector-specific criteria for the CJEU to consider in 
this context should include the following:- 
                                                             
224 See also Rasmussen’s conclusion that the CJEU needed to take into account more socio-
economic date in aits adjudication: H. Rasmussen, On Law and Policy of the European Court of 
Justice (Kluwer 1986)   
225 Kumm Op Cit 581. 
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Firstly, in respect of the subsidiarity element of the review, what is the overall 
degree of competence that has been transferred to the EU in any particular policy 
area?  This would include considering both the general and the specific 
competence and whether competence involves an internal market provision. This 
is an important question as the CJEU has frequently adopted an expansionary 
approach when approaching competence in internal market cases.
226
 
Furthermore, and as Craig has pointed out there is the new Impact Assessment 
strategy which ‘constitutes a framework within which to address concerns as to 
competence anxiety.’ This, he concludes should make easier judicial review in 
that the CJEU could examine the Commission’s discussion from any Impact 
Assessment undertaken.
227
 Thus it is vital that the CJEU needs to ensure that in 
performing judicial review when approaching competence questions in this 
context that it reviews any relevant Impact Assessments. 
Secondly, the CJEU also needs to consider what the minimum standards have 
been established under the European Convention on Human Rights on this and to 
include in its reasoning why it is not enough just to rely on these. Here 
subsidiarity can be related to the divide between international law and EU law: the 
CJEU needs to explain why it is not leaving human rights to the ECHR.
228
 The 
CJEU here could draw upon an argument by Schütze that there has been a 
conceptual shift of emphasis in EU federal philosophy from a dual federalism to 
co-operative federalism and that the latter encompasses the idea that the EU and 
Member States work together in a shared legal sphere.
 229
 Thus when the EU 
accedes to the ECHR it has a duty in conjunction with the Member States to 
ensure compliance in the shared legal sphere with ECHR standards rather than 
simply leaving the matter to the ECHR court.
230
 
                                                             
226 Gareth Davies, Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, In the Wrong Place, At the Wrong Time, (2006) 
43 CMLREV 63 at 65. 
227 Gareth Davies, Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, In the Wrong Place, At the Wrong Time, (2006) 
43 CMLREV 63 at 191. 
228 See further R.Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of 
European Law, (2009, OUP) 
229 Ibid for a consideration of the federal philosophy that informs the EU’s legal structure and in 
particular an argument of how the EU legal system has evolved from dual federalism (which 
encompasses the philosophical idea of dual sovereignty where both governmental bodies are co-
equals) to co-operative federalism (which encompasses the philosophical idea that two 
governmental bodies work together in a shared legal sphere). 
230 See also the recent opinion of the CJEU Opinion 2/13, ECHR, EU: C: 2014:2454 where the 
CJEU has held that the draft agreement as currently drafted is incompatible with Article 6(2) and 
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On the other hand, in the proportionality element of the review, the CJEU would 
also need to demonstrate to the Member States’ that there has been proper respect 
when weighing up conflicting issues to the division of power between the EU and 
the Member States in cases involving protecting the private and family rights of 
EU citizens/carers of EU citizens.  By adopting such an approach the CJEU would 
be acting as an arbiter in this context. It would also serve to anchor subsidiarity 
and proportionality and by including how it had undertaken a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review in its reasoning would demonstrate the proper respect for 
the division of power between the EU and the Member States. 
Thirdly that an important issue the CJEU needs to address in all such cases is 
when are the substance of rights compromised such that it does not need to 
consider any actual cross-border element.  The CJEU needs to identify a 
minimum threshold although arguably the presumption must be against this being 
necessary in most cases, because the European Convention on Human Rights has 
already done this. This would involve a consideration of whether it is possible to 
identify whether there is a minimum core of EU rights that are so sacrosanct that 
there is no need to consider any actual cross border element and the relationship 
with the European Convention on Human Rights and national constitutional 
traditions.  The CJEU needs to do this much more systematically.  
In respect of considering the national measure at issue that use could be made of a 
test suggested by Alexy.
231
  He proposed that a graduated scale for national 
measures which contained three levels – serious, moderate and minor – could be 
applied when considering national measures although such an approach does run 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Protocol No 8 EU and the Editorial comments, The EU’s Accession to the ECHR – a ‘No’ from 
the ECJ!’, (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 1-16 where it is pointed out how ‘the Court 
argues that the agreement is likely to have an adverse effect on the autonomy of European Union 
law and its specific characteristics (referred to in Protocol No 8 EU), notably relating to its own 
position and competences within the EU legal system.’ 
231 R.Alexy, A Theory of constitutional Rights, translated by J.Rivers, (OUP, 2002) 401-414.  See 
also J. Habermas Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (1998) 259-260; K. Moller, ‘Proportionality: Challenging the Critics’, (2012) 10(3) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 709 for a critique of Alexy’s theory of balancing as 
subjective. 
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the risk of opening up more potential for judicial discretion e.g. where on the scale 
is the line drawn between a minor and a more serious measure.
232
   
Fouthly, to consider how the CJEU approaches balancing the tension between a 
citizens rights in a particular policy context and any legitimate objectives of the 
Member States in a particular context.   Here, the CJEU could draw inspiration 
from the ECHR approach in this context and ask a series of questions about the 
national legislation at issue
233
.  Such questions could include asking whether there 
is a legitimate aim for a particular national measure and, if so, whether the 
particular national measure was both a necessary and proportionate way to 
implement that legitimate aim.  It would also entail the CJEU weighing up the 
seriousness of the national measure at issue against the need to balance the 
interests of society with those of individuals and groups.  In addition, and as 
Alexy points out, it is crucial for judges when balancing to assess the level of 
interference with a particular right and that where there is considerable 
interference that this requires the CJEU to demand good and valid reasons to 
justify such great interference.
234
 
Fifthly, that it is important for the CJEU to list the factors that it has taken into 
consideration when undertaking such a balancing exercise
235
 in order to anchor 
subsidiarity and proportionality and help ensure the proper respect for the division 
of power between the EU and the Member States. This would be especially 
important in areas where the EU is acting on the edge of its competence such as in 
relation to social security or immigration.  Here the need for the CJEU to include 
a subsidiarity and proportionality review and be explicit in its reasoning of how it 
had considered subsidiarity, weighed up the seriousness of the national measure at 
issue against the need to balance the interests of society with those of individuals 
and groups as well as demonstrating a respect for localism by giving more weight 
                                                             
232 R.Alexy, A Theory of constitutional Rights, translated by J.Rivers, (OUP, 2002) 401-414.  See 
also J. Habermas Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (1998) 259-260. 
233 See also de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and 
Housing, [1999] 1 AC 69,80 where the Privy Council defined the questions generally to be asked 
in deciding whether a measure is proportionate are, ‘whether (1) the legislative objective is 
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234 R.Alexy, A Theory of constitutional Rights,  translated by J.Rivers, (OUP, 2002) 401-414. 
235 See the recent case of Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department Kashmiri v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2007] UKHL 11 at  para 19-20 where the HL 
controversially said that the national courts should be doing the balancing here. 
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to the Member State’s right to regulate is the most compelling. This would 
involve the CJEU adopting a more systematic approach to competences: 
identifying more clearly the limits of EU competence, the importance of special 
competence over general competences and respecting the limits fo shared 
competences, such as Article 114 TFEU (ex Article 95 TEC) and taking a more 
deferential approach to matters raising fiscal implications for Member States in 
order to respect the fiscal competence of the Member States. 
Finally, it is anticipated that this thesis would contribute to the wider debates 
about what kind of national measures should be seen as obstacles in shared policy 
areas (especially the internal market). It is also anticipated that the thesis could 
offer lessons generalizable beyond this context in respects of the benefits of the 
CJEU adopting the structured approach to subsidiarity and proportionality 
proposed in this thesis in all cases concerning shared policy areas, the latter being 
a particularly fertile area for future research. Even though engaging more 
meaningfully with subsidiarity will not necessarily prevent the CJEU from 
displaying a pro-Union interpretative tendency
236
 the adoption of a subsidiarity 
and proportionality review would help to demonstrate the procedural legitimacy 
of the CJEU’s ruling. This would help to improve the quality of the reasoning of 
the CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling.237 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the concepts of subsidiarity and proportionality as twin 
constitutional principles and rules
238
 for mediating the balance of power between 
                                                             
238 Article 5 (3) TEU, in conjunction with the Protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality.  See 
also the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
Consolidated Texts of the EU Treaties as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, pages 204 to 207 (Cm 
7310) and House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee ‘Subsidiarity, National Parliaments 
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the EU and the Member States in the context of the development of EU law and 
the European integration process.
239
  They were adopted by the EU as legal rules 
to guide the EU law-making institutions when law-making in shared competence 
areas following the Treaty of Maastricht.
240
 The current law is located in Article 
5(3) TEU.
241
   
One objective of this chapter is to explain how the more rule like subsidiarity and 
proportionality are, the more it can be said they anchored and are less contested.  
On the other hand, if they are more in the domain of principles the more likely 
they are to being contested.  It has been argued that there is a clear distinction 
between legal rules and principles especially in terms of the respective standards 
that each sets.  Dworkin is prominent amongst the theorists in explaining that not 
only do principles and rules each have a distinctive set of standards but they differ 
in the character of the direction they give.
242
   As he explains, ‘the difference 
between legal principles and legal rules is a logical distinction. Both sets of 
standards point to particular decisions about legal obligation in particular 
circumstances, but they differ in the character of the direction they give. Rules are 
applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are given, then 
either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it 
is not, in which case it contributes nothing to the decision. But this is not the way 
principles operate.  All that is meant, when we say that a particular principle is a 
principle of our law, is that the principle is one which officials must take into 
                                                                                                                                                                       
and the Lisbon Treaty’ Thirty–third Report of Session 2007–08 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmeuleg/563/563.pdf > last 
accessed 12.7.12. for a discussion of this Protocol.. 
239 For a general discussion of both the theoretical and the legal dimension of European legal 
integration, see P.Craig, and  G. de Búrca, EU Law: Test, Cases and Materials. (5th ed., Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011) 2-5 and A.Wiener and T.Diez, European Integration Theory, 
(OUP, 2009).  
240 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) [1992] OJ C 190/1. 
241 See also the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality 
[1997] OJ C 340/105. 
242 R.Dworkin,'The Model of Rules I', in: idem, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge 1987) 14 at 25-26. For discussion of the wider context that this view takes place within 
see also Dworkin’s attack in his book Law’s Empire, (1986, Harvard University Press)  on a key 
tenet of positivism espoused by the jurisprudential theorist Hart that law and morality are not 
necessarily connected.  In respect of further discussion of Hart’s view of positivism see H.L.A 
Hart, The Concept of Law, (1994, Oxford, Clarendon Press) at 185-86.   In particular, he writes 
that legal positivism is ‘the simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws 
reproduce or satisfy demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so’, and at 268 that 
‘though there are many different contingent connections between law and morality there are no 
necessary conceptual connections between the content of law and morality.’ 
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account, if it is relevant, as a consideration inclining in one direction or another. 
This first difference between rules and principles entails another. Principles have a 
dimension that rules do not the dimension of weight or importance’.  243 Thus he 
argues that the key theoretical difference between legal rules and principles is that 
it is only the latter that has the ‘additional dimension of weight or importance’.244 
Building upon the literature regarding the theoretical distinction between legal 
principles and rules, there has been debate as to whether there needs to be a 
different theory of adjudication in respect of principles including principles that 
are fundamental rights.  For example, Alexy has built on this jurisprudential 
debate by Dworkin that principles differ from rules in that principles are 
optimization requirements.
245
 This means, according to Alexy, that satisfying 
principles varies and that ‘the appropriate degree of satisfaction depends not only 
on what is factually possible but also on what is legally possible’.246 The fact that 
principles are optimisation requirements, he then explains, have particular 
implications in the event of a conflict between one principle and another 
principle.
247
  In particular, he points out how such principle conflict can take 
different forms.  For example, Alexy points out that even though both principles 
are valid one principle might outweigh the other in certain circumstances. Such a 
balancing exercise necessarily involves a balancing of the competing interests 
associated with each principle in light of what is legally and factually possible in 
order to determine which principle should take priority.
248
 To illustrate how a 
court has determined which competing principle had the greater weight in the 
actual case before them, Alexy cites a German Federal Constitutional court 
case.
249
   In this case the German Constitutional Court was faced with a ‘tension 
between the duty of the state to maintain a properly functioning criminal justice 
system and the interest of the accused in his constitutionally guaranteed rights, 
which the state is also obliged to protect under the Basic Law’.250  Such tension 
                                                             
243 The difference between legal rules and principles is explained by R.Dworkin,'The Model of 
Rules I', in: idem, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press Cambridge 1987) 14 at 25-
26. 
244 Ibid. 
245 R.Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)  47. 
246 Ibid 48.   
247 Ibid. 
248 Ibid at 50. 
249 R.Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)  47 
citing BVerfGE 51, 324. 
250 R.Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)  47 
citing BVerfGE 51, 324. 
66 
 
was resolved by the German Constitutional Court balancing the conflicting 
interests and determining ‘which of the requirements having equal status in the 
abstract had the greater weight in the concrete case’.251 
These points in his theory of adjudication, however, have not gone unchallenged.  
For example, Poscher has argued that not only does the theory fail in in making 
the case for there being a structural difference between rules and principles but 
that it views adjudication as being only possible by either subsumption or 
balancing.
252
 Rather he makes the case that a theory of adjudication should 
involve a variety of techniques of adjudication which,  
‘always include subsumption by mere rule-following and sometimes even 
balancing in the sense of an optimization requirement, alongside an array 
of further methods and combinations of all the techniques.  For any given 
norm, adjudication may consist of mere rule-following in easy cases, of 
more complex analytical considerations when it comes to more complex 
cases, and of yet more complex argumentations and evaluations in hard 
cases, where even the balancing of legally protected rights in sense of an 
optimization requirement may play a role’.253 
So Poscher proposes that a theory of adjudication should involve a variety of 
techniques especially where here are cases which involve the balancing of 
competing rights. He therefore argues that Alexy fails to account fully for the 
relationship between rules and principles. Consequently, Poscher argues, in 
respect of formulating a theory for adjudication of fundamental rights, the theory 
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253 R.Poscher, ‘Insights, Errors and Self-Misconceptions of the Theory of Principles’, (2009) 22(4) 
Ratio Juris 425-54 at 439. 
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of principles cannot be a doctrinal theory of fundamental rights for where there is 
a contravention of a fundamental principle there is no room for balancing.  So, for 
example, regarding the example of the principle of proportionality, this demands 
‘a loose plausibility control to ensure that the measure is not grossly 
disproportionate’.254 However, academics have queried the use of judicial 
balancing on the grounds that judicial balancing is subjective
255
 and 
unpredictable. So, for example Habermas has argued that balancing is ‘arbitrary 
and rash’.256  Other critics too have stressed the difficulties of weighing up 
competing principles when there is ‘no common currency for making possible a 
comparison’257 i.e. the problem of determining the correct weight. 
With the above theoretical debate in mind, the key aim of this chapter is to argue 
that despite the principle of subsidiarity being a key constitutional concept 
alongside proportionality in EU law-making for mediating the balance of power 
between the EU and the Member States in areas of shared competence that the 
principle of subsidiarity is also an essentially contested concept using Gallie’s 
theory of essentially contested concepts.
258
 Such conceptual dissonance, it will be 
argued, favours judicial discretion on how it should be applied.
259
 Gallie’s idea 
also helps elaborate on the more problematic character of principles and the 
difficulties this poses in adjudication.   
Legal reasoning by the CJEU needs to address this issue of discretion. A 
subsequent chapter will then consider how subsidiarity, as a contested concept, 
could be anchored in EU law by the CJEU to help ensure the proper respect for 
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the division of power between the EU and the Member States in areas of shared 
competence and what could be agreed upon at European level. For by anchoring 
subsidiarity by using exemplars in order to demonstrate what is nearer to the heart 
of subsidiarity, this helps to minimise the risk of a dispute as to how it should be 
operationalized in adjudication.  Such an approach would directly address a key 
concern raised by Gallie that essentially contested concepts are at continual risk of 
being disputed
260
 and provides a useful conceptual framework in this thesis for 
helping to identify the core of subsidiarity. 
Section 2 and 3 discusses the broader conceptual meaning and origins of both 
subsidiarity and proportionality.  In particular, section 2 introduces subsidiarity   
as a key constitutional and legal principle and rule in EU law. 
261
  
Section 3 provides a contextualised discussion of how proportionality is a widely 
recognised concept used as a test in judicial review and that there are differing 
interpretations of the operationalization of proportionality.  Section 3 then focuses 
on explaining how proportionality in EU law has been recognised both as a 
general principle of EU law as well evidenced in practice from the reasoning of 
the CJEU.
262
  In particular, it will be pointed out in this section that in EU law the 
use of proportionality by the CJEU needs to be accompanied by a clear, consistent 
and principled approach to its content and structure in order to provide a clear 
doctrinal test that the CJEU can utilise in its case law. So, for example, the CJEU 
should give reasons and justify in its ruling following assessment of both the 
empirical and normative dimensions of a proportionality review to ensure the 
legitimacy of its decision. This relates to the rule of law principles of certainty and 
                                                             
260 W.B.Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, (1956)  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
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261 For an account of the origins and historical development of subsidiarity see K.Endo,  ‘The 
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predictability.
263
  Examination of a selection of well documented CJEU case law 
on proportionality will also reveal that there is a considerable variety in the degree 
of intensity and application by the CJEU of proportionality tests as well as 
differences in the amount of guidance it gives to the Member States in this 
context. 
Section 4 introduces the development of the use of subsidiarity alongside 
proportionality in EU law-making in areas of shared competence.  Here it is 
argued that despite subsidiarity being adopted as a formal constitutional principle 
to guide EU law-making in areas of shared competence, it is not a neutral arbiter 
between the EU level and national level, but inherently pushed towards a respect 
for local law-making and the legal regimes of the Member States.  Secondly, it is 
argued that subsidiarity is an example of an essentially contested concept with 
reference to Gallie’s theory of essentially contested concepts264 and that such 
conceptual dissonance has the potential to favour judicial discretion on how it is 
applied. This is related to the distinction drawn by Dworkin between rules and 
principles namely that rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion whereas 
principles are ‘a consideration including in one direction or another,’ and thus 
principles have a dimension that rules do not.  This is the dimension of weight or 
importance’.265 The issue addressed is to what extent subsidiarity can be related to 
rules or principles. 
Section 5 argues that despite the principle of subsidiarity being a key 
constitutional concept alongside proportionality in EU law-making for mediating 
the balance of power between the EU and the Member States in areas of shared 
competence that the principle of subsidiarity is also an essentially contested 
concept using Gallie’s theory of essentially contested concepts.266  Such 
conceptual dissonance, it will be argued, favours judicial discretion on how it 
                                                             
263 See further B.Tamanaha, B., On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004).  
 
264 W.B.Gallie,  ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, (1956)  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
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265 R.Dworkin,'The Model of Rules I', in: idem, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 
Cambridge 1987) 14 at 25-26. 
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should be applied.
267
 Consequently, there is a compelling argument for judicial 
reasoning to engage more fully with how the CJEU should deal with such 
dissonance. 
Section 6 concludes the chapter by further explaining how despite the essentially 
contested nature of subsidiarity following the Treaty of Lisbon there is a further 
renewed emphasis on the use of subsidiarity with its inherent respect for local 
law-making to guide the EU institutions when legislating in areas of shared 
competence.  It will also explain how such a renewed emphasis is further 
supported by the introduction of a system of ex ante monitoring by the national 
Parliaments
268
 following the Treaty of Lisbon.
269
   
 
 
2. Subsidiarity as a key constitutional principle for mediating the balance of 
power between the EU and the Member States  
2.1 Introduction to subsidiarity 
In the Treaty of Rome itself, there is no mention of the concept of subsidiarity. 
Nevertheless, as Douglas Scott has argued, there is some evidence that 
subsidiarity was operating within EU law.
270
 In particular, she argues that it could 
be seen in the approach of the CJEU and Commission to Article 28 TEC (now 
Article 34 TFEU).  In addition, Douglas Scott has pointed out that this is implicit 
in the CJEU’s interpretation of Article 28 TEC (now Article 34 TFEU) in the case 
of Cassis de Dijon
271
 where the CJEU held that ‘any product marketed in one 
                                                             
267 For further discussion on literature which highlights how disagreement and dissonance are 
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Member State might be sold in any other, subject only to certain requirements 
which could be demonstrated to serve an objective public interest’, i.e. mutual 
recognition.
272
  Mutual recognition is more consistent with subsidiarity in that it 
allows for more diversity of national regulation. For, and as Douglas-Scott has 
argued, ‘An alternative approach to free movement could have been the 
harmonisation of every last detail of product specification. However, this would 
not have accorded with subsidiarity and proportionality
273
 and would have led to 
the removal of much regional diversity’.274  Thus even at this early stage in the 
story of the emergence of subsidiarity in the EU, the EU was implicitly relying on 
subsidiarity as a way to respect cultural diversity of national rules in this context. 
Other indications of the early use of the concept of subsidiarity in the EU context 
as a mechanism to regulate the competence of the then European Community are 
to be found in the Tindemans Report on the EU.
275
 This report had as one of its 
aims the encouragement of Member States to accept greater Community 
legislative action in order to promote European integration.  Demirci suggests 
that, ‘The core of the debate then was about finding a means of persuading the 
Member States to embrace more, not less, Community action rather than finding a 
basis for the allocation of powers between the Community and the Member 
States’.276 
It is within this context that the subsequent Spinelli Initiative on European Union, 
which preceded the Maastricht Treaty, was produced. This called for reform of 
Community institutions to make such Community legislative action possible as a 
means of promoting the economic success of Europe: infused through the 
discussions leading up to the Spinelli Initiative was the issue of increasing the 
competence of the Community so that it could take more legislative action to 
                                                                                                                                                                       
‘although no specific mention of the word subsidiarity was to be found in the Treaties prior to 
Maastricht, subsidiarity was already operating within EEC law.  For example, it could be seen in 
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promote European integration.
277
  Spinelli’s initiative was put before the 
European Parliament. Their support for the initiative led to a draft EU Treaty 
being put forward in 1984.  In particular, it provided that the EU was only to be 
given ‘those powers required to complete successfully those tasks that they may 
carry out more satisfactorily than the States acting independently’.278This version 
of subsidiarity was weighted in favour of the EU and clearly favoured 
centralization.  As Spinelli explained, ‘the transition from one sphere to the other 
is subject to the principle of subsidiarity in cases when an objective may be 
achieved more effectively in common…’279 
However, the draft European Union Treaty received little support and the 
subsidiarity principle was put to one side while the EU institutions focused on the 
enacting of the Single European Act in 1986.
280
  There was only one indication of 
subsidiarity in the SEA and that was in respect of where the Community was to 
take action in respect of the environment.
281
It was not until President Delors 
promoted subsidiarity as a useful mechanism to provide a constraint on EU law 
making that discussions on subsidiarity started to assume a much greater 
prominence in reassuring politicians concerned about the increase in European 
powers at the expense of national powers.
282
 However, at this stage of discussion 
there was little idea of how the nebulous concept of subsidiarity would be used in 
practice as a safeguard to protect national interests in EU law-making in areas of 
shared competence.  In order to try and flesh out how subsidiarity would be used 
to safeguard of national interests the European Commission issued a report in 
1992 which highlighted the importance of subsidiarity as a safeguard for national 
powers and how subsidiarity could be used in EU law-making in areas of shared 
competence.  So, for example, it stated that ‘national powers are the rule and the 
Community’s the exception’.283  It also proposed that each proposal for 
Community action should be justified using subsidiarity
284
 as well as later 
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presenting to the European Council in 1992 a list of EU legislation already in 
force that did not comply with subsidiarity.
285
 
There was also an earlier draft of the TEU which included that subsidiarity could 
be used as a formal legal mechanism in EU law-making in areas of shared 
competence to protect national interests is evident.
286
 In particular, this provided 
that, ‘Where this Treaty confers concurrent competence on the Union, the 
Member States shall continue to act so long as the Union has not legislated.
287
 The 
Union shall only act to carry out those tasks which may be undertaken more 
effectively in common than by the member states acting separately, in particular 
those whose execution requires action by the Union because their dimension or 
effects extend beyond national frontiers’. 
It was not until the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty that subsidiarity was 
detached from its historical origins discussed next and formally adopted as a 
constitutional principle to guide the exercise of competence of the EU in shared 
policy areas in Article 5 TEC.  The current legal rules of principles are located in 
Article 5(3) TEU.
288
   
Thus in EU law, subsidiarity is a key constitutional principle and rule alongside 
proportionality
289
 for mediating the balance of power between the EU and the 
Member States in the context of the development of EU law and the European 
integration process.
290
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Subsidiarity as a principle in EU law has featured in academic literature from both 
from a legal and an economic perspective. From an economic perspective, 
Pelkmans has pointed out, economists have enjoyed a ‘long tradition in studying 
subsidiarity as a functional principle’291 and have welcomed the principle as a 
useful one in  determining what is best in terms of the overall welfare of a 
particular federal body in a multi-tier setting.
292
 For, as Pelkmans points out, not 
only is it a useful principle  in helping to limit centralisation it is also useful for 
justifying internal market intervention to Member States.
293
 So, for example in the 
EU context, where there has been discussion of subsidiarity from an economic 
perspective, the advantages of the use of such a concept in EU integration in 
respect of determining the best level of government for particular economic 
functions and enhancing and promoting the market has been emphasised.
294
  
On the other hand, subsidiarity has been approached from a legal perspective in 
the academic literature regarding the use of subsidiarity in EU law-making in 
areas of shared competence.  A common theme running through this literature is 
the considerable criticism voiced about the difficulties of operationalising 
subsidiarity from a legal perspective.  For example, Dehousse argues that 
subsidiarity is ‘ill-adapted to the problems it is meant to solve." Furthermore, he 
argues, ‘as a general guideline in favour of decentralisation … its direct utility as 
a legal instrument is limited’.295 It is the legal perspective of subsidiarity in EU 
law- making and the difficulties for the CJEU of operationalising subsidiarity in 
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its reasoning in areas of shared policy in particular that will be the focus of this 
thesis.
296
  
The next section considers the adoption of subsidiarity as a legal and 
constitutional principle by the EU to limit unnecessary EU intervention.  It also 
explains how the rhetoric accompanying the introduction of this principle into EU 
law was primarily focused on the symbolism of such a principle rather than its use 
in practice. This, it will be argued in the next section, is problematic when it 
comes to operationalizing subsidiarity on account of the two opposing aims 
underpinning the use of EU subsidiarity in areas of shared competence: on the one 
hand a push towards centralisation and on the other hand respecting localism. 
 
2.2 The adoption of subsidiarity as a legal and constitutional principle by the 
EU to limit unnecessary EU intervention 
The way the EU introduced the concept of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty as 
a legal and constitutional principle to limit unnecessary EU intervention reflected 
a compromise between various competing interests of the principal actors 
involved in the creation of the internal market.  The competing interests are 
highlighted by Kersbergen and Verbeek as firstly the UK’s concerns about EU 
legislation eroding the national sovereignty of UK Parliament.
297
  Secondly, 
concerns which were raised by the German Federal government that an increase 
of European powers would diminish German regional competence
298
 as well as 
calls by the German Länder for the inclusion of subsidiarity in the Maastricht 
Treaty.
299
 Finally the EU Commission’s interest in reducing the impression that 
the EU’s 1992 programme ‘would lead to ever growing power-wielding by 
Brussels’.300 
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The concept of subsidiarity was given legal effect in the EU initially by the Treaty 
of Maastricht in 1992 in Article 3b.
301
 Article 3b read as follows;  
 
‘The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon 
it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas 
which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall 
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in 
so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale 
or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. 
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of this Treaty’.  
 
Thus this latter article provided that subsidiarity is to be used as a rule to regulate 
EU law making in areas where the EU shares competence with the Member 
States.  
 
However, subsidiarity in that article itself was not defined. Furthermore, the 
principle of subsidiarity has moved away from being a principle of social 
organisation ‘to an explicitly political rule of institutional design through German 
federalist thought’302 and a constitutional and legal principle rule in EU law to 
limit unnecessary EU intervention.   
Examination of the wording of the aforementioned provisions further reveals that 
there was no reference to either the social or political theoretical basis of this 
concept or to the ‘deepest foundation of the doctrine of subsidiarity’ that Carozzo 
has argued underpins the concept of subsidiarity. Indeed reference to 
subsidiarity’s key theoretical foundations as a principle of social organisation is 
conspicuous by its absence from the EU’s concept of subsidiarity in Article 5 
TEU (ex Article 5 TEC).  Academic debate is also rather reticent from a 
philosophical perspective of the EU’s version of subsidiarity and the dangers of 
the conceptual discontinuity that arises from having a concept which has two 
opposing aims: on the one hand a push towards centralisation and, on the other 
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hand, respecting localism.
303
 Instead, academic debate tends to focus on the 
problematic parts of subsidiarity rather than its potential to be more fully realised 
perhaps on account of subsidiarity in EU law having a Eurosceptic connotation 
and pro-integration bias.
304
 So, for example, academic commentary has 
considered the extent to which subsidiarity could be used to restrain the EU law-
making institutions
305
 as well as considering the extent to which subsidiarity is 
subject to judicial review.
306
 
On the other hand, subsidiarity has been adopted as a guide to EU law-making in 
shared areas on account of its inherent respect for local law-making even though 
subsidiarity can also be utilised to push centralisation.
307
  Where subsidiarity is 
promoted as encompassing an emphasis on a respect for decision making being at 
national level when law-making in shared policy areas, this is respectful of the 
accountability of national governments, the latter being best placed to gauge the 
will of the electorate
308
 and best placed to adjust law and policy according to the 
particular cultural conditions in a particular Member State at any point in time.
309
  
Thus subsidiarity encompassing a respect for local law-making by the EU in turn 
enables particular Member States to retain a legal regime that reflects their 
particular socio-cultural conditions
310
 It also respects what Weiler describes as the 
people of a particular national state and its ‘demos’.  The latter he argues is a 
manifestation of various elements such as ‘the common history, common cultural 
habits and sensibilities…’.311 Furthermore, the individual is most fully represented 
politically in a polity marked by a demos, and as the EU lacks a demos this adds 
further weight to the argument that it is the national governments that are best 
placed to gauge the will of the electorate. It makes it easier for the Member State 
to accept supremacy. 
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Thus this section has explained the adoption by the EU of subsidiarity as a legal 
and constitutional principle by the EU to limit unnecessary EU intervention.    
The next section turns to consider the principle of proportionality which has later 
become an aspect of subsidiarity applied to competences in EU law.
312
 This 
provides a prelude to a later section which will look at specific applications of the 
principle of subsidiarity and theories by Kumm and Davies of how it can be 
specifically (or not) applied.  For, although the rhetoric of subsidiarity as a key 
constitutional legal principle and rule is widely accepted, its operationalisation in 
conjunction with the principle of proportionality is much more contested. 
  
3.  Proportionality as a widely recognised concept used as a test in judicial 
review  
3.1 Introduction 
This section introduces the concept of proportionality in EU law which, like 
subsidiarity in EU law, is about the appropriate means to achieve a need.  It also 
explains how unlike subsidiarity, proportionality in EU law is concerned with how 
competence is exercised rather than the EU legislative institutional process of 
determining the level for exercise of competence.  A key purpose of the section is 
to explain  how despite proportionality becoming  a recognised principle of law 
that there are differing levels of intensity of judicial review by the CJEU of 
national restrictions in light of the proportionality principle depending on the type 
of case being considered.
313
 
Adopting a doctrinal perspective, the section commences in 3.2 with a 
consideration of how proportionality is a widely recognised concept used as a test 
in judicial review of public acts at national level.  This discussion is also 
contextualised by reference to wider literature by Elliott which emphasises how at 
national level ‘public law is increasingly about the enforcement of a culture of 
justification’ on account of ‘the ultra vires doctrine [which]has always called for 
exercises of administrative authority to be justified by reference to positive 
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law’.314 Section 3.3 then considers some examples of differing interpretations of 
the operationalization of proportionality. Section 3.4  reviews the use of 
proportionality in EU law by  the CJEU to illustrate  how there are differing levels 
of intensity of judicial review by the CJEU of national restrictions in light of the 
proportionality principle depending on the type of case being considered.
315
 
 
3.2 Proportionality as a widely recognised concept used as a test in judicial 
review of public acts at national level 
Proportionality, Möller argues, ‘is a doctrinal tool for the resolution of conflicts 
between a right and a competing right or interest at the core of which is the 
balancing stage which requires the right to be balanced against the competing 
right or interest’316 and that ‘this conflict is ultimately resolved at the balancing 
stage’.317 Although he acknowledges that there are differing ways in which the 
proportionality principle has been expressed by courts in constitutional rights 
law,
318
 the widely accepted view is that the ultimate resolution of the conflict at 
the balancing test is preceded by the court ‘establish[ing] that there exists a 
genuine conflict (suitability) between the right and a relevant (legitimate) 
competing interest (legitimate goal) which cannot be resolved in a less restrictive 
way (necessity)’.319  Each stage, he argues, raises particular questions.  So, for 
example, in respect of establishing whether there is a legitimate goal the primary 
focus of a court is to consider ‘whether a policy or decision is objectively 
justifiable, not whether the persons who made it had the right considerations on 
their minds’.320 Once it is established that there is a legitimate goal for a particular 
policy he explains that a court necessarily goes on to consider ‘if the interference 
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contributes to the achievement of the goal to some extent, however small, then the 
suitability test is satisfied because it has been established that there is indeed a 
clash of the two values’.321 The third stage, he argues, focuses on establishing that 
‘there must be no other, less restrictive policy that achieves the legitimate goal 
equally well’322 although he does acknowledge that such a test can be problematic 
where the less restrictive policy requires more resources or finances.
323
  Finally, 
he explains how the most problematic stage is that of the balancing stage which 
necessitates ‘a moral argument as to which of the competing interests takes 
priority in the case at hand’ which in the constitutional context requires ‘balancing 
all the relevant considerations’324 and determining ‘the sacrifice that can 
legitimately be demanded from one person for the benefit of another person or the 
public’.325 This is most problematic because it seems to involve the greatest 
degree of discretion – a substantive policy choice by the judiciary over which of 
the two competing interests is more desirable. Thus, as Huscroft, Miller and 
Webber argue ‘what the principle of proportionality does promise is a common 
analytical framework, the significance of which is not in its ubiquity, but in how 
its structure influences (some would say controls) how courts reason to 
conclusions in many of the great moral and political controversies confronting 
political communities’.326 
As proportionality is a widely recognised and frequently used concept in judicial 
review of public acts at national level,
 327
  it consequently has close clinks in the 
literature with wider debates on the importance of justifying the exercise of 
governmental authority to legal authority in order to reflect and evidence an 
adherence to the rule of law.
328
  In respect of the latter and more recently in the 
light of increasing legal requirements imposed on governments Elliott argues 
there has been an increase of what is expected of government authorities when 
exercising governmental power.  In particular, and as Elliott highlights, for 
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government authorities ‘what the law requires is taken to have become 
increasingly demanding.’329 
Proportionality and its links with the wider debates on the importance of justifying 
the exercise of power has particular importance when considering how judges 
review the exercise of governmental authority which impacts on the rights of the 
legitimate expectations of the individual as ‘the sufficiency of any justification 
may fall to be assessed against additional, more demanding criteria.’ 330 This, 
Elliott argues requires courts when reviewing the exercise of governmental 
authority to be clear about firstly that, 
 ‘that it too would have proceeded in the way that the administrator did.  
Second, even once the issue of the standard of justification, or review has 
been settled, questions will arise about whether that standard has been met-
which, in turn, triggers questions about the court’s role in evaluating the 
quality of any justifications offered by the decision-maker.’331 
To achieve such a structured approach when reviewing the exercise of 
governmental authority, Elliott proposes that the court should focus on two 
distinct questions.  Firstly ‘to determine what should constitute the operative 
standard of justification in the particular circumstances of the case.  What, in other 
words, should be the justificatory burden under which the decision-maker is 
placed, and which will have to be discharged if the decision is to be found by the 
reviewing court to be lawful?’332 
Secondly, Elliott explains how the court needs to consider the rationality of the 
decision with reference to whether a fair balance has been struck between 
conflicting interests.  This question he accepts ‘reduces, at least to some extent, to 
a value judgement, the acceptability of the balance struck between two 
incommensurable variables being impossible to determine unless those variables 
are first invested with values that are inherently contestable’. 333 The debate about 
legitimacy centres on this: why should the judiciary be making alternative policy 
choices to the executive/legislature here? i.e. between incommensurable vaues. A 
                                                             
329 M. Elliott, ‘Justification, Calibration and Substantive Judicial Review: Putting Doctrine in its 
Place’  UK Const. L. Blog (17th September 2013) <  http://ukconstitutionallaw.org)>accessed 
13.6.14. 
330 Ibid. 
331 Ibid. 
332 Ibid. 
333 Ibid. 
82 
 
common theme highlighted in the literature concerning the use of proportionality 
by judges is on account of judges having to strike a balance between two 
incommensurable variables.  So, for example as Endicott explains, ‘The 
incommensurability problem: if there is no rational basis for deciding one way 
rather than the other, then the result seems to represent a departure from the rule 
of law, in favour of arbitrary rule by judges’.334  Barak, however, has sought to 
defend the use of proportionality  by arguing,  
‘ that it is a common base for comparison, namely the social marginal 
importance and that the balancing rules—basic, principled, concrete—supply 
a rational basis for balancing. A democracy must entrust the judiciary—the 
unelected independent judiciary—to be the final decision-maker—subject to 
constitutional amendments—about proper ends that cannot be achieved 
because they are not proportionality stricto sensu’. 335  
Thus Barak argues that as there is a common base for comparison and a structured 
approach to balancing that the judiciary must be allowed to make the final 
decision here.  Citing the example of a judge deciding a case weighing up the 
right to family life against a country’s right to control immigration, he argues that 
both options are socially important and therefore the judge can decide which way 
the case should be decided as there is a single criterion here.
336
 The single 
criterion he outlines refers to, ‘the relative social importance attached to each of 
the conflicting principle or interest at the point of conflict, which assesses the 
importance to society of the benefits gained by realisation of the law’s goals as 
opposed to the importance of society of preventing the limitations of human 
rights’.337 
On the other hand, Endicott points out, 
‘identifying a single criterion does not eliminate incommensurability if the 
application of the criterion depends on considerations that are themselves 
incommensurable.  If we are trying to decide whether to go to a restaurant 
with excellent food that is expensive, or a restaurant with less-than-
                                                             
334 T.Endicott, ‘Proportionality and Incommensurability’, in G,Huscriftm B. Miller and G.Webber 
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University Press, 2014) 317. 
335 A.Barak, ‘Proportionality and Principled Balancing’, (2010) 4 Law and Ethics of Human 
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336 Ibid at 7. 
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excellent food that is cheaper, you would be right to say that there is a 
common base for comparison (we could call it preferability); and you 
would be right to insist that there may be rational ground for judging that 
one restaurant is preferable to another (because, for example, there can be 
definite reason to choose a much-less-expensive restaurant where the food 
is almost as good) But you would have no reason to claim that the 
considerations that determine which restaurant is preferable are 
commensurable, and no reason to think that, for every pair of alternatives, 
there is determinate reason in favour of one choice between the two.  In 
human rights cases, the availability of the covering value, importance does 
not give us any reason to think that the grounds on which judgements are 
to be made are commensurable.  Major incommensurabilites need to be 
resolved in order to make the judgement that Barak recommends as to 
whether it is more socially important to interfere with family life (or 
freedom of speech or of religion) in a particular way, or more socially 
important not to do so’.338 
Other literature too has focused on whether proportionality as a concept is a 
normatively desirable one in the context of the relationship between the state and 
the individual at national level. In particular, the concept has been interpreted in 
different ways on account of the existence of different theories of rights regimes: 
for example, Alexy has argued that proportionality is a tool to balance 
individual/group interests against the public interest of the state.
339
 Furthermore, 
he argues, ‘the principle of proportionality in its narrow sense follows from the 
fact that principles are optimization requirements relative to what is legally 
possible.  The principles of necessity and suitability follow from the nature of 
principles as optimization requirements to what is factually possible’.340 In a 
recent article Alexy further points out that there is a distinction between formal 
principles, such as legal certainty, and substantive principles, such as justice, and 
how there are cases ‘in which a formal principle can and even must, be balanced 
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against a substantive principle’.341  Such balancing exercises, he concludes, ‘have 
been dealt with in the past in Germany after the collapse of the German 
Democratic Republic 1989 by applying the Radbruch formula of ‘extreme 
injustice is no law’.342 Such a formula he points out ‘is the result of balancing the 
substantive principle of justice against the formal principle of legal certainty’, and 
that ‘according to the law of colliding principles, the consequence of the 
procedure of the principle of justice over the principle of legal certainty under the 
conditions of extreme injustice is that under this condition the consequences 
required by the prevailing principle of justice applies and this is exactly what the 
Radbruch formula
343
 states.’344  Thus the use of such a formula involves giving a 
higher concrete weight to justice than to certainty in situations which involve 
extreme injustice.  
Dworkin, on the other hand, has argued that such balancing should not be utilised 
in the context of limiting rights.
345
 As he writes, ‘if someone has the right to do 
something then it is wrong for the government to deny it to him even though it 
would be in the general interest to do so’.346 Habermas too argues that balancing 
is difficult as ‘because there are not rational standards here, weighing takes place 
either arbitrarily or unreflectively, according to customary standards and 
hierarchies’.347 
 
Thus this section has explained how proportionality has been argued to be ‘a 
doctrinal tool for the resolution of conflicts between a right and a competing right 
or interest at the core of which is the balancing stage which requires the right to be 
balanced against the competing right or interest’348 and that ‘this conflict is 
ultimately resolved at the balancing stage’.349 This has included discussion of 
literature which has highlighted the difficulties of the use of proportionality by the 
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judges when having to strike a balance between two incommensurable variables. 
It has also explained how proportionality is a widely recognised concept (as 
discussed next) used as a test in judicial review of public acts at national level.
350
  
Such discussion was contextualised by reference to wider literature by Elliott 
which emphasises how at national level ‘public law is increasingly about the 
enforcement of a culture of justification’ on account of ‘the ultra vires doctrine 
[which]has always called for exercises of administrative authority to be justified 
by reference to positive law’.351 With this literature in mind the next section 
considers and critiques some examples of differing interpretations of the 
operationalization of proportionality in the use of balancing individual/group 
interests against the public interest.  
 
3.3 Differing interpretations of the operationalization of proportionality 
Proportionality has been said to encompass the notion that ‘if you pursue an end, 
you must use a means that is helpful, necessary and appropriate’.352  It has been 
proposed that it is a ‘test to determine whether an interference with a prima facie 
right is justified’.353 The origins of the use of a concept of proportionality as 
encompassing the notion that ‘more than enough is out of proportion’354 are 
old.
355
  So, for example, proportionality has been used in the context of exercise 
of administrative powers in nineteenth century administrative law of Prussia
356
 
and, in particular, the Prussian Supreme Administrative Court.  In the case of 
Kreutzberg, for example, the Prussian Supreme Administrative Court ruled that 
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the police should only employ such measures as are necessary for the maintenance 
of public order.
357
  
Following the Second World War, in Germany, the later established Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany also made further use of proportionality when 
reviewing administrative action of the German authorities in light of the German 
constitution which has a Bill of Rights enshrining a variety of individual rights.
358
 
But the same German constitution also permits administrative action which has 
the potential to limit these rights.  Consequently, the German Constitutional Court 
has been faced with two potentially conflicting principles that are both enshrined 
in the German Constitution. It is within the context of the German Constitutional 
Court being faced with such a conflict that they have relied on proportionality in 
that any German legislation that is brought in must be the minimum necessary to 
achieve the result.
359
  As Takahashi explains,  
‘the legitimacy of proportionality is derived from the requirement to 
protect citizens’ basic rights, one of the underlying constitutional values.  
The BVerfG has recognised proportionality as a constitutional principle on 
the basis of the principle of Rechsstaat (rule of law or constitutional state) 
and the essence of the fundamental rights themselves. First, while requiring 
the legitimacy of all the state’s actions to be compatible with the 
constitution, Rechsstaat is designed to protect citizens’ rights against 
interference by powerful state authorities.  Secondly, the concept of human 
dignity enunciated in Art 1(1) G and the right to the free development of 
the individual guaranteed in Article 2(1) GG preordain that citizens can 
enjoy the maximum freedom of action.’360 
The framework for the application of the proportionality test is considered by 
Cohn who explains how the German Constitutional Court has adopted a three 
pronged test.  
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 ‘Firstly the measure must be suitable for the achievement of the aim 
pursued.  Secondly, no other milder means could have been employed to 
achieve that aim (a necessity tool). Thirdly, under a proportionality stricto 
senso test, a type of cost-benefit analysis is required for the measure to be 
upheld. The benefit at large must outweigh the injury to the implicated 
individual’.361  
 It is the latter test, Cohn argues, is concerned with balancing which is ‘the main 
metaphor to explain what judges do when they rule upon the proportionality of a 
constitutional act’.362  However, balancing is also the most problematic part of the 
proportionality test in that such judicial balancing not only empowers judges in 
respect of judicial review of administrative action, it also runs the risk of leading 
to subjectivity in judicial reasoning on account of the fact that when judges adopt 
a balancing approach, this does not necessarily provide a consistent approach of 
how the interests are to be weighted.
363
 The problem of incommensurability of 
proportionality has been the subject of critique on the grounds that proportionality 
can be subjective when incommensurable values are to be pitted against another 
as discussed above.  For example, Möller considers this and points out that such 
criticisms focus on the argument ‘that proportionality analysis is not morally 
neutral or that balancing can or should always be conducted in a cost-benefit 
fashion.’364   
On the other hand, despite the criticism of the use of proportionality, the use of 
proportionality conceptually has been popular as a way of encompassing the 
notion that any legislation must be the minimum necessary to achieve a result in 
the context of the relationship between the state and the individual
365
 i.e. so the 
necessity element is less controversial. It has been used in a number of different 
ways and in a variety of legal contexts. So, for example, proportionality is a key 
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concept utilised by the European Court of Human Rights.
366
 It is frequently 
evidenced in practice in the case law of the ECHR where the Court of Human 
Rights has sought to balance Convention rights with legitimate governmental 
concerns and the existence of a margin of appreciation
367
 that states retain when 
legislating for legitimate concerns.
368
 So, for example, in the case of Sporrong 
and  Lönnroth v Sweden it emphasised in its ruling that even where contracting 
states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in the context of implementation of 
their town-planning policy, ‘the Court must determine whether a fair balance was 
struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the 
requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights The search 
for this balance is inherent in the whole of the Convention and is also reflected in 
the structure of Article 1.’369  
In the UK the principle of proportionality post the Human Rights Act 1998 is also 
now recognised by the House of Lords and Supreme Court as a principle of UK 
public law but only (usually) when applying the Human Rights Act.
370
 However, 
as Hick points out, although, 
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‘the reception of the principle of proportionality into domestic law has been 
a great advance, [but] it must be accompanied by a well-thought-out, clear, 
consistent and principled approach to its content and structure.  This has not 
occurred.  There is a real danger that proportionality will become no more 
than a label attached to the outcome of a judge’s consideration of the facts of 
the case’. 371  
 Furthermore, he argues that ‘the internal structure of proportionality needs to be 
carefully and clearly structured, its relationship with other substantive standards in 
public law must also reflect a broader principled structure’.372 This is a 
particularly pressing issue in light of the recent disagreements on proportionality 
in the UK between the judiciary and the Parliament when balancing the right 
rights of criminals from abroad to remain in the UK against their right to family 
life under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights and the 
difficulties of the balance when deciding how to prioritise competing abstract 
interests.
373
  So, for example, Teresa May has recently criticised UK judges as 
being too lenient in their approach and ignoring the will of Parliament in the 
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Huang and Kasmiri 
374
 case where the House of Lords ruled that the immigration 
rules, as secondary legislation, were subordinate to the court’s interpretation of 
proportionality under Article 8 ECHR as incorporated by the Human Rights Act 
1998 as they did not have full parliamentary endorsement.
375
  The dangers of an 
unstructured approach to proportionality are also considered by Hick who 
considers the judgment of Laws L.J. in Nadarajah
376
 and concludes that ‘the 
result was reached without the application of any standard or test of justification.’ 
The question of exactly how a court should perform the proportionality test has 
also been the subject of judicial debate.
377
  For example in in de Freitas v 
Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing 
Lord Clyde ruled that undertaking a proportionality test in this case should 
involve ‘whether the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify 
limiting a fundamental right; the measures designed to meet the legislative 
objective are rationally connected to it; and the means used to impair the right or 
freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective’.378 In 
Quilla,
379
 a fourth criterion has been referred to as including the need to balance 
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the interests of society with those of individuals and groups although in that case 
Endicott points out the Court was hampered in undertaking the balance in that, 
 ‘little information was available to the Home Secretary or the Court.  The 
government could not quantify the usefulness of the measure in fighting 
forced marriage.  Faced with a number of young couples who were 
inconvenienced by the delay in starting their married life together in the 
place where they wanted to live, and faced with a nebulous prospect that 
the measure might deter some forced marriages, the United Kingdom 
supreme court held that the measure was disproportionate in its impact on 
voluntary spouses (and therefore unlawful under the UK Human Rights 
Act’.380 
On the other hand, in the recent case of Miranda v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ,
381
 Laws LJ considered Lord Sumption’s approach to the nature of 
the proportionality test in Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2): namely 
‘[T]he question depends on an exacting analysis of the factual case advanced in 
defence of the measure, in order to determine (i) whether its objective is 
sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a fundamental right; (ii) whether 
it is rationally connected to that objective; (iii) whether a less intrusive measure 
could have been used; and (iv) whether, having regard to these matters and the 
severity of the consequences, a fair balance has been struck between the rights of 
the individual and the interests of the community.’382 This formulation, Laws 
argues adds a further requirement when considering the proportionality test 
namely ‘whether... a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the 
individual and the interests of the community’.383 This requirement, he explains,  
‘appears to have been introduced into our law in Razgar [2004] 2 AC 368 
(paragraph 20) and Huang [2007] 2 AC 167 (paragraphs 19 and 20), 
drawing on what was said by Dickson CJ in R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103. 
I think it needs to be approached with some care. It appears to require the 
court, in a case where the impugned measure passes muster on points (i) – 
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(iii), to decide whether the measure, though it has a justified purpose and is 
no more intrusive than necessary, is nevertheless offensive because it fails 
to strike the right balance between private right and public interest; and the 
court is the judge of where the balance should lie. I think there is real 
difficulty in distinguishing this from a political question to be decided by 
the elected arm of government. If it is properly within the judicial sphere, it 
must be on the footing that there is a plain case’.384 
This, Elliott argues, shows Laws J distinguishing the fair balance part of the 
proportionality test on the grounds that the Court is required to compare 
incommensurable values.
385
  Consequently Elliott concludes that the Court has to 
accord weight to each of these values before weighing these competing values 
against each other.
386
 
 In light of the increasing use of proportionality in the UK under the Human 
Rights Act 1998 and the imminent accession of the EU to the ECHR this begs the 
question of whether there will be a need to develop a single proportionality test 
for when the EU accedes to the ECHR.
387
 With this in mind, the next section turns 
to consider how there have been different levels of intensity of judicial review in 
light of the proportionality principle depending on the type of case being 
considered. 
 
3.4 Differing levels of intensity of judicial review by the CJEU of national 
restrictions in light of the proportionality principle depending on the type of 
case being considered 
In EU law too proportionality has been recognised as a general principle of EU 
law.
388
 Indeed, as Coutts highlights, proportionality in EU law ‘is seen as the 
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golden thread for deciding on the desirability and the need for EU action in a 
given area’.389 It is also well evidenced in practice from the reasoning of the 
CJEU.
390
  As  Harbo explains, ‘the ECJ applies the proportionality principle when 
it balances legislative and administrative measures against private interests, 
individual rights and fundamental freedoms’.391 
An example of where the CJEU has applied the proportionality principle is 
evidenced by the CJEU in the case of Alpine Investments
392
, a case concerning a 
Dutch firm which sold financial products by cold calling and Dutch national 
legislation which prohibited cold calling for all customers whether they were in 
the Netherlands or another Member State.   Here the CJEU applied the 
proportionality principle and held that such a restriction on the cross-border offer 
services could be justified to protect investor confidence in national financial 
markets
393
  when it ruled in para 48 that, 
 
‘The Member State from which the telephone call is made is best placed to 
regulate cold calling. Even if the receiving State wishes to prohibit cold 
calling or to make it subject to certain conditions, it is not in a position to 
prevent or control telephone calls from another Member State without the 
cooperation of the competent authorities of that State’ and in para 49 that, 
‘consequently, the prohibition of cold calling by the Member State from 
which the telephone call is made, with a view to protecting investor 
confidence in the financial markets of that State, cannot be considered to 
                                                                                                                                                                       
discussion of the function of proportionality in EU law and an argument that the CJEU applies 
proportionality in different ways see T.Harbo,  ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in 
EU law’, (2010) 16(2) European Law Journal 158-185. 
389 E. Herlin-Karnell, ‘Constitutional Principles in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, in 
D.Arcarazo and C.Murphy, EU Security and Justice Law after Lisbon and Stockholm, (Hart 
Publishing, 2014) 45 
390 See Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mBH v Einfurh und vorratsstelle für 
Getreide und Futtermittel where the CJEU found that the EC regulatory measures were 
proportionate and consequently not infringing the right to property. See also T.Inge Harbo, ‘The 
Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’, (2010) 16(2) European law Journal for a 
discussion of the function of the proportionality principle as a general principle of law in terms of 
securing legitimacy for judicial decisions; G. de Búrca, 'The Principle of Proportionality and its 
Application in EC Law', in (1993) 13 Yearbook of European Law 105–150,  
391 T.Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU law’, (2010) 16(2) European 
Law Journal 158-185 at 171. 
392 Case C 384/93, Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financien, [1995] 2 CMLR 209. 
393 Ibid paras 45-50. 
94 
 
be inappropriate to achieve the objective of securing the integrity of those 
markets’.394 
  
The use of proportionality has also been of relevance in the reasoning of the CJEU 
in the context of an individual EU ‘market’ citizen using the fundamental market 
freedoms under the Treaty following the case of Van Gend.
395
 For this latter case 
enabled individual EU market citizens to seek protection of these rights in 
national courts and, through the availability of the preliminary reference system 
pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, to access to the CJEU.  This in turn has led to the 
CJEU being afforded the role of protector of the fundamental market freedoms of 
EU citizens as well as being placed in the position of arbitrator between the 
individual citizen and the Member State in this context using proportionality when 
considering Member State action and the position of the individual citizen.
396
 
Kumm also highlights how the early use of proportionality by the CJEU was 
closely associated with the creation of human rights protection in the EU in the 
case of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft
397
 when he writes, 
 ‘it is possible to distinguish the familiar three main prongs of the test. The 
first concerns the question whether the measure at issue furthers a 
legitimate purpose. With regard to the forfeited deposits at issue in 
                                                             
394 See also Case 118/75, Watson and Belman, (1976) ECR 1185 where the CJEU in considering 
the proportionality of penalties for breach of EU law ruled in para 21 that ‘other penalties, such as 
fines and detention, whilst the national authorities are entitled to impose penalties in respect of a 
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395 Case 26/62 NV Algemene transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
 
396 For a more general discussion of the development by the CJEU of the key EU law doctrines of 
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who cites the Opinion of Mr. Dutheillet de Lamothye, in Case 11/70 Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft  at p. 1146  that  all human rights related questions ‘concerning the internal 
legality of the disputed measures are linked to one and the same problem, namely whether or not 
these measures comply with a principle of ‘proportionality’, under which citizens may only have 
imposed on them, for the purposes of the public interest, obligations which are strictly necessary 
for those purposes attained.’                                               
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Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, for example, the court first established 
that they furthered a legitimate purpose: the deposit served as an 
instrument to ensure that the Commission was well informed about overall 
volume of export and import, thus providing valuable information on the 
structure of the market the Commission was charged to help regulate. 
Second, the measure has to be necessary. It is necessary if there are no 
other equally effective means to achieve the same goal. In Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft the court found the rule regarding its forfeiture was 
necessary, in that alternative means, such as penalties imposed ex post, 
were not equally effective. Finally, the court examines whether the burden 
imposed is excessive or disproportionate when compared to its benefits. 
The court held that the system of deposits and the rules on forfeiture were 
not a disproportionate burden on the exporter, both because of the 
relatively modest amount of the deposit and the fact that in case of force 
majeur – which the court suggested should be interpreted liberally – the 
deposit was not forfeited.’398 
However, the use of proportionality by the CJEU also needs to be accompanied by 
a clear, consistent and principled approach to its content and structure in order to 
provide a clear doctrinal test that the CJEU can utilise in its case law.  This relates 
to the rule of law principles of certainty and predictability.
399
  Examination of a 
selection of well documented CJEU case law on proportionality reveals that there 
is a considerable variety in the degree of intensity and application by the CJEU of 
proportionality tests as well as differences in the amount of guidance it gives to 
the Member States in this context.
400
 For example, following the case of 
Dassonville
401
 and the CJEU’s expansion of the scope of free movement thereby 
necessitating more recognition of the exceptions to free movement by the CJEU, 
proportionality has been increasingly used in EU law by the CJEU to determine 
the scope of the exception to the free movement principle.
402
 The proportionality 
review undertaken by the CJEU in this context features three particular 
                                                             
398 Kumm Op.Cit. at 6. 
399 For further discussion see B. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
400 T.Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU law’, (2010) 16(2) European 
Law Journal 158-185 and who argues this. 
401 Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] 2 CMLR 436. 
402 T.Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (2006, 2nd ed., Oxford, OUP)  at 137 argues that 
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96 
 
characteristics.
403
  These have been considered by Jans and who outlines firstly 
‘the national measure must be suitable actually to protect the interest that requires 
protection.  There must, as it were, be a causal relationship between the measure 
and its object, i.e. it can achieve its object.
404
   
 
Secondly, Jans outlines how a second characteristic of a proportionality review in 
this context is whether there is a need for such a national measure.
405
 As he 
writes,’ this implies, among other things, that there must be no measure less 
restrictive, but adequate, available to attain the objective pursued.  In other words 
the familiar criterion of the least restrictive alternative’.406 This includes, he 
argues, considering whether the national measure is disproportionate in relation to 
the restriction to intra Community trade and is out of proportion with the result 
achieved.
407
 The CJEU in considering whether the national measure is 
disproportionate in relation to the restriction to intra Community trade and is out 
of proportion with the result achieved necessarily involves the CJEU in weighing 
up the conflicting interests at play.
408
  It is the most challenging characteristic of 
the proportionality review, argues Jans, in that it raises constitutional implications 
in terms of the distribution of power.  For the CJEU has to review whether the 
national measure at issue in a case, and which poses a restriction to Community 
law is out of proportion with the result achieved and   ‘the more intensive the 
                                                             
403 For further discussion of the German approach to proportionality see A.Brady,  Proportionality 
and Deference in the UK HRA,  (Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 52 and who writes ‘The 
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406 Jans Op.Cit at 245-247 for a discussion of case law in this context. 
407 Jans Op.Cit at 241 and a discussion of the few examples of the CJEU’s case law in this context 
at 248-252 where the ‘Court has explicitly formulated the proportionality as an obligation to 
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408 Jans Op.Cit at 241  and who points out that express references to balancing interests by the 
CJEU are extremely rare 248.  One example he cites where the CJEU has expressly referred to 
balancing of interests is in the Stoke on Trent case (Case C-169/91 Council of the City of Stoke-on-
Trent and Norwich City Council v B and Q PlC [1992] ECR I-6635).  
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Court of Justice’s scrutiny of national restrictions in light of the proportionality 
principle, the greater the shift in powers from the national legislatures to the 
European judiciary.’409  The more intensive the scrutiny by the CJEU of national 
restrictions the closer this comes to the CJEU’s approach to proportionality being 
merit-based. 
So how much discretion is left to the national court when the CJEU is scrutinising 
national restrictions in light of the proportionality principle?  In the context of free 
movement de Búrca argues this very much depends on the nature of the relevant 
public interest.
410
  The difference in levels of intensity of judicial review when 
undertaking a proportionality test has been argued by Tridimas to depend on the 
type of case.
411
  So, for example, he argues that where the CJEU ‘is involved in 
review of a Community measure where the CJEU will not strike down a measure 
unless it considers it manifestly inappropriate to achieve its objectives’.412  Such 
an approach by the CJEU is close to Wednesbury
413
 in its light touch towards 
review of EU measures, as opposed to review of national implementing measures 
where Gerards explains the burden is placed ‘on the individual challenging the 
administrative act to demonstrate that it is substantially unreasonable.
414
  
Furthermore, it implies that no specific test of proportionality will be 
applied….the  application of a test of proportionality would mean that a court 
would have to consider the relative weight according to a variety of interests and 
considerations, assess the balancing of the various interests involved in the 
decision and judge whether the administrative activity was really necessary’.415  
This Gerards concludes would be inappropriate as the courts ‘are not considered 
                                                             
409 Jans Op.Cit at 242. 
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to be sufficiently equipped to apply such an exacting test’.416 So this is the same 
criticism again about the judiciary making substantive policy choices. 
On the other hand, Tridimas argues, where the CJEU is involved in a case where 
it is argued that a national measure is contrary to a Community fundamental 
freedom and the CJEU is required to balance Union interests against the national 
interest ‘the principle is applied as a market integration mechanism and the 
intensity of the review is much stronger’.417 This is illustrated for example in the 
cases of Schmidberger.
418
  The case itself involved environmentalists protesting 
on the Brenner motorway in Austria with the implicit permission of the Austrian 
authorities.  It was argued that the Austrian authorities were acting contrary to 
Article 30. The CJEU here considered its case law category of exceptions and 
weighed up the conflicting principles of free movement of goods and the 
fundamental right to freedom of expression and determine an appropriate balance 
had been reached by the Austrian authorities when they had implicitly permitted 
the demonstration.
419
 In weighing up these competing interests, the CJEU pointed 
out that the competent authorities enjoy a wide margin of discretion in that regard 
ruling and  that ‘it is necessary to determine whether the restrictions placed upon 
intra-Community trade are proportionate in the light of the legitimate objective 
pursued, namely, in the present case, the protection of fundamental rights’.420 
Schidberger is an example of a more deferential approach by the CJEU where the 
CJEU distinguished the facts at issue in this case from the CMS v France
421
, 
another case concerning a demonstration which prevented the free movement of 
goods, in various ways.  For example, on the grounds that the demonstration in 
Schmidberger had taken place following a request for authorisation to the 
Austrian authorities and after the Austrian authorities had decided not to ban it.
422
 
Secondly, on the grounds that the demonstration took place only once, on a single 
route and for a limited time unlike in the Commission v France case where there 
had been serious disruption over a period of time.  Thirdly, that the Austrian 
citizens’ purpose here was in exercising their right to freedom of expression rather 
                                                             
416 Ibid. 
417 T. Tridimas, ‘Proportionality in Community Law: Searching for the Appropriate Standard of 
Scrutiny’, in E.Ellis The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe, (Hart Publishing, 
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than to restrict the free movement of goods as in the Commission v France case 
where the French farmers were seeking to obstruct the free movement of goods.
423
 
Fourthly, that the Austrian authorities had taken steps to mitigate the disruption by 
putting in place various administrative and supporting measures.
424
Ultimately, the 
CJEU concluded that, ‘the national authorities were reasonably entitled, having 
regard to the wide discretion which must be accorded to them in the matter, to 
consider that the legitimate aim of that demonstration could not be achieved in the 
present case by measures less restrictive of intra-Community trade’425.  Thus in 
this case we see the CJEU actually performing a proportionality review and 
balancing the interests involved in order to assess whether the right balance had 
been achieved even though in practice Jans argues the CJEU generally does not 
carry out the balancing
426
 i.e. because it leaves it to the national courts. 
In respect of weighing the balance here, the CJEU in this case also, by referring to 
the free movement principles as being fundamental, equates free movement with 
fundamental rights thus enabling it to weigh the balance in favour of free 
movement here even when the disruption to free movement was de minimus.  As 
Gerards points out,  
‘on a more abstract level, the judgement may thus be understood as 
meaning that the four freedoms constitute fundamental rights as much as 
civil and political rights. This equalisation of the four freedoms with 
fundamental rights is the more interesting as the freedoms are primarily 
economic in character, having been created to guarantee free trade within 
the internal market in the first place’.427 
More recently in the case of Anton Las,
428
 the CJEU has demonstrated how even 
where it accepts the Member States justification for particular national measures 
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to protect a language pursuant to Art 4(2) TEU,
429
 it is prepared to challenge those 
national measures as being disproportionate to the objectives relied upon by the 
national legislature and consequently contrary to Article 45 TFEU.  For here the 
appropriateness of Belgium rules requiring employers of a business situated in a 
particular federated entity to draft cross-border employment contracts in the 
official language of that particular federated entity, were deemed by the Advocate 
General, and later by the CJEU, as disproportionate in nature and that other more 
appropriate measures could have been adopted. 
430
 As the Advocate General 
highlighted,  
‘There are other, less restrictive, means of protecting employees which 
are just as, if not more, effective, whilst preserving use of the regional 
language, such as making it easier for the employee or employer who is 
not familiar with the language to use translations into a language which 
the person concerned understands sufficiently well.
431
 
The CJEU too agreed with the Advocate General and rejected the arguments put 
forward by the Belgian Government that, 
‘the legislation at issue in the main proceedings addresses a three-fold 
need, first, to promote and encourage the use of one of its official 
languages, next, to ensure the protection of employees by enabling them 
to examine employment documents in their own language and to enjoy 
the effective protection of the workers’ representative bodies and 
administrative and judicial bodies called upon to recognise those 
documents, and, finally, to ensure the efficacy of the checks and 
supervision of the employment inspectorate’.432   
Neither the CJEU nor the Advocate General considered and weighed up evidence 
to support its rejection of the arguments put forward by the Belgium government 
that such legislation was needed to safeguard the use of an official language, 
ensure protection of employment contracts in their own language and respect the 
decisions of the national body tasked with supervising employment documents.  
Rather the CJEU simply concluded ‘ In the light of the foregoing, it must be held 
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that legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings goes beyond what is 
strictly necessary to attain the objectives referred to in paragraph 24 of this 
judgment and cannot therefore be regarded as proportionate’.433 
On the other hand, in light of the discretion involved in the CJEU undertaking a 
proportionality review, is the CJEU well placed to engage in an assessment of the 
complex normative and empirical questions that a proportionality review 
requires?  This is an important question.  The CJEU is required to give reasons 
and justify in its ruling following assessment of both the empirical and normative 
dimensions of a proportionality review to ensure the legitimacy of its decision.  It 
also has to convince the national courts of the validity of its ruling in light of the 
supervisory role the national court has over the CJEU.  For the CJEU relies on the 
national court not just for questions raised through the preliminary reference but 
also for the national court to give effect to the CJEU’s preliminary ruling. 
Ultimately, the national court can in principle refuse to give effect to the CJEU’s 
preliminary ruling, although this does not happen in practice.
434
  Nevertheless, the 
more contestable the balancing approaches of the CJEU the more it feeds into 
doubts at national level about accepting supremacy.
435
 Consequently, in light of 
the immense use of proportionality in EU law
436
 as well as the different levels of 
intensity of review adopted by the CJEU in different contexts and the imminent 
accession of the EU to the ECHR there is an even more pressing need to consider 
whether there is a need for a single proportionality test and for the justification of 
whatever proportionality test is in fact adopted.
437
 
For if the EU applies a different proportionality test to that of the ECHR, this runs 
the risk of inconsistent standards between the two systems.  Accession may also 
cause difficulties where there is a conflict between a provision of EU and 
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provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights in that the former is 
binding on EU member States by virtue of the doctrine of supremacy of EU law 
over national law.
438
   
With this in mind, and having acknowledged the theoretical perspectives of both 
subsidiarity and proportionality, the chapter turns to consider how the concept of 
subsidiarity came to be detached from its historical roots and instead in EU law 
linked with proportionality to law-making in shared competence areas and 
determining in principle more than in CJEU practice whether the EU or the 
Member States should act. 
 
4 Subsidiarity and Proportionality in EU law-making in shared areas of 
competence 
 
4.1. A conceptual link between conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality 
Since its inception, a guiding principle for the EU is that it only has the 
competence
439
 or the power to act that has been conferred on it by the Treaties.
440
  
For although the explicit inclusion of the principle of conferral was only included 
in the Treaty of Maastricht,
441
 it was implicit in the debate over who are the 
masters of the Treaties.
442
  In respect of the different types of competence, 
currently, although the TFEU refers to three categories of competence in Article 5 
TFEU, 
443
 the focus of this discussion is in relation to Article 3(2) TEU where the 
EU shares competence with the Member States.  This provides that ‘The Member 
States will only be able to exercise this shared competence if the EU has not 
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439. For further discussion of the definition of power or competence see Wesley Hohfeld’s 
definition of power or competence as the capacity or amenity to change legal relations: W. 
Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning’, 1913-14 23 
Yale LJ 16-59 at 55 
440 For further discussion see K.Alter,‘Who are the Masters of the Treaty?  European Governments 
and the European Court of Justice’, (1998) 52 International Organization 121-147. 
441 Article 3b Treaty of Maastricht 7.2.92. 
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exercised its competence to act or if the EU has ceased to exercise its 
competence’.  It is in this specific context where the EU has competence to act 
that Article 5 TEU provides that the EU must observe the principles of conferral, 
subsidiarity and proportionality.
444
  All three of these principles are also 
conceptually linked. Furthermore, all three principles succeed each other and as 
Kumm argues, all these principles have a central constitutional role in the 
protection of federalism values in the EU: they decide the balance of authority and 
power.
445
 However, although all three succeed each other in the Treaty, they also 
point towards a role in balancing the two opposing forces of centralisation and 
decentralisation. In light of this link and its role at a conceptual level in balancing 
the two opposing forces of centralisation and decentralisation, the chapter now 
turns to explain first the reasons for adoption of the subsidiarity principle in 
particular as a key constitutional principle of EU law and its conceptual links 
between conferral and proportionality. 
 
4.2 Subsidiarity alongside proportionality in EU law-making in shared areas 
of competence 
Article 5 TEU requires the EU institutions to comply with the principle of 
subsidiarity and is concerned with the initial decision to exercise competence 
when acting in areas where it shares competence with the Member States.   It 
requires the EU to  ensure that it should only act ‘only if and insofar as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union 
level’. Article 5 also includes that the EU institutions when exercising shared 
competence should comply with the principle of proportionality.  This concerns 
the intensity of any EU legislative action.  Proportionality is defined in Article 5 
TEU. It requires that when the EU is bringing in legislation in areas of shared 
competence that ‘the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is 
necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties’. Proportionality provides a 
further safeguard to support subsidiarity and localism in that it ensures that any 
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regulatory freedom of the EU in areas of shared competence is limited to what is 
necessary to achieve any particular Treaty objective. 
 
A key purpose for the introduction of Article 5 TEC into EU law-making in 
shared competence areas was to help quell the fears of the Member States of too 
much incursion on the part of the EU.
446
 Thus, in particular with regard to the use 
of subsidiarity in EU law-making, Article 5 TEC made it clear that subsidiarity 
must be considered only in relation to areas which do not fall within the exclusive 
competence of the Community.  Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, this Treaty 
requirement inevitably led to difficulties in that it was not always clear which 
areas were within the exclusive competence of the EU. There was also a vague 
scope as to what was within the area of exclusivity, the latter providing fertile 
ground for contestation.  The CJEU has not always been consistent in its approach 
to determining the scope of what is within the area of exclusivity.  On the one 
hand, in the case of Kadi,
447
 the CJEU was called upon to consider the extent of 
Community competence under Article 308 TEC in a case where the facts of the 
case were linked to competition.  The case concerned a contested measure 
implementing a regulation of an economic measure, here a Regulation freezing 
funds and economic resources of particular persons and entities. In particular the 
CJEU considered if such a Regulation fell within the scope of Article 308 TEC 
and whether such a Regulation, 
 ‘could have a particular effect on trade between Member States, especially 
with regard to the movement of capital and payments, and on the exercise 
by economic operators of their right of establishment. In addition, they 
could create distortions of competition, because any differences between 
the measures unilaterally taken by the Member States could operate to the 
advantage or disadvantage of the competitive position of certain economic 
operators although there were no economic reasons for that advantage or 
disadvantage’.448  
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Regarding whether such a Regulation fell within the scope of Community 
competence in relation to Article 308 TEC, the CJEU then initially ruled that 
‘Article 308 EC, being an integral part of an institutional system based on the 
principle of conferred powers, cannot serve as a basis for widening the scope of 
Community powers beyond the general framework created by the provisions of 
the EC Treaty as a whole’.449  But it then went on to rule there were other Treaty 
articles, here Article 60 and 301 TEC, from which an objective constituting and 
objective of the Community for the purposes of Article 308 could be discerned.
450
 
Ultimately the CJEU concluded that these other relevant Treaty articles formed an 
expression of ‘[an] implicit underlying objective, namely that of making it 
possible to adopt such measures through the efficient use of a Community 
instrument’.451  Thus here the CJEU amalgamated provisions to produce a more 
abstract basis for the objectives of the Community overall which more easily 
allowed the justification of EU competence. 
On the other hand, in the Tobacco Advertising case,
452
 the CEJU adopted a more 
restrictive approach when considering whether any potential impact on 
competition between the Member States was enough to bring a matter within the 
competence of the Community, that in the absence of a threshold for determining 
effect of distortion of competition for a justification for the Community to 
exercise competence, ‘the powers of the Community legislature would be 
practically unlimited’.453 Such differing approaches by the CJEU in this context 
emphasises the difficulties facing the CJEU in respect of the vague scope of what 
is within the areas of exclusivity.
454
 
Furthermore, and as Davies points out in relation to the Tobacco Advertising case, 
‘the Court may, or may not, limit it by case law, but the article itself does not 
provide a sense that Community competence is contained’455.  In particular, the 
CJEU has sought to set a threshold in relation to encompassing the scope of free 
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movement and undistorted competition in the Tobacco Advertising case.
456
 It 
therefore set a threshold of ‘appreciable impact on competition,’457  even though 
previously in the cases of van de Haar and Kaveka de Meern
458
 the CJEU had 
refused to set any comparable threshold in the free movement context.   
The wording of Article 5 TEC did, however, include a subsidiarity requirement 
that the EC should only take action in shared competences ‘insofar as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, 
be better achieved by the Community’.  The latter part of Article 5 TEC then set 
out the proportionality principle that is ‘that any action by the Community shall 
not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty’.459   
Thus, in respect of subsidiarity following the introduction of Article 5 TEC, and 
as the European Commission has highlighted, there is a requirement to undertake 
a test of comparative efficiency when proposing Community action in a shared 
policy area.
460
 As Rasmussen argued this would require the CJEU to make an 
empirical assessment it is questionable not only whether the CJEU is well-placed 
to carry out such an assessment but also how would it be able to carry this out 
without access to accurate and up-to-date data.
 461
 In any event, the CJEU has not 
really addressed this criticism since it was first made by Rasmussen.
462
 
There are also difficulties in determining the exactly how subsidiarity should be 
operationalized in EU law in areas of shared competence.
463
 For example, how is 
it weighed up and concluded that a Member State is unable to achieve an 
objective sufficiently and that consequently such an objective can be better 
achieved at Union level?  What factors are at play in the determination of this and 
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what factors or combination of factors push the determination one way or another 
i.e. how is subsidiarity operationalized? Further clarification on how subsidiarity 
was to be operationalised in EU law-making in shared areas of competence has 
been provided several times.  For example, in 1993 an Interinstitutional 
Agreement on Procedures for implementation of the principle of subsidiarity was 
issued.
464
  In particular the Agreement required the EU institutions ‘to have regard 
to the principle when devising Community legislation’.465  Furthermore, in 
paragraphs 2-4 it included that, 
    ‘The explanatory memorandum for any Commission proposal shall include 
a justification of the proposal under the principle of subsidiarity.3 . Any 
amendment which may be made to the Commission's text, whether by the 
European Parliament or the Council, must, if it entails more extensive or 
intensive intervention by the Community, be accompanied by a 
justification under the principle of subsidiarity and Article 3b. 4. The three 
institutions shall, under their internal procedures, regularly check that 
action envisaged complies with the provisions concerning subsidiarity as 
regards both the choice of legal instruments and the content of a proposal. 
Such checks must form an integral part of the substantive examination’.  
However, the Agreement did not usefully further specify how to apply 
subsidiarity. 
A subsequent Protocol
466
 on the application of the principle of subsidiarity and 
proportionality was also attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. This 
included more guidance on where the principle of subsidiarity should have 
relevance in the legislative procedure
467
.  In particular the Protocol stressed the 
importance of justifying the need for Community action on the grounds of the 
Community being best placed to correct distortion of competition significantly in 
shared areas of competence.
 468
   However, paragraphs 4.5 and 9 of the Protocol 
also required that the Commission justify any proposed measure having regard for 
subsidiarity and paragraph 11 required that any amendments by the Council or the 
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European Parliament must also be justified with reference to subsidiarity.
469
  
Thus, as Craig and de Búrca highlight, following the Protocol, ‘minimum, rather 
than total, harmonization is now more the norm’.470 
Furthermore, the Commission is now required to show evidence that a sufficiency 
calculation of proposed Community action has been undertaken. This requires the 
Commission to justify action at Community level by way of two criteria which are 
complementary to one another namely:‘1. The absence of action at European level 
might have negative consequences for the effectiveness
471
 of instruments 
envisaged by the Member States and/or be contrary to the requirements of the 
Treaty. 2. “Action at Community level would produce clear benefits by reason of 
its scale or effects compared with action at the level of the Member States’.472 
Paragraph 7 also reinforces that the EU institutions must also respect 
proportionality by including that ‘the Community shall legislate only to the extent 
necessary’ to achieve its objectives. 
Nevertheless despite such clarification, difficulties still remained with not only 
with defining and operationalizing subsidiarity but also how the CJEU has failed 
to connect the proportionality test to subsidiarity as required by Article 5 TEU.
473
 
With this in mind, the next section argues that the concept of subsidiarity is an 
essentially contested concept with reference to an argument by Gallie.
474
 
5. Is EU Subsidiarity an essentially contested concept? 
The aim of this section is to contend that the nature and scope of the concept of 
subsidiarity is contested
475
 on the grounds that there are different arguments as to 
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how the nature and scope of subsidiarity should be interpreted at both a national 
and an international level.  This contention is made with reference to an idea 
posed by Gallie who wrote that ‘if you can break down a concept into different 
elements and there are different arguments on how each element should be 
interpreted then such a concept is an essentially contested concept’.476 
Thus according to Gallie an essentially contested concept relies on there being a 
consensus as to a concept being an exemplar but disagreement as to how the 
various parts of the concept should be interpreted.  He further argues that there is 
also disagreement about how the concept should be applied in practice for when a 
concept is an exemplar, conflict is almost inevitable when different authors put 
forward different views as to how such an exemplar is to be realised.  Gallie then 
proposes various conditions which a concept must satisfy in order to be identified 
as an essentially contested concept.  The conditions that Gallie proposes are as 
follows:- 
The first condition he outlines is that the concept must be an exemplar and 
represent a value that is worth realising in practice.
477
 The second condition he 
outlines is that to achieve in practice such a worthy aim the concept ‘must be of an 
internally complex character’.478 Gallie explains this second condition, using the 
concept of ‘champions,’ that there is no general method or principle for being a 
champion for if there was ‘the concept of the champions would cease to be an 
essentially contested one’.479 Thus according to Gallie, the concept of ‘champion’ 
has an internally complex character as there is no general method for being a 
champion. 
The third condition he outlines is that the concept must include reference to 
respective contribution of the various parts; yet prior to experimentation there is 
nothing absurd or contradictory in any one of a number of possible rival 
descriptions of its total worth, one such description setting its component parts or 
features in one order of importance, a second setting them in a second order, and 
so on.  In fine, the accredited achievement is initially variously 
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describable’.480The fourth condition he outlines is that the realisation of such a 
worthy aim ‘must be of a kind that admits of considerable modification in light of 
changing circumstances and such modification cannot be prescribed or predicted 
in advance’.481The fifth condition he outlines is that there should be a contestation 
of the concept at its core and debates can be used either aggressively or 
defensively.
482
 The final two conditions Gallie considers as being necessary to 
justify the continued use of essentially contested concepts.  The first of these later 
conditions is that ‘authority is acknowledged by all the contestant users’.483  The 
second of these outlined by Gallie is that the fact that there are disputes over the 
nature of the concept ‘enables the original exemplars achievement to be sustained 
and/or developed in optimal fashion’.484 
Anchoring a particular concept by using exemplars in order to demonstrate what 
is nearer to the heart of a particular concept, however, would help to minimise the 
risk of a dispute as to how it a particular concept should be operationalized in 
adjudication.  Such an approach would directly address the chief concern raised 
by Gallie that essentially contested concepts are at continual risk of being 
disputed.  It is for this reason that Gallie’s theory of essentially contested 
concepts, and the aforementioned conditions that Gallie argues must be fulfilled in 
order for a concept to be deemed an essentially contested practice, provides a 
useful conceptual framework in this thesis for helping to identify the core of 
values of subsidiarity.   
On the other hand it should be acknowledged that Beck has argued that some of 
these conditions partially restate each other 
485
with others arguing that in light of 
the relatedness of some of these conditions that it is the first of these conditions 
that are of the greatest import. So, for example Collier et al regard the first five 
conditions as the defining characteristics for an essentially contested concept.
486
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This agrees with Collier that it is the first five conditions which are the defining 
characteristics for an essentially contested concepts namely that concepts are an 
exemplar and represent a value that is worth realising in practice;
487
 concepts  
‘must be of an internally complex character;’ 488 the accredited achievement is 
initially variously describable;’489  ‘the realisation of such a worthy aim ‘must be 
of a kind that admits of considerable modification in light of changing 
circumstances and such modification cannot be prescribed or predicted in 
advance’;490 there should be a contestation of the concept at its core and debates 
can be used either aggressively or defensively.
491
 
The line of argument that subsidiarity is an essentially contested concept with 
reference to Gallie’s characteristics of an essentially contested concept492 
therefore holds considerable promise for use in respect of subsidiarity  despite 
firstly a caveat expressed by Waldron namely that ‘the idea [of contested 
concepts] is clearly vulnerable to overuse’. 493 This is similar to Clarke’s concern 
that ‘it is possible to make sense of the notion of an essentially contested concept, 
but only at the cost of introducing a radical relativism into all discourse using such 
disputable concepts’.494  Thus it is important when considering whether a concept 
is an essentially contested one to test that concept for the presence of the 
characteristics highlighted by Beck as required to determine the existence of an 
essentially contested concept.  The five characteristics highlighted by Beck
495
 as 
being the most important of Gallie’s characteristics for an essentially contested 
concept are summarized first.  Reference is also made to some examples of the 
application of Gallie’s characteristics to the concepts of human rights by Beck and 
the rule of law by Waldron. The purpose of such discussion is to inform a 
subsequent discussion considering whether the EU’s concept of subsidiarity meets 
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Gallie’s essential five characteristics of an essentially contested concept, but also 
to consider the extent to which it can be anchored.   
The first condition Gallie outlines is that the concept must represent a value that is 
worth realising in practice.
496
 Subsequent writers have made considerable use of 
Gallie’s theory to test a variety of concepts that are deemed values worth realizing 
in practice. So, for example Beck has argued in relation to Gallie’s first condition 
that human rights clearly ‘connote something valuable’.497 Waldron has argued in 
relation to Gallie’s first condition that the rule of law ‘is deployed by almost all of 
its users to enter a favourable evaluation of the regimes or situations to which it 
applies’.498 In terms of defining what the term ‘essentially’ refers to, Waldron has 
argued that it ‘refers to the location of the disagreement or indeterminacy: it is 
contestation at the core not just at the borderlines or penumbra of a concept’.499 
So, in the context of considering the rule of law as an essentially contested 
concept, Waldron has argued that the rule of law is a ‘contestation about the 
content and requirements of the rule of law ideal, and there is contestation about 
its point’.500 Applying a similar approach, it can be argued firstly that examination 
of the literature concerning the EU’s principle of subsidiarity reveals that the 
concept is worth pursuing.  Kumm, for example stresses the constitutional role 
that subsidiarity plays in the protection of federalism in the EU.
501
 
The second and third conditions Gallie outlines is that to achieve in practice such 
a worthy aim the concept ‘must be of an internally complex character’ and points 
to various rival descriptions of the key tenets of the concept.
502
 So, for example 
Beck argues that although human rights are internally complex as there are a 
‘variety of competing theories of the nature of rights’503 the important point he 
argues is that ‘there is no settled criteria for deciding which of these attributes is 
essential, more important or correct, because there is no universally shared or 
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demonstrably correct definition of the concept of human rights in terms of its 
range of necessary and optional attributes.’504   
Applying a similar approach, it can be argued that EU’s concept of subsidiarity 
satisfies the second and third criterion.  Despite the importance of subsidiarity as a 
concept, the core meaning of the concept of subsidiarity is contested in light of 
various competing theories as to the nature of the concept in EU law and its 
function in the exercise by the EU law-making institutions when it shares 
competence with the Member States. The most contested issue here is the 
question of how to measure value of Union legislative action over and above 
national level legislative action. 
On the one hand, some authors have focused on how the procedure of the 
substantive review should be formalized
505
 e.g. the process federalism of Berman.  
As he writes, 
 ‘my basic view is that the Community should respond to this challenge by 
recasting subsidiarity from a jurisdictional principle (that is a principle 
describing the allocation of substantive authority between the Community 
and the Member States) into an essentially procedural one (that is a 
principle directing the legislative institutions of the community to engage 
in a particular inquiry before concluding that action at the Community 
rather than the Member States level is warranted).’506  
Thus this would exclude judicial review of the actual merits of the inquiry by the 
CJEU. 
On the other hand, other academics have focused more on a theoretical 
consideration of whether the Community should exercise a shared competence.  
This approach Schütze has termed as operating within a ‘philosophy of dual 
federalism’ by its focus on ‘whether the Community should exercise one of its 
competences’.  This he points out is compatible with the distinction drawn 
between competence and subsidiarity in Article 5 TEU (1) and (2) and ‘will thus 
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only make sense if the subsidiarity principle concentrates on the whether and how 
of the specific at issue.  But the ‘whether’ and the ‘how’ of the specific action is 
inherently tied together’.507 Furthermore, examination of the literature on the 
question of whether subsidiarity can be operationalized is contested.  On the one 
hand, Davies thinks that subsidiarity cannot be operationalized. For, as he argues, 
there is a flaw inherent in the use of subsidiarity as a guide to the exercise of 
competence when there are competing goals in a particular policy area.  The flaw 
of subsidiarity that he identifies is that, 
‘subsidiarity’s weakness is that it assumes the primacy of the central goal, 
and allows no mechanism for questioning whether or not it is desirable, in 
the light of other interests, to fully pursue this…….It takes as its starting 
point that all levels are united in wishing to achieve certain goals and that 
none has any other interests or objectives which conflict with these….’508  
To put it another way, Davies questions the EU’s use of subsidiarity as a 
mechanism to guide the exercise of competence on the grounds of its only focus 
being the goal of market integration. Consequently, according to Davies,  the 
EU’s use of subsidiarity as a mechanism to inform competence does not allow the 
EU to balance other fundamental goals of the EU against the goal of market 
integration.  The question of how the CJEU uses subsidiarity when undertaking 
balancing fundamental goals in the context of the determination of EU citizens’ 
residency rights who are economically inactive will be considered further in 
chapters 4 and 5. 
However, Davies’ point is open to criticism here given that they duty of loyal 
cooperation is now recognized to be reciprocal between the Member States and 
the EU.
509
 Furthermore, the Treaties now explicitly refer to the constitutional 
traditions of the Member States and most recently in Article 4 TEU. It is arguable 
that such a requirement also implicitly includes a shared set of objectives that both 
the Member States and the Union must respect. 
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Kumm, on the other hand, however thinks that subsidiarity can be operationalized. 
In particular, he explains how CJEU has undertaken a subsidiarity review is in the 
context of review of EU institutional action in the internal market context. In 
respect of the stages involved in undertaking a subsidiarity and proportionality 
review in the context of the internal market.  Kumm suggests the following 
stages:- 
Firstly, Kumm argues that a subsidiarity and proportionality review involves 
considering whether there should be a legitimate purpose for Union intervention 
explicitly stated and evidenced as required by Article 5(2) TEU i.e. whether the 
competence is being exercised for a proper reason or motive.  The latter article 
requires that ‘the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States…but rather, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at the 
Union Level.’510  Such a requirement related to the scale or effects of the proposed 
action are difficult, argues Kumm, for the CJEU to quantify in its judgement.
511
 It 
is also problematic for the CJEU in its reasoning when it comes to assessing at 
exactly what the level of difficulty was which in turn required Union intervention 
and ‘when can Member States not sufficiently achieve the relevant purpose?’512   
Secondly, Kumm argues, with reference to the Tobacco Advertising and Working 
Time cases,
513
 that a subsidiarity and proportionality review involves considering 
whether that the Union internal market measure decided upon by the EU law-
making institutions is the minimum necessary to deal with the problem 
identified.
514
 This is a more practical and usable approach for the CJEU and one 
which the CJEU could adopt as well and refer to in its reasoning to demonstrate to 
the Member States’ courts that it had undertaken a meaningful subsidiarity and 
proportionality review of institutional law-making action. 
Thirdly, Kumm argues that  a subsidiarity and proportionality review involves 
considering the extent of the effect of a Union measure on autonomy of the 
Member State and the practical effect on the legal systems of the Member States 
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and that this should not be out of proportion to the result achieved by the Union 
measure. 
515
 This inevitably requires the CJEU to undertake a balancing test.  But 
as Kumm points out, citing the example of the Swedish Match case
516
, the CJEU 
has failed to undertake a balancing test.
517
  As he writes, 
 ‘even though Article 5 (3) specifically mentions the principle of 
proportionality in the context of the conferral of powers and the 
commitment to subsidiarity, the Court of Justice did not engage 
proportionality as part of the jurisdictional enquiry…it did not connect that 
analysis to the legitimate purpose of federal intervention.’518 
Nevertheless, despite the importance Kumm places on undertaking such analysis, 
Kumm does not consider how the CJEU should undertake such a balancing 
exercise or whether different policy areas require different considerations.  Nor 
does he specify exactly what the criteria should be or what factors the CJEU 
should take into account when undertaking such a balancing exercise. This is a 
significant omission as ‘balancing represents a different kind of thinking.  The 
focus is directly on the interests or factors themselves.  Each interest seeks 
recognition of its own and poses a head to head comparison with competing 
interests’.519 The existence of such theoretical debates from examination of the 
academic literature clearly fulfils Gallie’s second and third conditions for an 
essentially contested concept.
520
  
The fourth condition Gallie outlines is that the realisation of such a worthy aim 
‘must be of a kind that admits of considerable modification in light of changing 
circumstances and such modification cannot be prescribed or predicted in 
advance
521
 In respect of the latter condition, this can in the human rights context, 
Beck argues, be overcome by judges valuing one approach over another.   Beck 
then argues that this is illustrated where courts are more willing to impose a 
positive obligation under some articles than others.    So, for example, Beck 
explains how the ECHR judges have been more willing to impose positive 
                                                             
515 Kumm Op.Cit. 522. 
516 Case C-210/03. Swedish Match AB and Swedish Match UK Ltd. v. Secretary of State for 
Health. 
517 Kumm Op.Cit. 522. 
518 Kumm Op.Cit. 523. 
519 T.Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’, [1987] 96 Yale Law Journal 943 at 
945. 
520 Gallie Op.Cit. at 171-2. 
521 Gallie Op.Cit. at 171-2. 
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obligations under Article 8 concerning the right to privacy
522
 than they are to 
accept positive dimensions of negative rights when discussing abortion and the 
right to freedom of information under Article 10 ECHR,
523
 thus leaving the exact 
specification of negative rights to be achieved over time.
524
 
Applying a similar approach, it can be argued that the EU’s concept of 
subsidiarity satisfies the fourth criterion.  For a common theme running 
throughout much of the academic discussion highlighted in this chapter is the 
contestation at the core of what subsidiarity means.  On the one hand subsidiarity 
has been argued to be a centralizing principle on account of its inherent 
centralizing function.
525
  Such a function Barber has argued is in direct opposition 
to that of ‘national self-determination’ which he argues ‘ties political power to a 
national group – which may or may not map on to those affected by the power’.526  
Consequently he concludes ‘self-determination and subsidiarity present rival 
answers to the same question: where should the boundaries of the democratic unit 
is drawn’.527 However, such a view is questionable as arguably subsidiarity can be 
related to the idea of a defined political unit, as in the case of the EU, with the 
latter being able to influence a subsidiarity analysis when legislating with a view 
to either pushing towards centralisation or maintaining a respect for localism. 
Subsidiarity suggests there is a definite line to be drawn between levels of 
competence. 
A fifth condition Gallie outlines is that there should be a contestation of the 
concept at its core and debates can be used either aggressively or defensively.
528
 
In other words one can argue for or against a particular meaning of the core of the 
concept. This contestation has been argued to have a positive dimension.  For, for 
example, Waldron has argued in the context of the concept of the rule of law that 
‘the contestation between rival conceptions deepens and enriches all sides 
                                                             
522 Beck Op.Cit. at  328 citing Von Hannover v Germany ECtHR, 24 June 2004 (No. 59320/00) 40 
EHRR 1. 
523 Beck Op.Cit. 329 citing Open Door and Dublin Well Women v Ireland ECt HR, 29 October 
1992 (No 14234/88), 15 EHRR 244. 
524 Beck Op.Cit. 329. 
525 Beck Op. Cit.323. 
526 N.W.Barber, ‘The limited Modesty of Subsidiarity’, (2005) 11 (3) European Law Review 308-
235 at  329. 
527 Barber, N.W., ‘The limited Modesty of Subsidiarity’, (2005) 11 (3) European Law Review 308-
235 at 329. 
528 Gallie Op.Cit. at 172. See also see Waldron Op.Cit. who argued at 148-9 that Gallie’s  term 
essential ‘refers to the location of the disagreement or indeterminacy; it is contestation at the core, 
not just at the borderlines or penumbra of a concept’.  
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understanding of the area of value that the contested concept marks out’.529 On the 
other hand, in the context of human rights, for example Beck has argued how the 
consequence of this is that such conceptual indeterminacy has favoured judicial 
discretion.
530
 
Applying a similar approach, it can be argued that subsidiarity satisfies the fifth 
criterion. It is clear that the existence of the various approaches to subsidiarity has 
led to conceptual dissonance with such debate used both aggressively and 
defensively.  On the one hand, support has been given for subsidiarity to be 
perceived as a political principle of process federalism
531
 the latter principle 
having a focus on the procedural aspects of subsidiarity use.  On the other hand, 
other academics have focused on a philosophy of dual federalism and its emphasis 
on the EU and the Member States being sovereign co-equals.  This approach 
Schütze has termed as operating within a ‘philosophy of dual federalism’ by its 
focus on ‘whether the Community should exercise one of its competences’.  This 
he points out is compatible with the distinction drawn between competence and 
subsidiarity in Article 5 TEU (1) and (2) and ‘will thus only make sense if the 
subsidiarity principle concentrates on the whether and how of the specific at issue.  
But the ‘whether’ and the ‘how’ of the specific action is inherently tied 
together’.532 
Such academic theoretical debate on subsidiarity has therefore been used both 
aggressively in promoting the process federalist approach to subsidiarity as well 
as being defensive of the dual federalist approach and its emphasis on protection 
of national competence against federal competence. 
Thus it is contended in this section that in light of literature which has highlighted 
how subsidiarity is contested as to its meaning and scope that subsidiarity clearly 
fulfils Gallie’s criteria for being an essentially contested concept.  The 
                                                             
529 Waldron Op.Cit at 152. 
530 Beck Op.Cit.  at 330. 
531 See for example G. Berman, “Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European 
Community and the United States” (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 331 at 336: ‘My basic view 
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implications of the conceptual dissonance that arises from subsidiarity being an 
essentially contested concept will be considered in a subsequent chapter. Such 
conceptual dissonance, it will be argued favours judicial discretion on how it 
should be applied.  The question therefore arises as to how subsidiarity, as a 
contested concept should be anchored in EU law by the CJEU to help ensure the 
proper respect for the division of power between the EU and the Member States in 
areas of shared competence. 
For by anchoring subsidiarity by using exemplars in order to demonstrate what is 
nearer to the heart of subsidiarity, this helps to minimise the risk of a dispute as to 
how it should be operationalized in adjudication.  Such an approach would 
directly address a key concern raised by Gallie that essentially contested concepts 
are at continual risk of being disputed as well as providing a useful conceptual 
framework in this thesis for helping to identify the core of values of subsidiarity. 
This issue has particular importance in light of the recent renewed emphasis on 
subsidiarity in the Treaty of Lisbon to guide the EU law-making institutions when 
legislating in areas of shared competence to which the next section turns to 
consider. 
 
6. Subsidiarity and the introduction of the yellow card procedure following 
the Treaty of Lisbon 
The aim of this section is to explain how despite subsidiarity being an essentially 
contested concept that following the Treaty of Lisbon there is a renewed emphasis 
on the use of subsidiarity with its inherent respect for localism to guide the EU 
law-making institutions when legislating in areas of shared competence as 
evidenced by the introduction of the yellow card procedure.   
For examination of the Lisbon Treaty reveals how it reinforces the requirement to 
adhere to the principle of subsidiarity
533
 where the EU shares competence in a 
particular policy area with the Member States.  The relevant provision is Article 5 
TEU (ex Article 5 TEC) with Article 5 (3) TEU providing that subsidiarity is only 
                                                             
533 P.Craig and  G.de Búrca, EU Law: Test, Cases and Materials. (5th ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) at 83 for a discussion of shared competence.  In particular they write ‘the 
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relevant where the EU shares competence with the Member States in respect of 
law-making.  Article 5 (3) TEU, in conjunction with the Protocol on subsidiarity 
and proportionality,
534
 then sets out a test that the EU institutions should follow, 
that that if the Member States cannot exercise competence efficiently enough then 
the EU should take action.
535
  This reinforces a dual federalist approach. 
For the first time and as part of the response to calls from the national Parliaments 
for more democratic legitimacy,
536
 the Protocol also requires the EU to provide 
justification for the use of subsidiarity as a mechanism to guide the exercise of 
competence by the EU.
537
 It requires the Commission
538
  to send with all draft 
legislative acts an explanation of how the proposal complies with subsidiarity not 
just to the Union institutions for scrutiny but also to the national Parliaments.
539
  
In respect of the new ex ante monitoring role of the national Parliaments, the 
Lisbon Treaty reveals firstly how it reinforces the requirement to adhere to the 
principle of subsidiarity
540
 where the EU shares competence in a particular policy 
area with the Member States.  The key provision is Article 5 TEU where the remit 
of subsidiarity monitoring is extended to include national level.  The involvement 
                                                             
534 See also the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
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University Press, 2011) at 83 for a discussion of shared competence.  In particular they write ‘the 
reality is that shared competence is simply an umbrella term, with the consequence that there is 
significant variation as to the division of competence in different areas of EU law’. 
121 
 
of national Parliaments is widely regarded as crucial in helping to enhance 
democratic legitimacy of the EU legislative process in that national Parliaments 
are closer to the citizens of the EU.
541
 For example, this point was raised very 
recently by the UK in the Review of the Balance of Competences between the 
United Kingdom and the European Union, Subsidiarity and Proportionality.
542
 
The exact wording of Article 5 TEU provides that, 
 ‘Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can 
rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level’. 
 In addition, Article 5 TEU (ex Article 5 TEC) in conjunction with Article 5 (3) 
TEU provides that subsidiarity is only relevant where the EU shares competence 
with the Member States in respect of law-making.
543
  Article 5 (3) TEU, in 
conjunction with the Protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality,
544
 then sets out 
a test that the EU institutions should follow, that that if the Member States cannot 
exercise competence efficiently enough then the EU should take action.   
Under Article 2 of the Protocol on the application of subsidiarity and 
proportionality the Commission is required to undertake a consultation prior to 
proposing any legislation. In Article 5, the Commission is required to provide 
detailed written evidence as to how they have complied with the subsidiarity test 
including, 
                                                             
541 H.M.Government, Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and 
the European Union, Subsidiarity and Proportionality, (December 2014) < 
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 ‘some assessment of the proposal's financial impact and, in the case of a 
Directive, of its implications for the rules to be put in place by Member 
States, including, where necessary, the regional legislation’ as well as ‘the 
reasons for concluding that a Union objective can be better achieved at 
Union level shall be substantiated by qualitative and, wherever possible, 
quantitative indicators.’ 
Secondly, a new European Resolution further widens the subsidiarity monitoring 
to include regional and local levels of Member States by requiring national 
Parliaments to consult regional and local governmental bodies.
545
   
Thirdly, Article 12b TEU, in conjunction with the Protocol on the application of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, sets out how the ex ante system for monitoring 
subsidiarity is to be operationalized through an early warning system. When this 
system is activated, the relevant instrument under review will be further 
scrutinised by the Commission, a group of Member States or the relevant EU 
institution with a view to either keeping, amending or rejecting outright with 
reasons a particular instrument.  This is called the ‘yellow card’ procedure546 and 
the innovative setting up of such an ex ante review procedure illustrates how it is 
possible to anchor subsidiarity sufficiently at a procedural level to operationalize 
subsidiarity as a principle of EU law procedurally 
547
 although, as Craig and de 
Búrca point out, national Parliaments are only afforded a role in relation to 
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subsidiarity not proportionality.
548
  Wetherill too is critical of this omission on the 
grounds that the two principles are closely connected in this context.
549
 
Nevertheless, this new procedure does create a new role for national Parliaments 
in the subsidiarity assessment
550
 as national Parliaments will now be able to 
challenge proposed EU action in shared competence areas on the grounds of 
breach of subsidiarity.  As Dougan explains, ‘with such a wealth of material, 
argumentation over subsidiarity could metamorphose from the politically 
subjective into the readily justiciable.’551 However, the requirement of subsidiarity 
in EU law-making in shared areas of competence is only as strong as the degree of 
intensity of the CJEU’s judicial review of EU action. In the past the CJEU has 
shown a rather soft approach in its judicial review in assessing whether the EU 
has provided sufficient justification that the EU is best placed to take legislative 
action, which is considered further in chapter 3 of this thesis.  It remains to be 
seen whether the level of intensity of CJEU judicial review of the institutional use 
of subsidiarity in EU law-making in shared areas of competence will become 
stronger following the Treaty of Lisbon.
552
  
So far there have only been a few examples of the use of the yellow card 
procedure
553
 but the most notable example of this is the review of the proposal for 
a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office following reasoned opinions submitted by the national authorities.
554
  Here 
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the Commission following analysing the reasoned opinions submitted by the 
national authorities with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with 
Protocol No 2, and set out in a communication their response to the concerns 
raised by the national Parliaments in respect of the proposal on the establishment 
of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office.555Their communication commenced 
with the Commission setting out a few preliminary points.  In particular, it is to be 
commended that they distinguished between arguments relating to the principle of 
subsidiarity and those relating to proportionality or policy choices unrelated to 
subsidiarity as well as giving concrete example of arguments which fall outside of 
the scope of the subsidiarity control mechanism.  These included:- 
‘the Regulation is too far-reaching; the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office’s powers are too far-reaching and should be reserved to national 
authorities; the Regulation goes beyond what is necessary to achieve its 
objective; the Regulation may violate the protection of fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Czech Constitutional and the Charter; the Regulation 
would create disadvantages for Member States in that they lose the 
capacity to prioritise prosecution activities within their own criminal 
justice systems; Article 26 of the proposal contains investigation 
measures which are not allowed under national law in all Member States 
and this may undermine the effective protection of the rights of 
suspects.’556  
It is also to be welcomed that the Commission then addressed in turn the 
arguments raised by the national Parliaments that relate specifically to subsidiarity 
as well as giving their reasons for rejecting the arguments raised by the national 
Parliaments.
557
 First the Commission considered the argument raised by the 
national Parliaments that it had not sufficiently explained its reasons as to why the 
particular proposal at issue here was compatible with the principle of subsidiarity.  
It also considered that the argument raised that the Commission had conflated its 
consideration of insufficiency of member State action with the requirement of 
added-value of Union action.
558
  In response to this, the Commission emphasised 
                                                                                                                                                                       
of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, in 
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that they had given detailed consideration to the relevant Impact Assessments. 
They then disagreed that they had failed to explain sufficiently its reasons 
submitting that, 
 ‘the explanatory memorandum and the accompanying legislative financial 
statement of the Commission sufficiently explain why the action of the 
Member States is insufficient with regard to the policy objective and why 
Union action would better achieve that objective (e.g. lack of continuity in 
enforcement action and lack of an underlying common European 
prosecution policy)’.559 
Secondly, the Commission considered and rejected the arguments put forward by 
a number of national Parliaments that ‘investigation and prosecution action at 
Member State level is sufficient and that the coordination and investigation 
mechanisms existing at the Union level is sufficient and that the coordination and 
investigation mechanisms existing at the Union level (Eurojust, Europol and 
OLAF) would also be sufficient’.560 In particular the Commission referred to 
statistical evidence that shows ‘that the Treaty objective of an effective, deterrent 
and equivalent level of protection is not achieved in general’ and that ‘there is a 
solid basis of statistical evidence demonstrating that in general terms the action 
taken at Member State level in the specific area of Union fraud is insufficient.
561
 
The use of supporting statistical evidence from OLAF here, though, is brief and 
cursory and limited to statistical evidence submitted by OLAF.
562
 It is submitted 
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statistical evidence demonstrating that in general terms the action taken at Member State level in 
the specific area of Union fraud is insufficient’. 
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that the Commission should have given more consideration of a wider range of 
statistical data and examples to illustrate that action taken at Member State level is 
insufficient. 
Thirdly, the Commission considered and disagreed with the argument put forward 
by a number of national Parliaments questioning the added-value of the proposal.  
This was on the grounds that there ‘were significant improvements expected to 
come from a common Union-level prosecution policy’ and that ‘the proposal 
tackles a number of important practical and legal issues’.563 Here the citing by the 
Commission of concrete examples by way of illustration of these practical and 
legal issues is to be commended. 
Finally, the Commission considered and rejected concerns raised by a number of 
national Parliaments that the nature and scope of the competences of the proposed 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office are compatible with the principle of 
subsidiarity.
564
   In particular, in respect of the scope and competence in relation 
to Article 86 TFEU, the Commission considered that this was ‘the most effective 
way of ensuring a consistent investigation and prosecution policy across the 
Union and to avoid parallel action at Union and national level, which would lead 
to duplication and a waste of precious resources.  Also, without at least knowing 
of all cases, it would be difficult for the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to 
identify cross-connections between suspects and cases in different Member States.  
Limiting its competence to some cases, e.g. serious or cross-border cases, would 
not only reduce its added-value but also call into question the Union’s competence 
in this matter.’565  Consequently, the Commission concluded that ‘its proposal 
complies with the principle of subsidiarity enshrined in Article 5(3) TEU and that 
a withdrawal or amendment of that proposal is not required.’566  On balance, 
despite the somewhat brief and cursory use in places of supporting statistical 
evidence from OLAF, the Commission in this communication is to be 
commended identifiying the arguments raised by the national Parliaments that 
relate specifically to subsidiarity as well as supporting its reasons for rejecting the 
arguments raised by the national Parliaments with reference to relevant statistical 
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analysis.
567
The innovative setting up of such a procedure ex ante review 
procedure illustrates how it is possible to anchor subsidiarity sufficiently to 
operationalize subsidiarity as a principle of EU law at a procedural level even 
though the Commission’s response in this instance could have more fully justified 
its response.  For example, it could have undertaken a greater consideration of 
supporting statistical evidence and clarifying more precisely how such evidence 
has impacted on its final conclusion regarding added value that the introduction of 
a European Public Prosecutor would bring.  It could also, as Conway points out, 
have addressed more specifically the concerns raised by the national 
Parliaments.
568
 
 
A further important innovation is that the Lisbon treaty strengthens the idea of 
protecting local identities. For the Lisbon Treaty has enhanced the old Article 6(3) 
TEC by including a revised Article 4(2) TEU which requires the Union to respect 
not only the national identity of Member States but also the political, 
constitutional and legal regimes of those Member States.  The placing of this 
provision between the principle of conferral and the principle of sincere co-
operation at the outset of the TEU emphasises the central importance of such a 
principle in EU law.  Furthermore, such a development has been the subject of 
academic speculation as to how the existence of the national identity clause in the 
TEU might inform the constitutional relationship between the EU and its Member 
States
569
 with Leczykiewicz considering how the idea of protecting local identities 
has been utilised by the CJEU in its case law.  So, for example, she explains how 
the German Federal Constitutional Court in the Lisbon judgment has viewed 
Article 4(2) as ‘recognition of a national constitutional court’s power to safeguard 
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(2008) 6(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 117-136. 
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national constitutional identity by carrying out review of EU acts by that court 
(the Lisbon judgement)’.570   
On the other hand, Leczykiewicz also explains how the national identity clause 
has been of relevance in the context of the Member States’ derogations from EU 
law and how Article 4(2) TEU was used as an element of a proportionality review 
in the case of Sayn-Wittgenstein.
571
  For the CJEU held that ‘in the context of 
Austrian constitutional history, the law on the abolition of the nobility, as an 
element of national identity, may be taken into consideration when a balance is 
struck between legitimate interests and the right of free movement of persons 
recognised under European Union law’.572 However, the proportionality test 
employed by the CJEU was a cursory one with, as Besselink has pointed out, ‘the 
only argument used to conclude to the proportionality of the Austrian rule of 
constitutional law was the reference to Article 4(2) itself’.573 
Nevertheless, the existence of the national identity clause and its respect for 
Member States legal regimes holds considerable potential for the CJEU to make 
greater use of this clause to inform and support its reasoning.  This is particularly 
so when undertaking a subsidiarity review where proportionality is treated as an 
aspect of subsidiarity applied to competences.
574
 This will be considered further in 
chapter 3. 
 
 
                                                             
570 See  D.Leczykiewicz, ‘The national identity clause in the EU treaty: a blow to supremacy of 
Union law, <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/06/21/dorota-leczykiewicz-the-national-identity-
clause-in-the-eu-treaty-a-blow-to-supremacy-of-union-law/> accessed 23 April 2013.  Judgement 
of 30 June 2009, 2BvE 5/08 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08, 2 BvR 182/09 and general 
discussion of this case by P.Kiiver, ‘The Lisbon Judgement of the German Constitutional Court: A 
Court-Ordered Strengthening of the National Legislature in the EU, (2010) 16 (5) European Law 
Journal 578-588.  
571 Case C 208/09 22 December 2010, Illonka Sayn-wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien. 
See also F. Besselink, Respecting Constitutional Identity in the European Union: An Essay on 
CJEU (Second Chamber) Case C 208/09 22 December 2010, Illonka Sayn-wittgenstein v 
Landeshauptmann von Wien Jan 9 2012 Common Market Law Review, Forthcoming Available at 
SSRN:< http://ssrn.com/abstract+2002042 >accessed 1.3.12. 
572 F. Besselink, Respecting Constitutional Identity in the European Union: An Essay on CJEU 
(Second Chamber) Case C 208/09 22 December 2010, Illonka Sayn-wittgenstein v 
Landeshauptmann von Wien Jan 9 2012 Common Market Law Review, Forthcoming Available at 
SSRN:< http://ssrn.com/abstract+2002042 >accessed 1.3.12. at 17. 
573 Ibid at 17. 
574 M.Kumm,  (2006) ‘Constitutionalising subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: the Case of Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Union’ (12(4)  ELJ 503-533 at 531. 
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7. Conclusion 
This chapter has explained how since its inception, a guiding principle for the EU 
is that it only has the competence
575
 or the power to act that has been conferred on 
it by the Treaties.
576
  For although the explicit inclusion of the principle of 
conferral was only included in the Treaty of Maastricht,
577
 it was implicit in the 
debate over who are the masters of the Treaties.
578
  In respect of the different 
types of competence, currently, although the TFEU refers to three categories of 
competence in Article 5 TFEU, 
579
 the focus of this discussion is in relation to 
Article 3(2) TEU where the EU shares competence with the Member States.  This 
provides that ‘The Member States will only be able to exercise this shared 
competence if the EU has not exercised its competence to act or if the EU has 
ceased to exercise its competence’.  It is in this specific context where the EU has 
competence to act that Article 5 TEU provides that the EU must observe the 
principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality.
580
  All three of these 
principles are also conceptually linked. Furthermore, all three principles succeed 
each other and as Kumm argues, all these principles have a central constitutional 
role in the protection of federalism values in the EU: they decide the balance of 
authority and power.
581
 However, although all three succeed each other in the 
Treaty, they also point towards a role in balancing the two opposing forces of 
centralisation and decentralisation.  
 
                                                             
575. For further discussion of the definition of power or competence see Wesley Hohfeld’s 
definition of power or competence as the capacity or amenity to change legal relations: W. 
Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning’, 1913-14 23 
Yale LJ 16-59 at 55 
576 For further discussion see K.Alter,  ‘Who are the Masters of the Treaty?  European 
Governments and the European Court of Justice’, (1998) 52 International Organization 121-147. 
577 Article 3b Treaty of Maastricht 7.2.92. 
578 See for egs K.Alter, ‘Who are the Masters of the Treaties: European Governments and the 
ECJ’, <http://aei.pitt.edu/2434/1/002500_1.pdf> accessed 14.1.14. 
579 Firstly in Article 3 TFEU there is exclusive competence.  There is also in Article 2 (3) TFEU 
and Article 2 (5) TFEU two further categories of competence which R.Schütze, ‘Lisbon and the 
federal order of competences: a prospective analysis, (2008) European Law Review, 3, refers to as 
co-coordinating competence and complementary competence. For a more general discussion on 
competence in the EU see Dashwood, ‘The Limits of European Community Powers’, (1996) 21 
European Law Review 113-128 and S.Wetherill,  ‘Competence creep and competence control’, 
(2001\4) 23 Yearbook of European Law 1-55: House of Lords European Union Tenth Report 
(2008), chapter 2, paragraph 21.    
580 The wording of Article 5 applies to non-exclusive competences.  Subsidiarity is most important 
re shared competences because of the major impact of the latter – when exercised, shared 
competence eliminates Member State competence in the same area. 
581 M.Kumm,  (2006) ‘Constitutionalising subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: the Case of Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Union’ (12(4)  ELJ 503-533 at 531. 
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A key purpose for the introduction of Article 5 TEC into EU law-making in 
shared competence areas was to help quell the fears of the Member States of too 
much incursion on the part of the EU.
582
 Thus, in particular with regard to the use 
of subsidiarity in EU law-making, Article 5 TEC made it clear that subsidiarity 
must be considered only in relation to areas which do not fall within the exclusive 
competence of the Community.    
The key argument of this chapter has been to explain how despite subsidiarity 
being a key constitutional concept in EU law making for mediating the balance of 
power between the EU and the Member States, it is also  an essentially contested 
concept with reference to Gallie’s theory of essentially contested concepts.   
Furthermore, in section 3 it is explained how proportionality has been recognised 
both as a general principle of EU law as well evidenced in practice from the 
reasoning of the CJEU.
583
  Examination of a selection of well documented CJEU 
case law on proportionality in section 3, though, revealed that there is a 
considerable variety in the degree of intensity and application by the CJEU of 
proportionality tests as well as differences in the amount of guidance it gives to 
the Member States in this context. In addition, and as Jans has outlined, it was 
explained in section 3 that there are other contested issues involved in a 
proportionality review. So, for example, whether the national measure is 
disproportionate in relation to the restriction to intra Community trade and is out 
of proportion with the result achieved.
584
 For the CJEU in considering whether the 
national measure is disproportionate in relation to the restriction to intra 
Community trade and is out of proportion with the result achieved necessarily 
involves the CJEU in weighing up the conflicting interests at play.
585
  It is the 
most challenging characteristic of the proportionality review, argues Jans, in that 
                                                             
582 P.Craig and G.de Búrca , EU Law Text, Cases and Materials, (3rd ed. OUP., 2003) at 132 and 
who write ‘For those who feared further movement to some species of federalist Community the 
concept of subsidiarity was the panacea designed to halt such centralizing initiatives’. 
583 See Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mBH v Einfurh und vorratsstelle fúr 
Getreide und Futtermittel where the CJEU found that the EC regulatory measures were 
proportionate and consequently not infringing the right to property. See also T.Inge Harbo, ‘The 
Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’, (2010) 16(2) European law Journal for a 
discussion of the function of the proportionality principle as a general principle of law in terms of 
securing legitimacy for judicial decisions; G. de Búrca, 'The Principle of Proportionality and its 
Application in EC Law', in (1993) 13 Yearbook of European Law 105–150,  
584 Jans Op.Cit at 241 and a discussion of the few examples of the CJEU’s case law in this context 
at 248-252 where the ‘Court has explicitly formulated the proportionality as an obligation to 
balance interests. 
585 Jans Op.Ci.t at 241 points out, that express references to balancing interests by the CJEU are 
extremely rare 248.   
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it raises constitutional implications.  For the CJEU has to review whether the 
national measure at issue in a case, and which poses a restriction to Community 
law is out of proportion with the result achieved and   ‘the more intensive the 
Court of Justice’s scrutiny of national restrictions in light of the proportionality 
principle, the greater the shift in powers from the national legislatures to the 
European judiciary.’586  The more intensive the scrutiny by the CJEU of national 
restrictions the closer this comes to the CJEU’s approach to proportionality being 
merit-based. 
In light of the discretion involved in the CJEU undertaking a proportionality 
review, there is also the question of whether the CJEU well placed to engage in an 
assessment of the complex normative and empirical questions that a 
proportionality review requires?  This is an important question.  For the use of 
proportionality by the CJEU needs to be accompanied by a clear, consistent and 
principled approach to its content and structure in order to provide a clear 
doctrinal test that the CJEU can utilise in its case law. This relates to the rule of 
law principles of certainty and predictability.
587
  In particular, the CJEU is 
required to give reasons and justify in its ruling following assessment of both the 
empirical and normative dimensions of a proportionality review to ensure the 
legitimacy of its decision.  It also has to convince the national courts of the 
validity of its ruling in light of the supervisory role the national court has over the 
CJEU.  For the CJEU relies on the national court not just for questions raised 
through the preliminary reference but also for the national court to give effect to 
the CJEU’s preliminary ruling. 
Ultimately, the national court can in principle refuse to give effect to the CJEU’s 
preliminary ruling, although this does not happen in practice.  Nevertheless, the 
more contestable the balancing approaches of the CJEU the more it feeds into 
doubts at national level about accepting supremacy.
588
 Consequently, in light of 
the immense use of proportionality in EU law
589
 as well as the different levels of 
                                                             
586 Jans Op.Cit. at  242. 
587 See further B.Tamanaha, B., On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004).  
 
588 See also P.Craig and G. de Búrca, EU law Cases and Materials, (5th ed., OUP, 2011)  pages 
272- 283 for a discussion of German case law regarding the reluctant acceptance of supremacy of 
EU law and the limits laid down in that case law. 
589 Ibid., who writes ‘that the principle is invoked by litigants more often than any other general 
principle of Community law’. 
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intensity of review adopted by the CJEU in different contexts and the imminent 
accession of the EU to the ECHR
590
 there is an even more pressing need to 
consider whether there is a need for a single proportionality test and for the 
justification of whatever proportionality test is in fact adopted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
590 Council of Europe, Accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, < 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/default_en.asp> accessed 14.1.14. 
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Chapter 3 
Should subsidiarity and proportionality as twin constitutional principles in 
EU law-making, bind the CJEU as law- maker in its interpretation of shared 
competence areas and, if so, what can be agreed at European level? 
Contents 
1. Introduction  
2. Subsidiarity and judicial review by the CJEU of the political institutions 
2.1. Introducing the CJEU: a unique supranational court 
2.2. The CJEU: its pro-union interpretative tendency and accusations in the 
literature of activism  
2.3. Subsidiarity and judicial review by the CJEU of the political institutions  
3. How to apply Kumm’s argument that the CJEU should operationalize 
subsidiarity by employing subsidiarity and proportionality applied to 
competences as a tool of judicial review 
4. Academic support that the CJEU as a law-making institution should be 
bound by subsidiarity when reviewing cases in the context of the common 
market. 
5. Is it possible to identify more fully ex ante criteria for the application of 
subsidiarity thereby enabling the CJEU to engage more meaningfully with 
subsidiarity in its judicial reasoning in areas of shared policy outside of 
judicial review?  
6. Conclusion 
 
1. Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to consider whether subsidiarity and 
proportionality, as twin constitutional principles in EU law-making, bind the 
CJEU as law- maker in its interpretation of cases in shared competence areas and, 
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if so, what criteria can be agreed at European level and whether each shared 
policy area requires different criteria to be taken into account by the CJEU?  
The chapter introduces in section 2.1 the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(the CJEU) as a unique law-making institution which differs from international 
courts in the extent of its compulsory jurisdiction and from national courts in that 
they are not necessarily entitled to the same degree of deference by the CJEU that 
a national political-law-making institution has such as in the UK.  It then 
highlights in particular firstly how in academic literature the CJEU has been 
subject to considerable criticism on the grounds that the CJEU has frequently in 
its interpretation in a variety of policy contexts gone beyond the meaning of the 
wording of the texts of the Treaties agreed by the Member States and, thus, that it 
has gone beyond their intentions.
591
  Secondly, academic literature is considered 
which has pointed out that textual interpretation is also more open to manipulation 
because of the issue of varying levels of generality which facilitates judicial 
discretion
592
 and enables the CJEU to display a pro-Union interpretative tendency.
 
Even if there was no change in the ultimate case outcome the consideration of a 
subsidiarity and proportionality review in the CJEU’s reasoning would help to 
enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU.
593
 The question is then posed that if the 
CJEU were to utilise subsidiarity in its reasoning could this help to counter claims 
that the CJEU displays an unjustified emphasis in its case law on the need to 
pursue an ‘ever closer Union.’ For this deprives Member States of their 
competencies and is at the expense of the legal systems of the Member States?
594
  
It would also be consistent with the national identity clause in Article 4 (2) TEU.  
This provides that, 
 ‘The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties 
as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, 
political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-
government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including 
ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and 
                                                             
591 See for example P.Neill, The European Court of Justice: A Case Study in Judicial Activism 
(London: European Policy Forum, 1995); T.Hartley, ‘The European Court, Judicial Objectivity 
and the Constitution of the European Union’, (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review 95-109 at 95. 
592 See for example M.Lasser,  Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Transparency 
and Legitimacy (OUP, 2004) at 288.   
593 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308. 
594 Ibid. 
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safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the 
sole responsibility of each Member State’.595  
The wording ‘in particular’ here indicates that national identity and functions or 
competences are more generally respected, including in spheres other than 
national security. 
Such an inherent respect for localism also points towards the limits of competence 
of the EU in the Treaties.  For the notion of competence, which Spaak argues is 
one of the fundamental modes of legal regulation
596
, from both a legal and a 
theoretical perspective is a normative concept.
597
  As Spaak further explains, ‘to 
have competence is to have a hypothetical possibility to change legal positions by 
performing a specific kind of act’.598  It follows, therefore, that where there is no 
such legal power vested in that person or body, any legislative or policy action 
emanating from that person or body can be deemed invalid.  Consequently, 
competence and validity are inexorably linked at a conceptual level when 
considering whether a particular rule or policy decision can hypothetically be 
made by a particular body or person.  For as Spaak explains, ‘we need a concept 
of competence precisely in order to be able in an adequate way, to analyze and 
discuss questions concerning (in)validity.
599
 Validity is also an important in 
demonstrating constitutional legitimacy through evidencing that the EU law-
making institution is acting within the powers conferred upon it by the Treaty and 
complying with the rule of law as entailing government under the law.  
With this important conceptual link between competence and validity in mind, a 
review of the position of existing key case law regarding subsidiarity with 
reference to relevant academic critique in section 2.3 will be undertaken.  In 
particular, it will be pointed out how this reveals that the CJEU has been prepared 
to undertake a subsidiarity review in respect of the actions of the political 
institutions in the context of law-making. Section 4 then revisits and agrees with 
literature by de Búrca and others that, in particular in light of the Treaty of Lisbon 
                                                             
595 For further discussion of the identity clause see D.Leczykiewicz, ‘The national identity clause 
in the EU Treaty: a blow to supremacy of Union law?’, 
http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/06/21/dorota-leczykiewicz-the-national-identity-clause-in-the-
eu-treaty-a-blow-to-supremacy-of-union-law/> accessed 10.5.13  
596 T.Spaak, ‘Norms that Confer Competence’, (2003) 16(1) Ratio Juris 89-104 at 90. 
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the CJEU as a law-making institution should be bound by subsidiarity when 
interpreting in areas of shared competence.  
On the other hand, in section 3 it will be explained first how Kumm treats 
proportionality as an aspect of subsidiarity applied to competences.
600
  Building 
on this argument, he then proposes a subsidiarity and proportionality test that the 
CJEU should employ in the context of the internal market.  Such a test, he argues, 
should include three requirements: 1. Legitimate purpose, 2. necessity, 3. 
proportionality.
601
  He does not, however, give much detail as to how the CJEU 
should undertake a subsidiarity and proportionality review in practice or specify 
how the CJEU should undertake a subsidiarity and proportionality review 
involving a balancing exercise or whether different policy areas require different 
considerations.  Nor does he specify exactly what the criteria should be, whether 
each shared policy area requires different criteria to be taken into account or what 
factors the CJEU should take into account when undertaking such a balancing 
exercise. 
This is problematic as it was argued in chapter 2 that subsidiarity is an essentially 
contested concept using Gallie’s theory of essentially contested concepts.602  Such 
conceptual dissonance, it was argued, favours judicial discretion on how it should 
be applied.
603
 Consequently, it was concluded that there is a compelling argument 
for judicial reasoning to engage more fully with how the CJEU should deal with 
such dissonance. The inclusion of an explicit explanation of how the CJEU had 
considered subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning would help to improve the 
quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy of 
                                                             
600 M.Kumm, ‘Constitutionalising Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Union’, (2006) 12(4) European Law Journal 503-533 at 505. 
601 Ibid and who writes at 519 ‘federal intervention has to further legitimate purposes, has to be 
necessary in the sense of being narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose, and has to be 
proportionate with regard to costs or disadvantages relating to the loss of Member States’ 
regulatory autonomy’. 
602 W.B.Gallie,  ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, (1956)  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
167-98. 
603 For further discussion on literature which highlights out disagreement and dissonance are 
present in the law more than judicial reasoning sometimes suggests and calls for judicial reasoning 
to engage more fully with such disagreement and dissonance see for example J.Waldron, Law and 
Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999), C.Finkelstein, ‘Introduction to the Symposium on 
conflicts of Rights’, (2001) 7(3) Legal theory 235-238;  J.Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty: The 
Image of balance’, (2003) 11(2) Journal of Political Philosophy 191-210. 
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the CJEU’s ruling.604 This relates to the import of ensuring the persuasiveness of 
the CJEU to its audiences as an aspect of the rule of law for the rule of law enjoins 
obedience of the law.
605
 It also enhances the credibility of the CJEU as a guardian 
of competences in the eyes of the Member States in light of the growing concern 
of the competence creep of the EU institutions
606
. 
This begs the question of how subsidiarity, as a contested concept, could be 
anchored in EU law by the CJEU to help ensure the proper respect for the division 
of power between the EU and the Member States in areas of shared competence 
and what could be agreed upon at European level and whether it should be sector 
specific.  The possibility of anchoring is important in defending the criticisms 
directed at Gallie’s theory that it results in conceptual relativism607, whereby the 
usefulness and determinacy of a concept is fatally undermined through the 
possibility of interminable contestation.  For by anchoring subsidiarity by using 
exemplars in order to demonstrate what is nearer to the heart of subsidiarity, this 
helps to minimise the risk of a dispute as to how it should be operationalized in 
adjudication, i.e. that it has an objective, apolitical character.  This is important as 
one of the criticisms of subsidiarity is that it is too political to be justiciable.
608
 
Furthermore, such an approach would directly address a key concern raised by 
Gallie that essentially contested concepts are at continual risk of being disputed.  
It would also provide a useful conceptual framework in this thesis for helping to 
identify the core of values of subsidiarity, the latter being a key constitutional 
principle alongside proportionality in EU law-making for mediating the balance of 
power between the EU and the Member States in areas of shared competence.  
Such an approach allows for a more developed understanding of how the political 
dimension of subsidiary, which some authors have been keen to emphasise and 
                                                             
604 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
 
605 B.Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, (Cambridge University Press, 
2004). 
606 For a more general discussion of this see, for example, M. Pollack, Creeping Competence: The 
Expanding Agenda of the European Community, 
14(2) Journal of Public Policy 95 (1994). 
607 See J.N. Gray, ‘On the contestability of social and political concepts’, (1977) 5 Political Theory 
331-349 and C.Swanton, ‘On the Essential Contestedness of Political concepts’, (1985) 95 (4) 
Ethics 811-827.. 
608 C.Ritzer, M.Ruttloff and K.Linhart, ‘How to Sharpen a Dull Sword – the Principle of 
Subsidiarity and its Control, (2006) 7(9) German Law Journal, 733-760 for further discussion. 
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suggest is a matter of political rhetoric,
609
 can be reconciled with a legal concern 
with determinacy and specificity, the latter reflecting a key theme of the rule of 
law namely government is limited by law.
610
 
Section 5 thus considers whether it is possible to identify more fully ex ante 
criteria for the application of subsidiarity thereby enabling the CJEU to engage 
more meaningfully with subsidiarity in its judicial reasoning.  Such engagement 
would include the CJEU undertaking a balancing exercise to determine the 
proportionality of federal intervention and the advantages of such intervention and 
whether this outweighs the loss of Member State regulatory autonomy, but in a 
structured way.  
The contribution of this chapter is to set out what could be agreed upon at 
European level by proposing that not only should the CJEU move beyond an 
abstract discussion of subsidiarity and proportionality but that it should explicitly 
address any shared competence issues in its reasoning as well as setting out 
specific guidance about what the factors or criteria has informed its reasoning 
where it has undertaken any balancing of any competing issues in its judgement. 
This would help to legitimise the CJEU’s ruling to the Member States and address 
the problem of ultra vires EU action lacking legitimacy in the perspective of the 
Member States eyes.
611
 The key issues to consider here are firstly the general 
criteria for applying subsidiarity.  Secondly, the question of whether the criteria 
involved in a balancing test by the CJEU should be sector specific.  In particular it 
is proposed that each shared policy area requires different criteria to be taken into 
account by the CJEU when undertaking any review in order to take account of the 
different policy contexts and whether there are any competing interests relevant to 
a particular policy sector that require balancing.  By adopting such an approach, it 
is submitted, this should better legitimise genuinely European standards that have 
a clear legal basis. A subsequent chapter 4 will then focus on one particular shared 
policy context – determining the residency rights of EU citizens – as a lens to 
explore how a subsidiarity and proportionality review could address competence 
                                                             
609 K.Endo,    ‘Subsidiarity  and its Enemies: To what extent is Sovereignty Contested in the 
Mixed Commonwealth of Europe’:, ( Fiesolana: European University Institute, 2001). 
610 B.Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, (Cambridge University Press, 
2004). 
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issues. Chapter 5 then forms a case study to illustrate this theoretical framework 
more fully. 
First, however, the CJEU is introduced by explaining in section 2.1 how the CJEU 
is a truly unique supranational court and in section 2.2 a discussion of the pro-
union interpretatative tendency of the CJEU and the accusations in the literature 
of activism of the CJEU.  This discussion provides a prelude to considering 
whether the CJEU is a law-maker and, if so, an EU law-making institution bound 
by subsidiarity when interpreting in areas of shared competence. In particular, it is 
argued that a common thread throughout the CJEU’s case law is its teleological 
approach to interpretation of the Treaty and emphasis in its reasoning on 
promoting European integration and ensuring the uniformity and effet utile of EU 
law with the result that this eclipses other considerations such as subsidiarity. 
 
2. Subsidiarity and judicial review by the CJEU of the political institutions 
2.1. Introducing the CJEU: a unique supranational court 
The CJEU is a truly unique court.  Firstly it is a supranational court which differs 
from other international courts in the extent of its compulsory jurisdiction, which 
now covers almost all of EU law, and the lack of dissenting opinions.
612
 It does 
carry out certain constitutional tasks.
613
 So, for example, it rules on the 
competences of the EU relative to the Member States.
614
 However, despite this it 
is not a court primarily concerned with the protection of fundamental rights.
615
 
Indeed where it has been called upon to consider the fundamental rights of EU 
citizens, it has frequently struggled to articulate clearly its reasoning in a 
convincing and coherent way. This will be considered further in chapter 5. 
                                                             
612 For further discussion see V.Perju, ‘Reason and Authority in the ECJ’, (2009) 49 (2) Virginia 
Journal of International Law and who argues for a call for the CJEU to deliver dissenting 
judgements. 
613 B.Versterdorf, ‘A Constitutional Court for the EU’, 
<http://www.ecln.net/elements/conferences/book_berlin/vesterdorf.pdf> accessed 28.8.13. 
614 Ibid for further discussion of the cases in this context. 
615 For example as in the case of Case 43/75, Defrenne v Sabena, [1976].  For further discussion, 
see also E.Defeis, ‘Human Rights and the ECJ: An Appraisal,’ (2007|) 31 Fordham International 
Law Journal at 1104 and who writes ‘throughout its 50 year history, the ECJ has decided many 
cases which deal with fundamental rights such as non-discrimination, freedom of religion, 
association and expression’. 
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Secondly, although the EU political institutions are tasked with the making of 
primary legislation they are not necessarily entitled to the same degree of 
deference by the CJEU that a national political law-making institution has in the 
UK, for example, from their national courts.
616
  For as Alesina and Wacziarg point 
out, although the existence of European political institutions makes them more 
than ‘a sample area of policy co-ordination or integrated co-operation, the exact 
nature of European institutions is, however, extremely vague’.   Furthermore, they 
explain, ‘The Parliament is still more of a deliberative body than a legislative 
institution, the Council shares features of an executive and of a legislative 
institution, while the Commission is midway between a purely administrative 
body and an executive authority.’617 
This stands in sharp contrast to the position of a national court who is dealing with 
one supreme political law-making institution, for example as in the UK which has 
one main legislative body in the UK, the UK Parliament.  Here the traditional 
view -the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty - is that the Parliament is the 
supreme law-maker.
 618
  This doctrine has been respected and recognised by the 
national UK courts as requiring judges to defer to the will of Parliament when 
interpreting statute law 
619
 although following the introduction of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 there has been debate on the extent to which an unelected 
                                                             
616 British Railways Board v Pickin, [1974] AC 765 per Lord Reid.   
617 A.Alesina and R.Wacziarg, ‘Is Europe going too far?’, (1999) 51 Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy, 1-42 < 
http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/downloads/europe.pdf> last 
accessed 5.8.15      at 4. 
618 A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, (8th ed., London: 
Macmillan, 1915) who put forward the traditional view that, ‘The principle of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, namely that Parliament thus defined [i.e., as the 
‘King in Parliament’] has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law 
whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a 
right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.  See also Professor Adam Tompkins, 
Written evidence from the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee as part of its enquiry 
into clause 18 of the EU bill and Parliamentary Sovereignty, 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmeuleg/633ii/633we02.htm 
>accessed 4.8.15 for a discussion of more recent commentators who have assessed the extent to 
which our membership of the EU has challenged this traditional view. 
 
619 British Railways Board v Pickin, [1974] AC 765 per Lord Reid. However there have been some 
judicial statements which suggest that Parliament’s powers might be struck down where 
fundamental constitutional rights are concerned by Lord Hope in Jackson V Attorney General, 
[2006] 1 AC 262 para 107 when he stated ‘it is of the essence of supremacy of the law that the 
courts shall disregard as unauthorised an void the acts of any organ of government, whether 
legislative or administrative, which exceed the limits of the power that organ derives from the law.  
In its modern form, now reinforced by the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
enactment by Parliament of the Human Rights Act 1998, this principle protects the individual from 
arbitrary government.  The rule of law enforced by the courts is the ultimate controlling factor on 
which our constitution is based.’ 
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judiciary should have the power to overturn the democratic will of the legislature 
in order to protect fundamental rights.
620
  
Thirdly, the CJEU is unique in that it differs from national courts on the grounds 
that it is composed of judges from 28 different Member States.
 621
 They are 
assisted in their decision making task by 8 Advocate Generals.
622
  Thus the CJEU 
is composed of a very diverse set of judges and this may pose difficulties when 
deciding cases
623
  where judges come from different countries, with different legal 
traditions.  For, ‘they have had different types of education, they have different 
historical heritages and they think in the manner of different legal systems.  They 
bring to the CJEU’s process of decision making a variety in legal thinking as well 
as their personal concepts of values’624. However, as Craig and de Búrca, point 
out, ‘there is no sophisticated literature directly examining the attitudes and 
preferences of judges that have served on the Court. A major reason for this void 
is the fact that the CJEU does not publish its votes, and does not allow for 
dissenting opinions; judges are also precluded from commenting publicly on their 
work at the Court.’625 For example, in the context of gender equality, Jo Shaw626 
                                                             
620
 See B.Foley, ‘Diceyan ghosts: Deference, rights, policy and spatial distinctions’, (2006) 28 
DULJ 77 at 9 and who points out how ‘British courts have paid serious attention to the concept of 
deference under the Human Rights Act 1998’ and at 13 how ‘both academics and the courts 
routinely disagree over the extent to which deference is legitimate’. For wider theoretical 
discussion of the allocation of power between the judiciary and the legislature and the extent to 
which an unelected judiciary should be able to overturn legislation that is in breach of 
constitutionally protected rights see for example A.Young, ‘Deference, Dialogue and the Search 
for Legitimacy’, (2010) 30(4) 815-831’. See also at 176 her discussion regarding the part that 
judicial deference plays in testing for proportionality in the UK and the difficulties of determining 
exactly what that part is with reference to Laws L J in Huang v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, [2005] UWCA Civ 105, para 49.and who commented, ‘the nature and quality of the 
court’s task in deciding whether an executive decision is proportionate to the aim it seeks to serve 
is more conceptually elusive than has perhaps been generally recognised’. 
  
621 Pursuant to Article 253 TFEU (ex art 223 TEC), CJEU judges are to ‘be chosen from persons 
whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for appointment 
to the highest judicial office in their respective countries or who are jurisconsults of recognized 
competence they shall be appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States 
and for a term of 6 years’. 
622 Pursuant to Article 251 TFEU (ex art 222 TEC) the task of the Advocate General is to issue a 
preliminary opinion before the final judgement of the CJEU is delivered.  Such an opinion is 
merely advisory though and the CJEU is not therefore obliged to follow the opinion of the 
Advocate General.  Nor is the CJEU itself bound by its own previous decisions although it 
frequently tends to follow its own previous decisions.  See A. Arnold, The EU and its Court of 
Justice,  (OUP, 1999) 53 for further discussion. 
623 N.Everling, ‘The CJEU as a Decision Making Authority’.  (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 
1294. at 1294. 
624 Ibid., at 1295. 
625 P.Craig and G. De Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law, (2nd ed. OUP, 2011) at 146. 
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has questioned whether when interpreting gender equality law the predominantly 
male composition of the CJEU is open to question as an issue of lack of 
diversity.
627
 This is similar to concerns raised by J.A.G. Griffiths in respect of the 
UK judiciary in his book The Politics of the Judiciary and his argument that 
traditionally UK judges tend to be frequently white, male and educated at public 
school and Oxbridge.
628
 It is also similar to concerns raised by R.A.Posner in his 
book How judges think
629
 and the insightful discussion in that book on how the 
Supreme court judges make decision not on theory but on who they are, their 
gender, education, class and experience, the latter author being associated with a 
school of thought which advocates a realist approach
630
 to the theory of how 
judicial adjudication and adopting a sceptical view towards formalist ideas of the 
autonomy of legal reasoning.
631
 Realism doubts the possibility of objective 
standards.
632
  But in reality, although standards can be manipulated to an extent, at 
the same time objective standards are attainable.  This will be discussed further in 
sections 3, 4 and 5 of this chapter and chapter 3 of this thesis in the context of 
operationalizing how the CJEU could undertake a subsidiarity and proportionality 
review in order to demonstrate its adherence to the rule of law,
633
 the latter being 
enshrined in Article 2 TEU and argued by Weiler to be a constitutional principle 
                                                                                                                                                                       
626 J.Shaw,  ‘Gender and the Court of Justice’ in G.De Búrca,  and J.H.H.Weiler, ‘The European 
Court of Justice, (OUP, 1999).  For a more general discussion on the composition of the CJEU and 
women judges see S.Kennedy,  ‘Breaking the silence: gender mainstreaming and the composition 
of the European Court of Justice’ (2002) 10 Feminist Legal Studies  257-270. 
627 For further discussion see S.Kenney, ‘Breaking the Silence: Gender Mainstreaming and the 
Composition of the European Court of Justice’, (2002) 10 Feminist Legal Studies 257-270 at 257. 
628 (London Fontana, 1997). 
629 ( Harvard University Press, 1994).  See also J. Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, (Peter Smith 
Publishing Inc., 1985), 115. 
630 See Cornell University Law School legal institute 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/legal_realism> accessed 15.1.15 and who define legal realism as 
‘A theory that all law derives from prevailing social interests and public policy.  According to this 
theory, judges consider not only abstract rules, but also social interests and public policy when 
deciding a case’ and a key proponent of realism O.Wendell Holmes, The Common law 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2449/2449-h/2449-h.htm > accessed 15.1.15 at 1 and who writes 
‘The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.’ See also ‘Round and Round the 
Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship’, (1982) 95 (1) Harvard Law 
Review for further discussion of this approach.  
631 For further discussion see B.Leiter, ‘Legal formalism and legal realism: what is the issue? 
<http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/SSRN-id1646110.pdf >accessed 6.6.15 17-31. 
632 See further O.W. Holmes, “The Path of the Law,” in Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (New 
York: Peter Smith, 1952). 
633 For further discussion see B.Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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of EU law.  
634
  This is despite the fact that, ‘the Court of Justice, as the ultimate 
guardian of the Union legal order, is free to give an autonomous meaning to the 
EU principle of the rule of law even though the Court generally seeks to identify a 
common denominator in the constitutional traditions of the Member States when 
making use of a concept which was first developed at the national level'.
635
 
Foruthly, the CJEU as a supranational court is also unique in that its judges enter 
into a dialogue with judges from the national courts.  For cases before the CJEU 
take the form of questions which have been referred to the CJEU by the national 
court pursuant to the Article 265 TFEU (ex art 234 TEC) preliminary reference 
procedure.  Such a procedure has ‘been the mechanism through which national 
courts and the CJEU have engaged in a discourse on the appropriate reach of 
Community law when it has come into conflict with national legal norms’.636  For 
such a discourse between the CJEU and the national court to take place it relies on 
the national court to submit those questions in the first place. Thus Cichowski 
writes that for example in the gender equality context that ‘trade unions and 
individual activists utilized available legal resources and EU rules to bring legal 
claims before their national courts.  Operating to uphold EU interests and bring 
greater clarity to EU law, the CJEU resolved these disputes, and in doing so 
expanded the meaning and scope of EU social provisions’.637 This has a particular 
relevance as the primary audience of the CJEU is the national court to whose 
                                                             
634 J.Weiler, The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union', Jean Monnet 
Working Paper No 4 (New York, 2009) at 7.  See also ibid at 3 where he also refers to how the 
CJEU itself has referred to the EC as a 'community based on the rule of law'' in Case 294/93, Les 
Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para 23.  See further ibid at 4 how 'Indeed the rule of law, 
which is regularly equated with the idea of a "government of laws, not men", is generally 
assumed...to be a "good thing".  This undoubtedly explains why the court of Justice, in stressing 
the importance of the rule of law as a defining element of the EC's constitutional character, did not 
encounter much criticism’. 
635 Ibid., at 47.  See also the discussion by Weiler at 15 who points out that AG Mancini in Case 
294/93, Les Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339 'seems to equate it with the notion of judicial 
protection or control.' 
636 P. Craig, G. de Búrca, EU law: Texts, Cases and Materials, (3rd ed., OUP, 2000) 433.  See also 
K.Allen, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law  (OUP, 2000) for a discussion as to why 
the Member States have accepted the supremacy of EC law. 
637 R.Cichowski,  The European Court and Civil Society – Litigation, Mobilisation and 
governance’, (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 118.  See also A.Stone Sweet, ‘The ECJ and the 
judicialisation of EU governance’, (2010) Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 70 
<http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/70/ > accessed 10.7. 13 and A.Vauchez, 
‘Integration-through-Law’ Contribution to a Socio-history of EU Political commonsense’, EU 1 
Working Paper RSCAS 2008/10. 
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sense of ‘persuasive legal argument and analysis the court must appeal, by 
reference to the intention of the original framers of the Treaty.’638 
The CJEU does not claim to recover original intention in its reasoning, though 
occasionally it does as in the case of Kaur.
639
  Here the CJEU considered that the 
1972 Declaration by the UK of the categories of citizens to be regarded as 
nationals for the purpose of Community law should be taken into account when 
considering the scope of the Treaty.
640
  Consequently, the CJEU concluded that 
when a person of the UK is a national for the purposes of Community law, it is 
necessary to refer to the 1982 Declaration which replaced the previous 1972 
Declaration.
641
  This stands in sharp contrast to for example the case of CILFIT
642
 
where the CJEU did not refer to any original intention of the Treaty framers but 
rather held that ‘every provision of Community law must be placed in its context 
and interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole, regard 
being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on 
which the provision in question is to be applied’.643 
Fifthly, the CJEU is, of course, unique from other courts in that it is reliant on the 
national courts of the Member States for a good part of its work.
644
  Furthermore, 
it is also up to the national court at the end of the day to apply the court’s ruling to 
the facts in any given case before a national court.
645
   Thus, when analysing cases 
of the CJEU account needs to be given to the relationship between the CJEU and 
the Member States. This is particularly important in policy areas where the EU 
                                                             
638 J.W.R.Reed, ‘Political Review of the CJEU and its jurisprudence’  
<http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/archive/papers/95/9513ind.html > last accessed 21.7.12. 
639 Case C-192/99, The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Manjit 
Kaur, [2001] ECR I-1237. 
640 Para 24. 
641 Para 27. 
642 Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health, [1982] ECR 3415. 
643 Ibid., para 20.  See also G. Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of 
Justice’, (CUP, 2012) chapter 7 and in particular at 274 where he points out that the ‘ECJ itself 
quite rarely elaborates explicitly on the question of the choice of interpretative technique.  When it 
does do, it tends to briefly state the need to adopt a purposive interpretation in the light of the place 
of particular provisions in the overall scheme of the Treaties…….identify[ing] the highest level of 
generality, ever-increasing integration, ignores the contestability of the extent of legal integration.  
This approach conceives of legitimacy on the basis of a simple linear narrative of integration.  
However, normativity in EU law needs to be understood more fully and comprehensively if the 
way in which the EU self-articulates is to be taken seriously.  The extent to which integration 
should proceed is fundamentally a matter for the constituent power in the EU, which is the 
Member States.  This understanding of the authority of the Member States is inherent in the 
principle of conferral’. 
644 Not for example for reviews of legality or enforcement actions. 
645 Article 267 TFEU and C.Lentz, ‘The role and mechanism of the Preliminary reference 
procedure’, (1994) 18 Fordham International Law Journal, 389. 
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and the Member States share competence as ultimately it is up to the national 
court of the Member State to decide the case in light of the CJEU’s ruling. 
Furthermore, some shared policy areas involve highly sensitive policy areas 
which have traditionally been the preserve of the Member States. So, for example, 
in the pregnancy and maternity context such cases raise considerations of who 
should bear the cost of any protective measures and complex questions as to how 
to deal with the responsibilities that arise in the home and private sphere for a 
worker once they have a dependent child. Consequently, and as Reed has pointed 
out, ‘whenever the CJEU makes a controversial decision, it does so under the 
shadow of [Article 270 TFEU (ex art 236 TEC)] ’.646 This latter provision which 
provides that ‘The Government of any Member State or the Commission may 
submit to the Council proposals for the amendment of this Treaty,’ has been 
utilised in relation to the competences of the CJEU.  So for example, Lisa Conant 
647
 outlines two specifically direct threats that have been made in the past to CJEU 
competencies.  Firstly, she outlines that there was an informal proposal made by 
the UK that CJEU rulings could be overturned by a qualified majority vote in the 
Council.  Secondly, she also outlines that there was a proposal to eliminate the 
right of lower national courts to make a reference for preliminary rulings.
648
   
Finally, and perhaps one of the most unique characteristic of the CJEU is the 
absence of dissenting judgments. In view of the judges of the CJEU coming from 
such a variety of different backgrounds, it is perhaps surprising that in a ruling of 
the CJEU in any particular case that it contains only the one judgment
649
.  Despite 
the apparent diversity of the background for the judgements, there is no diversity 
of opinion reflected in the judgment. This, of course, has the advantage of speed.  
Indeed as Judge Edward has pointed out, ‘If you’ve got to have the written 
judgment written by the majority and then the dissents written, then you’re going 
to add months given the translation problems, to the production of the eventual 
                                                             
646 Ibid. 
647 L.Conant, Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the EU, (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University 
Press, 2002)  236. 
648 See the Debates of European Parliament OJ and EC Annex no 3 434 14 Sept 1993 at 50. 
Furthermore, since the majority of references to CJEU originate in lower courts, see L.Conant, 
Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the EU, (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press ,2002)  and 
who points out at 236 that this would have cut of the CJEU’s docket and delay proceedings 
considerably.   
649It has been frequently noted now the CJEU’s judgements tend to be brief and declaratory.  See 
for example P.Craig and G de Búrca,  EU law: Texts and Materials  ( OUP, 2000) at 100; N. 
Everling, ‘The CJEU as a Decision Making Authority’.  (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294. 
146 
 
judgment’.’650 The absence of dissenting judgments651 stands in stark contrast to 
the European Court of Human Rights which does have dissenting judgments and 
manages translation problems.  Indeed, recent research into the value of 
concurring and dissenting opinions by Professor R. White and Boussiakou reveal 
that interviews with the judges themselves revealed how they were  
‘overwhelmingly in favour of the use of concurring and dissenting 
opinions because it demonstrated the nuances of human rights protection, 
promoted debate among the Strasbourg judiciary, indicated that questions 
of interpretation and application were not always clear-cut, could provide 
consolation for the losing party who would know that some judges 
appreciated their position and arguments, and demonstrated openness and 
transparency’.652  
The absence of dissenting judgements in the CJEU therefore means that it is 
difficult for others to examine the disagreements between the judges of the CJEU.  
It is also impossible to examine dissenting judgments alongside the majority 
judgment and weigh up the extent to which each ruling has been reached in an 
impartial and objective way and, if not, undertake a  consideration of the possible 
sources of any possible bias and which might have arisen on account of a 
particular judge’s particular affiliations or background653.  This is of particular 
relevance for example in the gender equality context where despite the 
introduction of anti-discrimination legislation in EU law Fredman writes that 
‘women remain substantially disadvantaged, in the work-place, in political life 
and in the home’.654  Furthermore she argues, ‘law is made by people in power, 
traditionally monarchs, now politicians, bureaucrats and judges, and is therefore 
strongly influenced by prevailing economic and political conditions and 
ideologies….’655 Judge Edward, on the other hand, draws attention to the fact that 
                                                             
650 Judge David Edward Oral History: Years on the Courts – Part 1 at 16 < 
http://law.du.edu/documents/judge-david-edward-oral-history/transcript-2006-05-17-session-4.pdf 
> last accessed 12.7.12. 
651 See V. Perju  ‘Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice’ (2009) 49(2) Virginia 
Journal of International Law  and who calls for dissenting opinions in the CJEU. 
652 R.White and I.Boussiakou, ‘Separate Opinions in the European Court of Human Rights’, 
(2009) 9(1) Human Rights Law Review 37-60 at 57. 
653See Laffranque ‘Dissenting Opinion in the CJEU – Estonia’s possible contribution to the 
democratization of the EU’, <http://www.juridicainternational.eu/public/pdf/ji_2004_1_14.pdf > 
accessed 5.5.09. 
654 S.Fredman.,  Women and the Law, ( Oxford Clarendon Press, 1997)  1. 
655 Ibid. 
147 
 
the rulings of the CJEU do not contain dissenting judgments as an advantage.  
This is because, he argues, judges cannot be identified with particular ideological 
positions.  He writes thus,  
‘My final reason for being against dissenting opinions is ideology. The 
one saving grace of the Luxembourg court is that the judges are not 
identified with being in the field of employment, in favour of gender 
equality or against gender equality; they’re not in favour of free 
movement of goods as opposed to the environment.  They don’t become 
identified with particular ideological positions.
656
  And I think that’s 
enormously valuable for the working of that particular court and I am 
only speaking about that particular court.’657  
His comment is interesting because he does not say that ideologies are not at 
work, just that judges do not become identified with them.  If such ideologies are 
at work, however, then surely such ideologies should be more openly recognised 
and identified by both judges and academics alike so that it can be justified. In the 
context of subsidiarity, this means clearly identifying the extent to which it is 
capable of legal adjudication. 
 
2.2 The CJEU: Its pro-union interpretative tendency and accusations in the 
literature of activism   
 ‘The EU is and has always been plagued by uncertainty.  It has never been able to 
escape its historical failure to identify its purpose with any reasonable degree of 
precision.  In particular, a coherent institutional account of its ‘ideal constitution’ 
and those values which might plausibly unite its constituents has been missing’658  
However, despite such a historical failure to identify its purpose with any 
reasonable degree of precision, the founding fathers of the European Community 
did set up a judicial court with the sole responsibility for interpretation of the 
                                                             
656 See  M. Lasser, Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency and 
Legitimacy, (Oxford Studies in European Law, OUP, 2004).for an assessment made of the style of 
judicial discourse of the CJEU as a whole. 
657 Ibid. 
658 A.Williams,  ‘Taking Values Seriously: Towards a Philosophy of EU Law’, (2009), Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies pp 1-29 at 3. 
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Treaties.
659
   They also ensured that such a responsibility was made possible in 
practice by the inclusion in the Treaty of Rome of an article which is now located 
in Article 267 TFEU.  This latter article made provision for a preliminary 
reference procedure whereby the national courts were able refer questions of 
Community law arising to the CJEU.  Article 19 TEU provides that the task of the 
CJEU is ‘to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law 
is observed’. It has therefore been given the specific task of interpretation of EU 
Treaties and law.  Its purpose is therefore to ensure that EU legislation is 
interpreted and applied in the same way in all EU countries so that EU law is 
applied equally within the courts of the Member States.  Thus,  preliminary 
reference is not an appeal, but allows the CJEU to address purely legal questions 
in a consultative way: Member States’ courts are obliged to refer save where EU 
law is already very clear, under the CILFIT acte claire doctrine.
660
  Through the 
questions referred to it by the national courts this has given the CJEU the 
opportunity to interpret EU legislation in a variety of policy contexts
661
.  Thus the 
CJEU is similar to any other national court to the extent that it seeks to interpret 
the meaning of the provision before it. But it is also a court of ultimate authority 
in respect of supranational EU law i.e., it has jurisdiction to determine points of 
Union law and questions relating to European integration even when they arise in 
proceedings brought before national courts.
662
 Köbler has reinforced this through 
extending State liability to judicial acts of national supreme courts.
 663
   
 
The questions from the national court that the CJEU answers Everling points out 
are ‘[presented] in a commonplace form, concealed in questions of interpretation 
that are technically complicated and directed toward specific factual situations.  
However, behind such narrow questions always lies the fundamental question of 
the general orientation and the system of values which are to apply in the 
Community.
664
 
 
                                                             
659 Article 177 TEC. 
660 Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health, [1982] ECR 3415. 
661 Article 180 TFEU (ex art 164 TEC) 
662
 See Pollicino, O., ‘Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice in the Context of the Principle of 
Equality Between Judicial Activism and Self-restraint’ at 285 for further discussion. 
663 Case C-224/01, Köbler v Republik Osterreich [2003] ECR I-10239. 
664 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294. 
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The CJEU has employed a variety of methods of interpretation.
665
 These methods 
include firstly the literal interpretation, where the CJEU has described the normal 
meaning of the words used.
666
  The second method of interpretation involves a 
historical interpretative approach where the court has examined a variety of 
preparatory documents for particular pieces of secondary legislation. 
667
 The third 
method of interpretation involves where the CJEU has interpreted the Treaty in 
favour of a broad purposive way that understands purpose at a high systemic level 
of generality.
668
 Interestingly as Beck points out, the CJEU ‘rarely mentions that it 
has followed a particular so-called method of interpretation such as the literal, 
historical or teleological (purposive) method’. 669 However, the  CJEU’s approach 
to interpretation involving the CJEU justifying its decisions ‘in terms of the 
cumulative weight of purposive, systemic and literal arguments’ Beck argues is an 
approach which ‘is more in line with orthodox legal reasoning in other legal 
systems than is commonly acknowledged’.670  
 
On the other hand, from an early stage in its history, the CJEU has displayed a 
pro-union interpretative tendency particularly when it has acted at a supranational 
level as both a constitutional court
671
 and a court protecting the rights of 
                                                             
665 Even though as G.Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU, (Hart 
Publishing 2012at 282, relying on evidence from a study by Dederichs, Die Methodik des EuGH 
(Baden-Baden, Normmos, 2003) 64 et seq as well as his own examination of the Court’s case law 
for 2011 where the Court relied on purposive arguments in nearly 74% of all cases, points out ‘the 
CJEU rarely expressly mentions that it has followed a particular so-called method of 
interpretation, such as the literal, historical or teleological (purposive) method, although it readily 
refers to the wording, context, general scheme or indeed the precise words and provision in 
question, and the purposes, objectives and spirit of the EU Treaties and legislation adopted under 
it.  
666 See for example C-233/96 Denmark and Commission [1998] ECR I-5759 at para 38. 
667 See for example Case 29/69, Stauder v City of Ulm, [1969] ECR 419 at 5. It cannot however 
rely on the travaux preparatoires for the Treaties which are not available to it.  
668 Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health, [1982] ECR 3415. 
669 G.Beck,  The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU, (Hart Publishing 2012) at 281. 
670 G.Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU, (Hart Publishing 2012)  chapter 
9 for further discussion of the CJEU’s cumulative approach to interpretation and who notes that 
‘the Court of Justice’s rare declarations as to its general method are not always consistent and 
therefore not terribly helpful in determining the topoi of interpretation.  Indeed, the Court may 
support its reasoning and decisions with statements endorsing the most diverse interpretative 
approaches’.  See also Beck chapter 5 for a  more general discussion of differing theoretical views 
of legal reasoning and in particular at 126 the summary of Alexy’s ‘canons of interpretation as 
representative of the interpretative aids typically employed across legal systems’ in R.Alexy, 
Theorie der juristischen Argumentation (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1983). 
671 AM. Donner, ‘The Constitutional Powers of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities’, 11 CMLRev 127-140 (1974). 
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individuals within the Member States when interpreting the Treaties
672
  So, for 
example, in the case of Costa, it has acted in the capacity of a constitutional court 
when it enunciated the supremacy of EU law even in the absence of explicit 
textual support when it ruled that: ‘By creating a Community of unlimited 
duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity 
and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more particularly, 
real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers 
from the States to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign 
rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which 
binds both their nationals and themselves.’673 
 
The CJEU has also provided protection for individuals within the Member States 
of rights arising from the Treaties thus enabling EU citizens to rely on EU law in 
national courts.  This was first enunciated in the case of Van Gend en Loos where 
the CJEU ruled that ‘The Community constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign 
rights….and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals’. 674 
In these early cases the CJEU has realised a central role in furthering of 
integration even where there was no explicit textual support through the use of 
purposive interpretation that understands purpose at a high systemic level of 
generality which tends to favour integration.
675
 Such rulings clearly illustrate a 
clear pro-union interpretative tendency of the CJEU. 
A particular feature of the law-making role of the CJEU demonstrating its pro-
Union interpretative tendency is its emphasis in its reasoning on the uniformity 
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and effet utile of EU law.
676
 Thus, in respect of effet utile, this has involved the 
CJEU emphasising the importance of ensuring the effectiveness of EU law in its 
reasoning when adjudicating.  So, for example, as Sydner points out,  
 ‘In dealing with the problem of non-transposition of directives, the basic 
tool of the Court of Justice has been the gradual, piecemeal development of 
a judicial liability system. As a means of supervision and control, the 
creation of a judicial liability system is not unusual. However, the system 
which has been developed by the Court of Justice has distinctive features. 
First, it has been established by the process of adjudication, that is, 
gradually by the judiciary, rather than in a single act by the legislature. 
Secondly, it has been directed mainly at governments, not at private 
organisations. Thirdly, its primary target has been the failure of Member 
States to fulfil their Treaty obligations, in particular by failing to transpose 
Community directives into national law. Fourth, and consequently, its aim 
has been limited in scope: to enforce the correct transposition of directives, 
that is, to ensure the effectiveness of Community law in this limited (but 
none the less important) formal sense. Fifth, the branch of Community-
level government from which complainants seek relief, in the last instance, 
is the same branch which is the source of the rules, that is, the Court of 
Justice. Sixth, the system depends on one of the key relationships in the 
Community, namely the relationship between the Court of Justice and 
national courts’.677 
However, the CJEU’s devotion to emphasising effet utile in its reasoning has 
meant that the CJEU has failed to consider subsidiarity and localism especially 
when reviewing EU institutional action.  This is evidenced, for example, in the 
Working Time Directive case
678
, a case where the UK challenged the validity of a 
Directive concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, where 
the CJEU failed to check whether the EU institutions had demonstrated that the 
                                                             
676 For further discussion of this see F.Snyder, ‘The Effectiveness of European Community Law: 
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EU could achieve value-added protection when bringing in legislative measures 
for Community harmonization in this context.  This case will be considered 
further in the next section. 
Uniformity of EU law in a Union of 28 Member States who all have very different 
legal systems is also a particularly important issue for a supranational body such 
as the EU.  This is especially the case regarding Directives, the latter being the 
responsibility of each Member State to give effect to by their own national 
legislation.  Where Member States have not implemented Directives, the CJEU 
has applied direct effect.  Direct effect was first created of Treaty provisions,
679
 
extended to secondary legislation in Franz Grad
680
 whereby an individual is able 
to rely on an unimplemented directive in a national court, provided certain 
conditions are met.
681
  One of famous early cases where the CJEU applied direct 
effect of directives arose in the Defrenne II case concerning Article 119 TEC.
682
 
As Pollicino points out this case was illustrative of the CJEU law-making through 
its creative interpretation of Article 119 TEC.
 683
  A common thread running 
through such creative interpretation is the emphasis in the CJEU’s reasoning on 
the importance of having uniformity in respect of common standards and ensuring 
the effet utile.  This is a particularly important consideration for a supranational 
law especially in terms of ensuring the uniform interpretation of common 
standards at supranational level.
684
 The CJEU has played an important part in 
developing these common standards when interpreting EU gender equality rules, 
for example as well as emphasising in its case law that Member States should not 
apply rules which are ‘liable to jeopardize the achievement of the objectives 
pursued by a Directive’.685 Thus effet utile has been utilised by the CJEU to 
resolve the problems in particular of where an unimplemented Directive was not 
                                                             
679 Case 26/62 NV Algemene transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse 
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capable of direct effect as illustrated in Von Colson.
686
  Here the CJEU ruled that 
where an unimplemented Directive was not capable of direct effect that the CJEU 
should interpret any relevant national legislation as far as possible to conform 
with the provisions of the Directive.
687
 
Furthermore, in subsequent case law, the CJEU have emphasized the importance 
of effet utile of such EU law rights at national level through effective judicial 
protection at national level of EU equal treatment rights. So, for example in the 
case of Johnston
688
, the CJEU emphasized the importance of a right to an 
effective judicial remedy for breach of EU equal treatment rights. As the CJEU 
stated, ‘all persons have the right to obtain an effective remedy in a competent 
court against measures which they consider to be contrary to the principle of equal 
Treatment for men and women laid down in the Directive’.689 Furthermore, the 
CJEU explained that it is for the Member State to ensure effective judicial control 
of the ‘national legislation intended to give effect to the rights for which the 
Directive provides’.690 
Relatedly, the CJEU also established in the case of Von Colson 
691
 that to promote 
the effet utile of EU law rights that the national court should impose an effective 
sanction for breach of EU law. This case concerned a referral to the CJEU 
regarding a Ms Colson who argued that she had been discriminated against on the 
grounds of sex when she was applied for a job as a prison worker but was refused 
on the grounds of her sex.  The CJEU reasoned that national courts ‘are required 
to interpret their national law in the light of the wording and the purpose of the 
Directive in order to achieve the result referred to …’ 692 The CJEU then ruled 
that ‘it is impossible to establish real equality of opportunity without an 
appropriate system of sanctions’.693 In light of the importance of sanctions having 
a deterrent effect in this context it then considered the question of the adequacy of 
national remedies in this particular case in light of the requirement in the Equal 
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Treatment Directive for national remedies to be both adequate and effective.  In 
the words of the CJEU, ‘if a Member State chooses to penalise breaches of that 
prohibition by the award of compensation, then in order to ensure that it is 
effective and that it has a deterrent effect, that compensation must in any event be 
adequate in relation to the damage sustained and must therefore amount to more 
than purely nominal compensation such as, for example, the reimbursement only 
of the expenses incurred in connection with the application’.694 Such a ruling 
clearly emphasised the importance of the need for national courts to ensure the 
effectiveness of EU law rights by providing an adequate remedy.
695
 
In the case of Marshall II,
696
  Mrs Marshall then sought compensation for the loss 
she had sustained from the existence in the UK of retirement legislation that had 
required her to retire at 60 whereas male colleagues were able to retire at 65.
 697
   
However, there was a statutory limit on the amount of compensation that she 
could receive under UK legislation.  Following an appeal to the House of Lords 
challenging the level at which damages could be set under UK legislation, a 
reference was sent to the CJEU requesting whether Article 6 of the Equal 
Treatment Directive could be relied on to challenge national legislation limiting 
the amount of compensation that could be awarded. The CJEU ruled that any UK 
rules limiting the amount of damages that could be obtained had to be disapplied. 
The reasoning for this, the CJEU explained, was to ensure that for breach of EU 
rules on equal treatment an effective remedy was available.  Both the rulings in 
Marshall I and Marshall II   were significant in emphasising to the national court 
the need to ensure the uniformity and effectiveness of EU gender equality law 
demonstrating a pro-union interpretative tendency of the CJEU. 
Firstly, the ruling in Marshall I that gender equality Directives could in principle 
be capable of direct effect in horizontal situations
698
 enabled individuals in 
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Member States to rely in principle in national courts on the provisions of EC 
Directives against a State or an emanation of the State.
699
  There are important 
effects of attributing direct effect to the Equal Treatment Directive in this case.  
For example, the attribution of direct effect to Directives, including the Directive 
at issue in the Marshall case, has enabled the doctrine to be used as a ‘sword’ in 
that ‘it imposed Community law upon the national courts; it forced them to treat it 
as a source of law to be applied in cases before them.’700 It has also been argued 
that through the concept of direct effect, ‘Citizens are given a role in the new legal 
order and the Treaty becomes more than just a Treaty’701 
Secondly, in Marshall II the CJEU ruling that a national court should ignore both 
national laws setting a statutory limit on damages and a power to award interest 
and instead provide an adequate level of damages was explicitly on the grounds of 
ensuring the effectiveness of EU equal treatment law at a national level.
702
  Article 
6 of the new Directive 2002/73 incorporates various aspects of the CJEU case law 
in this context.
703
  
Thus the above discussion has highlighted how the CJEU has emphasised the 
importance of the effet utile of these common standards of gender equality in the 
employment sphere at national level. However, it is surprising that despite the fact 
that such standards arise in an area of shared competence and that there is 
                                                                                                                                                                       
principle capable of having direct effect.  This meant therefore that there could be judicial 
enforcement of rights arising from the provisions of that Directive and that such provisions were in 
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699 Ibid where the CJEU held that for or a Directive to have direct effect, it must be clear, 
unconditional and precise, the operation of the measure must not be dependent on further action by 
the state or Community and that the relationship between the claimant and the defendant must be 
vertical. See also P.Craig., G.De Búrca, EU Law, Texts, Cases and Materials, ( 3rd ed., OUP, 
2002) 185-9 for further discussion regarding the conditions that must be satisfied for a Directive to 
have direct effect. 
700
 S.Prechal, ‘Does direct effect still matter?’ 2000 CMLRev 37 1047-1069, 200 at 1047 
701 S. Douglas Scott, Constitutional Law of the EU, Harlow, Essex, Pearson Education 2002 at 
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considerable cultural diversity of legal gender regimes, there is no consideration 
of subsidiarity by the CJEU in its preliminary rulings regarding emphasising to 
national courts the importance of the effet utile of these common uniform 
standards at national level. Thus effet utile is used to smother subsidiarity with an 
integration logic and demonstrates the CJEU displaying a pro-union interpretative 
tendency.  
In other policy contexts, there have also been other moves by the CJEU which 
have attracted considerable criticism in academic literature on the grounds that the 
CJEU has frequently in its interpretation in a variety of policy contexts displayed 
a pro-Union interpretative tendency and gone beyond the meaning of the wording 
of the texts of the Treaties agreed by the Member States.
704
 This is an important 
issue for the CJEU as by interpreting beyond the meaning of the Treaty text this 
falls short of  demonstrating to the Member States that they are complying with a 
key tenet of the rule of law, the requirement of formal legality
705
, 
 
The CJEU has displayed a pro-Union interpretative tendency especially where the 
common market is involved.  As Everling highlights ‘the common market 
constitutes the starting point for the entre integration process and all attempts at 
more far-reaching economic and political progress stem from it.  Running like a 
red thread through the whole of the Court’s case law is the idea that this core of 
the Community must remain sacrosanct’.706 So, for example, in the free 
movement of goods context he highlights how ‘particularly well known are the 
conflicts arising from the rules governing the manufacture and marketing of 
products that have still not been harmonised, a situation which the decision in the 
Cassis de Dijon case was designed to meet’.707 Creative interpretation on the part 
of the CJEU is also evident in the free movement context, for example in the cases 
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of Dassonville
708
 and Bosman
709
 where the CJEU adopted a wide interpretation 
covering non-discriminatory obstacles. 
More radically, the CJEU has also allowed free movement (lex generalis) to be 
engaged, thereby circumventing more specific shared competences. This is 
discussed by Conway and who explains how, for example, in the decisions in 
Laval and Viking that the CJEU held that the right to strike fell within the scope of 
the free movement principle by bringing ‘the right to strike within Union 
competence, despite the right to collective action being expressly excluded from 
the social competence of the Community by then Article 137(5) EC Treaty (now 
Article 153(5) TFEU).’710 
 
Perhaps the most remarkable creativity and demonstration of a pro-Union 
interpretative tendency of the CJEU however is the development of the key 
constitutional doctrines by the CJEU discussed above.
711
 Firstly, the doctrine of 
supremacy of EU law over national law in the event of a conflict between the two 
in the case of Costa.
712
 Secondly, the creation of direct effect in the case of Van 
Gend whereby an individual was able to rely on a provision of EU law in a 
national court provided certain criteria are satisfied
713
 despite the absence of an 
explicit Treaty basis for such doctrines.
714
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themselves.’ 
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of international law’.   
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However, where the CJEU has interpreted the Treaty in favour of a broad 
purposive way that   understands purpose at a high systemic level of generality 
demonstrating a pro-union interpretative tendency, this has been subject to 
considerable academic debate.  In particular, academic literature has emphasised 
the distinction between interpretation
715
 and judicial activism.  So, for example, 
and as Pollicino writes ‘According to this distinction, the former is considered a 
legitimate expression of judicial function and the latter its degeneration, involving 
a judge’s arbitrary intrusion into the political arena by giving priority to values 
other than legal ones, such as, in the case of the CJEU, supporting the process of 
European integration.’716 Pollicino concludes by explaining that the CJEU’s law-
making is achieved by the CJEU on account of the unique teleological approach 
that the CJEU has adopted when interpreting the Treaties.
717
  The teleological 
approach was explicitly discussed by the CJEU in the case of CILFIT where it 
stated that ‘every provision of EC law must be placed in its context and 
interpreted in the light of Community law as a whole….’718  Such an approach to 
interpretation has been widely regarded as radical’719 although as Hans Kutscher, 
has pointed out, ‘How else should the Court of Justice carry out this function 
which it has been assigned except by an interpretation of Community law geared 
to the aims of the Treaty, that is to say, one which is dynamic and 
teleological?’.720  Furthermore, it has been argued by the CJEU itself that a 
purposive interpretation is needed to ensure that EU law has a useful effect when 
it held in Francovich that, ‘the full effectiveness of Community rules would be 
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impaired and the protection of the rights which they grant would be weakened if 
individuals were unable to obtain redress when their rights are infringed by a 
breach of Community law for which a Member State can be held responsible’.721  
The focus here is therefore on ensuring the effectiveness of EU law even where 
there is no explicit Treaty provision giving a right to an individual to seek 
compensation from the state where it fails to implement or mis-implements a 
Directive, or any other provision of EU law.
722
  
 
Furthermore, Pollicino argues that judicial function encourages not just 
interpretation but law-making.
723
  Such a need for law-making, he explains, is 
particularly so in the European context for various reasons and where the CJEU 
frequently employs in its reasoning a teleological approach to interpretation where 
it looks at the purpose of particular legal rules.  Firstly, on account of the 
legislative inertia that has been prevalent in the history of the EU.
724
   Rasmussen 
has also explained how, ‘The most-favoured rationale for this involvement has 
been that judicial activism was needed in order to break the impasse into which 
the political branches had settled.’725 Secondly the framework nature of a Treaty 
requires the CJEU to interpret creatively to fill in the gaps.
726
  Thirdly he argues 
that frequently the CJEU is creatively interpreting in order to avoid denying 
justice to the individual seeking to rely on a right pursuant to EU law.
727
  Fourthly, 
he argues that the multilingual nature of EU law ‘implies that the expressions 
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contained in the Treaties are beset by the difficulties involved in expressing their 
meaning in various linguistic versions’,728 the latter difficulty being explicitly 
addressed by the CJEU in CILFIT when it ruled that ‘it must be borne in mind that 
Community legislation is drafted in several languages and that the different 
language versions are all equally authentic.  An interpretation of a provision of 
Community law thus involves a comparison of the different language versions’.729 
This is a particularly important consideration when interpreting particular wording 
in the ruling is considered in later case law where particular terminology has been 
interpreted differently between different languages.  For example, Vauchez 
highlights that in the Van Gend case there was differing interpretation of the key 
terminology of direct effect in various languages.
730
  As he explains,  
‘while the English-speaking version mentioned the ‘direct effects’ (ECJ 
1963:13), the French one spoke about effets immediats (CJCE 1963:21), 
the unofficial translation made by the Common Market Law Reports 
referred to ‘direct effect’ with no plural to it, not to mention the rich 
vocabulary legal scholars mobilized to comment it (self-executing articles, 
direct application, direct insertion…)  this ambiguity of the decision as 
well as the fluidity in the lexicon not only indicates that no legal 
commonsense had yet imposed itself erga omnes, but also confirms that a 
wide range of possible legal futures were still open’.731 
The frequent use by the CJEU of a teleological approach has also led a few 
commentators to argue that ‘teleological interpretation can also be seen as more 
faithful to the democratic outcomes since it prevents textual manipulation of the 
legal rules.’732  
However this is a debatable point of view and against the weight of analysis in the 
literature where a more general charge is that teleological interpretation is more 
open to manipulation because of the issue of varying levels of generality.
733
 So 
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and Legitimacy (OUP, 2004) at 288.   
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rather than the CJEU just looking at the spirit and purpose of the Treaty rules the 
CJEU goes further and also considers the Treaty rule in light of the broader 
context of the EU legal order – a meta-teleological approach.734  A classic 
example of the latter approach is evidenced in CILFIT 
735
 where the CJEU stated 
that ‘every provision of Community law must be placed in its context and 
interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole, regard 
being had to the objective’s thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on 
which the provision in question is to be applied’.736  
One of the most stringent critics of the meta-teleological approach
737
  and the 
expansive approach to the interpretation of free movement is by Conway who has 
pointed out how the CJEU rarely explains its interpretative method preferring 
instead a broad purposive approach and an emphasis in its reasoning on the 
importance of the effectiveness of EU law.
738
 Furthermore, he explains the CJEU 
does not follow the Vienna Convention to the extent that it does not prioritise 
textual interpretation over teleological interpretation. This he points out is 
incompatible ‘with a universalised conception of legal reasoning’.739 
The consistent failure by the CJEU to make explicit its reasoning and 
interpretative assumptions he concludes makes inconsistency between cases less 
                                                             
734 M.Maduro ‘Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional 
Pluralism’ 1 (2) European Journal of Legal Studies <http://www.ejls.eu/2/25UK.pdf>   last 
accessed 3.1.15 at  5 
735 Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health, [1982] ECR 3415 
736 Ibid para 20. 
737 See., for example T.Hartley, ‘The European Judicial Objectives and the Constitution of the 
EU’,  (1996) 112 LQR, 95 and who argues at 95 that the CJEU sometimes interprets provisions of 
the Treaty contrary to the natural meaning of the words used and has taken place in pursuance of a 
settled and consistent policy of promoting European federalism e.g. the creation of direct effect in 
Van Gend; R. Herzog and L.Gerken: ‘Stop the European Court of Justice’, EU Observer.com, 
(2008)  < https://euobserver.com/opinion/26714 >  (last accessed 20.8.15) and who are critical of 
CJEU ruling that there was a general principle of Union law against age discrimination even where 
there was no explicit reference in the Treaty to such a principle. See also G.Conway, The Limits of 
Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice’, (CUP, 2012) 79-83 for further analysis of 
the key  literature on the activism of the CJEU. 
738 G.Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice’, (CUP, 2012) at 
22. 
739 G.Conway, G., The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice’, (CUP, 
2012) at 23. And also at 10 citing M.Bengoetxea, N.MacCormick, L.M.Soriano, ‘Integration and 
Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’, in G.De Burca and 
J.H.H.Weiler (eds), The European Court of Justice, (Oxford University Press, 2001) that ‘Legal 
reasoning is regarded by many scholars as necessarily having a universal character to justify the 
general normative claim to obedience that it makes: in other words, there is no special case of 
European legal reasoning, nor anything particularly European about the way the ECJ proceeds to 
justify its decisions.  Rather, any general theory of legal reasoning…could account for the ECJ’s 
decision-making.  Obviously certain rearrangements would need to be made in order to adjust the 
general theory to the different idiosyncratic elements of the European legal system’. 
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obvious and ‘focuses attention on outcomes rather than processes’.740  This does 
mean that the CJEU is able to promote a pro-Union stance without explicitly 
stating as such.  However, the promotion of a pro-Union stance runs the risk of 
claims of judicial activism and a lack of impartiality and objectivity which 
challenges the legitimacy of the CJEU in the eyes of the Member States.
741
   
Other critics too have argued that such an activist approach has gone beyond 
standard methods of judicial interpretation in order that the CJEU can promote 
European federalism.  Hartley, for example, argues that the court has a policy of 
promoting European federalism often refusing to accept the natural meaning of 
treaty provisions.
742
 Herzog and Gerken point out how the CJEU are even 
prepared to rule that there was a general principle of Union law against age 
discrimination even where there was no explicit reference in the Treaty to such a 
principle.
743
  
Furthermore, they argue that ‘judicial decision-making in Europe is in deep 
trouble. The reason is to be found in the European Court of Justice (CJEU), whose 
justifications for depriving member states of their very own fundamental 
competences and interfering heavily in their legal systems are becoming 
increasingly astonishing. In so doing, it has squandered a great deal of the trust it 
used to enjoy’. 744  
Such claims that judicial interpretation displays a pro-union interpretative 
tendency going beyond standard methods of judicial interpretation are an 
important concern. This is because as the CJEU does not enjoy primary authority 
to create law, the CJEU must satisfy its audience that in these decisions they are 
                                                             
740 Ibid., at 26 
741 See also  G.Beck, G., The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU, (Hart Publishing 
2012) referring to the Pringle case and who argues at 449 that  the CJEU is keen to protect the 
European integration process particularly ‘in critical cases and emergency situations  [where] 
written EU law no longer imposes any effective constraints on the judiciary and that in critical 
cases which may fundamentally affect the integration process within the EU, the Eurozone as a 
whole, the law is becoming what the judges say it is whatever the new meaning of the written law 
and whatever the written law actually says’.  
 
742 T.Hartley, ‘The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of the European 
Union’, (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review 95-109 at 95. 
743 See R. Herzog and L.Gerken: ‘Stop the European Court of Justice’, EU Observer.com, (2008)  
< https://euobserver.com/opinion/26714 >  (last accessed 13.8.15). 
744 R. Herzog and L.Gerken, ‘Stop the European Court of Justice’, 
<http://euobserver.com/7/26714> accessed 2.5.12.  See also K. Hänsch, ‘A Reply to Roman 
Herzog and Lüder Gerken’, 3(2) ECLR 219-224 (2007)] 
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applying valid law that interpretation does not constitute law-making.
745
 Applying 
valid law demonstrates a respect for the rule of law.
746
 The rule of law is a neutral 
arbiter; it avoids the judiciary having to make substantive moral choices 
themselves and helps to counter claims that the CJEU has an unjustified emphasis 
on an ever closer Union. Furthermore, and as Everling explains,  
         ‘courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.  The inherent power of persuasion of their judgements 
entitles courts to expect acceptance by those affected by the 
decisions. Reliance on the power of persuasion is particularly 
important in a system such as the Community in which the means 
for enforcing judgements are limited and in which compliance 
with them ultimately depends on the recognition by all concerned 
that the common interest requires respect for the Community legal 
order.  Nevertherless, it is difficult to determine the criterion 
against which the quality of the case law is to be measured.’747  
 
If the CJEU continues to utilise the meta-teleological approach or to circumvent 
more specific competences in shared competences areas by an expansive 
interpretation of free movement as, for example, in the cases of Viking and Laval, 
748
 it runs the risk of damaging the quality of its decision making in the eyes of the 
Member States and national courts, the latter responsible for giving effect in the 
member state to the rulings of the CJEU. Rather the CJEU could enhance its own 
                                                             
745 J.Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice,  (OUP, 1993) 114.  For a 
more general discussion on the importance of courts justifying their decisions through their 
judicial reasoning see R.Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory of Rational 
Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification (trans by R.Adler and N.MacCormack), (Clarendon 
Press, 1989) 221; N. MacCormick ‘Argumentation and Interpretation in Law’, (1993) 6(1) Ratio 
Juris 16-29. 
746 Article 2 TFEU.  See also chapter 1 and the discussion of how the rule of law has been widely 
recognised from a procedural viewpoint. 
747
 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308. 
748 See Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd, v Svenska Byggnadsarbetarefobundet, [2007] ECR 
I-11767 and Case C-438/05, The International Transport Workers’ Federation and the Finnish 
Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OU Viking Line Esti [2007] ECR I-10779 discussed by 
G.Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice’, (CUP, 2012)  49 
and who explains how ‘the decisions in Laval and Viking have brought the right to strike within 
Union competence, despite the right to collective action being expressly excluded from the social 
competence of the Community by then Article 137(5) EC Treaty (now Article 153(5) TFEU). The 
ECJ has held that the right to strike nonetheless falls within the scope of the free movement 
principle’. 
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legitimacy through quality decision making by firstly avoiding the meta-
telelogical approach as a method of interpretation in the future and instead 
preferring a teleological approach especially where there are gaps in the Treaty 
and a literal approach to interpretation is not possible. 
 
Secondly to enhance further the legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling for the CJEU to 
pay more attention to subsidiarity by checking whether the Union has competence 
to act (conferral) and in cases concerning areas of shared competence to include 
this in its reasoning. An explicit explanation of how the CJEU had considered 
subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning would help to improve the quality of the 
reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s 
ruling.
749
 
Thus the review of the cases in this section with reference to relevant academic 
literature has revealed how the CJEU has frequently tended in its interpretation to 
display a pro-Union interpretative tendency. Consequently engaging more 
meaningfully with subsidiarity will not necessarily prevent the CJEU from 
continuing to display a pro-Union interpretative tendency especially as 
subsidiarity itself is a contested concept and characterised be a degree of 
vagueness.
 750
  Nevertheless, even if the CJEU inevitably approaches 
interpretation from a certain perspective, the adoption of a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review with an explicit explanation of how the CJEU had 
considered subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning would help to improve the 
quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy of 
the CJEU’s ruling.751 
The next section turns to consider academic support that the CJEU as a law-
making institution should be bound by subsidiarity when reviewing cases in the 
context of the common market.  It also considers the question of whether it is 
possible to identify more fully ex ante criteria for the application of subsidiarity 
                                                             
749 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
 
750 This was argued in section 5 of chapter 2. 
751 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
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thereby enabling the CJEU to engage more meaningfully with subsidiarity in its 
judicial reasoning in areas of shared policy outside of judicial review. Further 
chapters 4 and 5 will focus on how the CJEU could engage more meaningfully 
with subsidiarity in its judicial reasoning when interpreting shared competence 
areas in the context of determining the residency rights of migrant EU citizens. 
 
2.3. The CJEU and its approach to subsidiarity when judicially reviewing the 
EU political institutions  
Despite the low numbers of subsidiarity cases brought,
752
 there have been various 
academic debates which have critiqued the use of subsidiarity by the CJEU when 
reviewing the actions of the political institutions in law-making.  So, for example 
some commentators have been highly critical of the CJEU arguing that the CJEU 
has adopted a very low intensity judicial review in this context.
753
 Other 
commentators have focused on considering the appropriateness in the first place 
of using subsidiarity in judicial review on the grounds that subsidiarity is ‘the 
wrong rule, in the wrong place at the wrong time’.754 
Arguably two of the most important advantages are preserving localism and 
respect for cultural diversity of the Member States legal regimes, the latter being 
substantively different to the former in that a respect for cultural diversity of the 
Member States legal regimes also involves a respect for the cultural and social 
diversity that the legal regime is part of.   But by respecting these two tenets and 
including in its reasoning how it had respected these tenets this would help to 
demonstrate the legitimacy of the CJEU’s rulings755 and that it is not getting 
involved in political judgments that the Member States’ authorities are best placed 
to decide upon although Berman has pointed out that for the CJEU to pay more 
attention to subsidiarity when reviewing the EU institutions, ‘require[s] the Court 
of Justice to play a role to which it is not accustomed namely restraining 
Community action in the interests of localism.’756   The discussion therefore 
                                                             
752 P.Craig and G.de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, (OUP, 5th ed., 2011) 99. 
753 Ibid. 
754 G.Davies, ‘Subsidiarity: the Wrong Idea in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time’, (2006) 43 (1) 
Common Market Law Review 66.  See also P.Craig, ‘Subsidiarity: A Legal and Political 
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755 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308. 
756 G.Berman, ‘Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the 
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agrees with existing literature that if the EU and the Member States have adopted 
subsidiarity in the Treaties as a constitutional principle, then the CJEU should pay 
attention to subsidiarity.  The section therefore turns to consider some examples 
of cases which illustrate how despite the ubiquity of subsidiarity the CJEU has 
frequently adopted a low intensity subsidiarity review when reviewing cases 
concerning the EU institutions when law-making.  
The first time that subsidiarity was raised in court proceedings and which 
demonstrated the CJEU’s reluctance to pay any attention to subsidiarity when 
reviewing the EU law making institutions was by the UK in the Working Time 
Directive case.
757
  The UK challenged the legality of the adoption of the Working 
Time Directive on the basis that the EU had acted ultra vires when adopting this 
Directive.  Pivotal in the argument put forward by the UK was that the Working 
Time Directive infringed the concept of subsidiarity and that,  
‘the Community legislature neither fully considered nor adequately 
demonstrated whether there were transnational aspects which could not 
be satisfactorily regulated by national measures, whether such measures 
would conflict with the requirements of the EC Treaty or significantly 
damage the interests of Member States or, finally, whether action at 
community level would provide clear benefits compared with action at 
national level…..Article 118a should be interpreted in the light of the 
principle of subsidiarity, which does not allow adoption of a directive in 
such wide and prescriptive terms as the contested directive, given that the 
extent and the nature of legislative regulation of working time vary very 
widely between Member States’.758  
The Advocate General in reviewing the argument advanced by the UK in 
paragraph 123 of his opinion clearly distinguished subsidiarity from 
proportionality opining that these two operate in turn and that ‘the first 
determines whether community action is to be set in motion, whereas the 
second defines its scope.  Hence the question of competence is dissociated from 
that of its exercise.  In other words, the principle of subsidiarity comes into play 
before the Community takes action, whilst the principle of proportionality 
comes into play after such action has been taken’.  He then concluded in 
                                                             
757 Case C-84/94, UK v Council [1996] ECR I-5755. 
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paragraph 127 and 128 that ‘by relying on the principle of subsidiarity, 
therefore, the applicant is disputing as a matter of principle the possibility of the 
Council taking action in the area covered by the contested directive, and not the 
extent of that power which, for its part, is conditional on compliance with the 
principle of proportionality.  In that regard the actual principle that action may 
be set in motion by the Community in the areas covered by the contested 
directive cannot be called in question that initiative could not have been left to 
the Member States alone’. 
 
The CJEU in its judgment first considered the scope of Article 118 a ruling that 
‘Article 118 a confers upon the Community internal legislative competence in 
the area of social policy.  The existence of other provisions in the Treaty does 
not have the effect of restricting the scope of Article 118 a. Appearing as it does 
in the chapter of the Treaty which deals with ‘Social Provisions’, Article 118 a 
relates only to measures concerning the protection of the health and safety of 
workers.  It therefore constitutes a more specific rule than Articles 100 and 
100a’.  Consequently other provisions of the Treaty here were not capable of 
restricting the scope of Article 118. 
 
Secondly, the CJEU adopted  a broad approach to health and safety in 
paragraph 15 ruling that ‘there is nothing in the wording of Article 118a to 
indicate that the concepts of ‘working environment’, safety and health as used 
in that provision should, in the absence of other indications, be interpreted 
restrictively, and not as embracing all factors, physical or otherwise, capable of 
affecting the health and safety of the worker in his working environment, 
including in particular certain aspects of the organization of working time’.  
 
In relation to the subsidiarity argument advanced by the UK the CJEU then 
undertook a very limited scrutiny of whether the subsidiarity principle had been 
breached.  Rather, in reaching the decision in this case, the CJEU relied heavily 
on an argument put forward by the Advocate General in this case that displayed 
a pro-union interpretative tendency that the subsidiarity test was of limited 
application where Community harmonization was at issue when it ruled that: 
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‘[O]nce the Council has found that it is necessary to improve the existing 
level of protection as regards the health and safety of workers and to 
harmonise the conditions in this area while maintaining the improvements 
made, achievement of that objective through the imposition of minimum 
requirements necessarily presupposes community-wide action’.759 
 
It also accepted the Council’s view put forward in this case that the 
Community’s aims were necessary in this context ‘and reasoned that it would 
be pointless to require a specific statement of reasons for each of the technical 
choices made by it.
760
  Here the CJEU’s reasoning reveals an emphasis on the 
importance of giving the Council a wide discretion when bringing in legislative 
measures for Community harmonization of those conditions as illustrated when 
it ruled that, ‘As to judicial review of those conditions, however, the Council 
must be allowed a wide discretion in an area which, as here, involves that 
legislature in making social policy choices and requires it to carry out complex 
assessments’.761  Once the CJEU had established that there was a justification 
for such a wide discretion for the Council when bringing in legislation in this 
context, it then limited the ambit of its review of the legislative action to merely 
‘examining whether it has been vitiated by manifest error or misuse of powers, 
or whether the institution has manifestly exceeded the limits of its 
discretion’.762  Thus the CJEU paid little attention to subsidiarity and the need 
to respect localism when reviewing the Council’s action in this context.  
Furthermore, in respect of its consideration as to whether there was a breach of 
the proportionality principle in this case, the CJEU also failed to require the 
Council to produce evidence of how it justified its decision that legislative 
action was needed in this context i.e. so no requirement to demonstrate that the 
EU could achieve value-added protection. 
 
The seeds of a development by the CJEU of undertaking a subsidiarity review 
when reviewing the EU institutions decision to adopt EU legislation can be 
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discerned in the Deposit Guarantees Case.
763
  The Directive at issue in the case 
involved deposit-guarantee schemes.  It was adopted under Article 57(2) TEC and 
its aim stated in paragraph 3 of the CJEU’s ruling was to ensure cover was in 
place for all depositors of all authorised credit institutions, including the 
depositors of branches of credit institutions that had their head offices in other 
Member States. This case itself concerned a challenge by Germany of a Directive 
94/19/EC on deposit-guarantees which included an argument by Germany that the 
Community legislator had adopted the wrong Treaty basis and failed to adduce 
adequate reasons for supranational action in this context
764
 i.e. no requirement to 
demonstrate that the EU could achieve value-added protection.    
 
Although the Advocate General rejected the argument that subsidiarity applied, 
the CJEU accepted that regulation of credit institutions was an area of shared 
competence and therefore subsidiarity did apply.  For in paragraph 26 of its ruling 
it stated, ‘In the present case, the Parliament and the Council stated in the second 
recital in the preamble to the Directive that, 
 
 'consideration should be given to the situation which might arise if 
deposits in a credit institution that has branches in other Member States 
became unavailable' and that it was 'indispensable to ensure a harmonized 
minimum level of deposit protection wherever deposits are located in the 
Community. This shows that, in the Community legislature's view, the aim 
of its action could, because of the dimensions of the intended action, be 
best achieved at Community level. The same reasoning appears in the third 
recital, from which it is clear that the decision regarding the guarantee 
scheme which is competent in the event of the insolvency of a branch 
situated in a Member State other than that in which the credit institution 
has its head office has repercussions which are felt outside the borders of 
each Member State’. 
 
The CJEU then acknowledged that the view of the Parliament and the Council 
was in conformity with the principle of subsidiarity when it reasoned that, 
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 ‘it is apparent that, on any view, the Parliament and the Council did 
explain why they considered that their action was in conformity with the 
principle of subsidiarity and, accordingly, that they complied with the 
obligation to give reasons as required under Article 190 of the Treaty.  An 
express reference to that principle cannot be required’.765   
 
It also referred in paragraph 26 to recital 2 of the preamble to the Directive where 
the European Parliament and the Council had concluded that action was needed at 
Union level.  The relevant recital stated, ‘consideration should be given to the 
situation which might arise if deposits in a credit institution that has branches in 
other Member States became unavailable' and that it was 'indispensable to ensure 
a harmonized minimum level of deposit protection wherever deposits are located 
in the Community'.  This the CJEU ruled ‘shows that, in the Community 
legislature's view, the aim of its action could, because of the dimensions of the 
intended action, be best achieved at Community level’.766  
 
The CJEU then pointed out that the same reasoning appears in the third recital.  
As it stated ‘from which it is clear that the decision regarding the guarantee 
scheme which is competent in the event of the insolvency of a branch situated in a 
Member State other than that in which the credit institution has its head office has 
repercussions which are felt outside the borders of each Member State’.767 
 
Finally it stated in paragraph 27 that ‘Furthermore, in the fifth recital the 
Parliament and the Council stated that the action taken by the Member States in 
response to the Commission's Recommendation has not fully achieved the desired 
result. The Community legislature therefore found that the objective of its action 
could not be achieved sufficiently by the Member States’. 
 
Although this provides evidence of the CJEU paying attention to subsidiarity 
when reviewing the EU institutions decision to adopt this Directive, the CJEU did 
not demand that this evidence be demonstrated.  Thus the ruling in this case 
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demonstrates that although the CJEU was now prepared to undertake a 
subsidiarity review of EU institutional action that it was only prepared to adopt a 
superficial and light touch approach in its review.   
A similar tendency is apparent in Directive 98/44 on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions case. 
768
  The case itself concerned a challenge by the 
Netherlands on the validity of this Directive.  The challenge included an argument 
that the Directive should be annulled for breach of the principle of subsidiarity.
769
  
In particular, it was pointed out by the Netherlands that national patent law had 
implemented the European Patent Convention.
770
 The Advocate General opined 
that the Directive in this context was necessary to harmonise Member State law in 
this context and that the principle of subsidiarity was respected in the Directive, as 
evidenced by recitals 3,5,6,7, and 9 of the Directive.
771
  However, the Advocate 
General in reaching his opinion on this point did not consider whether there was 
any evidence to support the EC’s decision that it was only the EC that could have 
acted here.  Nor did he consider whether the legislator had unnecessarily restricted 
national autonomy and the extent to which EC law intervention was proportionate. 
So it was enough for the legislature to make a formal reference to subsidiarity. 
The CJEU also accepted that subsidiarity was respected but it approached a 
subsidiarity review in a different way to the Advocate General.  It first 
considered that, ‘by requiring the Member States to protect biotechnological 
inventions by means of their national patent law, the Directive in fact aims to 
prevent damage to the unity of the internal market which might result from the 
Member States' deciding unilaterally to grant or refuse such protection’.772 It 
then considered the objective of the Directive at issue here as being ‘to ensure 
smooth operation of the internal market by preventing or eliminating 
differences between the legislature and practice of the various Member 
States…’773  Finally, the CJEU weighed up whether action was necessary at 
supra-national level, concluding that it was on the grounds that the required 
action ‘could not be achieved by action taken by the Member States alone’.774  
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In reaching this conclusion, it did explicitly acknowledge that compliance with 
subsidiarity is implicit in the recitals to the Preamble of the Directive when it 
ruled that ‘in the absence of action at Community level, the development of the 
laws and practices of the different Member States impedes the proper 
functioning of the internal market’.775 Relying on this wording, the CJEU then 
reasoned that supranational action was permitted where the aim of the 
legislation in question was to remove trade barriers, the latter being a key goal 
connected to the realisation of the internal market.  In the CJEU’s view, the 
existence of such an aim in the contested Directive met the requirements of 
subsidiarity.  Thus, the ruling in this case is another example of where although 
the CJEU was prepared to undertake a subsidiarity review of EU institutional 
action, that it was only prepared to adopt a superficial and light touch approach 
in its review of the internal market.  However, the latter can always be 
understood conceptually as involving joint action.  Consequently, the CJEU 
here by linking subsidiarity to joint action effectively neutralizes subsidiarity in 
that the CJEU did not consider why greater use of the European Patent 
Convention might have achieved the same objective. 
 
One of the most notable examples where an argument was put forward by a 
Member State that a particular Directive was contrary to subsidiarity was the 
Tobacco Advertising Case.
776
  In this latter case Germany argued that that the EU 
institutions had failed to pay proper attention to subsidiarity when adopting the 
Tobacco Advertising Directive.  In particular they argued that there was little 
evidence of cross border trade in such products when they submitted that such 
activities were ‘practically non-existent and [had] to date not been subject to any 
restrictions’777.  Thus they concluded that the EU legislator had neither respected 
the subsidiarity guidelines nor adduced evidence as to the need for Community 
action.
778
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On the question of weighing up whether the EU institutions had failed to pay 
proper attention to subsidiarity, Advocate General Fenelly undertook a review of 
the arguments put forward by the applicants that the institutions had paid attention 
to subsidiarity when adopting the legislation at issue in this case.  The Advocate 
General noted that such arguments included that the legislator in this case had not 
respected the guidelines on subsidiarity that had been issued by the European 
Council in 1992 or the inter-institutional agreement of 1993 between the Council, 
the Parliament and the Commission on procedures for implementing the principle 
of subsidiarity.
779
 In particular, this required that any action proposed is ‘is as 
simple as is compatible with the proper attainment of the objective of the measure 
and the need for effective implementation.
780
 
Furthermore, the Advocate General referred to an argument by the applicants that 
firstly the EU legislator had failed to consider the principle of subsidiarity that 
was included in the recitals in the preamble to the Directive.  The Advocate 
General also referred to another argument by the applicants that the EU legislator 
had made no consideration of any qualitative or quantitative evidence in support 
of the need for Community action on the grounds that national regulation was 
insufficient to remedy perceived difficulties with tobacco advertising.
781
  Such a 
subsidiarity based review in his opinion was essential as if there was no evidence 
of a significant identified need for transnational action, the regulation for 
advertising should remain with the Member States.
782
 
The Advocate General then considered the argument by the defendants.  For the 
defendants in this case, on the other hand, argued that the Treaty articles at issue 
in this case were inherently exclusive in character meaning that subsidiarity was 
not relevant here i.e. exclusive EU competence.
783
   They further added that the 
Member States were unable to remove effectively distortions of competition in 
trade in media and advertising services. Thus they argued that Community action 
was clearly needed.  Furthermore they contended that the existence of such 
                                                             
779 Ibid., para 46. 
780 Inter-institutional Agreement of 1993 between the Council, the Parliament and the Commission 
on procedures for implementing the principle of subsidiarity [2003] C 321/01 para 12. 
781 Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly delivered on 15 June 2000 in Case C-376/98, Federal 
Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, The Queen v 
Secretary of State for Health and Others, ex parte Imperial Tobacco Ltd and Others para 46. 
782 Ibid., para 46. 
783 Ibid., at para 47. 
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distortions had been clearly assessed by the legislator.
784
  For, as they argued, 
even if the Treaty articles in this case were not exclusive in character and 
consequently subsidiarity did apply and the Member States were unable to 
achieve removal of distortions of competition in trade in this context, the 
legislator had ‘clearly assessed and reasoned the need for Community action in 
response to divergent national rules.’ Furthermore, the legislator had then chosen 
as the legislative instrument here a Directive which leaves the Member States ‘a 
considerable margin for manoeuvre in many respects’.785   
In delivering his opinion on this contested issue, a key consideration was 
identifying the need for Community action where there are different rules at 
national level which give rise to distortion of competition.  As he opined, 
 ‘the coordination or approximation of national rules which affect 
economic activity is the very essence of these competences, provided it 
serves the purposes of the internal market, and is not merely an instrument 
for achieving some separate, materially defined objective.  It is clear that 
only the Community can adopt measures which satisfy these 
requirements’.786    
However, how clear was it that only the Community could adopt measures which 
satisfied such requirements and where was the evidence to support such a view?  
Kumm has argued that any subsidiarity review should involve the CJEU 
considering firstly whether there was a legitimate purpose for the particular 
legislative measures, secondly whether there was a need for such a measure and 
finally that the ‘EU legislative intervention does not lead to a disproportionate loss 
of Member States autonomy’.787  Only if all three of these criteria are satisfied has 
the subsidiarity review performed. However, in this case the Advocate General, in 
determining whether there was a real need here for EC action, failed to ask for 
evidence to support the EC’s decision that only the EC can act here and which is a 
key consideration when determining whether the legislator had unnecessarily 
restricted national autonomy. Rather the Advocate General merely reasoned that 
there was no need to undertake the difficult test of weighing up the comparative 
                                                             
784 Ibid. 
785 Ibid. 
786 Ibid., at para 139. 
787 M.Kumm, (2006) ‘Constitutionalising subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: the Case of Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Union’ (12(4)  ELJ 503-533 at 531. 
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efficiency between the benefits of EU harmonizing action to promote the internal 
market on the one hand and Member State regulatory action on the other.
788
   
Accordingly, the Advocate General concluded ‘the principle of subsidiarity does 
not apply, I do not think it is necessary to analyse whether it was observed in this 
case.  I would, therefore, reject this ground of invalidity.’789 
When the case was heard by the CJEU, however, the CJEU accepted that the 
adoption of the Directive was contrary to subsidiarity.  In particular, it focused on 
considering whether the EU had gone beyond the limits of the particular Treaty 
articles at issue in this case, namely Articles 95, 47 and 55 TEC (now Articles 
114, 53 and 62 TFEU), when it had adopted the Tobacco Advertising Directive.
790
  
Firstly, the CJEU interpreted Article 110a in light of Article 3(c) as, 
 ‘intended to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning 
of the internal market.  To construe that article as meaning that it vests in 
the Community legislature a general power to regulate the internal market 
would not only be contrary to the express wording of the provisions citied 
above but would also be incompatible with the principle embodied in 
Article 3 b of the EC Treaty (now Article 5EC) that the powers of the 
Community are limited to those specifically conferred on it’.791 
 Rather the CJEU reasoned any measure adopted in this context must ‘genuinely 
have as its object the improvement of the conditions for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market’.792  
Pivotal in the CJEU’s examination here was to determine whether the Directive 
actually contributed to the elimination of obstacles to the free movement of goods 
and removing distortions of competition by adopting a threshold for distortions to 
the market as being at least appreciable rather than undertaking a subsidiarity 
review.
793
  However, as Kumm points out, the omission of the CJEU to consider 
and explain the relevance of the subsidiarity principle in this case, means that ‘the 
                                                             
788 Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly delivered on 15 June 2000 in Case C-376/98, Federal 
Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, The Queen v 
Secretary of State for Health and Others, ex parte Imperial Tobacco Ltd and Others at para 142. 
789 Ibid. 
790 Case C-376/98, Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union, The Queen v Secretary of State for Health and Others, ex parte Imperial 
Tobacco Ltd and Others paras 76-89. 
791 Ibid., para 83. 
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Court of Justice has not yet adopted a doctrinal framework that effectively 
operationalises the Treaty’s commitment to subsidiarity and proportionality in the 
context of the common market.’794  It also means, as Craig and De Búrca write, 
that ‘the CJEU will not lightly overturn EU action on the ground that it does not 
comply with subsidiarity’.795 
However, in the case of Germany v European Parliament and Council (2
nd
 
Tobacco Advertising case),
796
 the CJEU, in considering the validity of Directive 
2001/37/EC, extended its judicial review to considering whether the Directive 
violated the principle of subsidiarity.  Consideration by the CJEU, however, again 
remained on a formalistic level of consideration with little evaluation of the 
evidence of the level of harmonisation that was needed. 
 
The case came before the CJEU as a preliminary reference concerning the validity 
of the Directive.  The Directive itself was a harmonizing Directive concerning the 
manufacture, sale and presentation of tobacco products.  The CJEU included in its 
deliberations a consideration of the three main harmonizing provisions of the 
Directive, namely Articles 3, 5 and 7.  Article 3 harmonised the maximum tar, 
nicotine and carbon monoxide yields in cigarettes and imposed a prohibition on 
the manufacture of such products that exceeded these limits.  Article 2 made 
provision for various labelling requirements for such products and Article 7 
prohibited the use on tobacco products of certain descriptions which might 
indicate that a product is less harmful than other such products. 
Although the applicants claimed that the Directive breached the principle of 
subsidiarity this was rejected by the CJEU.  In particular the CJEU reasoned that 
‘The Directive’s objective is to eliminate the barriers raised by the differences 
which still exist between the Member States’ laws…Such an objective cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States individually and calls for action at 
                                                             
794 M.Kumm, (2006) ‘Constitutionalising subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: the Case of Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Union’ (12(4)  ELJ 503-533 at 502. 
795 Craig and de Búrca, Op.Cit.  at  104. 
796 Case C-491/01, British American the Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British 
American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial tobacco Ltd, 2002 ECR 1-11453.  See also 
D.Slater, ‘The Scope of EC Harmonising Powers Revisited? (2003) 4(2) German Law Journal 
137-147.  
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Community level.’797  Here the CJEU sets a minimal criterion of removing 
barriers as an end in itself, whereas the essence of a subsidiarity review is to 
subject that criterion to scrutiny. Thus the CJEU’s consideration of whether the 
EU legislator had respected subsidiarity remains very formalistic.  It did not 
examine alternative approaches or apply any serious necessity element of a 
subsidiarity test. The CJEU also  failed to call for evidence of the EU legislators 
subsidiarity review prior to law making in order to determine to what extent 
should Community harmonization in an area of shared competence was required 
such action.
798
  
This section of the chapter has reviewed a selection of key cases where the CJEU 
has undertaken a subsidiarity review when undertaking judicial review of EU 
legislative action by the EU law making institutions.  In all the cases examined the 
CJEU is progressively paying more attention to subsidiarity when reviewing EU 
legislative action by the EU institutions.  However such review of EU legislative 
action by the CJEU is invariably light touch, with the CJEU frequently employing 
a very cursory approach to its examination of the EU institutions’ decision that 
harmonizing legislation is required.  The CJEU formally respects it, but not really 
in substance. The CJEU relates subsidiarity to the idea of the internal market and 
displaying a pro-union interpretative tendency treats advancement of the internal 
market as an end in itself, which is bound to neutralise subsidiarity. In the cases 
selected the judgments of the CJEU revewing EU political institutional legislative 
action are also characterized by a formalistic approach when considering if the EU 
                                                             
797 Case C-491/01 181-82. 
798 The low level intensity of the CJEU’s review of the Directive at issue in this case stands in 
contrast to the more intensive review undertaken by firstly the Advocate General opinion in Case 
C-491/01, British American the Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American 
Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial tobacco Ltd, 2002 ECR 1-11453 where he opined at para 
22 that ‘the Community legislature derives its powers from the realisation of the internal market. 
Those powers can, none the less, be exercised with a view to protecting a matter of public interest, 
such as public health in the present case. The measures adopted must in fact be appropriate for 
abolishing existing or at least probable obstacles to free movement. In exercising its powers the 
Community legislature is faced with the same evaluation as the national legislature when it 
intends, for the protection of a matter of public interest, to impose prior conditions on the 
economic freedom of market participants’. Secondly, Advocate Fenelly in Case C-376/98 
Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising) paras 119-120 who opined that 
‘although the legislation at issue affected the functioning of the internal market, that effect was not 
sufficient for Article 100A of the Treaty to apply where that effect is merely incidental’  before 
concluding that the Community legislator had manifestly exceeded its discretion in adopting the 
Advertising Directive as a measure to secure undistorted competition in the tobacco advertising 
and sponsorship sector. 
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institutions have paid proper attention to subsidiarity, with little consideration of 
the substantive evidence that Union harmonization is needed.
799
 
 
 
3. How to apply Kumm’s argument that the CJEU should operationalize 
subsidiarity by employing subsidiarity and proportionality applied to 
competences as a tool of judicial review 
It was explained in chapter 1 how Kumm argues a subsidiarity and proportionality 
review involves considering whether there should be a legitimate purpose for 
Union intervention explicitly stated and evidenced as required by Article 5(2) 
TEU.  The latter article requires that ‘the Union shall act only if and insofar as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member 
States…but rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved at the Union Level.’800  Furthermore, Kumm argues, with 
reference to the Tobacco Advertising and Working Time cases,
801
 that a 
subsidiarity and proportionality review involves considering whether that the 
Union internal market measure decided upon by the EU law-making institutions is 
                                                             
799 Although the EU political institutions are tasked with the making of primary legislation they are 
not necessarily entitled to the same degree of deference by the CJEU that a national political law-
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one supreme legislative body in the UK, the UK Parliament.  Here the traditional view put forward 
by A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, (8th ed., London: 
Macmillan, 1915) -the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty - is that the Parliament is the supreme 
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judges to defer to the will of Parliament when interpreting statute law as evidenced in  British 
Railways Board v Pickin, [1974] AC 765 per Lord Reid although there have been some judicial 
statements which suggest that Parliament’s powers might be struck down where fundamental 
constitutional rights are concerned by Lord Hope in Jackson V Attorney General, [2006] 1 AC 262 
para 107 when he stated ‘it is of the essence of supremacy of the law that the courts shall disregard 
as unauthorised an void the acts of any organ of government, whether legislative or administrative, 
which exceed the limits of the power that organ derives from the law.  In its modern form, now 
reinforced by the European Convention on Human Rights and the enactment by Parliament of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, this principle protects the individual from arbitrary government.  The 
rule of law enforced by the courts is the ultimate controlling factor on which our constitution is 
based.’For a wider theoretical discussion of the allocation of power between the judiciary and the 
legislature and the extent to which an unelected judiciary should be able to overturn legislation that 
is in breach of constitutionally protected rights see for example A.Young, ‘Deference, Dialogue 
and the Search for Legitimacy’, (2010) 30(4) 815-831’.  
 
 
800 Kumm Op.Cit 519. 
801 Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising case); Case C-84/94 
UK v Council [1996] ECR 1-5755. 
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the minimum necessary to deal with the problem identified.
802
  Finally, Kumm 
argues that  a subsidiarity and proportionality review involves considering the 
extent of the effect of a Union measure on autonomy of the Member State and the 
practical effect on the legal systems of the Member States and that this should not 
be out of proportion to the result achieved by the Union measure. 
803
 This 
inevitably requires the CJEU to undertake a balancing test.  But as Kumm points 
out, citing the example of the Swedish Match case
804
, the CJEU has failed to 
undertake a balancing test.
805
  As he writes, ‘even though Article 5 (3) specifically 
mentions the principle of proportionality in the context of the conferral of powers 
and the commitment to subsidiarity, the Court of Justice did not engage 
proportionality as part of the jurisdictional enquiry…it did not connect that 
analysis to the legitimate purpose of federal intervention.’806 
Nevertheless, despite the importance Kumm places on undertaking such analysis, 
Kumm does not consider how the CJEU should undertake such a balancing 
exercise or whether different policy areas require different considerations.  Nor 
does he specify exactly what the criteria should be or what factors the CJEU 
should take into account when undertaking such a balancing exercise. This is a 
significant omission as ‘balancing represents a different kind of thinking.  The 
focus is directly on the interests or factors themselves.  Each interest seeks 
recognition of its own and poses a head to head comparison with competing 
interests’.807  Building upon this argument by Kumm, this section therefore 
explains the steps the CJEU could have taken in the judicial review cases 
considered in this section. 
So, for example, in respect of the Working Time Directive case, here the CJEU in 
undertaking a subsidiarity and proportionality review would firstly need to 
address first whether there was a legitimate purpose for Union intervention as 
required by Article 5 TEU.  This would require the CJEU to identify the relevant 
Treaty provision that the Working Time Directive
808
 was adopted under. As the 
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803 Kumm Op.Cit at 522. 
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805 Kumm Op.Cit at 522. 
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relevant Treaty article here was Article 118 a TEC, this would include considering 
whether the Council had the right to exercise competence under Article 118 a 
TEC in line with the principle of conferral, which is now provided for in Article 5 
(2) TEU. It would also include considering data that the EU institutions had relied 
upon in support of their decision that there was a legitimate purpose for Union 
intervention.  This could, for example, include scientific and medical data e.g. 
data regarding the health implications for long working hours.  It could also 
include empirical data on the different approaches of the Member States to 
working time limits, night working etc and any data on the financial implications 
of regulating working time. 
Secondly, Kumm points out that Article 5 (3) specifically mentions the principle 
of proportionality in the context of the conferral of powers and the commitment to 
subsidiarity.
809
  Thus, once a legitimate purpose was established, according to 
Kumm, the CJEU would then need to ‘connect that analysis to the legitimate 
purpose of federal intervention.’ 810  This could be achieved by the CJEU 
considering if the EU law-making institutions had considered any data projecting 
an estimate of the scale and effect of such legislation and, if so, how the EU 
institutions had evaluated this and concluded that legislative action in this context 
had tipped the balance in favour of Union intervention.  This would necessarily 
involve the CJEU reviewing the EU institutions decision here that the legislation 
adopted was the minimum necessary to deal with the problem. This goes beyond 
merely looking at the purpose of the measure to considering the proportionality of 
such a measure. This would also involve the CJEU checking that the EU 
institutions adopted legislation that was not only the minimum necessary to deal 
with the problem but also proportional to the result to be achieved in light of any 
practical effects on the Member States e.g. in this particular case the implications 
for businesses and government of limiting working time hours. In performing this 
review, the CJEU could adopt a balance of probability threshold.  
In the Deposit Guarantees Case
811
, too the CJEU in undertaking a subsidiarity 
and proportionality review would firstly need to address first whether there was a 
legitimate purpose for Union intervention as required by Article 5 TEU.  This 
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811 Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament and Council, [1997] ECR 1-2405 22-28 (Deposit 
Guarantees case). 
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would require the CJEU to identify the relevant Treaty provisions both the general 
ones and the specific ones, here Directive 94/19/EC
812
  and considering whether 
the Council had the right to exercise competence under in line with the principle 
of conferral, which is now provided for in Article 5 (2) TEU. It would also 
include requiring data that the EU institutions had relied upon in support of their 
decision that there was a legitimate purpose for Union intervention.  This could, 
for example, include providing empirical data that Union action was needed in 
this context to substantiate the claim made in recital 2, 
 
‘to ensure a harmonized minimum level of deposit protection wherever 
deposits are located in the Community' to deal with the problem in 
recital 3 that in the event of the insolvency of a branch situated in a 
Member State other than that in which the credit institution has its 
head office [there are] repercussions which are felt outside the borders 
of each Member State’.813 
 
Once a legitimate purpose was established, according to Kumm, the CJEU would 
then need to ‘connect that analysis to the legitimate purpose of federal 
intervention.’ 814  This could be achieved by the CJEU considering if the EU law-
making institutions had considered any data projecting an estimate of the scale 
and effect of such legislation and, if so, how the EU institutions had evaluated this 
and concluded that legislative action in this context had tipped the balance in 
favour of Union intervention.  This would necessarily involve the CJEU 
reviewing the EU institutions decision here that the legislation adopted was the 
minimum necessary to deal with the problem.  Here the CJEU should look beyond 
any assertion by the legislature about proportionality i.e. it should adopt a more 
evidence-based assessment of proportionality. It would also involve the CJEU 
checking that the EU institutions adopted legislation that was not only the 
minimum necessary to deal with the problem but also proportional to the result to 
be achieved in light of any practical effects on the Member States e.g. any 
financial implications for businesses of harmonized minimum level of deposit 
protection wherever deposits are located in the Community.  In this particular case 
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the CJEU would need to require evidence of data to substantiate its claims that 
Union action was needed and was the minimum necessary to deal with the 
problem to support the claim in recital 2.  This would require a cost-benefit 
analysis involving relevant expert evidence on the practical effects on the Member 
States of harmonized minimum level of deposit protection. Again, in performing 
this review, the CJEU could adopt a balance of probability threshold.  
 
In the Biotechnological Inventions case, again the CJEU in undertaking a 
subsidiarity and proportionality review would firstly need to address first whether 
there was a legitimate purpose for Union intervention as required by Article 5 
TEU.  This would require the CJEU to identify the relevant Treaty provisions both 
the general ones and the specific ones, here Directive 98/44/EC
815
 The Directive 
was adopted on the basis of Article 100a of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, 
Article 95 EC).  Its purpose was to require the Member States, through their 
patent laws, to protect biotechnological inventions, whilst complying with their 
international obligations. So the purpose limb of the test is satisfied. 
 
The CJEU would then need to consider firstly whether the Council had the right to 
exercise competence in line with the principle of conferral, which is now provided 
for in Article 5 (2) TEU. Secondly, to require evidence of the data that the EU 
institutions had relied upon in support of their decision that there was a legitimate 
purpose for Union intervention.  This could, for example, include providing 
empirical examples that Union action was needed in this context to substantiate 
claim by the Parliament and the Council referred to in paragraph 16 of the CJEU 
judgement that,  
‘even if the relevant national provisions predating the Directive are 
most often taken from the Convention on the Grant of European 
Patents, signed at Munich on 5 October 1973, (hereinafter 'the EPC), 
the differing interpretations to which those provisions are open as 
regards the patentability of biotechnological inventions are liable to 
give rise to divergences of practice and case-law prejudicial to the 
proper operation of the internal market’.  
 
                                                             
815 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal 
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Such evidence might include data showing differences between Member States’ 
laws e.g. differences in Member States’ laws regarding the extent to which 
biotechnical inventions are patentable or differing views as to what types of 
biotechnical invention are regarded as contrary to public policy. The CJEU would 
also have to consider views of the Member States as the Directive will require 
Member States to protect biotechnological inventions under national patent law 
which may require them to adjust their national patent law to take account of the 
provisions of this Directive.
816
 
 
Once a legitimate purpose was established, according to Kumm, the CJEU would 
then need to ‘connect that analysis to the legitimate purpose of federal 
intervention.’ 817 Here Kumm is focusing on the first limb of the test, legitimate 
purpose, rather than considering the other limbs he identified: 2. Necessity, 3. 
Proproportionality.
818
  On the other hand, the latter could be achieved by the 
CJEU considering if the EU law-making institutions had considered any data 
projecting an estimate of the scale and effect of such legislation on national 
legislation of the Member States and, if so, how the EU institutions had evaluated 
this and concluded that legislative action in this context had tipped the balance in 
favour of Union intervention.  In this particular case the CJEU would need to 
examine evidence of data which illustrates that the patentability of 
biotechnological inventions are liable to give rise to divergences of practice and 
case-law prejudicial to the proper operation of the internal market and determine 
some way of measuring impact beyond a minimis impact (e.g. appreciable impact 
threshold as in the Tobacco Advertising case).  The CJEU would also have to 
consider views of the Member States as the Directive will require Member States 
to protect biotechnological inventions under national patent law which may 
require them to adjust their national patent law to take account of the provisions of 
this Directive.
819
Again, in performing this review, the CJEU could adopt a 
balance of probability threshold.  
 
In respect of the Tobacco Advertising case, although the decision in this case was 
on the legal basis, not subsidiarity, the logic of the ruling is consistent with 
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applying subsidiarity.  However, there was no explicit subsidiarity review.  Kumm 
has argued that any subsidiarity review should involve the CJEU considering 
firstly whether there was a legitimate purpose for the particular legislative 
measures, secondly whether there was a need for such a measure and finally that 
the ‘EU legislative intervention does not lead to a disproportionate loss of 
Member States autonomy’.820  Only if all three of these criteria are satisfied has 
the subsidiarity review performed.  
As neither the CJEU or the Advocate General in this case undertook an in depth 
subsidiarity review, it is proposed that the CJEU in undertaking a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review would firstly need to address whether there was a 
legitimate purpose for Union intervention as required by Article 5 TEU.  This 
would require the CJEU to identify the relevant Treaty provisions both the general 
ones and the specific ones.  The specific Directive here was Directive 
98/43/EC.
821
 The Directive was adopted on the basis of Article 57(2) of the EC 
Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 47(2) EC), Article 66 of the EC Treaty 
(now Article 55 EC) and Article 100a of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, 
Article 95 E).This would include considering whether the Council had the right to 
exercise competence in line with the principle of conferral.
822
 The CJEU would 
therefore need to examine the data that the EU institutions had relied upon in 
support of their decision that there was a legitimate purpose for Union 
intervention and the ultimate decision by the law-making institutions to adopt the 
Directive.  In particular, they could ask for evidence to be produced for example 
to support the claim made by the Parliament and the Council and referred to by 
the CJEU in paragraph 9 of the CJEU’s in relation to ‘problems of the cross-
border aspects of advertising via free distribution, which forms part of a uniformly 
defined advertising concept put into effect for a particular brand’ and how ‘the 
prohibition of promotional gifts is justified by the need to prevent circumvention 
of the rules’. 
Once a legitimate purpose was established, according to Kumm, the CJEU would 
then need to ‘connect that analysis to the legitimate purpose of federal 
                                                             
820 Kumm Op.Cit. at 531. 
821 Directive 98/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating 
to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products OJ 1992 L 213, p. 9. 
822 Article 5 (2) TEU 
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intervention.’ 823  This could be achieved by the CJEU considering if the EU law-
making institutions had considered any data projecting an estimate of the scale 
and effect of such legislation and, if so, how the EU institutions had evaluated this 
and concluded that legislative action in this context had tipped the balance in 
favour of Union intervention.  This would necessarily involve the CJEU 
reviewing the EU institutions decision here that the legislation adopted was the 
minimum necessary to deal with the problem.  It would also involve the CJEU 
checking that the EU institutions adopted legislation that was not only the 
minimum necessary to deal with the problem but also proportional to the result to 
be achieved in light of any practical effects on the Member States . Again, in 
performing this review, the CJEU could adopt a balance of probability threshold.  
 
In respect of the second Tobacco Advertising case, pursuant to Article 5 (2) TEU, 
again the CJEU would need to identify the relevant Treaty provisions both the 
general ones and the specific ones.  In relation to the specific Directive, this 
concerned Directive 2001/37/EC.
824
 Thus the CJEU would need to consider 
whether the Council had the right to exercise competence under in line with the 
principle of conferral, which is now provided for in Article 5 (2) TEU. Then it 
would need to examine data that the EU institutions had relied upon in support of 
their decision that there was a legitimate purpose for Union intervention.  This 
could, for example, include empirical data that Union action was needed in this 
context to substantiate the claim made in the second and third recitals in the 
preamble to the Directive and referred to in paragraph 6 of the CJEU’s ruling in 
this case that, ‘there are still substantial differences between the Member States' 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions on the manufacture, presentation, 
and sale of tobacco products which impede the functioning of the internal market, 
and those barriers ought to be eliminated by approximating the rules applicable in 
that area.’ 
 
Secondly, Kumm points out that Article 5 (3) specifically mentions the principle 
of proportionality in the context of the conferral of powers and the commitment to 
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824 Directive 2001/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products OJ 2001 L 194, p. 26. The 
Directive was adopted on the basis of Articles 95 EC and 133 EC and is aimed at recasting 
Directives 89/622 and 90/239 by amending and adding to their provisions. 
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subsidiarity.
825
  This could be achieved by the CJEU considering if the EU law-
making institutions had considered any data projecting an estimate of the scale 
and effect of such legislation and, if so, how the EU institutions had evaluated this 
and concluded that legislative action in this context had tipped the balance in 
favour of Union intervention.  This would necessarily involve the CJEU 
reviewing the EU institutions decision here that the legislation adopted was the 
minimum necessary to deal with the problem and also proportional to the result to 
be achieved in light of any practical effects on the Member States and in light of 
evidence submitted in this case. Again, in performing this review, the CJEU could 
adopt a balance of probability threshold.  
 
Thus so far this chapter has considered whether subsidiarity has impacted on the 
CJEU in its interpretative role when interpreting areas of shared competence. This 
is an important question which the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty, where 
subsidiarity was first introduced formally into EU law, did not specifically 
address.  This was despite the fact that it was considered by the European 
Parliamentary committee in the lead up to the Maastricht Treaty.
826
 It has also 
included a section which has briefly reconstructed various judicial review cases in 
order to illustrate how Kumm’s argument that the CJEU should operationalize 
subsidiarity by employing subsidiarity and applied to competences as a tool of 
judicial review. An illustration of how such a subsidiarity and proportionality 
review could be useful is to apply the proposed subsidiarity and proportionality 
review using Bosman case 
827
 discussed below. This case was also considered 
earlier in section 4 of this chapter and involved considering whether Article 48 
TFEU applied to rules laid down by national sporting associations.  It was also an 
example of where the CJEU in that case did consider in para 81 whether ‘national 
                                                             
825 Kumm Op.Cit. at 523. 
826 European Parliament Committee on Institutional Affairs, Interim Report on the Principle of 
Subsidiarity, European Parliament Document A3-163/90 (June 1990). More recently the Opinion 
of the Committee on constitutional Affairs for the Community on legal affairs on the 18th Report 
on better legislation – Application of the Principle of Subsidiarity and Proportionality 
2011/2276(INI)  <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
%2f%2fEP%2f%2fNONSGML%2bCOMPARL%2bPE-
483.487%2b02%2bDOC%2bPDF%2bV0%2f%2fEN> accessed 30.4.13 has also considered that 
‘there has been only one judgment by the European Court of Justice on proportionality and 
subsidiarity in the reporting period (‘roaming’ in mobile telephony), noting that Court found that 
there was no breach of either of these two principles in this case as it was necessary to limit prices 
for final consumers in order to protect their interests, and as this objective was best achieved at 
Union level’. 
827 Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921. 
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rules [are] within the field of application of EU law’.  In particular, it ruled that 
article 48 applied not only ‘to the action of public authorities but extends also to 
rules of any other nature aimed at regulating gainful employment in a collective 
manner’. Furthermore the CJEU considered in para 84 that, 
 
 ‘if the scope of Article 48 of the Treaty were confined to acts of a public 
authority there would be a risk of creating inequality in its application…. 
That risk is all the more obvious in a case such as that in the main 
proceedings in this case in that…. the transfer rules have been laid down 
by different bodies or in different ways in each Member State’.  
  
However, although this does demonstrate the CJEU paying some attention to the 
scope and ambit of Article 48 TFEU,  it is proposed, using this case as an 
example, that the CJEU needs to more meaningfully engage with subsidiarity and 
proportionality in its judicial reasoning. A more explicit explanation of how the 
CJEU had considered subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning would help to improve 
the quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy 
of the CJEU’s ruling.828 
 In the context of the Bosman case, it is proposed firstly that this could include the 
CJEU identifying limits to the competences through subsidiarity analysis and 
making explicit reference in its reasoning to how it has respected subsidiarity and 
demonstrated a respect for localism.  Secondly, it is proposed that this would 
involve the CJEU considering if there were genuinely European standards here 
and being explicit in its reasoning about when it is acting on the edge of its 
competence in an area of shared area of competence.  Finally, it is proposed that 
this would involve the CJEU stating whether any relevant qualitative or 
quantitative evidence in relation to the effect on the internal market of rules laid 
down by sporting associations had been considered and, if so, how it had been 
assessed and weighed up against relevant qualitative or quantitative evidence 
concerning the effect of Article 48 TFEU on rules laid down by sporting 
associations. 
  
                                                             
828 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
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Furthermore, the CJEU could also liaise with the national referring court or a 
national research body to ascertain the national views as to whether there are any 
local circumstances requiring additional consideration. 
829
  Adopting this approach 
would help inform the CJEU in reviewing the institutions decision regarding the 
extent to which the need for Union action outweighs the respect for local law 
making inherent in subsidiarity. Engaging more meaningfully with subsidiarity 
will not necessarily prevent the CJEU from continuing to display a pro-union 
interpretative tendency especially as subsidiarity itself is a contested concept and 
characterised by a degree of vagueness.
830
  Nevertheless, even if the CJEU 
inevitably undertakes review of the political institutions from a certain 
perspective, the adoption of a subsidiarity and proportionality review would help 
with an explicit explanation of how the CJEU had considered subsidiarity in the 
CJEU’s reasoning would help to improve the quality of the reasoning of the CJEU 
and consequently enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling.831 
 
To give a hypothetical example, suppose that the EC Commission was to propose 
a Directive, to be adopted under Article 95 TFEU, standardising rules 
concerning the placing on the market size and type of electrical plugs to fit a 
particular socket outlet.  The reasoning for this was to enhance the free movement 
of electrical products and that the UK was opposed to this on the grounds that 
there is a different size and type of plug and socket outlet in use in the UK to 
many other countries in Europe.  The CJEU in considering a challenge by the UK 
to the adoption of such a Directive would need to undertake a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review along the following lines. 
 
Firstly the CJEU would need to consider whether the Council had the right to 
exercise competence in line with the principle of conferral, which is now provided 
                                                             
829 A similar idea has been mooted in the context of the European Court of Human Rights where 
there has been discussion of creating a Research Division within the ECHR’s Registry by 
S.Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and 
Prospects (2006) 189. See also G.Rutherglen, ‘Title VII Actions’, (1980) 47 U Ch LR at 713 for 
how elaborate statistical evidence has been vital in the development of disparate impact cases in 
America when considering justifications put forward by Member States for their state social 
security rules.    
 
830 This was argued in section 5 of chapter 2. 
831 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
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for in Article 5(2) and the relevant Treaty basis for the Directive.  Where the 
relevant Treaty basis proposed is Article 95 TFEU this is a piece of harmonising 
legislation subject to subsidiarity.
832
 
Secondly, the CJEU would need to require evidence to be adduced of the data that 
the EU institutions had relied up on support of their decision that there was a 
legitimate purpose for Union intervention.  This could, for example, include 
providing empirical examples that Union action was needed in this context to 
substantiate any claim that legislation was needed in this context. 
Thirdly the CJEU would need to consider the proportionality here of having a 
Directive in this context.  This would require a cost-benefit analysis involving 
relevant expert evidence on the practical effects on the Member States of such a 
Directive. It could be achieved by the CJEU considering if the EU law-making 
institutions had considered any data projecting an estimate of the scale and effect 
of such legislation on the Member States’ regulation on existing standards of size 
and type of electrical plug and, if so, how the EU institutions had evaluated this 
and concluded that legislative action in this context had tipped the balance in 
favour of Union intervention.  In particular, the EU institutions could have 
examined evidence of data which illustrates the advantages of having a standard 
size and type of plug, the extent of diversity between Member States as to 
different sizes and types of electrical plugs to fit differing socket outlets
833
 and 
any pertinent data on estimates of the considerable financial implications for 
Member States of having a standard size and type of electrical plug and socket 
outlet.  It would also need to consider what added value the EU could bring here 
in that manufacturers of electrical goods in the EU would only have to produce 
one type of plug for all Member States. This would help to minimise costs for 
manufacturers in that they would only have to manufacture electrical goods using 
one particular type of plug. 
 
                                                             
832 See The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco 
(Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd. [2002] ECR I-111453 
 
833 See World Electricity Standards 
<http://www.quantumbalancing.com/worldelectricity/electricityif.htm#plugs> accessed 20.1.15. 
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On the other hand, it would also need to consider if a Member State such as the 
UK could deal with the issue in some way itself by allowing the use of adapters to 
enable non-compliant plugs of an appliance to be plugged into a socket outlet of a 
particular Member State or, for example, why easily available adapers could not 
address the issue.  Such adapters are readily available and relatively cheap for 
consumers but less convenient in that if you were a holiday maker traveling to a 
few countries where there were various different types of plugs you might need to 
purchase several adapters.  In performing this review, the CJEU could adopt a 
balance of probability threshold. With this in mind, the next section reviews 
academic support that the CJEU as a law-making institution should be bound by 
subsidiarity in the context of the common market. 
 
4. Academic support that the CJEU as a law-making institution should be 
bound by subsidiarity in the context of the common market. 
This section reviews the academic debate on the matter in more depth and in 
particular considers how there has been some academic support that the CJEU as 
a law-making institution should be bound by subsidiarity in the context of the 
common market. For as Kumm argues, ‘if a constitution establishes the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality as legal principles, questions of competences 
are closely tied up with questions of regulatory policy.  This means that the Treaty 
carves out a powerful role for the Court of Justice to assess the jurisdictional 
reasonableness of market intervention when reviewing whether the EU was 
legally competent to act’.834 Craig and De Búrca also have pointed the ‘act of 
interpretation itself can constitute the exercise of law-making power by the 
Court’.835  However, in respect of how the subsidiarity principle might be 
operationalized by the CJEU, they point out, ‘yet it is unclear whether or how the 
subsidiarity principle might affect this particular exercise of judicial power’.836  
Berman too argues that for subsidiarity to be taken seriously as a political 
obligation that the CJEU needs to engage with this principle in its interpretation in 
shared areas of competence.  As he succinctly puts it 'subsidiarity should be 
                                                             
834 M.Kumm Op.Cit 504. 
835 De Búrca Op.Cit.  at 222. 
836 De Búrca Op.Cit. at 222. Kumm Op.Cit. at 504 also points out that ‘the Court of Justice has not 
yet adopted a doctrinal framework that effectively operationalizes the Treaty’s commitment to 
subsidiarity and proportionality in the context of the common market’. 
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practised not preached'.
837
  Horsley, drawing on such literature, has explained how 
there are two dimensions when considering the implications of the CJEU paying 
more attention to subsidiarity.
838
  The first dimension, he argues, relates to 
whether the CJEU should pay attention to subsidiarity in all its interpretation of 
EU law or whether the CJEU should only pay attention to subsidiarity in limited 
contexts. Here he contends that, although the CJEU enjoys a right of interpretation 
in Article 5(2) TEU, such interpretation by the CJEU must involve interpreting 
law within a policy area that is held concurrently between the Member States and 
the Union. Thus although as Horsley points out the CJEU is only acting as a 
Union institution for the purposes of Article 5(3) TEU when it is interpreting,
 839
 
the CJEU’s power in interpretation is itself subject to a legitimacy inquiry in light 
of the fundamental values of the EU, including subsidiarity and the rule of law.  
Secondly Horsley considers in practice where the CJEU is bound by the 
subsidiarity principle in its interpretation as to how in practice it should pay 
attention to subsidiarity.  Here Horsley points out that there are various practical 
problems.  In particular, he argues that even where the CJEU is bound by the 
subsidiarity principle, ‘the application of the subsidiarity principle may seem 
entirely inappropriate in certain contexts.  Its logic may challenge core policy 
objectives set out in the Treaties’.840  However, this perhaps understates the 
situation as the Treaty of Rome provisions include on one hand the references to 
the idea of an ever closer Union and on the other the recognition of continuing 
sovereignty competences of the Member States.  The inclusion of diametrically 
opposing tenets in the Treaty of Rome was inevitably going to lead to tensions 
from the outset between the EU and the idea of an ever closer Union and the 
recognition of the continuing sovereignty competences of the Member States in 
areas where the EU and the Member States share competence i.e. subsidiarity 
must some of the time tilt the balance in favour of Member State competence.  It 
was for this very reason precisely why subsidiarity was included later in the 
                                                             
837 See G.A.Berman, ‘Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and 
the United States’, (1994) 94(2) Columbia Law Review pp331-456;  G.De Búrca , ‘The Principle 
of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional Actor’, (1998) 36 (2) Journal of 
Common Market Studies 217-35 ‘at 217;  T.Horsley, ‘Subsidiarity and the European Court of 
Justice: Missing Pieces in the Subsidiarity Jigsaw’, (2011) Journal of Common Market Studies 11-
15. 
838 T.Horsley, ‘Subsidiarity and the European Court of Justice: Missing Pieces in the Subsidiarity 
Jigsaw?’, (2011) Journal Of Common Market Studies, 1-16. 
839 Ibid., at 9. 
840 T.Horsley, ‘Subsidiarity and the European Court of Justice: Missing Pieces in the Subsidiarity 
Jigsaw?’, (2011) Journal Of Common Market Studies, 1-16. 
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Treaty following the Treaty of Maastricht to help guide the EU institutions when 
law-making in areas of shared competence.  Consequently, subsidiarity must have 
an important role to play in the CJEU’s interpretation in areas of shared 
competence
841
 and in particular the performing of a subsidiarity review where it 
not only pays formal respect to subsidiarity but also ensures that it respects the 
substance of subsidiarity.  Otherwise subsidiarity is of no legal value, despite its 
apparent centrality to the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty.
842
  
Relatedly, and as Horsley has argued, for the CJEU to pay attention to subsidiarity 
in its interpretation this is possible on the grounds that ‘the fact that the Court 
undermines its own legitimacy as a Union institution where it acts contrary to the 
demands of the subsidiarity principle’.843  Furthermore, he highlights that there is 
some support already in the CJEU’s case law on the operation of subsidiarity as a 
restraint on the CJEU’s own functions.  So, for example, in Bosman,844 also 
discussed above at pages 174-5, the CJEU was requested to pay attention to 
subsidiarity in response to an argument raised by one of the parties in this case 
and it accepted the principle of subsidiarity as applicable. 
Mr Bosman was a professional footballer who challenged the legality of various 
rules concerning the transfer of professional footballers on the grounds that they 
were contrary to Article 45 TFEU. During the appeal proceedings in the 
national case a preliminary reference was made from the Cour d'Appel (Court 
of Appeal), Liège.  The reference contained two questions.  The first of these 
questions asked whether rules permitting a football club to charge a transfer fee 
when a player that it contracted to that particular club moves to another club 
when that contract comes to an end were compatible with the free movement of 
workers rules in Article 45 TFEU.  The second of these questions concerned 
whether various rules restricting the access of foreign footballers to particular 
football competitions were contrary to EU law.   
 
                                                             
841 Ibid., at 10 and who gives some examples of contexts as being inappropriate for subsidiarity as 
including the promotion of gender equality pursuant to Article 8 TFEU and environmental 
protection pursuant to Article 11 TFEU 
842 For further discussion see K.Alter, ‘Who are the Masters of the Treaty? European Governments 
and the ECJ’, <http://aei.pitt.edu/2434/1/002500_1.pdf> last accessed 20.1.14. 
843 T.Horsley, ‘Subsidiarity and the European Court of Justice: Missing Pieces in the Subsidiarity 
Jigsaw?’, (2011) Journal Of Common Market Studies, 1-16 at 11. 
844 Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921. 
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When the reference was considered by the Advocate General and the CJEU 
they both paid some attention to an argument raised by the German government 
in relation to UEFA, a regulatory body for football that was supported by 
reference to the principle of subsidiarity. In particular, they were required to 
consider what should be the extent of the EU’s involvement in the regulation of 
sporting activities.  The Advocate General in considering this argument opined 
that Article 48 TFEU was appropriate for regulation of sporting activities, the 
latter being an economic activity. 
845
 Furthermore he opined that, 
 ‘Similar considerations apply to the reference by UEFA to the principle 
of subsidiarity now enshrined in Article 3b of the EC Treaty. The 
principle of subsidiarity, according to the wording of Article 3b, does not 
apply in the field of the Community's exclusive competence, such as the 
fundamental freedoms. Nor can it be deduced from that principle that 
Community law could not be applied to the field of professional sport’.846  
This really limits subsidiarity as almost any issue of EU competence can be 
seen from the angle of freedom of movement. 
 
The CJEU also considered and rejected the argument raised by the German 
government that regulation of sporting activities by the Union should be limited to 
what was strictly necessary as required by the principle of subsidiarity.
847
  In 
particular it ruled that,  
‘Subsidiarity, as interpreted by the German Government to the effect that 
intervention by public authorities, and particular [Union] authorities, in the 
area in question must be confined to what is strictly necessary, cannot lead 
to a situation in which the freedom of private associations to adopt sporting 
rules restricts the exercise of rights conferred on individuals by the 
Treaty’.848  
 Thus, both the Advocate General and the CJEU in this case have undertaken a 
light touch subsidiarity review in that they have both paid some attention to 
                                                             
845 Ibid., at para 130. 
846 Ibid., at para 130. 
847 Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921at 72. 
848 Ibid., at para 81. 
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subsidiarity in their deliberations on an argument raised by the German 
government in relation to UEFA, a regulatory body for football. 
Horsley has also identified how the more recent case of Fundacion Gala Dali
849
 
involved a question which required the CJEU to make a decision on the scope of 
union intervention in the regulation of the internal market as an area of shared 
competence when it was asked to interpret whether Directive 2001/84 on the 
resale right for authors was contrary to French legislation on succession.
850
 
When considering this question, the Advocate General stressed the importance of 
a key purpose of the Directive, namely to eliminating distortions to the 
competitive environment within the internal market, and ensuring that a resale 
right is levied throughout the Union.  However, the Advocate General then 
distinguished the benefit of a resale right in relation to succession on the grounds 
that ‘ensuring that the right benefits precisely those entitled under a particular law 
of succession is not [such a distortion to the competitive environment]’. 851  
The CJEU also ruled that the scope of Union action was limited in this context 
and did not extend to prohibiting French legislation which prevented the benefit of 
a resale right in relation to succession.
852
  In support of this ruling the CJEU 
acknowledged that as the Union decided against legislative action in relation to 
national laws on succession, the matter of determining who was entitled to benefit 
from rights arising under the Directive was a matter for the Member States.
853
  
Such a ruling, Horsley has argued, sits comfortably with the subsidiarity principle 
as the CJEU in this case appeared to undertake an assessment of the Union’s 
reasoning as to the extent of legislative action that was needed in this context 
based on the views of the EU legislature itself.
854
 However, the EU institutions 
need to support any assessment when considering if legislative action is needed by 
considering evidence to support its assessment that there was no legitimate 
purpose here for Union action rather than deferring to the legislature, without 
elaborating on subsidiarity: this is deference, without subsidiarity being 
                                                             
849 Case C-518/08, Fundacion Gala-Salvador Dali, judgment of the Court (Third Chamber of 15 
April 2010. 
850 OJ 2001 L272/32 
851 Case C-518/08, Fundacion Gala-Salvador Dali, judgment of the Court (Third Chamber of 15 
April 2010 Advocate General’s Opinion Para 65. 
852 Case C-518/08, Fundacion Gala-Salvador Dali, judgment of the Court (Third Chamber of 15 
April 2010  at para 33. 
853 Ibid., at para 32. 
854 Horsley Op.Cit. at 7. 
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articulated which the CJEU will have to review. However, such an approach 
stands in stark contrast to other CJEU cases where the CJEU has adopted a more 
creative approach when interpreting cases concerning the internal market and 
justified such an activist approach in periods when there was legislative inertia as 
evidenced in its key rulings concerning the removal of national barriers to 
trade.
855
 
In respect of the CJEU undertaking a subsidiarity review, the CJEU did not 
explicitly refer to subsidiarity at all in its reasoning even though subsidiarity in the 
Treaty is established in Article 5 TEC, now Article 5 TEU, alongside conferral 
and proportionality.  Consequently, the CJEU needs to take this into account in its 
interpretation.  But, and as Kumm points out, in the context of the internal market 
that although these requirements all ‘work together as integral parts of a 
comprehensive conceptual framework….in practice this is an area where the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice is confused and uncertain.’ 856 For although 
conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality are ‘interlinked and all are focused on 
issues of competencies, ultimately in the service of safeguarding Member States’ 
autonomy…., in respect of subsidiarity and proportionality the Court of Justice 
has not succeeded in establishing a plausible conceptual framework that brings 
together these two ideas so that justice is done to the complex constitutional 
commitment of Article 5 TEC.’857  
Furthermore, even though subsidiarity is a key constitutional concept alongside 
proportionality in EU law-making for mediating the balance of power between the 
EU and the Member States in areas of shared competence, it was argued in 
chapter 2 that subsidiarity is an essentially contested concept using Gallie’s theory 
of essentially contested concepts.
858
  Such conceptual dissonance, it was argued, 
favours judicial discretion on how it should be applied.
859
 Consequently, it was 
                                                             
855 See Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974 ECR 837; See also Case 120/78 Rewe-
Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649 and 
Craig, P., and  de Búrca, G., EU Law: Test, Cases and Materials. (5th ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 64. 
856 Kumm Op.Cit 505. 
857 Kumm Op.Cit 519 
858 W.B.Gallie,  ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, (1956)  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
167-98. 
859 For further discussion on literature which highlights out disagreement and dissonance are 
present in the law more than judicial reasoning sometimes suggests and calls for judicial reasoning 
to engage more fully with such disagreement and dissonance see for example J.Waldron, Law and 
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concluded that there is a compelling argument for judicial reasoning to engage 
more fully with how the CJEU should deal with such dissonance and 
operationalise subsidiarity to help ensure the proper respect for the division of 
power between the EU and the Member States in areas of shared competence  
With this in mind, the next section considers the following research questions on 
the grounds that considering these questions is pivotal in helping to anchor 
subsidiarity in EU law-making by the CJEU in shared areas of competence 
outside of judicial review as to ensure a proper respect for localism on the part of 
the CJEU.  Even where there is no change in case outcomes an explicit 
explanation of how the CJEU had considered subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning 
would help to improve the quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently 
enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling.860 
  
The first of these questions is whether competence issues are or should be 
explicitly addressed in every CJEU judgment in cases concerning areas of shared 
competence in order to demonstrate the relevance of subsidiarity. 
The second of these questions is the extent to which it is possible for the CJEU to 
adopt a single subsidiarity review which treats proportionality as an aspect of 
subsidiarity applied to competences to anchor subsidiarity to help ensure the 
proper respect for the division of power between the EU and the Member States 
when dealing with shared policy areas.  For there is a wide variety of shared 
policy contexts with some  types of policy contexts being on the edge of the EU’s 
competence such as equal treatment in social security context.  However, there are 
also other shared policy contexts which involve other competing fundamental 
principles of EU law such as gender equality or the rights under the Charter for 
citizens concerning a right to respect for a private and family life. This thesis will 
focus on one particular shared policy context – determining the residency rights of 
EU citizens as a lens to explore how a subsidiarity review could address 
competence issues.  It is hoped that this will shed light on what could be agreed  
                                                                                                                                                                       
Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999), C.Finkelstein, ‘Introduction to the Symposium on 
conflicts of Rights’, (2001) 7(3) Legal theory 235-238;  J.Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty: The 
Image of balance’, (2003) 11(2) Journal of Political Philosophy 191-210. 
860 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
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upon at European level by the CJEU and, if it is possible, to identify more fully ex 
ante criteria for the application of subsidiarity thereby enabling the CJEU to 
engage more meaningfully with  subsidiarity in its judicial reasoning. This 
consideration forms the main contribution of this chapter while chapter 4 focuses 
on the case study of citizenship. 
 
5. Is it possible to identify more fully ex ante criteria for the application of 
subsidiarity thereby enabling the CJEU to engage more meaningfully with 
subsidiarity in its judicial reasoning outside of judicial review?  
In every policy area where the EU shares competence with the Member States this 
thesis proposes that the CJEU should explicitly consider competences in its 
reasoning in all cases in order to demonstrate the relevance of subsidiarity and its 
respect for localism although this might not result in any change in outcome, it 
would help to demonstrate the legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling.861  The views of 
the EU institutions when law-making should be referred to and their reasons for 
favouring local law-making over centralised action should be explicitly stated.  
For, and as Kumm has pointed out, the advantages of local law-making over 
centralised action are three fold and encompass efficiency, democracy and 
preserving the identities of citizens of the Member States which is easier at a local 
level than a European level.
862
  
However, there is a considerable diversity of shared policy areas that the CJEU is 
involved in within its case law.  On the one hand, there are cases involving shared 
policy areas where there is a considerable diversity in legal regimes at national 
level where the EU is acting on the edge of its competence such as in relation to 
pregnancy and maternity leave and the exception made in EU law for national 
leave provisions.
863
 This latter exception has been critiqued by many academics as 
entrenching the public private divide and perpetuating stereotypical roles of 
                                                             
861 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
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862 Kumm Op.Cit. 581 
863 See Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 Feb 1976 on the implementation of the principle of 
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motherhood.
864
  Article 15 of Directive 2006/54 also lays down various standards 
for women when they return to work from maternity leave.  
In addition the Pregnant Workers Directive,
865
 adopted under Article 118 a 
TEC,
866
  is an example of an area where the EU is acting on the edge of its 
competence. Examination of the recitals to the Directive reveals a key focus of 
this Directive being the encouragement of health and safety of three particular 
groups of workers.  Recital 8 lists these three groups as firstly pregnant workers, 
secondly workers who have recently given birth and finally workers who are 
breastfeeding.
 867
  However, the Directive does includes that there is an 
entitlement to a continuous period of maternity leave of at least 14 weeks, two of 
which must be compulsory.  As Article 8 of the Pregnant Workers Directive is 
aimed at women, such provisions regarding leave are for women only.
868
 Such 
provisions do not, however, provide time off for breastfeeding leave, even though 
the Pregnant Workers’ Directive is directly concerned with a worker who is 
breastfeeding.
869
   
                                                             
864 See further C.McGlynn, Ideologies of Motherhood in European Community Sex Equality 
Law’, (2000) 6(1) European Law Journal. 
865 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently 
given birth or are breastfeeding. It was the tenth individual Directive to be adopted under the 
framework Directive 89/391/EEC on health and safety at work. Pregnant workers, workers who 
have recently given birth or workers who are breastfeeding are a group who face specific risks in 
the work place and therefore need specific health and safety protection, as set out in the Directive.   
866 Article 118 a TEC provided, ‘Member States shall pay particular attention to encouraging 
improvements, especially in the working environment, as regards the health and safety of workers, 
and shall set as their objective the harmonisation of conditions in this area, while maintaining the 
improvements made. In order to help achieve the objective laid down in the first paragraph, the 
Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189c and after consulting 
the Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt, by means of directives, minimum requirements 
for gradual implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in each 
of the Member States. Such directives shall avoid imposing administrative, financial and legal 
constraints in a way which would hold back the creation and development of small and medium-
sized undertakings.The provisions adopted pursuant to this Article shall not prevent any Member 
State from maintaining or introducing more stringent measures for the protection of working 
conditions compatible with this Treaty. 
867 See further V.Cromack, ‘The EC Pregnancy Directive: Principle or Pragmatism?’, [1993] 
JSWFL 26.   
868 However, the recent proposal to amend the Pregnant Workers Directive does propose a 
minimum period of leave from 14-18 weeks in Article 8.  It also proposes giving women a choice 
when they can take the leave and they are no longer obliged to take the leave before birth.  
However again the new proposal remains focused on biological reasons for maternity leave and 
the biological recovery of the mother. 
869 Article 2 of Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures 
to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who 
have recently given birth or are breastfeeding 
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On the other hand, there are cases involving fundamental rights of EU law such as 
gender equality or a right to respect for private and family life under the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights.  This begs the question of whether the CJEU should take 
different factors into account or give more weight to certain factors when 
undertaking a subsidiarity and proportionality review in such cases. In other 
words should a subsidiarity and proportionality review be sector specific. 
The main area where the CJEU has undertaken a subsidiarity review is in the 
context of  EU institutional action in the internal market context close to the core 
of EU competences. Kumm proposes the following stages:- 
Firstly, Kumm argues that a subsidiarity and proportionality review involves 
considering whether there should be a legitimate purpose for Union intervention 
explicitly stated and evidenced as required by Article 5(2) TEU.  The latter article 
requires that ‘the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States…but rather, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at the 
Union Level.’870  This requirement is related to the scale or effects of the 
proposed action are difficult, argues Kumm, for the CJEU to quantify in its 
judgement.
871
 However Kumm asks ‘when can Member States not sufficiently 
achieve the relevant purpose?’872  Arguably, a threshold could be identified by the 
CJEU along the lines of a balance of probability standard. But if the CJEU were to 
adopt such an approach when decision making, would this need to be informed 
first by a consideration of socio-economic data?  Rasmussen has already argued 
that the CJEU should have access to socio-economic data on a regular basis 
making references to the advantages of medical and scientific evidence being 
adduced in the case of Nisin where significant medical and scientific data on the 
dangers to health of Nisin were presented before the CJEU.
873
  Furthermore, as 
Rasmussen concluded, 
‘Access to comprehensive socio-economic fact has become an 
increasingly important factor conditioning successful handling of 
federalism disputes over the location of the boundary between central 
                                                             
870 Kumm Op.Cit. at 519. 
871 Kumm Op.Cit. at 520. 
872 Ibid. 
873 H.Rasmussen, On Law and Policy of the European Court of Justice, (Martinus Hijhoff 
Publisher, Dordrecht, 1986)  428 citing Dutch Nisin case, Case 53/80 Officier van Justitie v. 
Koninklijke Kaasfabriek Eyssen B V,  [1981] ECR 409,. [1982] 2 CMLR 20. 
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and local spheres of government.  Counsel is well advised in future to 
produce that sort of fact in a variety of cases.  The chances of winning in 
proceedings before the Court of Justice may greatly be enhanced by such 
briefing’.874  
Such types of data could  take a wide variety of forms but could include health 
and safety considerations, financial and/or fiscal implications and  cultural 
diversity of local laws in a particular context. 
Secondly, Kumm argues, with reference to the Tobacco Advertising and Working 
Time cases, that a subsidiarity and proportionality review involves considering 
whether that the Union internal market measure decided upon by the EU law-
making institutions is the minimum necessary to deal with the problem 
identified.
875
 The present author agrees with Kumm and argues that in light of the 
Treaty of Lisbon and the reaffirmation of both in Article 5 (3) TEU that the need 
to undertake a subsidiarity and proportionality review now carries even more 
weight. For, in respect of proportionality, this too is concerned with the 
appropriate means to achieve a need but unlike subsidiarity it is concerned with 
how competence is exercised rather than the EU legislative institutional process of 
determining the level for exercise of competence. Together, subsidiarity and 
proportionality are key concepts that the EU lawmaking institutions are required 
to comply with when law-making in shared policy areas in order to claim not only 
democratic legitimacy but also to demonstrate to the Member States that they are 
complying with a key tenet of the rule of law, the requirement of formal 
legality.
876
 To evidence the Union institutions compliance with proportionality 
and enable an assessment of compliance with proportionality by the CJEU, the 
Union legislature should provide evidence of how it has addressed alternative 
possibilities in detail. 
 
Thirdly, Kumm argues that  a subsidiarity and proportionality review involves 
considering the extent of the effect of a Union measure on autonomy of the 
Member State and the practical effect on the legal systems of the Member States 
                                                             
874 H.Rasmussen, On Law and Policy of the European Court of Justice, (Martinus Hijhoff 
Publisher, Dordrecht, 1986) 459 
<http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=eKlBYCIB0rcC&pg=PA427&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=
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875 Kumm Op.Cit. 521. 
876 J.Waldron,  ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?’, (2002) 21(2) 
Law and Philosophy 154-5. 
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and that this should not be out of proportion to the result achieved by the Union 
measure. 
877
 This inevitably requires the CJEU to undertake a balancing test.  But 
as Kumm points out, citing the example of the Swedish Match case,
878
 where 
despite an absolute prohibition on tobacco for oral use included in the EU 
Directive on the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products being 
found to be proportionate , the CJEU failed to undertake a balancing test.
879
  As 
he writes,  
‘even though Article 5 (3) specifically mentions the principle of 
proportionality in the context of the conferral of powers and the 
commitment to subsidiarity, the Court of Justice did not engage 
proportionality as part of the jurisdictional enquiry…it did not connect that 
analysis to the legitimate purpose of federal intervention.’880 
 
However, the present author suggests that following the Treaty of Lisbon, in every 
case concerning shared competence the CJEU, and in order to identify limits to 
the competences through subsidiarity analysis, it should consider is the EU acting 
on the edge of its competence in shared area of competence or are there genuinely 
European standards here and that ‘national rules [are] within the field of 
application of EU law’.881 This would mean, for example, carefully outlining how 
one category of competence relates to each other and not overusing Articles 114 
and 352 TFEU.  Even where there is no change in case outcomes an explicit 
explanation of how the CJEU had considered subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning 
would help to improve the quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently 
enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling.882 
Secondly, to consider if any Charter rights have been breached in situations 
falling within EU law. 
                                                             
877 Kumm Op.Cit. at 522. 
878 Case C-210/03, Swedish Match AB and Swedish Match UK Ltd. v. Secretary of State for 
Health. 
879 Kumm Op.Cit. at 522 
880 Kumm Op.Cit. at 523. 
881 S.Prechal, ‘Competence creep and General Principles of law, (2010) (3) Review of European 
Administrative Law at 9.   
 
882 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
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Thirdly, that each shared policy area requires different criteria to be taken into 
account by the CJEU when undertaking any review in order to take account of the 
different policy contexts and whether there are any competing interests relevant to 
a particular policy sector that require balancing.  By adopting such an approach is 
that this should better legitimise genuinely European standards that have a clear 
legal basis 
In respect of what the CJEU should include in respect of quantifying the scale or 
effects of the proposed action in areas of shared competence are not only to 
consider the explicit reasons for Union action but also to review the procedural 
steps of the Commission.  So, for example, the CJEU could review whether the 
Commission has undertaken a rigorous subsidiarity and proportionality review in 
keeping with the Impact Assessment guidelines of 2009’.883 In particular the 
Impact Assessment guidelines require the following questions to have been 
considered and ‘substantiated with qualitative and where possible quantitative 
indicators’.884 
‘1.Does the issue being addressed have transnational aspects which cannot 
be dealt with satisfactorily by action by Member States? (e.g. reduction of 
CO 2 emissions in the atmosphere)’. 
In respect of this provision, the CJEU would need to examine if there was 
data to illustrate that Member State action was insufficient to deal with any 
transnational aspects. 
‘2.Would actions by Member States alone, or the lack of Community 
action, conflict with the requirements of the Treaty? (e.g. discriminatory 
treatment of a stakeholder group) 
3. Would actions by Member States alone, or the lack of community 
action, significantly damage the interests of Member States? (e.g. action 
restricting the free circulation of goods). 
4. Would action at Community level produce clear benefits compared with 
action at the level of Member States by reason of its scale? 
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5. Would action at Community level produce clear benefits compared with 
action at the level of Member States by reason of is effectiveness?’885 
Finally, the Impact Assessment Guidelines acknowledge that as the answers may 
not be the same for each policy option that these questions should be posed for 
each policy option
886
 and that any Union action meets the conditions set by the 
principle of proportionality: ‘the principle of proportionality states that any Union 
action should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve satisfactorily the 
objectives which have been set’.887  It then gives a set of questions that should be 
asked to ensure that apply the proportionality principle has been applied correctly. 
‘Scope of instrument 
1. Does the option go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective 
satisfactorily? 
2. Is the scope of action limited to those aspects that Member States cannot 
achieve satisfactorily on their own and where the Union can do better? 
(Boundary test). 
3. If the initiative creates a financial or administrative cost for the Union, 
national governments, regional or local authorities, economic operators or 
citizens, is this cost minimised and commensurate with  the  objective to be 
achieved? 
4. Will the community action leave as much scope for national decision as 
possible while achieving satisfactorily the objectives set? 
5. While respecting Community law, are well-established national 
arrangements and special circumstances applying in individual Member 
States respected? 
Nature of Instrument 
6. Is the form of community action (choice of instrument) as simple as 
possible, and coherent with satisfactory achievement of the objective and 
effective enforcement? 
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7. Is there a solid justification for the choice of instrument – regulation, 
(framework) directive, or alternative regulatory methods such as co-
regulation  or self-regulation?’888 
Consequently, any subsidiarity and proportionality review by the CJEU in the 
context of the internal market should  ensure that not only have these questions 
have been considered by the EU institutions but  that such consideration is 
supported by qualitative and where possible quantitative indicators.  
An illustration of how such a subsidiarity and proportionality review could be 
useful is to apply the proposed subsidiarity and proportionality review in the 
context of the Bosman case.
889
 This case was considered earlier in section 4 of 
this chapter and involved considering whether Article 48 TFEU applied to rules 
laid down by national sporting associations, sport being on the edge of EU 
competence.  It was also an example of where the CJEU in that case did consider 
in para 81 whether ‘national rules [are] within the field of application of EU law’.  
In particular, it ruled that article 48 applied not only ‘to the action of public 
authorities but extends also to rules of any other nature aimed at regulating gainful 
employment in a collective manner’. Furthermore the CJEU considered in para 84 
that, ‘if the scope of Article 48 of the Treaty were confined to acts of a public 
authority there would be a risk of creating inequality in its application…. That risk 
is all the more obvious in a case such as that in the main proceedings in this case 
in that…. the transfer rules have been laid down by different bodies or in different 
ways in each Member State’.  However, although this does demonstrate the CJEU 
paying some attention to the scope and ambit of Article 48 TFEU,  it is proposed, 
using this case as an example, that the CJEU needs to more meaningfully engage 
with subsidiarity and proportionality in its judicial reasoning.  In the context of the 
Bosman case, it is proposed firstly that this could include the CJEU identifying 
limits to the competences through subsidiarity analysis by making explicit 
reference in its reasoning to the fact that sport is on the edge of EU competence  
to demonstrate respect for subsidiarity.  Secondly, it is proposed that this would 
involve the CJEU considering if there were genuinely European standards here 
and being explicit in its reasoning about when it is acting on the edge of its 
competence in an area of shared area of competence.  Finally, it is proposed that 
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this would involve the CJEU stating whether any relevant qualitative or 
quantitative evidence in relation to the effect on the internal market of rules laid 
down by sporting associations had been considered and, if so, how it had been 
assessed and weighed up against relevant qualitative or quantitative evidence 
concerning the effect of Article 48 TFEU on rules laid down by sporting 
associations.  
Furthermore, the CJEU could also liaise with the national referring court or a 
national research body to ascertain the national views as to whether there are any 
local circumstances requiring additional consideration.
 890
    Adopting this 
approach would help inform the CJEU in reviewing the institutions decision 
regarding the extent to which the need for Union action outweighs the respect for 
local law making inherent in subsidiarity.   
For national courts, the advantages of the CJEU explicitly respecting subsidiarity 
in the CJEU’s reasoning in judicial review cases would be twofold: firstly, it 
would improve the quality of judicial reasoning by providing justification for its 
ruling and secondly it would enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s decision.891    
Furthermore, for EU citizens, the CJEU explicitly stating the criteria used by the 
CJEU when balancing subsidiarity against other competing principles is more 
easily understood by the lay EU citizen than more complex methods of judicial 
reasoning.  Such an approach would also help to reassure national courts as well 
as EU citizens that the CJEU is respecting subsidiarity and respect for local law-
making when undertaking a subsidiarity review.
892
 Even where there is no change 
in case outcomes an explicit explanation of how the CJEU had considered 
subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning would help to improve the quality of the 
                                                             
890 A similar idea has been mooted in the context of the European Court of Human Rights where 
there has been discussion of creating a Research Division within the ECHR’s Registry by S.Greer, 
The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects (2006) 189. 
See also G.Rutherglen, ‘Title VII Actions’, (1980) 47 U Ch LR at 713 for how elaborate statistical 
evidence has been vital in the development of disparate impact cases in America when considering 
justifications put forward by Member States for their state social security rules.    
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reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s 
ruling.
893
 
With this in mind, subsequent chapters will focus on considering whether the 
CJEU has undertaken a subsidiarity and proportionality review in cases involving 
the determination of residency rights of EU citizens and the criteria involved in 
balancing conflicting issues in the particular sector and if not, how the CJEU 
could undertake a subsidiarity and proportionality review. 
Such research also feeds into wider discussions about the judicial approach to 
fundamental rights post Lisbon
894
 and the difficulties of balancing the differing 
interests in this context.  This is especially important in the new human rights era 
and following the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human 
Rights where the EU ‘will have its legal system measured by human rights 
standards’895 and the CJEU does not want to be found to be lacking in respect of 
the quality of its reasoning.
896
 Thus the CJEU needs to consider what the 
minimum standards have been established under the European Convention on 
Human Rights on this and to include in its reasoning why it is not enough just to 
rely on these. Here subsidiarity can be related to the divide between international 
law and EU law: the CJEU needs to explain why it is not leaving human rights to 
the ECHR.
897
 Here the CJEU could draw upon an argument by Schütze that there 
has been a conceptual shift of emphasis in EU federal philosophy from a dual 
federalism to co-operative federalism and that the latter encompasses the idea that 
the EU and Member States work together in a shared legal sphere.
 898
 Thus when 
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894 See S. Morano-Foadi and S.Andreadakis, ‘Reflections on the Architecture of the EU after the 
Treaty of Lisbon: The European Judicial Approach to Fundamental Rights’, (2011) pp 595-610 at 
595 and who argues that the post-Lisbon era is characterized by firstly the impact of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights following Article 6(1) of the TEU and secondly the future accession to the 
ECHR of the EU pursuant to Article 6(2) TEU. 
895 T. Lock, ‘EU Accession to the ECHR: implications for the judicial review in Strasbourg’, 
(2010) European Law Review at 16 See also  S. Douglas-Scott, 'EU Admission to the ECHR' 19 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2012)] 
896 T. Lock, ‘EU Accession to the ECHR: implications for the judicial review in Strasbourg’, 
(2010) European Law Review at 16. 
897 See further R.Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of 
European Law, (2009, OUP) 
898 Ibid., for a consideration of the federal philosophy that informs the EU’s legal structure and in 
particular an argument of how the EU legal system has evolved from dual federalism (which 
encompasses the philosophical idea of dual sovereignty where both governmental bodies are co-
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the EU accedes to the ECHR it has a duty in conjunction with the Member States 
to ensure compliance in the shared legal sphere with ECHR standards rather than 
simply leaving the matter to the ECHR court. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to consider whether subsidiarity and 
proportionality, as twin constitutional principles in EU law-making, bind the 
CJEU as law- maker in its interpretation of cases in shared competence areas and, 
if so, what can be agreed at European level?  
Section 2 considered the Court of Justice of the European Union (the CJEU) as a 
unique supranational law-making institution.  It was also highlighted how in 
academic literature the CJEU has been subject to considerable criticism on the 
grounds that the CJEU has frequently in its interpretation in a variety of policy 
contexts has gone beyond the meaning of the wording of the texts of the Treaties 
agreed by the Member States.
899
 Secondly, with reference to a selection of case 
law with reference to relevant academic literature, it was noted that the courts pro-
union interpretative tendency and the emphasis of the CJEU in its case law on 
effect utile and ensuring the uniformity of EU law is used to smother subsidiarity 
with integration logic. 
In light of the recent affirmation of subsidiarity following the Treaty of Lisbon, 
the chapter then revisited and agreed with literature firstly by Kumm as to how he 
treats proportionality as an aspect to subsidiarity applied to competences.  
Secondly, literature by De Búrca et al that has convincingly argued that the CJEU 
as a law-making institution should be bound by subsidiarity outside of judicial 
review cases when interpreting in areas of shared competence. Further 
subsidiarity is an essentially contested concept; such conceptual dissonance 
favours judicial discretion on how it should be applied and consequently raises the 
question of how such discretion should be justified within the reasoning of the 
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CJEU.   It was then contended that as a minimum that the CJEU should explicitly 
address competence issues in its reasoning in every case concerning an area of 
shared competence.  For this could help to counter claims that the CJEU displays 
an unjustified emphasis in its case law on the need to pursue an ‘ever closer 
Union’ which deprives Member States of their competencies and is at the expense 
of the legal systems of the Member States.
900
  It would also be consistent with 
subsidiarity and its inherent respect for localism in conjunction with the national 
identity clause in Article 4 (2) TEU.   
The contribution of this chapter is to set out what could be agreed upon at 
European level by proposing that not only should the CJEU should move beyond 
an abstract discussion of subsidiarity and proportionality but that it should 
explicitly address any shared competence issues in its reasoning as well as setting 
out specific guidance about what the factors or criteria has informed its reasoning 
where it has undertaken any balancing of any competing issues in its judgement. 
Even where there is no change in case outcomes an explicit explanation of how 
the CJEU had considered subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning would help to 
improve the quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the 
legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling.901 
 
The key issues to consider here are firstly the general criteria for applying a 
subsidiarity and proportionality review applied to competences.  Secondly, in 
considering the question of whether the criteria involved in a balancing test by the 
CJEU should be sector specific, it has proposed that each shared policy area 
requires different criteria to be taken into account by the CJEU when undertaking 
any review in order to take account of the different policy contexts and whether 
there are any competing interest relevant to a particular policy sector that require 
balancing.  In developing the criteria for subsidiarity the approach is to try and 
specify it and make it rule-bound as much as possible, as this would relate it back 
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to the rules-principles distinction.
902
  This relates to the rule of law, principles of 
certainty and predictability
903
  and, by adopting such an approach, this should 
better legitimize genuinely European standards that have a clear legal basis. 
Subsidiarity, as it stands, is presented as more of an incommensurable principle by 
its critics,
904
 and thus not so suited to adjudication.
905
 A subsequent chapter 4 will 
then focus on one particular shared policy context – determining the rights of EU 
citizens in chapter 4- as a lens to explore how a subsidiarity and proportionality 
review could address competence issues.  Chapter 5 then forms a case study to 
illustrate this theoretical framework more fully.  This feeds into wider discussions 
about the judicial approach to fundamental rights post Lisbon
906
 and the 
difficulties of balancing subsidiarity and a respect for localism with other 
conflicting principles of EU law.  This is especially important in the new human 
rights era and following the accession of the EU to the European Convention on 
Human Rights where the EU ‘will have its legal system measured by human 
rights standards’907 and the CJEU does not want to be found to be lacking in 
respect of the quality of its reasoning.
908
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Chapter 4 
 
The fundamental status of EU citizenship and the determination of residency 
rights of EU citizens by the CJEU 
 
1.Introduction 
2.Theoretical Perspectives: the concept of citizenship and its link to political 
identity which in an EU context means that the competence must be 
necessarily shared with the Member States 
2.1 Introduction 
2.2 The concept of citizenship and its link to political identity which in an EU 
context means that the competence must be necessarily shared with the Member 
States 
2.3 The limits of EU citizenship 
2.4 The problems of differing levels of protection from expulsion for different 
categories of EU citizens 
2.5 Conclusion 
3. Legal Perspectives – EU citizenship, the CJEU and the fundamental status 
of EU citizenship and residency rights in Directive 2004/38  
3.1Introduction 
3.2 The Introduction of EU citizenship provisions following the Treaty of 
Maastricht 
3.3 The strengthening of residency rights for EU citizens in Directive 2004/38 
3.4 3.4 The CJEU, the fundamental status of EU citizenship and residency rights 
of EU citizens  
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3.5 The reaffirming and strengthening of the residence rights of EU citizens by the 
Treaty of Lisbon in light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
4. The failure of the CJEU to undertake  a subsidiarity and a proportionality 
review by the CJEU when determining the residency rights of EU citizens 
following the Treaty of Lisbon 
5.Conclusion 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Agreeing with de Búrca
 909
 and Kumm
910
, it was argued in chapter 3 that 
following the Treaty of Lisbon, firstly that there is even more weight to the 
argument that the CJEU is required firstly to demonstrate the proper respect for 
local law-making in areas of shared competence in its reasoning.  Secondly, that 
the CJEU should demonstrate what could be agreed upon at European level in 
terms of protecting the fundamental status of EU citizenship in light of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and the impending accession of the EU to the ECHR
911
  
when dealing with cases involving the residency rights of EU citizens.  As de 
Búrca has pointed out, 'the act of interpretation
912
 itself can constitute the exercise 
of law-making power by the Court'.
913
 The current author agrees with an argument 
by de Búrca that the CJEU is a law-making institution and therefore bound by 
subsidiarity in its interpretation of shared competence areas. Furthermore, the 
                                                             
909 G.De Búrca, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional Actor’ 
(1998) 36(2) Journal of Common Market Studies,  217-235. 
910 M.Kumm, ‘Constitutionalising Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: The Case of Tobacco 
Regulation in the European Union’, (2006) 12(4) European Law Journal 503-533 at 505. 
911 Council of Europe, Accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, < 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/default_en.asp> accessed 14.1.14. 
912  See J.Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice, (1993) for further 
discussion of the method of reasoning that the CJEU employs.  See in particular his discussion at 
114 that the method of interpretation that the CJEU adopts when deciding cases is an important 
question as ‘the CJEU does not enjoy primary authority to create law because the Court must 
satisfy its audience that in their decisions they are applying valid law’.  See also A. Bredimas, 
Methods of Interpretation and Community Law (North Holland, 1978) and Koopmans, T, ‘The 
Theory of Interpretation and the Court of Justice’, in O’Keeffe and Bavasso (eds) Judicial Review 
in EU law (Kluwer, 2000) and G.Conway, ‘The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European 
Court of Justice, (CUP, 2012) chapter 2. 
913 G.de Búrca , ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional Actor’, 
(1998) 36 (2) Journal of Common Market Studies 217-35 at 222. 
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current author will point out in this chapter that to date the CJEU has paid little 
attention to subsidiarity applied to competences and a respect for localism in 
citizenship cases concerning the rights of EU citizens who are economically 
inactive.
914
  On the other hand, in  judicial review cases in shared competences 
areas discussed in chapter 3 the CJEU was prepared to adopt at least a very low 
intensity judicial review of subsidiarity and proportionality applied to 
competences in the cases selected in that context. 
With this in mind, and building upon an argument by Kumm that the CJEU 
should employ subsidiarity and proportionality as an aspect of subsidiarity applied 
to competences
915
, this chapter explains how  the CJEU should review subsidiarity 
and proportionality applied to competences in this particular context.  An explicit 
explanation of how the CJEU had considered subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning 
would help to improve the quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently 
enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling.916This is an important issue.  On the 
one hand, EU citizenship has been proclaimed as having fundamental status in EU 
law
917
 even though the approach of the CJEU in citizenship cases involving social 
protection for EU migrant citizens has been incremental and piecemeal leading to 
what O’Brien has termed ‘a perforated personhood patchwork’918 where ‘gaps in 
this patchwork can tip non-nationals into destitution, suggesting a fairly loose 
commitment to social protection and social justice for non-nationals’.919   On the 
other hand, EU citizenship, following the Treaty of Lisbon
920
, remains parasitic on 
national citizenship in that in order to be an EU citizen you must first be a national 
of a Member State.  Citizenship, therefore, is complementary, but on the approach 
of the CJEU it impacts on competence generally. Furthermore, EU citizenship is 
constrained by the limits of EU competence in areas of shared competence and 
                                                             
914 See for example Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern, [1998] ECR I-2691 
915 See M.Kumm, (2006) ‘Constitutionalising subsidiarity in Integrated Markets: the Case of 
Tobacco Regulation in the European Union’ (12(4)  ELJ 503-533 at 531 
916 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
 
917 Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v Centre Public D’Aide Sociale D’Ottignies-Louvain-La-Neuve 
[2012] 1 CMLR 19. 
918 C. O’Brien, ‘I Trade, therefore I am: Legal Personhood in the European Union’, (2013) 50 
Common Market Law Review 1643-1684 at 1649. 
919 Ibid. 
920 OJ C 306, 17.12.2007, p. 1–271. 
213 
 
subsidiarity.
921
  Respect for the latter principle, which has an inherent respect for 
local law-making, taken in conjunction with the national identity clause, should be 
a powerful constraint on the CJEU when interpreting in this area.  The CJEU 
should also ensure that when weighing up criteria when determining the residency 
rights of EU citizens it also takes into account any limitations which may 
legitimately be imposed on any Charter rights.  
In light of the wide range of policy contexts for which citizenship rights could be 
an issue, it is further submitted that an important issue the CJEU needs to address 
in all such cases is when are the substance of rights compromised such that it does 
not need to consider any actual cross-border element.
922
  This would involve 
firstly a consideration of whether it is possible to identify whether there is a 
minimum core of EU rights that are so sacrosanct that there is no need to consider 
any actual cross border element. This will be considered further in section 4 and 
chapter 5. 
Secondly, in respect of considering the national measure at issue, use could be 
made of a test suggested by Alexy
923
  who proposed that a graduated scale for 
national measures which contained three levels – serious, moderate and minor – 
could be applied when considering national measures
924
  Alexy’s test does not 
exhaust the problem of making value judgements about relative degrees of 
importance of different interests, but it provides a basis for a more explicit 
articulation, something that the CJEU tends to be quite poor at. 
Thirdly, to consider how the CJEU approaches balancing the tension between a 
citizen’s rights in a particular policy context and any legitimate objectives of the 
Member States as well as the general interest of the internal market, and how such 
questions could include asking whether there is a legitimate aim for a particular 
national measure and, if so, whether the particular national measure was both a 
necessary and proportionate way to implement that legitimate aim.  The CJEU 
                                                             
921 See also recent literature by S.Sánchez, ‘Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of the Union at a 
Crossroads: A Promising alliance or a Dangerous Liaison?’, (2014) 20 (4) European Law Journal 
464-481 at 466 and who points out that ‘the development of citizenship of the Union has 
progressively brought about a growing tension between the limited protection of individual’s 
rights outside the realm of the fundamental freedoms and the egalitarian connotations attached to 
the concept of citizenship’. 
922 C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de L’Emploi (ONEM), [2011] ECR I-1177. 
923 R.Alexy, A Theory of constitutional Rights,  translated by J.Rivers, (OUP, 2002) 401-414. 
924 Ibid. 
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needs to systematically set out the scope of shared competences and apply rights 
within them when the EU has exercised competence legislatively, rather than 
using rights as a vehicle for expanding EU competences, which it has tended to do 
by dropping the cross-border element.
925
  Further, the CJEU needs to relate its 
own attempts at rights protection to both the European Convention on Human 
Rights and national constitutional traditions. 
Finally, it would also be important for the CJEU not only to demand good and 
valid reasons to justify considerable interference with a particular right when 
weighing this against a particular national legitimate aim but also to list the 
factors that it has taken into consideration when undertaking such a balancing 
exercise
926
 in order to anchor subsidiarity and proportionality applied to 
competences and help ensure the proper respect for the division of power between 
the EU and the Member States. This would be especially important in areas where 
the EU is acting on the edge of its competence such as in relation to social 
security or immigration.  Here the need for the CJEU to include a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review and be explicit in its reasoning of how it had considered 
subsidiarity, weighed up the seriousness of the national measure at issue against 
the need to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and groups as 
well as demonstrating a respect for localism by giving more weight to the 
Member State’s right to regulate is the most compelling. 
If such an approach were adopted this would help to counter claims that the CJEU 
has an unjustified emphasis on an ever closer Union and ignores the Member 
States local law on sensitive immigration or entitlement to welfare issues.  
Furthermore, it is proposed that the criteria involved in any balancing test 
undertaken by the CJEU in this context should be sector specific and that the 
CJEU should be explicit in its reasoning as to what criteria it had utilised when 
weighing up competing criteria during any subsidiarity and proportionality 
                                                             
925 See for example C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de L’Emploi (ONEM), 
[2011] ECR I-1177 discussed further in chapter 5. 
926 See the recent case of Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department Kashmiri v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2007] UKHL 11 at  para 19-20 where the House of 
Lords controversially said that the national courts should be doing the balancing here.  See also the 
discussion J.Rivers, ‘Proportionality and variable intensity of review’, (2006) Cambridge Law 
Journal 175-6  by that’there is considerable agreement as to why judges should have regard for the 
views of legislatures and executive bodies when testing for proportionality.  The Human Rights 
Act 1998 makes the protection of Convention rights a joint responsibility of Parliament and the 
courts….the doctrine of proportionality needs structuring in such a way that, although applied by 
the judiciary, it is sensitive to the proper contribution of the other branches of government.’ 
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review. Greater judicial candour about the extent and content of judicial discretion 
is necessary in order to adhere to the rule of law ideal of the law having a public 
and objective content.
927
 The need for the CJEU to include its consideration of 
these matters in its reasoning is also vital in demonstrating that it is upholding the 
rule of law,
928
 the latter being enshrined in Article 2 TEU. The rule of law is also 
a widely recognised aspirational principle as evidenced in both the European 
Convention of Human Rights
929
 and the preamble to the Statute of the Council of 
Europe.
930
   Thus where the CJEU departs from the rule of law through judicial 
activism this inevitably leads to a ‘predictable loss of judicial authority and 
legitimacy’931 
On the other hand, in a more recent development is the giving of legal effect to a 
Bill of Rights for EU citizens in the Charter of Fundamental Rights pursuant to 
the Treaty of Lisbon.
932
  The giving of legal effect to the Charter in EU law, more 
generally, has been regarded by Raucea as, 
‘a considered a major step forward in the promotion of fundamental rights 
within EU law, indeed a milestone also in the delicate architecture of 
European citizenship. Because of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union has been granted with the 
same binding legal force as the Treaties, becoming a more visible 
catalogue of parameters that should be considered in testing the legal 
validity of the Union's legislative acts and policy actions.’933  
So post the Treaty of Lisbon when the CJEU scrutinises aspects of Member State 
regulatory regimes which also concern fundamental rights is there a particular 
need for it to act as an arbiter between respect for Member States law and 
protecting the residence rights of EU citizens with reference to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights?  The sensitivity of the defining rights sharpens the 
subsidiarity concern. This is to examine the competence of the CJEU and its 
                                                             
927 For further discussion see B.Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004)  
928 For further discussion see B.Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
929 European Treaty Series No 5. 
930 European Treaty Series No 1 
931 See B.Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, (Cambridge University Press, 
2004) at 9. 
932 OJ C 306, 17.12.2007, p. 1–271. 
933 C. Raucea, ‘Fundamental Rights: The Missing Pieces of European Citizenship?’,  [2014] 14 
(10) German Law Journal 2021-2040 at 2026. 
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institutional placing at a supranational level as suited to adjudication of 
citizenship. This is discussed further in section 4 and chapter 5. 
Adopting a doctrinal perspective, this chapter explores in light of the Treaty of 
Lisbon how a subsidiarity and proportionality review applied to competences 
could be anchored by the CJEU when determining the residency rights of EU 
citizens.
934
 An explicit explanation of how the CJEU had considered subsidiarity 
in the CJEU’s reasoning would help to improve the quality of the reasoning of the 
CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling.935 
This is an important question in light of the impending accession of the EU to the 
ECHR and also feeds into wider discussions about the judicial approach to 
fundamental rights post Lisbon
936
 and the difficulties of balancing subsidiarity and 
a respect for localism with other conflicting principles of EU law.  As 
Konstadinides and O’Meara point out, 
 ‘The value of accession in reinforcing the centrality of fundamental rights 
protection in the EU legal order, and on a practical level, subjecting the EU 
to external scrutiny should not be underestimated.  The relationships 
between the European Court of Human Rights and the CJEU may be 
tested, and emerging case law closely scrutinised in cases involving 
overlap between core Charter and Convention rights, with draft legislation 
coming under renewed scrutiny for compatibility with the Charter and the 
ECHR.  Commissioner Reding’s statement that EU accession will increase 
the perception of the European Court of Human Rights as the European 
capital of fundamental rights protection does not diminish the duties of all 
courts to robustly adjudicate in defence of fundamental rights 
protection.’937 
                                                             
934 See section 2 for further discussion. 
935 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
 
936 See S. Morano-Foadi and S.Andreadakis, ‘Reflections on the Architecture of the EU after the 
Treaty of Lisbon: The European Judicial Approach to Fundamental Rights’, (2011) pp 595-610 at 
595 and who argues that the post-Lisbon era is characterized by firstly the impact of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights following Article 6(1) of the TEU and secondly the future accession to the 
ECHR of the EU pursuant to Article 6(2) TEU. 
937 T.Konstadinides and N.O’Meara, ‘Fundamental Rights and Judicial Protection’ in D.Arcarazo 
and C.Murphy, EU Security and Justice Law after Lisbon and Stockholm, (Hart Publishing, 2014) 
83. 
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A subsequent chapter will adopt a normative approach and make a consideration 
of the specific criteria that should be identified when considering the right of 
residence cases for non-economically active citizens where there is no cross 
border element.  Such cases are particularly important because the absence of a 
cross-border element is at the limits of EU competence. Particular reference is 
made to the Zambrano case.
938
  2 other cases of Rottman,
 939
 and Dereci 
940
 will 
also be considered. These 3 cases have been selected as they are excellent 
examples of cases where the CJEU has to adjudicate in areas involving 
fundamental rights where both the EU and the Member State share competence.  
The cases also involve shared policy areas involving contentious issues for the 
EU, the CJEU and the Member States.  Firstly, as EU law in this context is an area 
of shared competence between the EU and the Member States this leads to 
difficult questions for the CJEU as to where the balance is to be drawn in cases on 
matters which touch upon Member States’ preserve of national immigration and 
the EU citizenship provision in light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Secondly, the question of residence rights of non-economically active EU 
citizens’ raises difficult issues relating to the disadvantages of migration and in 
particular the cost of a Member State supporting EU migrants who may have no 
means of support and could be a burden on the Member States welfare system.
941
  
Thirdly, there are implications for the fundamental status of EU citizenship of 
having extra residency protection for those EU migrant citizens who have resided 
in a particular host Member State for a certain period of time, protected from 
expulsion in Directive 2004/38.
942
 
                                                             
938 C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de L’Emploi (ONEM), [2011] ECR I-1177. 
939 Case C-135/08, [2010] ECR I-1449 Rottmann.   
940 Case C-256/11, Dereci and others v Bundesministerium für Inneres, [2011] ECR I-0000. 
941 For example, in the UK, there has been heated debate about not only the benefits but also the 
disadvantages of migration especially following 1 January when Romanian and Bulgarian 
nationals are able to look for work in other EU Member States.  For further discussion see for 
example Business for New Europe, Migration – Making it work, (2013) 
<http://www.bnegroup.org/images/uploads/publications/files/LATEST-_BNE_Paper_-
_Migration_Making_it_Work_-_May_2013.pdf> accessed 16.5.14. 
942 Although beyond the scope of the discussion in this thesis, the position of third country 
nationals who are long term residents is governed by Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 
November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, OJ 
2004 L 16/44 as amended by Directive 2001/51, OJ 2011 L 123/1.  The Directive does not apply 
to the UK, Ireland or Denmark.  For further discussion of this Directive see most recently 
D.Arcarazo, ‘Civic Citizenship Reintroduced? The Long-Term Residence Directive as a Post-
National Form of Membership’, 21(2) (2015) European Law Journal 200-219. 
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Fourthly in light of Article 45 (3) TFEU which already permits Member States to 
expel EU migrant citizens who pose a sufficiently serious threat to the 
fundamental interests of society,
943
  there are also difficult questions as to the 
intensity of any proportionality review in EU residency cases where EU migrant 
citizens are unable to support themselves. Such difficult questions involve not 
only the level of deference that the CJEU should articulate in its reasoning but 
also what role the Charter of Fundamental Rights should play in both contexts and 
the possible overlapping role of the ECHR especially as ‘any ECHR decisions 
will be binding on the Union as a matter of international law’944 i.e. following the 
EU accession to the ECHR.  Furthermore, the EU can only have responsibility for 
its actions on the basis of a valid competence to carry them out, under the rules of 
attribution of responsibility in international law, which the European Court of 
Human Rights applies.
 945
   Thus the EU, as a supranational body, is not 
responsible for the measures advanced by Member States in their implementation 
of EU law i.e. the EU as a supranational body does not have sufficient control 
over the Member State actions.  However, as Eckes points out, there could be 
challenges to the Court’s autonomy to interpret EU law in that the, 
‘The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) might attribute 
responsibility to and apportion it between the EU and its Member States’ 
which is particularly problematic here in light of ‘the complex and 
dynamic task division between the EU and its Member States [which] 
could lead the ECtHR to offer an interpretation of substantive EU law 
binding on the Court of Justice’.946    
                                                             
943 Case 30/77, Bouchereau, [1977] ECR 1999. 
944 C. Eckes, ‘One Step Closer: EU Accession to the ECHR ‘ Const. L. Blog (2nd May 2013) 
(available at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org). 
945 International Law Commission, Draft articles on the law of Treaties between States and 
International Organsiations or between international organisations with commentaries, (1982).  
For<http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_2_1982.pdf> last accessed 
29.1.14.  See also the cases of Loizidou v Turkey, 40/1993/435/514, Council of Europe: European 
Court of Human Rights, 28 November 1996 and Ilascu and others v Moldova and Russia, 
48787/99, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 8 July 2004. 
946 C. Eckes, ‘One Step Closer: EU Accession to the ECHR ‘ Const. L. Blog (2nd May 2013) 
(available at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org). See also most recently the CJEU’s opinion 2/13 
Opinion 1/13 8.12.14 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=160882&pageIndex=0&doclan
g=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=40247> accessed 8.1.15 regarding the EU’s 
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Citing the particular challenges here of firstly the unique way in which EU law is 
often implemented at a national level by the Member States in order to be directly 
effective.
947
  Secondly, the relationship that exists between the courts of the 
Member States and the CJEU through the preliminary reference system whereby 
the CJEU depends not only on the national courts to refer questions to it but also 
upon the national court to give effect to the CJEU’s preliminary ruling when 
ultimately deciding a particular case she concludes, 
 ‘ultimately, this discussion on the EU’s autonomy boils down to the 
question of how integrated and irreversibly interlocked the EU and national 
legal orders and judicial systems really are in the face of an external 
challenge, such as confirmation by a well-respected external judicial 
authority that the EU breaches human rights. Will such a finding of the 
ECtHR flare up resistance towards EU law by national courts or public 
opinion?’948 
 Such tensions have a particular resonance when one considers the determination 
of the residency rights of EU migrant citizens.  Such cases frequently involve 
issues which involve fundamental ECHR rights and, in particular,  the Article 8 
ECHR right to respect for private and family life such as in the cases of Rottman,
 
949
 Zambrano
950
 and Dereci.
951
  There has also been heated debate in the UK 
about the question of the costs of benefits for EU migrant citizens and their 
families looking for work.
952
 In light of the potential for conflict between the two 
courts, Eckes explains how ‘the draft agreement  declares joint responsibility of 
the respondent and co-respondent to be the common case.
953
 This will for most 
                                                                                                                                                                       
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights where the CJEU has emphasised the need 
to preserve the autonomy of EU law when considering human rights protection. 
947 Ibid. 
948 Ibid. 
949 Case C-135/08, [2010] ECR I-1449 Rottmann.   
950 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office Nationale de L’emploi (ONEM) [CJEU, 08 
March 2011). 
951 Case C-256/11, Dereci and others v Bundesministerium für Inneres, [2011] ECR I-0000. 
952 For example, in the UK, there has been heated debate about not only the benefits but also the 
disadvantages of migration especially following 1 January when Romanian and Bulgarian 
nationals are able to look for work in other EU Member States.  For further discussion see for 
example Business for New Europe, Migration – Making it work, (2013) 
<http://www.bnegroup.org/images/uploads/publications/files/LATEST-_BNE_Paper_-
_Migration_Making_it_Work_-_May_2013.pdf> accessed 16.5.14. 
953  Article 3(6) of the Draft Accession Agreement 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting_reports/47_1(2013)008rev2
_EN.pdf provides  ‘If the violation in respect of which a High Contracting Party is a co-respondent 
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cases unburden the Strasbourg Court from the task of assessing the distribution of 
competences between the EU and its Member States. However, it does not rule 
out the possibility that the ECtHR chooses to apportion responsibility in the 
individual case’.954 
In order to introduce the discussion in this chapter section 2 begins with a 
contextualised discussion of literature firstly on the wider concept of citizenship 
which highlights not only the symbolic importance of the citizenship concept at 
national level and its association with a set of fundamental political, civil and 
social rights
955
 but also the important role in fostering a sense of allegiance to a 
particular Member State.
956
  
Secondly, section 2 then reviews literature which reveals how EU citizenship, on 
the other hand, differs sharply to national citizenship in that EU citizenship was 
primarily focused on the market rights of citizens as well as being parasitic on 
national citizenship.  For it is only by being a national citizen of a Member State 
can one acquire EU citizenship and the range of additional rights acquired are 
much narrower.  Citizenship cases could therefore be taken as an excellent 
example of shared competence.  
Thirdly, section 2 reviews literature which considers the limits of EU citizenship 
and in particular literature which highlights that there has been critique of EU 
citizenship on the grounds that different categories of EU citizens when exercising 
their residency rights have varying levels of protection from expulsion and this 
undermines the fundamental status of EU citizenship.
957
 
Section 3 explores the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship and in particular 
residency rights given to EU citizens in Directive 2004/38. This discussion is also 
contextualised in section 3.4 by a consideration of how the CJEU has played a key 
                                                                                                                                                                       
to the proceedings is established, the respondent and the co-respondent shall be jointly responsible 
for that violation, unless the Court, on the basis of the reasons given by the respondent and the co-
respondent, and having sought the views of the applicant, decides that only one of them be held 
responsible.’ 
954 C. Eckes, ‘One Step Closer: EU Accession to the ECHR ‘ Const. L. Blog (2nd May 2013) 
(available at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org). 
955 For further discussion see D.Held, Models of Democracy, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996) at 
176 
956 See further T.Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1950) 28-29. 
957
 P.Craig and  G.de Búrca, EU Law: Test, Cases and Materials. (5th ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 757. 
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role in fleshing out the meaning of citizenship and moving away from its 
economic market focus in favour of a more rights based approach to reflect its 
fundamental status in EU law
958
 through its expansive and dynamic interpretation 
of the EU citizenship treaty provisions. The CJEU has done this in its case law on 
‘substance of rights’,959 but this is controversial because it touches on Member 
States competence.  As Kostakopoulou explains the expansive interpretation of 
EU citizenship Treaty provisions has involved ‘giving meaning, specificity, and 
value to [citizenship], thereby establishing new institutional norms which will 
impact on and modify national legal cultures’.960    Such a dynamic approach in 
this context has largely been through the teleological approach adopted by the 
CJEU in its interpretation of the wording of the Citizenship Treaty articles
961
 and 
more generally the creation of direct effect enabling EU citizens to rely on EU 
law.  Direct effect was first created of Treaty provisions,
962
 extended to secondary 
legislation in Van Duyn 
963
 whereby an individual is able to rely on an 
unimplemented directive in a national court, provided certain conditions are 
met.
964
  Subsequently in Baumbast,
965
 the CJEU held that the citizenship 
provisions were directly effective, although as Shaw notes this was not altogether 
expected because of the uncertain scope of the relevant Treaty wording.
966
 
                                                             
958 See Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d’Aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-La-
Newve, [2001]ECR i-06193 para 31. 
959 See for example Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de L’Emploi 
(ONEM), [2011] ECR I-1177 where the CJEU referred to the ‘substance of rights’ of EU citizens 
in paragraph 42.  Here it ruled that ‘Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the 
effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights 
confer red by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union’. 
960 D.Kostakopoulou, ‘Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship: Explaining Institutional Change’, 
(2005) 2 The Modern law Review 263. 
961 See also J. Bengoetxea, ‘The Scope for Discretion, Coherence and Citizenship’, in O. Wiklund 
(ed.), Judicial Discretion in European Perspective (Kluwer 2003), 72-74 that the CJEU should 
engage in activism in the area of rights to enhance a sense of citizenship in the EU and that this 
might help to make up for the lack of demos in the EU. 
962 Case 26/62 NV Algemene transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
963 Case Case 41/74, Van Duyn v Home Office, [1974] ECR 1337. 
964 See P. Craig, and  G.de Búrca,  EU Law: Test, Cases and Materials. (4th ed.Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007) at 272-277 for a discussion of the conditions for direct effect of Treaty 
provisions, Regulations and Directives. 
965 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091 para 91. 
966 J.Shaw, the Transformation of citizenship in the European Union: Electoral Rights and the 
Restructuring of Political space (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 163. 
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Section 3.2 considers the introduction of EU citizenship provisions into EU law 
following the Treaty of Maastricht with section 3.3 explaining how the residency 
rights of EU citizens were subsequently strengthened in Directive 2004/38.  
Section 3.4 then considers the provisions in Directive 2004/38 concerning the 
expulsion of EU citizens where they have a right of permanent residence.
967
  This 
also includes a discussion of how such provisions have led to the CJEU being 
called to adjudicate on expulsion of EU migrant citizens’ cases which also raise 
fundamental rights matters that have previously either been the preserve of 
national constitutional courts at a national level or fundamental human rights at 
internal level.  Such issues have included considering how even though the 
Charter represented a major step in fundamental rights protection for EU citizens, 
there are difficulties for EU citizens when seeking to rely on fundamental 
protection in that ‘ Article 51 of the Charter ‘restricts the incorporation of these 
European fundamental rights to the implementation situation’. 968 
However, and as Scott explains, the unique way that fundamental rights are raised 
in the EU means that ‘fundamental rights come in the EU in a collateral way 
because of the preliminary reference system as against the US’.  She cites the 
example of Schmidberger 
969
  
‘freedom of speech comes in a secondary/collateral way because of the 
preliminary reference system, where the national court has to do the 
preliminary work.  There is something absent and unsatisfactory in the 
absence of direct action.  What these cases show is that there is no direct 
action, because of the nature of the EU as a polity: EU jurisdiction is 
                                                             
967 Article 28(2) of Directive 2004/38.  This provision provided that, ‘2. The host Member State 
may not take an expulsion decision against Union citizens or their family members, irrespective of 
nationality, who have the right of permanent residence on its territory, except on serious grounds 
of public policy or public security. 
3. An expulsion decision may not be taken against Union citizens, except if the decision is based 
on imperative grounds of public security, as defined by Member States, if they: 
(a) have resided in the host Member State for the previous ten years; or 
(b) are a minor, except if the expulsion is necessary for the best interests of the child, as provided 
for in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989.’ 
968 R. Schütze, in G.De Búrca,  D.Kochenov,  and A.Williams, ‘Debating Europe's Justice Deficit: 
The EU, Swabian Housewives, Rawls, and Ryanair’,  (November 14, 2013).EUI Working Paper, 
LAW 2013/11, 2013. < http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2354568 > last accessed 1.4.14. at 44. 
969 Case 112/ 00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659 (CJEU). 
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limited.  Is the CJEU ever going to develop its human rights jurisdiction as 
the US Supreme Court: If it can’t then will there always be a form of 
dissatisfaction in the way justice is done through fundamental rights in the 
EU’.970  
Furthermore, the actual operation of the preliminary reference system restricts the 
CJEU in that the CJEU not only relies heavily on the cooperation of national 
courts and their willingness to refer questions in the first place but at the end of 
the day it is up to the national referring court to apply the CJEU’s ruling to the 
facts of the case at issue.  
Section 4 reviews the CJEU’s dynamic and radical interpretation of the 
citizenship Treaty provisions and explains how it has shifted the emphasis of 
citizenship from a market focus involving a cross-border element towards a more 
rights based approach in three particular cases of Rottman,
 971
 Zambrano
972
 and 
Dereci.
973
 In particular, it will be pointed out how the shift in emphasis in these 
cases in conjunction with the Citizenship articles and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights post the Treaty of Lisbon, while they may seem rhetorically attractive, 
however, have the potential to lead the CJEU into controversial territory with the 
Member States.  This is particularly so in cases involving policy areas where the 
EU is acting in shared competence areas or on the edge of its competence and in 
light of the reaffirmation in the Treaty of Lisbon of subsidiarity and its inherent 
respect for localism.  However, despite this, the CJEU has failed to undertake any 
subsidiarity review in the cases considered.  Furthermore, the CJEU has failed to 
identify a minimum core of EU rights for all EU citizens that are so sacrosanct 
that they need to be preserved for EU migrant citizens too irrespective of the 
cross-border requirements and how this impacts upon the division of competence 
between the EU and the Member States. Jurisdiction over rights puts the role of 
the CJEU in more sensitive context regarding competence.  The CJEU needs to 
relate this new jurisdiction to constitutional questions of competence and its own 
institutional role. Even where there is no change in case outcomes an explicit 
                                                             
970 J.Scott in G.De Búrca,  D.Kochenov,  and A.Williams, ‘Debating Europe's Justice Deficit: The 
EU, Swabian Housewives, Rawls, and Ryanair’,  (November 14, 2013).EUI Working Paper, LAW 
2013/11, 2013. < http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2354568 > last accessed 1.4.14. at 47. 
971 Case C-135/08, [2010] ECR I-1449 Rottmann.   
972 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office Nationale de L’emploi (ONEM) [CJEU, 08 
March 2011). 
973 Case C-256/11, Dereci and others v Bundesministerium für Inneres, [2011] ECR I-0000. 
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explanation of how the CJEU had considered subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning 
would help to improve the quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently 
enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling.974 
A subsequent chapter will form a case study which will illustrate the theoretical 
framework in this thesis by proposing a normative argument of how a subsidiarity 
and proportionality review applied to competences could by anchored by the 
CJEU when determining the residency rights of EU citizens who are non-
economically active with particular reference to the cases of  Rottman,
 975
 
Zambrano
976
 and Dereci 
977
. 
 
2. Theoretical Perspectives –the concept of citizenship and its link to political 
identity which in an EU context means that the competence must be 
necessarily shared with the Member States 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of section 2 is to explain with reference to relevant academic 
critique the context of citizenship and its link to political identity which in an EU 
context means that the competence must be necessarily shared. The discussion 
will examine literature firstly on the wider concept of citizenship in order to 
highlight not only the symbolic importance of the citizenship concept at national 
level and its association with a set of fundamental political, civil and social 
rights
978
 but also the important role in fostering a sense of allegiance to a 
particular Member State.
979
  
 
                                                             
974 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
 
975 Case C-135/08, [2010] ECR I-1449 Rottmann.   
976 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office Nationale de L’emploi (ONEM) [CJEU, 08 
March 2011). 
977 Case C-256/11, Dereci and others v Bundesministerium für Inneres, [2011] ECR I-0000. 
978 For further discussion see D.Held, Models of Democracy, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996) at 
176 
979 See further T.Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1950) 28-29. 
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2.2 The concept of citizenship and its link to political identity which in an EU 
context means that the competence must be necessarily shared with the 
Member States  
Citizenship, although an ancient concept,
980
 was brought to the fore in the 
eighteenth century as a modern political and powerfully symbolic concept linked 
to the development of rights at national level.  As Held argues, following the 
French Revolution in 1789 citizenship was transformed ‘into one common 
universal status – the citizen (…) This language of universality and equality is 
what distinguished this moment – the moment of the ”Rights of Man” – from 
earlier phases in the long march of citizenship.’981  
Examination of other literature by Marshall also highlights the symbolic 
importance of citizenship of a particular society as a political concept but also 
reveals that there are two key aspects of citizenship discourses at national level.  
Firstly, the focus on the rights and duties those citizens have by virtue of their 
citizenship status with a common thread underpinning these rights Marshall has 
argued is a respect for the fundamental value of equality: everyone is entitled to 
be treated as a full and equal member of society, and to be given the means to 
enjoy that equality.
982
 As T.H Marshall writes,  
‘Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a 
community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights 
and duties with which the status is bestowed. There is no universal 
principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies 
in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal 
citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which 
aspiration can be directed.’983 
 However, there are problems in determining equality as evidenced by Westen 
who has argued that, in the context of administration of rules, equality is just ‘an 
                                                             
980 D.Held, Models of Democracy, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996) at 176.   
981 Ibid.  See also Y.Zilbershats, ‘Reconsidering the Concept of Citizenship’, (2001) Texas 
International Law Journal 689. 
982 T.Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950) 28-
29. 
983 T.Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950) 24-
25. 
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empty concept’ 984 in that it lacks substantive content thereby requiring particular 
standards to be developed to determine what inequalities are unacceptable.
985
   
Such difficulties tie in with the issue of whether citizenship should mean full 
equality which in an EU context would entail full harmonisation or whether there 
should be some version of mutual recognition, to translate market integration 
concepts to the rights sphere. 
There has also been a wealth of literature which has focused on considering the 
political, civil and social rights of citizens
986
 although more recently in the UK 
there has been a move towards emphasising the responsibilities of citizens
987
 in 
order to counter-balance the potentially excessive individualism of rights.
988
  Such 
a development highlights the tension that exists between viewing a citizens rights 
as sacrosanct and viewing individual citizens’ rights in light of the needs of the 
wider community, the latter reflecting a more communitarian view of rights.
989
 In 
                                                             
984 P.Westen, in ‘The empty idea of equality’, (1992) 95 (3) Harvard Law Review. 
985 Ibid and who writes at 547 writes ‘Equality is an empty vessel with no substantive moral 
content of its own.  Without moral standards, equality remains meaningless, a formula that can 
have nothing to say about how we should act.  With such standards, equality becomes superfluous, 
a formula that can have nothing to say about how we should act’. 
986 Ibid.  For a discussion of the two main ways that citizenship has been awarded to an individual,  
firstly ius sanguinis citizenship which is awarded on parentage, secondly Ius soli where 
‘citizenship is awarded on the basis of birth in a territory’ see I. Honohan, ' Ius soli Citizenship', 
<http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/ius-soli-policy-brief.pdf> accessed 15.3.15. See also ibid his 
discussion at 1 that ius soli citizenship in 2010 is prevalent in some form ‘in 19 of the 33 countries 
included in the EUDO Citizenship study’ and ‘has the advantage of offering membership of a 
given political community to those most likely to live there, to be subject to its laws and to 
contribute to its society and the economy.  It provides a way of promoting social integration and 
democratic legitimacy, and reducing concerns about internal exclusion and insecurity of 
residence’. 
987 For a view which dismisses the argument that duties should be at the essence of citizenship see 
D.Kochenov, EU Citizenship without Duties (September 10, 2013), (2014)  European Law Journal   
(Forthcoming); University of Groningen Faculty of Law Research Paper 15/2013. Available at 
SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2323273 >accessed 14.2.14. 
988 See for example Lord West of Spithead, Hansard, Feb 11 2009 at a second reading of  
the proposed 2009 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill, who stated, ‘With rights come 
responsibilities, and those responsibilities must first be  demonstrated, ensuring that the benefits of 
British citizenship are earned. This is at the heart of the Government’s firm-but-fair system.’ See 
also The Independent, 29.1.15  quoting Teresa May 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/exclusive-no-way-back-for-britons-who-join-the-
syrian-fight-says-theresa-may-9021190.html >accessed 15.1.15.a recent statement that 
‘Citizenship is a privilege, not a right, and the Home Secretary will remove British citizenship 
from individuals where she feels it is conducive to the public good to do so.’988 Such a statement 
points towards a shift of focus of discussion of UK citizenship not just to discussing rights and 
duties of citizens but also the extent to which the executive could exercise is discretion to address 
such a situation by deprivation of citizenship where it is in the public interest to do so.   
989 For an example of a communitarian view of citizenship see M.Sandel, Justice, (Penguin, 2010) 
263. 
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an EU context, this tends to play itself out as a balance between citizens’ rights 
and the principle of integration: on this the CJEU tends to be ambiguous about the 
status of free movement relative to fundamental rights, sometimes it treats free 
movement itself as a fundamental right.
990
 
 
On the other hand, Marshall explains how citizenship does not just involve rights 
and duties but also involves fostering a sense of allegiance of citizens to a 
particular democratic society which is a more informal one involving ‘a direct 
sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilisation which is in 
common possession. It is loyalty of free men endowed with rights and protected 
by a common law.’991 The question of citizenship fostering a sense of allegiance 
to a particular democratic society is more difficult in the EU context though as 
‘there is no European demos – not a people not a nation.  Neither the subjective 
element (the sense of shared collective identity and loyalty) nor the objective 
conditions which could produce these (the kind of homogeneity of the organic 
national-cultural conditions on which peoplehood depend) exist….,’ and his view 
that, ‘Integration is not about creating a European nation or people, but about the 
ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe’.992 
 
2.3 The Limits of EU citizenship 
Interestingly in the Treaty of Rome there was no explicit mention of citizenship in 
the Treaty itself.
993
 On the other hand, following the introduction of the Treaty of 
Rome Everson has argued that notions of market citizenship of the Community 
subsequently arose as a consequence of European integration.
994
 For following the 
                                                             
990 For a discussion of a view of EU citizenship without duties see D.Kochenov,  EU Citizenship 
without Duties (September 10, 2013). ELJ 2014 (Forthcoming); University of Groningen Faculty 
of Law Research Paper 15/2013. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2323273> 
accessed 1.3.14. 
991 T.Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950) 24-
25. 
992 JHH. Weiler, ‘The State “über alles”; Demos, Telos, and the German Maastricht Decision’, 
1995 NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 6/1995 at 37. 
993 However, ideas of an EU citizenship were evident from the writings of J.Monnet, Memoirs, 
(Mayne, Richard Collins, 1978), 173-175. 
994 M.Everson, ‘The Legacy of the Market Citizen’, in J.Shaw and G.More, (eds) New Legal 
Dynamics of the European Union, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) 85. 
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Treaty of Rome in 1957- through a combination of direct effect,
995
 the preliminary 
reference system
996
, and the supremacy doctrine
997
 a new and direct relationship 
had been established between the EC and the nationals of the Member States, the 
latter playing a key part in the legal and practical realisation of the common 
market as well as being the recipients of various general rights.
998
  It was on 
account of this new relationship between the EC and nationals of the Member 
States following the Treaty of Rome that led Everson to describe the nationals of 
the Member states as being European market citizens.
999
 
What is perhaps less clear at those early stages of market creation is to determine 
to what extent it was intended that something more dynamic and symbolic than 
market creation and market citizenship involving the free movement of 
economically active citizens was at that stage anticipated.  For citizenship at a 
national level is usually associated with stronger ties of belonging
1000
  than purely 
economic advantages. Certainly prior to the formal introduction of citizenship into 
EU law following the Treaty of Maastricht,  there were notions of European 
citizenship pervading the European Commission’s proposals1001 as well as EU 
secondary legislation, albeit in the context of residence rights of economically 
active citizens.
1002
 But such notions of European citizenship in this EC/EEC 
secondary legislation were focused around those citizens who were participating 
in the market or those citizens who did not become a burden on the Member 
States and were without the requisite health insurance, it was still a question of 
economic entitlement.
1003
  
                                                             
995 Cases 26/62 NV Algemene transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v 
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1and Case 80/70 Defrenne (No 1) v 
SABENA [1971] ECR 445 
996 Article 257 TFEU. 
997 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
998 M.Everson, ‘The Legacy of the Market Citizen’, in J.Shaw and G.More, (eds) New Legal 
Dynamics of the European Union, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) 85. 
999 Ibid., at 80. 
1000 T.Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950) 28-
29. 
1001 See for example, ‘Commission, ‘Towards European Citizenship: the granting of special 
rights’, COM (75) 321 final. 
1002 See Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence [1990] OJ L 
180/26; Council Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for employees 
and self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity [1990] OJ L 180/28; 
Council Directive 93/96/EEC of 29 October 1993 on the right of residence for students [1993] OJ 
L 317/59. 
1003 Ibid. 
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It was not until the Treaty of Maastricht that various formal EU citizenship 
provisions were introduced.  In particular, Article 17 TEC provided that,  
‘Citizenship of the Union is hereby established.  Every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.  Citizenship 
of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship. 
Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this treaty and 
shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby’.  
Thus EU citizenship differed to national citizenship in the EU citizenship was 
parasitic on national citizenship.  In addition, as Couts highlights, ‘The Treaty of 
Maastricht [therefore] constructed a half-way house: providing the elements of a 
more political union, namely citizenship, justice and home affairs and some 
mention of fundamental rights, but not combining them in a meaningful way.  By 
maintaining their separateness, it diminished their impact and the possibility of 
constructing a meaningful, normatively inspired relationship between the 
individual and the European Union.’1004  
The focus of this section is, however, not to consider in depth the literature 
concerning the symbolic political importance of citizenship rights at either EU or 
national level, the role of citizenship in fostering an allegiance to a particular state 
or, in the EU context, to the EU polity
1005
 or indeed the development of 
fundamental and human rights for citizens at an international level
1006
 or in the 
context of justice and home affairs.
1007
 The focus of this thesis is considering how 
a subsidiarity and proportionality review could be applied to competences when 
determining the residency rights of EU migrant citizens and space precludes an 
                                                             
1004 S.Couts, ‘Citizenship of the European Union’, in D.Arcarazo and C.Murphy, EU Security and 
Justice Law after Lisbon and Stockholm, (Hart Publishing, 2014) 95. 
1005 Such an allegiance between citizens of the EU and the EU itself is much more difficult where 
citizens are not aligned to one particular national identity but instead aligned to a supranational 
identity that is much harder to identify.  For further discussion of this see M.Kumm, ‘To be a 
European Citizen? Constitutional Patriotism and the Constitutional Treaty’, (2005) 11 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 481 and M.Kumm, The Idea of Thick Constitutional Patriotism and Its 
Implications for the Role and Structure of European Legal History, (2005) 6(2) German Law 
Journal. 
1006 More recently, other literature has highlighted how the development of fundamental rights has 
become an aspect of globalisation.  See for example K.Nash, ‘Between Citizenship and Human 
Rights’, (2009) 43 (6) Sociology 1068 and who writes that ‘development of human rights takes 
place primarily through international Treaties with the principle of democracy, self-determination 
that governs existing understandings of citizenship.’ 
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exploration of the such wider issues in this thesis.
 
  The focus of this section is to 
consider a selection of literature which highlights the contested nature of the 
concept of EU citizenship and the limits of EU citizenship: this raises the problem 
of how EU citizenship can ever be more than a half-way house. 
In respect of the former, Kochenov argues convincingly how the concept of 
citizenship is an essentially contested concept.
1008
 He argues in light of Gallie that 
both its meaning and the essential characteristics that EU citizenship is composed 
of are unclear.
1009
  In particular, he highlights how there are two competing views 
of citizenship: one relating to status ‘building on the formal legal link existing 
between any state or other entity-the EU, for instance-and its citizens. The second 
is citizenship as rights, viewed through the prism of the rights enjoyed by the 
members of a community’.1010 However, as Kochenov points out, EU citizenship 
does not fall within this second view but rather it is derivative in nature with 
‘European citizenship [being] largely left within the virtually exclusive domain of 
the Member States.  It means that the Member States themselves decide who their 
nationals for Community legal purposes are, thereby automatically conferring on 
them European citizenship.’1011 
With regard to consideration of the limits of EU citizenship, other literature has 
adopted a theoretical framework using a legal perspective in order to highlight the 
limits of EU citizenship.   Shuibhne, for example, explains how there are three 
different types of limits of EU citizenship concept. These are normative, inner and 
the outer limits of EU citizenship.  A normative limit she explains ‘describe the 
conceptual fundamentals of citizenship as an idea and as a status.  These limits 
concern the potential of political entities to generate a meaningful citizenship and 
associated rights’.1012 An inner limit Shuibhne argues refers to the legal and 
regulatory space at national level that is preserved for EU Member States by the 
Treaties ‘into which the EU citizenship should not intrude’.1013 An outer limit she 
explains refers to the limits imposed by the interpretation by the CJEU of the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
1007 S.Couts, ‘Citizenship of the European Union’, in D.Arcarazo and C.Murphy, EU Security and 
Justice Law after Lisbon and Stockholm, (Hart Publishing, 2014). 
1008 D.Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult 
Relationship between Status and Rights’, (2009) 15 Columbia Journal of European law at 175. 
1009 Ibid. 
1010 Ibid. 
1011 Ibid., 182. 
1012 See N.Shuibhne, ‘EU Citizenship after Lisbon’, in D.Ashiagbor, N.Countouris and I.Lianos, 
(eds) The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon, (Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 168 
1013 Ibid. 
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wording of the Treaties in this context.
1014
  So, for example in Baumbast
1015
, in 
para 90-91 the CJEU 90 explicitly referred to the limits to its interpretation of EU 
citizenship and residency rights  when it ruled that, 
 ‘In any event, the limitations and conditions which are referred to in 
Article 18 EC and laid down by Directive 90/364 are based on the idea that 
the exercise of the right of residence of citizens of the Union can be 
subordinated to the legitimate interests of the Member States. In that 
regard, according to the fourth recital in the preamble to Directive 90/364 
beneficiaries of the right of residence must not become an unreasonable 
burden on the public finances of the host Member State. However, those 
limitations and conditions must be applied in compliance with the limits 
imposed by Community law and in accordance with the general principles 
of that law, in particular the principle of proportionality. That means that 
national measures adopted on that subject must be necessary and 
appropriate to attain the objective pursued (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 
C-259/91, C-331/91 and C-332/91 Alluè and Others [1993] ECR I-4309, 
paragraph 15)’. 
However, does such an approach sufficiently capture the true extent of the limits 
of EU citizenship?  Jo Shaw, for example, argues that there is another limit of EU 
citizenship.  This is the concept of the symbolic limit of EU citizenship which she 
explains as being ‘the fact that even those exercising rights associated with the 
European integration process (e.g. consumer rights enhanced as a result of a 
supranational harmonisation) typically do not see themselves as acting in the 
guise of EU citizens.’1016  Weiler too has argued that, 
‘there is no European demos – not a people not a nation.  Neither the 
subjective element (the sense of shared collective identity and loyalty) nor 
the objective conditions which could produce these (the kind of 
homogeneity of the organic national-cultural conditions on which 
peoplehood depend) exist….,’  
                                                             
1014 Ibid. 
1015 Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R v Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091 
1016 J.Shaw, ‘EU Citizenship and the edges of Europe’, Working Paper 2012/19 at 5. 
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and that, ‘Integration is not about creating a European nation or people, but about 
the ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe’.1017 On a more practical note 
Careera has highlighted how EU citizenship in the context of free movement of 
EU citizens is limited by the fact that, 
‘the principle of free movement is still dependent on a degree of financial 
self-sufficiency of the person moving.  Residence rights will not be 
granted to those EU citizens who lack sufficient resources to cover 
themselves in the hosting state (i.e. the requirement to provide proof of 
adequate means of subsistence and health insurance).  Access to residence 
and the employment market, the social system, and the educational system 
continues to be subject to excessive economic conditions and practical 
obstacles.’1018 
These limits on EU migrant citizens will be considered further in section 4. 
 
2.4 The Problems of differing levels of protection from expulsion in a host 
Member State for different categories of EU migrant citizens in Directive 
2004/38 
A final limit of EU citizenship highlighted in academic literature is in respect of 
the palpable tension that exists between on the one hand the Union’s concern to 
protect an EU migrant citizens’ residence rights in Directive 2004/38 and, on the 
other, the Member State’s right to expel EU migrant citizens on the grounds of 
public policy or public security pursuant to Article 45(3) TFEU. As 
Kostakopoulou and Ferreira point out,  
‘the public security, public policy and public health derogations from the 
free movement have been marked by a disjunction between governmental 
interests and sovereign power and EU regulation.  Member States have 
been keen to maintain the vestiges of their sovereignty in the sphere of 
migration law.  Accordingly, they have preserved the power to restrict 
the free movement rights of Union citizens and their family members on 
                                                             
1017 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The State “über alles”; Demos, Telos, and the German Maastricht Decision’, 
1995 NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 6/1995 at 37. 
1018 S.Careera, ‘What does Free Movement mean in Theory and Practice in an Enlarged EU’, 11(6) 
European Law Journal, 699-721 at 700 at 701-2. 
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public security, public policy and public health grounds (Article 
45(3)’.1019  
However, despite this, Kostakopoulou and Ferreira point out, any derogation on 
the grounds of public policy and public security cannot ‘be invoked in order to 
serve economic ends even in time of recession, and cannot be imposed 
automatically’.1020 This is now in Directive 2004/38. In addition, Kostakopoulou 
and Ferreira highlight how ‘the Court’s clear preference for a rights-based 
approach to the interpretation of the Treaty’s derogations from free movement in 
the internal market shields individuals from the discretionary power of states.
1021
  
As protected persons, their interest takes priority over the interests of states.’1022 
Section 3.3 will consider further the derogations in Article 27(2) of Directive 
2004/38 which provides that,  
‘measures taken on grounds of public policy or public security shall be 
based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned.  
Previous criminal convictions shall not in themselves constitute grounds for 
taking such measures. The personal conduct of the individual concerned 
must represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting 
one of the fundamental interests of society.’1023 
Other authors have focused on considering how the extent of protections put in 
place to protect EU migrant citizens when Member States are seeking to deport 
them.  For example, Craig and de Búrca highlight how there have been 
substantive and procedural protections put in place to protect EU migrant citizens 
when faced with an expulsion order.
1024
  Article 28 of Directive 2004/38 in 
particular provides that when a Member State makes an expulsion order it must 
                                                             
1019 T.Kostakopoulou and N.Ferreira, ‘Testing Liberal Norms: the Public Policy and Public 
Security Derogations and the Cracks in European Union Citizenship’, (May 29, 2013), Warwick 
School of Law, Legal Studies paper No Paper No 2013/18 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2271722 >accessed 16.6.14 at 5. 
1020 Ibid., at 6. 
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1023 See for example Case 30/77, Bouchereau, [1977] ECR 1999. 
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‘take account of considerations such as how long the individual concerned has 
resided on its territory, his/her age, state of health, family and economic situation, 
social and cultural integration into the host Member State and the extent of his/her 
links with the country of origin’. Extra protections are also given to citizens who 
are have resided in host member state for more than 10 years – Art 28(3) provides 
that ‘an expulsion decision may not be taken against Union citizens, except if the 
decision is based on imperative grounds of public security’. 
However, despite such protections for EU migrant citizens there are particular 
difficulties when restricting an EU migrant citizens’ rights on the grounds of 
public security (PI and Tsakouridis).
1025
  For example Schütze highlights the 
difficulties for EU migrant citizens in that there are different sources of 
fundamental rights protection in the form of both the EU’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and also the European Convention on Human Rights when 
considering the expulsion of EU migrant citizens on the grounds of either public 
policy or public security. As he explains,  
‘the European story if – sadly- much more complicated, since it centres 
around the three bills of rights identified by Article 6 TEU.  For each of 
these three sources of fundamental rights a distinct European 
incorporation doctrine has developed in the past.  For European 
fundamental rights as general principles of Union law, two situations 
have thereby ben identified as leading to incorporation: the 
implementation situation and the derogation situation.  The more 
problematic one here is doubtless the latter.  For what is a derogation 
from Union law, and what is the constitutional rationale for insisting on a 
common sphere of justice here? The second source of European 
fundamental rights is the Charter, and it seems that Article 51 of the 
Charter restricts the incorporation of these European fundamental rights 
                                                             
1025 Case 348/09 PI v Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid, and Case 145/09 Land Baden-
WürttembergPanagiotis Tsakouridis. See further S.Couts, ‘Citizenship of the European Union’, in 
D.Arcarazo and C.Murphy, EU Security and Justice Law after Lisbon and Stockholm, (Hart 
Publishing, 2014) at p.94  For a more general discussion of EU Security and Justice Law after 
Lisbon and Stockholm see D. Acosta Arcarazo and C.Murphy (eds.) EU Security and Justice Law 
after Lisbon and Stockholm, (Hart Publishing 2014) 
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to the implementation situation.  We also have a third –future- direct 
source of fundamental rights: the ECHR.’1026   
The existence of three separate sources of fundamental rights at both 
supranational level and national level he concludes has led to ‘a gradual blurring 
of the federal/state distinction which contrasts with the original idea to create 
separate spheres of justice’.1027  
With the above literature in mind and the difficulty of having three sources of 
fundamental rights, the remainder of this section focuses on considering to the 
implications of having in Directive 2004/38 differing levels of protection against 
expulsion between different categories of EU migrant citizens.  For in addition to 
literature highlighting the limits and contested nature of EU citizenship, there has 
been critique of EU citizenship on the grounds that different categories of EU 
migrant citizens have varying levels of protection from expulsion when in a host 
Member State and that this undermines the fundamental status of EU citizenship. 
For example, Craig and de Búrca point out that examination of Directive 2004/38 
reveals although there is a standard level of protection against the expulsion of 
migrant EU citizens, there are also additional protections against expulsion for 
those EU migrant citizens who have gained permanent residence in a particular 
Member State.
1028
 So, for example, extra protections are given to citizens who 
have resided in host member state for more than 10 years with Art 28(3) providing 
that ‘an expulsion decision may not be taken against Union citizens, except if the 
decision is based on imperative grounds of public security.’1029 This is related to 
subsidiarity in that there is a margin of appreciation for States in the interpretation 
of derogations which is important as it is the Member State court who is best 
                                                             
1026 R.Schütze, ‘A European incorporation doctrine: Human Rights and the Member States’ in De 
Búrca, G., Kochenov, D., and Williams, A., ‘Debating Europe’s Justice Deficit: the EU, Swabian 
Housewives, Rawls and Ryanair’ EU1 working Paper LAW 2013/11, 2013 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2354568> 1.3.14 at 45. 
 
1027 Ibid. 
1028 P.Craig and  G.de Búrca, EU Law: Test, Cases and Materials. (5th ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 757. 
1029 P.Craig and  G.de Búrca, EU Law: Test, Cases and Materials. (5th ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 757.  For a wider discussion of how the CJEU has approached the 
interpretation of the Area of freedom, security and justice  and the privileging of aggregate 
security interests over the interests of individuals in the post Lisbon period see M.Avbelj, ‘Security 
and the Transformation of the EU Public Order’ Special Issue Lisbon v Lisbon [2013] German 
Law Journal 2057-2073. 
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placed to determine the level of public security risk posed by a particular 
individual. 
Callaaert too has explained how different categories of EU migrant citizens have 
varying levels of protection from expulsion when in a host Member State in EU 
law and that this contrasts with the approach by the European Court of Human 
Rights.
1030
  So, for example, he explains how, on the one hand, 
 ‘under EU law the status and rights which a person seeking protection 
from expulsion is entitled to claim will vary according to whether this 
person is an EU citizen, a person who has exercised his right of freedom of 
movement, a family member of one of the former categories or none of the 
above.
1031
 Even though the CJEU does seek to harmonise the protection 
enjoyed by each of these categories through increased reliance on the 
notion of EU citizenship,
1032
 differences still remain in relation to the rights 
attached to each of these categories.
1033
 In addition, as recently emphasised 
by the ECJ, under EU law the protection of the family life of EU citizens is 
primarily designed to eliminate obstacles to the exercise of the 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the EC Treaty’.1034  
On the other hand, he explains how, 
 ‘by contrast, the decisive consideration when assessing whether protection 
from expulsion should be granted under art.8 ECHR will not so much be 
the nationality or legal status of the persons concerned, but rather the 
extent of their social integration in the host country. This is evaluated by 
reference to criteria relating to the personal situation of an applicant and 
                                                             
1030 J.Callewaert, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and European Union law: a long 
way to harmony’, (2009) European Convention on Human Rights Law Review,  779. 
1031 J.Callewaert, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and European Union law: a long 
way to harmony’,  (2009) European Convention on Human Rights Law Review,  779 and who 
cites among others, Carpenter (C-60/00) [2002] E.C.R. I-6279; Poirrez v Caf de la Seine Saint-
Denis (C-206/91) [1992] E.C.R. I-6685 ECJ; Trojani v Centre Public d'Aide Sociale de Bruxelles 
(C-456/02) [2004] E.C.R. I-7573 ECJ; Proceedings brought by Turpeinen (C-520/04) [2006] 
E.C.R. I-10685 ECJ; Metock v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (C-127/08) [2009] 
Q.B. 318 ECJ 
1032 J.Callewaert, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and European Union law: a long 
way to harmony’,  (2009) European Convention on Human Rights Law Review, 779 and who cites 
Turpeinen (C-520/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-10685. 
1033 As recently illustrated in Metock (C-127/08) [2009] Q.B. 318. 
1034 Metock (C-127/08) [2009] Q.B. 318 at [56]. See also Mouvement contre le Racisme, 
l'Antisemitisme et la Xenophobie ASBL (MRAX) v Belgium (C-459/99) [2002] E.C.R. I-6591 ECJ 
at [53]; European Commission v Germany (C-441/02), judgment of April 27, 2006 ECJ at [109]. 
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his family members, which will necessarily involve an element of 
duration.
1035
 Thus, while under EU law the specific legal category to which 
a foreigner belongs will usually be decisive for determining the protection 
against expulsion to which he is entitled, any foreigner can qualify for 
protection under art.8, regardless of his nationality or legal status, provided 
his actual links with the host country are sufficiently strong’. 1036  
Secondly, he explains how  
‘there are important differences between the two systems as regards the 
procedural safeguards against expulsion. On the one hand, the Strasbourg 
Court declined to apply art.6 ECHR to expulsion procedures, considering 
that, decisions regarding the entry, stay and deportation of aliens do not 
concern the determination of an applicant's civil rights or obligations or of 
a criminal charge against him, within the meaning of art.6 of the 
Convention. On the other hand, however, and in stark contrast to the 
Strasbourg approach, under EU law an increasing number of safeguards, 
comparable to those laid down in art.6 ECHR, are being provided in 
expulsion procedures’.1037 
Such differing levels of protection between EU citizens runs counter to the 
rhetoric and symbolism of EU citizenship and its fundamental status in EU law
1038
 
i.e. as regards equality. This raises difficult questions as to the intensity of any 
proportionality review not only as to whether the CJEU should articulate in its 
reasoning a level of deference to the national judgements, equivalent to the 
                                                             
1035 J.Callewaert, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and European Union law: a long 
way to harmony’, (2009) European Convention on Human Rights Law Review,  779 referring to 
the full list of these criteria as being  found in the judgments given in the cases of Boultif v 
Switzerland (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 50 ECtHR, Üner v Netherlands ( 2006) 45 E.H.R.R. 14 ECtHR 
and Maslov v Austria (App. No.1638/03), judgment of June 23, 2008 ECtHR. See C. Steinorth, 
“Üner v The Netherlands: Expulsion of Long-term Immigrants and the Right to Respect for 
Private and Family Life” (2008) 8 
H.R.L. Rev. 185. 
1036 J.Callewaert, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and European Union law: a long 
way to harmony’, (2009) European Convention on Human Rights Law Review,  779. 
1037 J.Callewaert, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and European Union law: a long 
way to harmony’,  (2009) European Convention on Human Rights Law Review,  779  citing e.g. 
Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L158/77; Directive 2003/109 
concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents [2003] OJ L16/44. 
See also art.47 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights. 
1038 J.Callewaert, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and European Union law: a long 
way to harmony’,  (2009) European Convention on Human Rights Law Review, 779. 
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margin of appreciation doctrine under the ECHR, in this context but also what 
role the Charter of Fundamental Rights should play in this respect especially in 
light of the impending accession of the EU to the ECHR.
1039
 The question of 
deference or some kind of margin of appreciation here is about the application of 
subsidiarity and proportionality: the decision to apply some kind of deference 
reflects subsidiarity, the degree of deference can be analysed more under the 
heading of proportionality. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Thus this section has reviewed literature explaining the context of EU citizenship 
and its link to political identity, which in an EU context means that competence 
must necessarily be shared. It has also reviewed literature which highlights some 
of the limits of EU citizenship as well as the contested nature of EU citizenship. 
Finally, critique of EU citizenship on the grounds that different categories of EU 
migrant citizens have varying levels of protection from expulsion when in a host 
Member State and that this undermines the fundamental status of EU citizenship 
was also considered. 
The next section 3 considers the formal introduction of the Treaty provisions on 
EU citizenship following the Treaty of Maastricht and the subsequent 
strengthening of the citizenship residency rules in Directive 2004/38. In addition, 
it explains how despite EU citizenship being parasitic on national citizenship and 
focused on the market rights of EU citizens, the CJEU has started to play a key 
role in developing EU citizenship in two ways.  Firstly in fleshing out the 
meaning of citizenship and moving EU citizenship away from its economic 
market focus in favour of a more rights based approach to reflect its fundamental 
status in EU law.
1040
  Secondly, how the CJEU in this case when considering the 
scope of residence rights led to a consideration of the wider Treaty right of non-
discrimination.  On the other hand, a  subsequent section 4 will explain how 
despite such development of EU citizenship by the CJEU that the CJEU displays a 
                                                             
1039 See further S.Sanchez, ‘The Court and the Charter: the Impact of the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty on the ECJ’s approach to fundamental rights’, (2012) 49(5) Common Market Law 
Review. 
1040 See Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d’Aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-La-
Newve, [2001]ECR I-06193 para 31. 
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pro-union interpretative tendency by persistently failing to consider subsidiarity 
expressly in its case law in this context and in particular the identification of limits 
to its competences through subsidiarity analysis.  This is problematic as any pro-
union interpretative tendency especially when identifying the limits to its 
competences through subsidiarity analysis has the potential to affect the quality of 
its reasoning and undermine any recommendation to anchor a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review. Furthermore, any pro-union interpretative tendency by the 
CJEU when considering the legitimate objectives of the Member States against 
the general interest of the internal market  also has the potential to affect the 
quality of its reasoning
1041
 and undermine any recommendation to anchor a 
subsidiarity and proportionality review. This runs counter to the recent affirmation 
by the Treaty of Lisbon of subsidiarity and a respect for localism.  
3. Legal Perspectives: Directive 2004/38 and the distinction between 
economically active and non-economically active EU citizens  
 
3.1   Introduction 
Section 3 explores firstly the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship and the 
residence rights of EU citizens in Directive 2004/38. This includes firstly a 
discussion of the distinction drawn between economically active and 
economically inactive EU citizens in relation to residency rights given to EU 
citizens in Directive 2004/38.  Secondly, there is a critical discussion of the 
provisions regarding the expulsion of EU migrant citizens where they have had 
periods of imprisonment pursuant to Directive 2004/38. This includes a 
consideration of how the CJEU has emphasised the fundamental status of EU 
citizenship in Sala and has made inroads into the idea that nationals of the 
Member States exercising their right of free movement must be economically self-
sufficient and must not become a burden on the host Member State when 
interpreting the scope of the residency rights of EU citizens.
 1042
 It also includes a 
critical discussion of how residence rights of EU citizens were reaffirmed and 
strengthened in the Treaty of Lisbon and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
                                                             
1041 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
1042 Case C-85/96 María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691. 
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3.2 The Introduction of EU citizenship provisions following the Treaty of 
Maastricht 
The first formal introduction of EU citizenship Treaty provisions was in 1992 
following the Treaty of Maastricht.
1043
 The Preamble to that Treaty included that 
the Heads of the Member States were resolved ‘to establish a citizenship common 
to nationals of their countries’. Article 8 to that Treaty then included that,  
‘1. Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding 
the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. 
2. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and 
shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby’. 
Furthermore, specific articles were included regarding not only various political 
rights for EU citizens but also residence rights of EU citizens in Article 8a TEC.  
In respect of the latter this provided that, ‘1. Every citizen of the Union shall have 
the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 
subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the 
measures adopted to give it effect’. 
Article 12 also was added which attempted to ‘convert market citizenship (i.e. 
whereby the individual is a holder of economic freedoms) into a broader idea of 
‘Union citizenship’.1044 However, the actual wording of Article 12 provided that 
’Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without prejudice to the 
special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality 
shall be prohibited’. This is important as it points to an approach to citizenship 
rights only as defined to the extent expressed in the Treaties or secondary 
legislation, and not the actual approach of the CJEU, which is to leave it as an 
open-ended category, which can be developed on the basis of a general principle 
of equality/non-discrimination.  The latter is not really consistent with conferral 
and subsidiarity.  
                                                             
1043 The current key citizenship articles are in Articles 20 and 21 TFEU (ex-Articles 17-22 TEC). 
1044 S.Careera, ‘What does Free Movement mean in Theory and Practice in an Enlarged EU’, 11(6) 
European Law Journal, 699-721 at 700. 
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One of the most unique and distinguishing aspects of the EU citizenship Treaty 
articles introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in Article 17 TEC is that despite 
being hailed in CJEU case law as having fundamental status in the case law, EU 
citizenship is parasitic on national citizenship. So the rhetoric of the CJEU is 
moving ahead of legislative developments. For EU citizenship differs from 
national citizenship in that in respect of EU citizenship it is only by being a 
national of a Member State that one acquires EU citizenship.  The rights of an EU 
citizen under the Treaty therefore do not arise autonomously under these 
provisions.   
Furthermore, not only is EU citizenship parasitic on national citizenship but 
following the  introduction of the EU citizenship provisions into  the Treaty of 
Maastricht  EU citizenship was primarily concerned with the market rights of 
citizens.
1045
  As article F(1) TEU makes clear: ‘The Union shall respect the 
national identities of its Member States, whose systems of government are 
founded on the principles of democracy'. EU citizenship is then linked with 
national citizenship in that only a national of a Member State can be an EU 
citizen.  This was achieved by Article 17 TEC which provided that,  
‘Citizenship of the Union is hereby established.  Every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.  Citizenship of 
the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship. Citizens of 
the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this treaty and shall be subject 
to the duties imposed thereby’. 
In addition, although there was no reference to duties,
1046
 various rights for EU 
citizens were spelt out.
1047
  In respect of residence rights these included in Article 
8 A TEU the `right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by 
the measures adopted to give it effect'; in Article 8 B(1)-‘the right to vote or stand 
                                                             
1045 M.Everson, ‘The Legacy of the Market Citizen’, in J.Shaw and G.More, (eds) New Legal 
Dynamics of the European Union, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) 
1046 See further P. Stasinopoulos, ‘EU Citizenship as a Battle of the Concepts: Travailleur v 
Citoyen’, (2011) 4 (2) European Journal of Legal Studies at 78 who writes that ‘it would be 
argued, however, that all EU citizens have the duty to respect the laws and cultures of the states in 
which they reside when they exercise their right to free movement, but complying with the law is a 
general duty and not one that can be codified by the institutions of the EU.’ 
1047 Ibid and who points out how ‘although the status civitatis is normally associated with both 
rights and duties, the EU legislation governing citizenship mirrors the sui generis status of the 
Human Rights law that bypasses the states and gives rights to the individual without following the 
traditional state/citizen relationship, which is, by nature, reciprocal. 
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in municipal elections for those citizens residing in Member States of which they 
are not nationals (Article 8B(1))’;  in Article 8B (2) ‘the right to vote or stand in 
European parliamentary elections for the same group of citizens’; in Article 8 C 
‘that  EU citizens finding themselves in the territory of a third country where their 
own country is not represented have the right to diplomatic or consular protection 
by any Member State which is represented there’;  in Article 138 E ‘the right to 
petition the European Parliament and to apply to the Ombudsman established’.  
Thus the rights listed here for EU citizens are focused around political and 
residence rights and do not include any social rights such as the right to welfare 
entitlement of some kind. EU citizens’ rights in the Treaty are therefore much 
narrower in scope to those commonly recognised rights at national level.  The 
remainder of the thesis focuses on the residency rights of EU citizens rather than 
the political rights of EU citizens. 
 
3.3 The strengthening of residence rights in Directive 2004/38 
Subsequent to the Treaty of Maastricht, there was a further strengthening of the 
citizenship residency status in Directive 2004/38.  Article 1 provided, ‘the right of 
permanent residence in the territory of the Member States for Union citizens and 
their family members; Article 5 dealt with the formalities in connection with the 
entry and residence.  It provided, 
‘1. Without prejudice to the provisions on travel documents applicable to 
national border controls, Member States shall grant Union citizens leave to 
enter their territory with a valid identity card or passport and shall grant 
family members who are not nationals of a Member State leave to enter 
their territory with a valid passport. No entry visa or equivalent formality 
may be imposed on Union citizens. 
2. Family members who are not nationals of a Member State shall only be 
required to have an entry visa in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 
539/2001 or, where appropriate, with national law. For the purposes of this 
Directive, possession of the valid residence card referred to in Article 10 
shall exempt such family members from the visa requirement. Member 
States shall grant such persons every facility to obtain the necessary visas. 
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Such visas shall be issued free of charge as soon as possible and on the 
basis of an accelerated procedure. 
3. The host Member State shall not place an entry or exit stamp in the 
passport of family members who are not nationals of a Member State 
provided that they present the residence card provided for in Article 10’. 
Article 2(2) extended the list of family members of EU citizens that could 
accompany an EU citizen.  It provided that, 
‘ "Family member" means: 
(a) the spouse; 
(b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered 
partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a Member State, if the 
legislation of the host Member State treats registered partnerships as 
equivalent to marriage and in accordance with the conditions laid down in the 
relevant legislation of the host Member State; 
(c) the direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependants and 
those of the spouse or partner as defined in point (b); the dependent direct 
relatives in the ascending line and those of the spouse or partner as defined in 
point (b); 
3) "Host Member State" means the Member State to which a Union citizen 
moves in order to exercise his/her right of free movement and residence’. 
On the other hand, in addition to the EU citizenship provisions in the Treaty of 
Maastricht and the strengthening of the citizenship residency rights in Directive 
2004/38, EU migrant citizens may lose their right to reside in certain prescribed 
circumstances. 
Firstly Directive 2004/38 Member States includes the right to expel EU migrant 
citizens on the grounds of public security.  This provision provided that, ‘2. The 
host Member State may not take an expulsion decision against Union citizens or 
their family members, irrespective of nationality, who have the right of permanent 
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residence on its territory, except on serious grounds of public policy or public 
security.
1048
 
The question of how to deal with EU migrant citizens where they have had 
periods of imprisonment in the host state raise contentious issues for the 
CJEU.
1049
 As EU law in this context is an area of shared competence between the 
EU and the Member States
1050
 this leads to difficult questions for the CJEU as to 
where the balance is to be drawn in cases on matters such as the Member States’ 
preserve of national immigration and public order and public security rules.
1051
 
However, questions in this context also straddle what Schütze calls 
complementary competence.  Even though the treaty does not use this term in 
Article 2 (5) TFEU, so it is a non-legislative competence according to Schütze, 
1052
 the EU has a much weaker competence. Nevertheless, the CJEU could still 
draw upon subsidiarity to recognise such complementary competences in a 
particular part of a policy area especially where a policy area already includes 
shared competences.   
 A particularly contentious issue in this context is where the CJEU has been called 
to adjudicate on cases concerning the calculation of the 10 year period pursuant to 
                                                             
1048 However, there was also provision made in this Directive giving various protections to certain 
categories of migrant EU citizens: 
‘3. An expulsion decision may not be taken against Union citizens, except if the decision is based 
on imperative grounds of public security, as defined by Member States, if they: 
(a) have resided in the host Member State for the previous ten years; or 
(b) are a minor, except if the expulsion is necessary for the best interests of the child, as provided 
for in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989.’ 
1049 Case 30/77,  Bouchereau [1977] 2 CMLR 800.   
1050 As Schütze in P.Craig, The Lisbon Treaty, Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, (Oxford, OUP, 
2010) at 5 points out, following the Treaty of Lisbon, these shared competences ‘remain the 
ordinary competences of the European Union. Unless the Treaties expressly provide otherwise, an 
EU competence will be shared.’  Furthermore, C.Barnard and S.Peers, EU law, (OUP, 2014) at 
108 point out that Member States may ‘exercise their competence to the extent the Union has not 
exercised its competence.  Once the Union has adopted rules on a particular matter, the Member 
State action is said to be pre-empted and they may no longer legislate.  Given the nature of Union 
competences, however, pre-emption may only cover those elements of the Union action in 
question and not the whole area of the activity being regulated’. 
1051  For a wider discussion of how the CJEU has approached the interpretation of the Area of 
freedom, security and justice  and the privileging of aggregate security interests over the interests 
of individuals in the post Lisbon period see M.Avbelj, ‘Security and the Transformation of the EU 
Public Order’ Special Issue Lisbon v Lisbon [2013] German Law Journal 2057-2073. 
1052 R.Schütze, ‘Lisbon and the Federal Order of Competences: a Prospective Analysis’, (2008) 
European Law Review 709-722. 
245 
 
Article  28(3) of Directive 2004/38 for increased residency protection for EU 
migrant citizens in a host Member State and the question of whether this 10 year 
period should include periods of imprisonment. One such example is 
Tsakouridis.
1053
 Here the case involved a Mr Tsakouridis, who had been involved 
in a variety of crimes including eight counts of illegal dealing in substantial 
quantities of narcotics as part of an organized group was sentenced to six years 
and six months imprisonment. Consequently, he lost the right of entry and 
residence in Germany in 2008 and was informed by that he was liable to an 
expulsion measure to Greece.
1054
  
Upon appeal of his case by the Higher Administrative Court of Baden 
Wurttemberg and following some debate as to the meaning of imperative grounds 
of public security pursuant to Directive 2004/38,  a question was submitted to the 
CJEU which in para 22 ‘asks essentially to what extent absences from the host 
Member State during the period referred to in Article 28(3)(a) of Directive 
2004/38, that is, during the 10 years preceding the decision to expel the person 
concerned, prevent that person from enjoying the enhanced protection laid down 
in that provision’.1055 
In respect of defining the meaning of public security, the CJEU held in para 43 
that this covers both a member State’s internal and its external security. ’ In 
considering whether dealing in narcotics falls within the public security exception 
the CJEU notes how the operation of groups dealing with narcotics often were 
associated with ‘impressive economic and operational resources and frequently 
with transnational connections.’1056  
The CJEU in para 47 also referred to both its own previous case law and an 
ECHR case
1057
 which accepted that trafficking in narcotics as part of an organized 
group could reach a level of intensity that might directly threaten the calm and 
physical security of the population as a whole or a large part of it’. 
                                                             
1053 Case C-145/09, Land Baden- Württemberg v Panagiotis Tsakouridis.   
1054 Ibid., para 14. 
1055 Ibid., para 22. 
1056 Ibid., para 46. 
1057 Case 221/81 Wolf [1982] ECR 3681, paragraph 9, and Eur. Court H.R., Aoulmi v. France, no. 
50278/99, § 86, ECHR 2006-I). 
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The CJEU then moved to consider in paragraph 49 how an expulsion order must 
be based on the Individual conduct of person here in light of Article 27(2) of 
Directive 2004/38.  This latter provision the CJEU pointed out, 
‘emphasises that the conduct of the person concerned must represent a 
genuine and present threat to a fundamental interest of society or of the 
Member State concerned, that previous criminal convictions cannot in 
themselves constitute grounds for taking public policy or public security 
measures, and that justifications that are isolated from the particulars of the 
case or that rely on considerations of general prevention cannot be 
accepted’. 
Finally, in para 50, the CJEU also advised that in respect of undertaking a 
proportionality assessment whilst accepting that fundamental rights can be 
restricted in the event of a sufficiently serious threat to public security, account 
must be taken of the exceptional nature of the threat to public security as a result 
of the personal conduct of the person concerned must be undertaken alongside 
other factors.  Such factors included the risk of offending and level of 
involvement of the criminal in the activity at issue must be balanced against the 
‘risk of compromising the social rehabilitation of the Union citizen in the State in 
which he has become genuinely integrated, which, as the Advocate General 
observes in point 95 of his Opinion, is not only in his interest but also in that of 
the European Union in general’. The CJEU then added that in respect of the 
application of Directive 2004/38, ‘a balance must be struck more particularly 
between the exceptional nature of the threat to public security as a result of the 
personal conduct of the person concerned, assessed if necessary at the time when 
the expulsion decision is to be made’ and a number of other factors.  These factors 
the CJEU ruled included on the one hand, the penalties and sentences imposed by 
the Member State. Secondly, the degree of involvement in the criminal activity by 
Tsakouridis and the extent of risk that there was of him reoffending.  On the other 
hand, the CJEU pointed out they also included ‘the risk of compromising the 
social rehabilitation of the Union citizen in the State in which he has become 
genuinely integrated, which, as the Advocate General observes in point 95 of his 
Opinion, is not only in his interest but also in that of the European Union in 
general’. 
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Ultimately, the CJEU, in undertaking a proportionality assessment, ruled in para 
53 that the national court should ‘assess whether the interference contemplated is 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, in this case the protection of public 
security.’  Furthermore, and by way of guidance to the national court, it advised 
that the national court should take account, 
 ‘in particular of the nature and seriousness of the offence committed, the 
duration of residence of the person concerned in the host Member State, 
the period which has passed since the offence was committed and the 
conduct of the person concerned during that period, and the solidity of the 
social, cultural and family ties with the host Member State. In the case of a 
Union citizen who has lawfully spent most or even all of his childhood and 
youth in the host Member State, very good reasons would have to be put 
forward to justify the expulsion measure (see, to that effect, in particular, 
Maslov v. Austria, §§ 71 to 75)’.1058 
However, despite this case involving shared competence areas as well as the 
sensitivity of defining of rights sharpening the subsidiarity concern, the CJEU 
paid little attention to subsidiarity in its ruling.  With this in mind, it is proposed 
here that any subsidiarity and proportionality review in this case concerning 
whether the calculation of the 10 year period pursuant to Article 28(3) of 
Directive 2004/38 for increased residency protection should include periods of 
imprisonment. This, it is suggested, should at the very least involve the CJEU 
making explicit reference in its reasoning to, on the one hand, how it has 
undertaken a subsidiarity and proportionality review.  The CJEU needs to do this 
much more systematically. Such an approach would not only be respectful of the 
rule of law but would improve quality of decision making by the CJEU thus 
enhancing the legitimacy of the CJEU in the eyes of the national courts of the 
Member States. Even where there is no change in case outcomes an explicit 
explanation of how the CJEU had considered subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning 
                                                             
1058 See, to that effect, in particular, Maslov v. Austria, [2008] ECHR [GC] 1638/03 (23 June 
2008) §§ 71 to 75. 
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would help to improve the quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently 
enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling.1059  
Any such review should include considering firstly, what is the overall degree of 
competence that has been transferred to the EU in this context.  This would 
include considering both the general and the specific competence and whether 
competence involves a consideration of the limits of shared competence in the 
internal market and any derogation on the grounds of public security for the free 
movement of persons rules and the extent to which the EU is acting on the edge of 
its competence in relation to interfering with the Member States’ laws in the 
context of criminal law. 
This is an important question as the CJEU has frequently adopted an expansionary 
approach demonstrating a pro-union interpretative tendency when approaching 
competence in internal market cases and as Davies writes prior to the Treaty of 
Lisbon, ‘Alas, as every Community lawyer knows, there could hardly be more 
open‐ended and ambiguous competences than those assigned to the Community.’  
1060Furthermore, Conway writes that ‘the conceptual pull of the concept of 
‘internal market’ or ‘common market’ make defining the limits of EU competence 
very difficult.
1061
 
Yet following the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 5 TEU clearly defines the EU as an 
organization of conferred and shared powers.  Craig highlights ‘the Laeken 
Declaration and subsequent discussion of Treaty reform was premised on the 
basis that there were concerns voiced about ‘competence creep’, more especially 
in relation to two of the most general Treaty provisions,  Article 95 and 308 EC’. 
1062
 However, Craig then explains that despite the Treaty of Lisbon, ‘problems 
still remain’   and that, ‘the Treaty of Lisbon will….. do little if anything to 
                                                             
1059 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
 
1060 Gareth Davies, Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, In the Wrong Place, At the Wrong Time, (2006) 
43 Common Market Law Review 63- 84 at 65’. 
1061 G.Conway ‘Conflicts of Competence Norms in EU Law and the Legal Reasoning of the ECJ’ 
11 (9) German Law Journal at 967-1005 at 970. 
1062 P.Craig, (2010) The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press)    
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alleviate problems of ‘competence creep’ in the terrain covered by Article 114 
TFEU (ex Article 95 TEC).
1063
 
It should also include considering the implications for the Member State of giving 
third country national family members of EU citizens who have committed 
offences and spent time in prison in a particular Member State permanent 
residence.  This could include discussion of any views from the national court 
what the potential impact might be on immigration for that particular Member 
State of giving third country national family members of EU citizens who have 
committed offences and spent time in prison in a particular Member State 
permanent residence.  Access to pertinent public security data or discussion that 
the national referring court had submitted about the degree of public security risk 
could be helpful here in informing the CJEU’s consideration of this issue.1064 Far-
reaching effects into the public security and immigration of a Member State, for 
example, would suggest the CJEU is intruding upon public security and 
immigration competence, which remains with the Member States.
1065
  
Any views of the national court in this context and their reasons for favouring 
local law-making over centralised action should be explicitly stated.  For, and as 
Kumm has pointed out, the advantages of local law-making over centralised 
action are three fold and encompass efficiency, democracy and preserving the 
identities of citizens of the Member State which is easier at a local level than a 
European level.
1066
 
But on the other hand, in cases concerning a citizens giving third country national 
family members of EU citizens who have committed offences and spent time in 
prison in a particular Member State permanent residence the CJEU would also 
need to demonstrate that it had considered whether  the justice provisions in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights had been respected by the national authorities 
when considering the extent to which the substance of the rights of a family 
member of an EU citizen  had been so compromised.   
                                                             
1063 Ibid., at 188 
1064 See also Rasmussen’s conclusion that the ECJ needed to take into account more socio-
economic date in aits adjudication: H. Rasmussen, On Law and Policy of the European court of 
Justice (Kluwer 1986)]   
1065 Article 79 and 80 TFEU. 
1066 Kumm Op. Cit. 581. 
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By explicitly including in its judgement the sector-specific criterion it had 
employed when weighing up such issues in citizenship in cases concerning the 
calculation of the 10 year period pursuant to Article 28(3) of Directive 2004/38 
for increased residency protection should include periods of imprisonment and the 
weight given by the CJEU to each criterion, this would anchor subsidiarity.   
The expulsion of such migrant EU citizens by host Member States’1067 also raise a 
wide variety of fundamental rights matters that have previously either been the 
preserve of national constitutional courts at a national level or fundamental human 
rights at international level such as those provided in Article 47 the right to an 
effective remedy and to a fair trial ‘within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal previously established by law’ and that ‘legal aid shall be 
made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is 
necessary to ensure effective access to justice’.  It also includes in Article 48, 49 
and 50 that various procedural safeguards are adhered to such as a presumption of 
innocence and a right of defence, as well as various principles of justice such as 
ensuring the legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties are 
adhered to.  
Secondly, Directive 2004/38 includes that EU migrant citizens may also lose their 
right to reside if they fail to meet the conditions laid out in Article 7
1068
 and 
Article 14(2) of Directive 2004/38. 
1069
 However, Article 14(3) of that Directive 
does state ‘An expulsion measure shall not be the automatic consequence of a 
Union citizen's or his or her family member's recourse to the social assistance 
                                                             
1067 See for example the Case 348/09,  P.I. v Oberburgemeisterin der Stadt Remscheid 
where the CJEU has elaborated upon the factors that a national court should take into account 
when issuing any expulsion measure for EU citizens on the grounds of public security. 
1068 In the recent case of Case C-333/13 Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig the CJEU was asked to consider 
if a non-economically active EU citizen was entitled to special non-contributory cash benefits that 
economically inactive Member State nationals are entitled to. After briefly referring firstly to EU 
citizenship being destined to a general to be the fundamental status of citizens in para 58, but again 
without elaborating what such a status might entail, and secondly to the principle of non-
discrimination in Article 18 TFEU in para 59, it then went on to rule that Ms Dano did not have a 
right of residence as she did not fulfil the conditions required by Directive 2004/38 section 7(1) (b) 
regarding having an EU citizen having sufficient resources of their own.  Ultimately in para 81, the 
CJEU therefore concluded that as Ms Dano had no right of residence she was not entitled to the 
principle of non-discrimination. In drawing this conclusion particular emphasis was also given in 
para 76 to the purpose of Article 7(1) (b) of Directive 2004/38 namely ‘to prevent economically 
inactive Union citizens from using the host Member State’s welfare system to fund their means of 
subsistence’.  
1069 These conditions are laid out in Article 7, 12 and 13 Directive 2004/38.  These  include a right 
of residence for more than three months for workers, the self-employed, students enrolled at an 
educational establishment and their prescribed family members provided they all have sufficient 
resources and sickness insurance.  
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system of the host Member State.’  This however creates a difficult dividing line: 
citizens may not become dependent on social assistance, but they may not be 
expelled immediately if they lack financial resources.  It could just be a question 
of applying Antonissen with a bit more liberality, but then the scope of this needs 
to be clarified by the CJEU.There were also added protections given in Directive 
2004/38 to those EU migrant citizens who have resided in a particular host 
Member State on a long term basis. So, for example, Article 16 of Directive 
2004/38 includes that for EU migrant citizens who have lived in the host Member 
State for more than five years they gain permanent residency status and therefore 
a Member State cannot expel such citizens or their family members on the 
grounds of unemployment.  There were also protections from expulsion given to 
those who are seeking work in Article 14 (4) of Directive 2004/38 where such a 
migrant EU citizen can provide evidence that he or she ‘is continuing to seek 
employment’ and has a ‘genuine chance of being engaged.’  
Furthermore, the criteria for using the derogations are stricter in that Art 28(2) of 
Directive 2004/38 provides that the Member State can only deport a person who 
has acquired a right of permanent residence ‘on serious grounds of public policy 
or public security. 
Article 28 (3) (a) Directive 2004/38 further provides that ‘imperative grounds of 
public security’ measures must be based  ‘exclusively on the personal conduct of 
the individual concerned.’ A Member State is only justified in invoking public 
policy where such conduct represents: ‘a genuine, present and sufficiently serious 
threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society.  Justifications that are 
isolated from the particulars of the case or that rely on considerations of general 
prevention shall not be accepted’.1070 
Thus this section has considered how a key reason for the insertion of EU 
citizenship provisions into EU law was to enhance the ‘the justification and 
acceptability by individuals of public power or authority’1071 in the eyes of 
                                                             
1070 Directive 2004/38, Art. 27(2), 2nd para.  Note that under Art. 28(2) of Dir. 2004/38 and the 5-
year rule there must be “serious” public policy grounds before measures can legally be taken.   
1071 C.Closa, ‘Limits to the Legitimacy Function of EU citizenship: The Nationality of Member 
States, Paper delivered at the Fourth Biennial International Conference of the European 
Community Studies Association, Charleston, South Carolina May 11-14 1995 
<http://www.academia.edu/1436985/Limits_to_the_Legitimacy_Function_of_EU_Citizenship_Th
e_Nationality_of_Member_States >accessed 20.2.14.   
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European citizens. 
1072
 This is even though the residence rights attaching to EU 
citizenship in both the Treaty and the Directive 2004/38, which are the focus of 
this thesis, were, though, predominantly aimed at those EU citizens who were 
economically active.  Finally, consideration was given to the exception in 
Directive 2004/38 for expulsion of EU migrant citizens.  This included a 
discussion of where the CJEU has been called to adjudicate on cases concerning 
the calculation of the 10 year period pursuant to Article 28(3) of Directive 
2004/38 for increased residency protection for EU migrant citizens in a host 
Member State and the question of whether this 10 year period should include 
periods of imprisonment in the case of Tsakouridis.
1073
 In particular, it was 
pointed out how despite this case involving shared competence areas as well as 
the sensitivity of defining of rights sharpening the subsidiarity concern, the CJEU 
paid little attention to subsidiarity in its ruling.  It was therefore suggested that the 
CJEU, should  at the very least make explicit reference in its reasoning to, on the 
one hand, how it has undertaken a subsidiarity and proportionality review.  A 
brief outline was then proposed of how this might be undertaken. Even where 
there is no change in case outcomes an explicit explanation of how the CJEU had 
considered subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning would help to improve the 
quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy of 
the CJEU’s ruling.1074 
The next section turns to consider the CJEU’s approach to another contentious 
matter in its citizenship case law: the fundamental status of EU citizenship and 
making inroads into the idea that nationals of the Member States exercising their 
right of free movement must be economically self-sufficient and must not become 
a burden on the host Member State when interpreting the scope of the residency 
rights of EU citizens 
 
                                                             
1072 See also S. Andreev, ‘The EU ‘Crisis of Legitimacy’ Revisited: Concepts, Causes and Possible 
Consequences for the European Politics and Citizens’, 
<eghttp://politicalperspectivesmanchester.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/epru-2007-s1-07.pdf > 
accessed 20.2.14. 
1073 Case C-145/09, Land Baden- Württemberg v Panagiotis Tsakouridis.    
1074 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
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3.4 The CJEU, the fundamental status of EU citizenship and residency rights 
of EU citizens  
Despite the limits of EU citizenship in the Treaty and the emphasis in Directive 
2004/38 residency rights for economically active EU migrant citizens, a common 
thread running through the case of law of the CJEU is the emphasis by the CJEU 
of the fundamental status of EU citizenship.
1075
 Furthermore, the CJEU has 
adopted an expansive approach to its interpretation of the citizenship Treaty 
provisions so as to give various residence rights to certain categories of EU 
citizens even where there is no economic nexus
1076
  i.e the CJEU in its case law 
has made inroads into the idea that nationals of the Member States exercising their 
right of free movement must be economically self-sufficient and must not become 
a burden on the host Member State when interpreting the scope of the residency 
rights of EU citizens.   
On the other hand, it will be pointed out by the current author how despite EU 
citizenship cases often involving shared competence areas and touching upon 
areas of national sensitivity such as immigration and welfare, there was no 
subsidiarity review undertaken by the CJEU to support the expansive 
interpretation of EU citizenship in this context.  This omission, it will be argued, 
is a key concern in that it lays the CJEU open to claims that it is failing to respect 
the rule of law.  It is also failing to demonstrate in its reasoning a proper respect 
for local law making which runs counter to the recent affirmation by the Treaty of 
Lisbon that subsidiarity is a key legal principle governing the EU law institutions 
including the CJEU.
1077
 
In order to introduce this discussion, it should be re-emphasised how one of the 
most unique and distinguishing aspects of the EU citizenship Treaty articles 
introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in Article 17 TEC is that despite being 
hailed as having fundamental status in the case law, EU citizenship is parasitic on 
national citizenship.  Thus EU citizenship differs from national citizenship in that 
in respect of EU citizenship it is only by being a national of a Member State that 
                                                             
1075 See for example Grzelczyk v Centre public D’Aide Sociale D’Ottignies-Louvan-La-Neuve 
(Case C-184/99) [2002] 1 CMLR 19 para 1. 
1076 Ibid. 
1077 This builds upon the argument put forward by De Burca that the CJEU is a law making 
institutions and therefore governed by subsidiarity when interpreting in shared competence areas 
and discussed previously in chapter 3. 
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one acquires EU citizenship.  The rights of an EU citizen under the Treaty 
therefore do not arise autonomously under these provisions.   
Furthermore, and as Craig and de Búrca  highlight, Directive 2004/38 continues to 
distinguish between economically active and non-economically actives EU 
nationals.
1078
  However, despite this distinction there seems to be a gap between 
the CJEU’s approach1079 and the more limited legislative provision in Directive 
2004/38.   
On the other hand, the CJEU has played a key role in fleshing out the meaning of 
EU citizenship and moving away from its economic market focus in favour of a 
more rights based approach to reflect its fundamental status in EU law
1080
 through 
its expansive and dynamic interpretation of the EU citizenship treaty provisions. 
The CJEU has done this in its case law on ‘substance of rights’,1081 but this is 
controversial because it touches on Member States competence.  As 
Kostakopoulou explains the expansive interpretation of EU citizenship Treaty 
provisions has involved ‘giving meaning, specificity, and value to [citizenship], 
thereby establishing new institutional norms which will impact on and modify 
national legal cultures’.1082    Such a dynamic approach in this context has largely 
been through the teleological approach adopted by the CJEU in its interpretation 
of the wording of the Citizenship Treaty articles
1083
 and more generally the 
creation of direct effect enabling EU citizens to rely on EU law.  Direct effect was 
first created of Treaty provisions,
1084
 extended to secondary legislation in Franz 
                                                             
1078 P.Craig and  G.de Búrca, EU Law: Test, Cases and Materials. (5th ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 819. 
1079
 See for example Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office Nationale de L’emploi 
(ONEM) [CJEU, 08 March 2011).  
1080 See Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d’Aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-La-
Newve, [2001]ECR i-06193 para 31. 
1081 See for example Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de L’Emploi 
(ONEM), [2011] ECR I-1177 where the CJEU referred to the ‘substance of rights’ of EU citizens 
in paragraph 42.  Here it ruled that ‘Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the 
effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights 
confer red by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union’. 
1082 D.Kostakopoulou, ‘Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship: Explaining Institutional Change’, 
(2005) 2 The Modern Law Review 263. 
1083 See also J. Bengoetxea, ‘The Scope for Discretion, Coherence and Citizenship’, in O. Wiklund 
(ed.), Judicial Discretion in European Perspective (Kluwer 2003), 72-74 that the CJEU should 
engage in activism in the area of rights to enhance a sense of citizenship in the EU and that this 
might help to make up for the lack of demos in the EU. 
1084 Case 26/62 NV Algemene transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v 
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
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Grad
1085
 whereby an individual is able to rely on an unimplemented directive in a 
national court, provided certain conditions are met.
1086
  Subsequently in 
Baumbast,
1087
 the CJEU held that the citizenship provisions were directly 
effective as well as emphasising how the directly effective rights at issue must be 
considered in the broader context of Regulation 1612/68 as a whole.  As the CJEU 
reasoned in para 68, 
 ‘First, Article 12 of Regulation No 1612/681088 and the rights which flow 
from it must be interpreted in the context of the structure and purpose of 
that regulation. It is apparent from the provisions of the regulation, taken as 
a whole, that in order to facilitate the movement of members of workers' 
families the Council took into account, first, the importance for the worker, 
from a human point of view, of having his entire family with him and, 
secondly, the importance, from all points of view, of the integration of the 
worker and his family into the host Member State without any difference in 
treatment in relation to nationals of that State (see, to that effect, Case 
249/86 Commission v Germany [1989] ECR 1263, paragraph 11).’ 
Sala is one of the most radical of the early case examples where the CJEU 
adopted such a teleological approach to the interpretation of the citizenship 
provisions and, in particular, made significant inroads into the idea that nationals 
of the Member States exercising their right of free movement must be 
economically self-sufficient and must not become a burden on the host Member 
State.
 1089
  The CJEU ruled that an EU citizen who was economically inactive, but 
was lawfully residing in a host Member State as a matter of German law, was 
entitled to rely upon the equal treatment provisions to obtain some degree of 
social assistance.  
 
                                                             
1085 Case 9/70, Franz Grad v Finanzamt Traunstein, [1970] ECR 825. 
1086 See P. Craig, and  G.de Búrca,  EU Law: Test, Cases and Materials. (4th ed.Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007) at 272-277 for a discussion of the conditions for direct effect of Treaty 
provisions, Regulations and Directives. 
1087 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091 para 84. 
1088 This Regulation is now codified as Regulation (EC) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement of workers within the Union L141/1 
27.5.2011. 
1089 Case C-85/96 María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691.  
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The facts of the case concerned a Mrs Sala who was a Spanish national living in 
Germany for 25 years.  During this period she had had periodic employment up 
until 1989.  In respect of obtaining the relevant residence permits to allow her to 
stay in Germany, she received such residence permits allowing her to stay up until 
1984.  After that date, although she had applied for extension of her residence 
permit she was not in receipt of the relevant residence permit when in Jan 1993 
she applied for a child-raising allowance for her child born during that month.  An 
application for a child-raising allowance was subsequently refused by the German 
authorities.  She therefore took her case initially before the German social court 
before, following rejection of her application by the German Social Court, making 
an appeal to the Bayerisches Landessozialgericht .  It was during these latter 
proceedings between Mrs Martínez Sala and Freistaat Bayern (State of Bavaria) 
concerning the latter's refusal to grant her child-raising allowance for her child 
that four questions were referred to the CJEU.  
 
The first question focused on whether Ms Sala was a worker for EU law 
purposes
1090
 with the second question asking whether a child-raising allowance 
was a social advantage within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation No 
1612/68?
1091
  
A third question then asked if it was compatible with the law of the European 
Union for the BErzGG to require possession of a formal residence permit for 
the grant of child-raising allowance to nationals of a Member State, even 
though they are permitted to reside in Germany?'  
 
The CJEU considered the second and third questions together first ruling that  
the child-raising allowance at issue constituted both a family benefit for the 
                                                             
1090 `(1) Was a Spanish national living in Germany who, with various interruptions, was employed 
until 1986 and, apart from a short period of employment in 1989, later received social assistance 
under the Bundessozialhilfegesetz (Federal Social Welfare Law, the "BSHG") still, in 1993, a 
worker within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 or an employed 
person within the meaning of Article 2 in conjunction with Article 1 of Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71? 
1091 This Regulation is now codified as Regulation (EC) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement of workers within the Union L141/1 
27.5.2011. 
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purposes of Article 4 (1) (h) of Regulation No 1408/71 and a social advantage 
within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68’.1092  
 
The CJEU then went on to consider the first question regarding whether ‘a 
national of one Member State who resides in another Member State, where he is 
employed and subsequently receives social assistance, has the status of worker 
within the meaning of Regulation No 1612/68 or of employed person within the 
meaning of Regulation No 1408/71’.1093   It then ruled that such a question was 
for the national court to decide upon. For, as the CJEU pointed out in paragraph 
31, ‘there is no single definition of worker in Community law: it varies 
according to the area in which the definition is to be applied’ even though the 
basic definition of a worker has been set out by the CJEU in Laurie Blum.
1094
   
 
Finally the CJEU considered the fourth question from the referring court 
regarding ‘whether Community law precludes a Member State from requiring 
nationals of other Member States to produce a formal residence permit in order 
to receive a child-raising allowance.’1095    The CJEU noted that as Mrs Sala 
was a national of a Member State who was lawfully residing in Germany that 
she fell within the ‘scope ratione personae of the provisions of the Treaty on 
European citizenship’.1096 Consequently Ms Sala, although a Spanish citizen as 
a matter of German law she was entitled to German citizenship. Thus her 
entitlement to German citizenship arose under German law, it was not a 
consequence of the CJEU interpretation of the Treaties.  The significance of this 
point, though, was not made very clearly in the judgment.  It therefore raised 
doubts after the case as to how much of a precedent Sala was, since it was 
possible to distinguish it from other cases where residents of the host Member 
State were not entitled under the local national law to be a citizen of the host 
Member State. 
 
                                                             
1092 Ibid at para 21.  
1093 Case C-85/96 María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691 at para 29. 
1094 Case 66/85 Deborah Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden- Würtemberg [1986] ECR 2121. 
1095 Ibid., at para 46. 
1096 Ibid., at para 60. 
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However, in light of her entitlement to German citizenship recognised under 
German law, she was subject to the rules that govern European citizenship and, 
in particular, the general principle of non-discrimination that all EU citizens are 
afforded.
1097
  A fundamental tenet of the general principle of non-discrimination 
is the right of EU citizens not to be discriminated against on the grounds of 
nationality.
1098
  Thus, the CJEU, demonstrating a pro-union interpretative 
tendency, ruled that Mrs Sala can, by virtue of her being a EU citizen and 
lawfully resident in the territory of the host Member State, ‘rely on Article 6 of 
the Treaty in all situations which fall within the scope ratione materiae of 
Community law, including the situation where that Member Sate delays or 
refuses to grant to that claimant a benefit that is provided to all persons lawfully 
resident in the territory of that State on the ground that the claimant is not in 
possession of a document which nationals of that same state are not required to 
have and the issue of which may be delayed or refused by the authorities of that 
State.’1099  
 
The use of the discrimination principle in Article 12 EC as the basis for 
claiming equal access to a German child-raising benefit for her newborn child 
Craig and de Búrca have pointed out illustrate how ‘the CJEU in this case was 
willing to ‘explode the linkages’1100 which had previously been required in 
order for the principle of non-discrimination to apply.  It was not necessary for 
there to be involvement in any economic activity as a worker or service 
provider, nor was it necessary to show preparation for a future economic 
activity as a student, etc.  Furthermore, Craig and de Búrca discuss how ‘the 
fact that the CJEU did not base the applicant’s right to residence on Article 18 
EC, having found that Germany had authorized her residence (under the terms 
of a Council of Europe Convention on social and medical assistance), meant 
that the Court did not have to confront the limiting conditions within that 
Article, and especially the requirement that she should have sufficient resources 
                                                             
1097 Ibid., para 62. 
1098 Ibid., para 62. 
1099 Ibid., at para 63-64.  
1100 See Craig de Búrca Op.Cit  at 859-860 and who refer to O’Leary S., ‘Putting the Flesh on the 
Bones of European Union Citizenship’ (1999) 24 EL Rev 68, 77-78 and Toner., H ‘Judicial 
Interpretation of European Union Citizenship/ Consolidation or Transformation’, (2000) 7 MJ 158. 
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to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance scheme of the State.  The 
CJEU instead based itself simply on Articles 12 and 17(2) of the Treaty’.1101  
 
Such a ruling was remarkable in several other respects. 
 
Firstly, although Shaw has argued that the CJEU in this case refused to 
recognize ‘care work’ as a ‘proper’ form of work for the purposes of 
interpreting the Courts reading of the categories which frame the case, i.e. 
citizenship and free movement rules,’1102 the CJEU widened the concept of 
citizenship to include economically inactive persons. In so doing the CJEU was 
happier to dispense with the need for economic activity than to offer a wide 
interpretation of work as including care work with some indirect economic 
dimension to it. Thus, the CJEU has given recognition to Union citizens not just 
on their legal and economic position within the Union, but also now to their 
status as citizens of the Union.  Consequently, as Wollenschlager writes, this 
judgment is one of the ‘path-breaking decisions which have operated a civic 
turn in Community law, putting flesh on the bones of the citizenship provision’.  
1103
 
 
However, this is controversial as the CJEU failed to discuss explicitly the extent 
to which the CJEU’s expansion of EU citizenship to include economically 
inactive persons
1104
 facilitates the general objective in Article 18(1) TEC of 
preventing any obstacles to the right of Union citizens to move and reside 
freely.  Nor did it undertake any weighing up of whether their ruling contributes 
to such a goal or whether it has gone beyond what the Treaty article envisaged.  
Considerations such as the dangers and costs to the host Member state of 
permitting non-economically active citizens a right to welfare benefits such as 
the benefit at issue in this case and the extent of interference with Member 
                                                             
1101 Ibid. 
1102 J.Shaw, in Gender and the Court of Justice’, in The European Court of Justice G de Búrca and 
J.Weiler (eds) (OUP, 2001) at 141. 
1103 F.Woolenschlager,  ‘Union Citizenship and Its Dynamics for Integration beyond the market’, 
paper presented at the EUSA Eleventh Biennial International Conference 2009 
<http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2009/papers/wollenschl%C3%A4ger_05E.pdf > last accessed 
17.6.13. 
1104 In Case C-85/96 María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691 she was entitled 
as a matter of German law to German citizenship. 
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States policy in this context were also not explicitly discussed and weighed up. 
Furthermore, and as Rasmussen has argued, socio-economic data is also 
necessary to underpin the CJEU’s decision as, 
 ‘the operation of the balancing technique threatens the survival of many 
national legislative acts.  If fairness and justice should prevail, it seems to 
be a minimum requirement of the judicial process that a federalism 
conflict umpiring takes place on the basis of comprehensive socio-
economic briefing of the members of the Court’.1105 
 
The ruling is also controversial as the text of the Treaties suggests that citizens 
have rights as are specified in the Treaty: the CJEU inverted this approach and 
suggests citizens may have rights generally on the basis of an equality 
principle
1106
, but conceptually this could lead to the complete harmonisation of all 
of the rights of citizens.  If the only connecting basis with EU competence is the 
principle of equality, there are no limits to the EU’s competence when it comes to 
citizenship.  Shared competence should remain with the Member State only so 
long as the EU does not exercise it.  It is hard to see the limits of shared 
competence if equality is the underpinning conceptual basis, equality itself 
already having been subject to much debate in academic literature regarding the 
differing contested conceptions of equality
1107
 that there are or the argument put 
                                                             
1105 H. Rasmussen, H., On Law and Policy in the EU: A Comparative Study in Judicial Policy 
Making (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986,) at 432. 
1106 Equality as a legal concept encompassing a principle that like should be treated alike has a 
long history and can be traced back to the writings of Aristotle Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea 
V.3.1131a-1131b  (Ross, W trans ,1925) and who wrote ‘Equality in morals means this: things 
that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated unalike 
should be treated unalike in proportion to their unlikeness’. See also S. Fredman, Women and the 
Law ((Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) 7 for further discussion of how the concept of equality was 
also a key development of liberalist thinking and a discussion of the characteristics of liberalism 
and which have had an important influence on the law namely ‘rationality, autonomy, 
individualism, equality before the law; and abstentionist, neutral state, respecting a divide between 
public and private and based on consent’.  There is also a considerable array of literature on the 
development of the concept of equality which indicates a concept that is both contested  and multi-
faceted.  See for example, Beck, G., ‘The Mythology of Human Rights’, (2008), 21 (3) Ratio Juris 
312-47at 325  (1956).  See also J.N. Gray, ‘On the contestability of social and political concepts’, 
(1977) 5 Political Theory 331-349., C.Swanton, ‘On the essential contestedness of Political 
Concepts’, (1985) (4) Ethics 811-827. 
 
1107 S.Fredman, Women and the Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) at 2 has outlined that there 
have been three main conceptions of equality.   Firstly there is equality of treatment.  This 
conception of equality she submits ‘is predicated on the principle that justice inheres in 
consistency; hence likes should be treated alike.  But this in turn is based on a purely abstract view 
of justice, which does not take into account existing distributions of wealth and power’. Secondly, 
she outlines a second conception of equality as one ‘which concentrates on correcting 
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forward by Westen that, in the context of administration of rules, equality is just 
‘an empty concept’ 1108 in that it lacks substantive content thereby requiring 
particular standards to be developed to determine what inequalities are 
unacceptable.
1109
   Equality, according to Westen, has nothing to add to the 
interpretation of the rule ‘that is not already inherent in the substantive terms of 
the rule itself’.1110 However, as Chermersky points out, 
 ‘this argument [however] assumes that formalism is possible; that it is 
practical to apply rules mechanically to decide all of the situations where 
the rules are supposed to apply …….But legal scholars have long 
discarded a belief in formalism because even the most detailed command 
must leave to the individual executing the command some discretion.  
Hence every law-applying act is only partly determined by law and partly 
undetermined.  Once there is discretion in applying laws, we can no longer 
simply say the law applies to the cases to which it applies.  It is imperative 
to develop a concept of equality to insure consistent, non-discrimatory 
application of the laws.’ 1111  
 Consequently, she surmises that Westen’s view that equality is an empty concept 
overlooks how equality requires that where there is discretion in applying laws 
that these are applied even handingly.  For, as she argues, this ‘is not part of any 
law, but rather is derived from the notion of equality’.1112 
Following Sala the CJEU then continued to display a pro-union interpretative 
tendency by further expanding the scope of citizenship rights in its case law in 
various ways to include various different types of EU non-economically active 
citizens gaining an entitlement to some limited financial assistance. For example 
                                                                                                                                                                       
maldistribution.  Such a principle would lead to a focus on equality of results, requiring unequal 
treatment if necessary to achieve an equal impact’.  Finally she outlines a conception of equality 
where ‘the focus could lie on facilitating personal self-fulfilment, by equalizing opportunities.  
This differs from both the above conceptions, in that a notion of equality which stresses equal 
opportunities is consistent with inequality of treatment and inequality of results’.  
1108 P.Westen, in ‘The empty idea of equality’, (1992) 95 (3) Harvard Law Review, 537–596. 
1109 Ibid., and who writes at 547 ‘Equality is an empty vessel with no substantive moral content of 
its own.  Without moral standards, equality remains meaningless, a formula that can have nothing 
to say about how we should act.  With such standards, equality becomes superfluous, a formula 
that can have nothing to say about how we should act’. 
1110 Ibid., at 551. 
1111 E.Chemerinsky, ‘Articles and Commentary of Equality: In Defense of Equality: A Reply to 
Professor Westen, (1983) Michigan Law Review  at 575. 
1112 Ibid., at 581. 
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an EU citizen who was a student as falling within the equal treatment provisions 
of the Treaty for the purposes of a limited grant when he was exercising a right of 
residence under the Student Directive (now Directive 2004/38) in Grzelczyk
1113
 
and an EU citizen who was a jobseeker to claim jobseeker’s allowance in the UK 
in Collins.
1114
   
The Court has placed rhetorical emphasis on the fundamental status of citizenship 
and the rights attached to citizenship in its ruling initially in Grzelczyk but also in 
a line of subsequent case law
1115
 that ‘Union citizenship is destined to be the 
fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find 
themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of 
their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for’.1116  
This was described by De Waele as “brazen rhetoric”.1117 It also demonstrates 
how the CJEU’s rulings are moving ahead of legislative developments. 
Perhaps even more radically, in Garcia Avello the CJEU extended citizenship 
rights to an EU citizen even where there was no cross border element thus 
severing the link between EU citizenship and market integration itself.
1118
 
However, even where there is no change in case outcomes an explicit explanation 
of how the CJEU had considered subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning would help 
to improve the quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the 
legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling.1119 Furthermore, it is important that the CJEU is 
                                                             
1113 Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v Centre Public D’Aide Sociale D’Ottignies-Louvain-La-Neuve 
[2012] 1 CMLR 19 
1114 Case C-138/02, Collins [2004] ECR 1-2703. 
1115 See for example Cases C-73, Bressol v Gouvernement de la communaute Francaise [2010] 3 
CMLR 20; C-524/06 Huber v Germany [2009] 1 CMLR 49; C-158/07 Forster v Hoofddirectie van 
de Informatie Beheer Groep [2009] 1 CMLR 32; C-192/05 Tas-Hagen v Raadskamer WUBO van 
de Pensioen-en Uitkeringsraad [2007] 1 CMLR 23; C-470/04 N V Inspecteur van de 
Belastingdienst Oost/Kantoor Almelo [2006] 3 CMLR 49; C-147/03 Commission of the European 
Communities v Austria [2006] 3 CMLR 39.   
1116 Grzelczyk v Centre public D’Aide Sociale D’Ottignies-Louvan-La-Neuve (Case C-184/99) 
[2002] 1 CMLR 19 para 1. 
1117 The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Integration Process: A Contemporary and 
Normative Assessment’, (2010) 6(1) Hanse Law Review 3-26 at 7: < 
http://www.hanselawreview.org/pdf9/Vol6No01Art01.pdf > last accessed 14.1.14. 
1118 Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v Etat Belge [2003] ECR I-11613. 
1119 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
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explicit in its reasoning about its consideration of how it has concluded that the 
substance of an EU citizens rights is so compromised that there is no need to 
consider a cross border element.  The question of how the CJEU approaches its 
reasoning in this context is important as the CJEU has already demonstrated that 
to adopt different approach to judicial reasoning, as evidenced for example in the 
cases of Akrich
1120
 and Metock,
1121
 can allow it to reach a completely different 
conclusion.  Akrich was a preliminary reference concerning a third country 
national and his right to enter and remain in the UK following his marriage to a 
British citizen on the grounds that he was entitled to remain in the host Member 
State as a spouse of a UK citizen.  Here the CJEU included in its ruling that 
Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68 required a third country national ‘who is a 
spouse of an EU citizen to be lawfully resident in a Member State when he moves 
to another Member State to which the citizen of the Union is migrating or has 
migrated’.1122  The CJEU then departed from such an approach in the case of 
Metock. The case of Metock and others concerned four cases that came before the 
High Court in Dublin but which were joined together when considered by the 
CJEU.
1123
 The key issue raised in these cases was whether Directive 2004/38 
precluded national legislation which required the spouse of an EU citizen to have 
lived in another Member State before they could lawfully reside in the host 
Member State.
1124
   
Despite strenuous arguments put forward by the Minister for Justice that to 
interpret Directive 2004/38 as prohibiting a host Member State from requiring 
prior lawful residence for a third country national spouse of an EU citizen in 
another Member State would undermine the national immigration policies of 
Member States,
1125
 the CJEU categorically rejected this.
1126
  Rather it ruled that 
the benefit of Article 10 of Directive 2004/38 right cannot depend on prior lawful 
                                                             
1120 Case C-109/01, Akrich, [2003] ECR I-9607. 
1121 Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock & Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform (Metock & Others), 3 CKLR 39 (2008) 
1122 Ibid., at para 50. 
1123 Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock & Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform (Metock & Others), 3 CKLR 39 (2008) 
1124 For further discussion of this case see for egs  C.Costello, Metock: Free Movement and 
‘Normal Family Life’ in the Union’, (2009) 46 CML Rev 587 and S.Currie, ‘Accelerated Justice 
or a Step to Far? Residence Rights for non-EU Family Members and the Courts Ruling in Metock’, 
(2009) 34 EL Rev 310. 
1125 Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock & Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform (Metock & Others), 3 CKLR 39 (2008) para 72. 
1126 Ibid., at paras 53-54 
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residence of such a spouse in another Member State.
1127
  Furthermore, it 
reconsidered its ruling in Akrich in relation to the eligibility for third country 
nationals married to EU citizens to benefit from rights provided for under Article 
10 of Regulation No 1612/68 before ruling in relation to Directive 2004/38 that 
the Directive did not include any requirement that an EU citizen must have 
founded a family already before it went to the host Member State.
1128
  As Currie 
states, ‘In essence, the ruling enshrines a more equitable approach to third country 
national family members of Union citizens in circumstances of genuine family 
union.  Reasoning on the individual level, this is surely a fair result’.1129  
However, what was the main thrust of the CJEU’s reasoning in this case? 
Furthermore,  does the CJEU consider if there is a minimum core of EU rights of 
an EU citizen that are  sacrosanct  and , if so, how balancing of such core rights 
with other competing rights and legitimate government objectives with reference 
to ECHR standards could be undertaken. 
In respect of the thrust of the CJEU’s reasoning to support such a ruling, this was 
directed primarily towards the importance of ensuring that the effectiveness of the 
Directive was not diminished by the existence and retention of the national 
legislation at issue in this case.
1130
  So, for example in respect of the CJEU’s 
reasoning in response to the question raised by the Member State regarding 
whether Directive 2004/38 precludes legislation of a Member State requiring prior 
lawful residence for a third country national spouse of an EU citizen in another 
Member State, the CJEU pointed out that the Directive 2004/38 includes no such 
provision.  Furthermore, the CJEU cites precedent which points out how the 
Community legislature has recognised the importance of ensuring the protection 
of the family life of EU citizens in order to eliminate obstacles to the exercise of 
their free movement rights.
1131
  It also explained that the Member States were 
already able to limit the entry into the Member State of family members of Union 
citizens on the prescribed grounds of public policy, public security or public 
                                                             
1127 Ibid. 
1128 Ibid., para 58 
1129 S.Currie, ‘Accelerated Justice or a Step to Far? Residence Rights for non-EU Family Members 
and the Courts Ruling in Metock’, (2009) 34 EL Rev 310 at 324-5. 
1130 See for egs Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock & Others v Minister for Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform (Metock & Others), 3 CKLR 39 (2008) para 84. 
1131 Ibid., para 56 where the CJEU cites the cases of Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279, 
para 38; Case C-459/99 MRAX [2002] ECR I-6591, para 53; Case C-157/03 Commission v Spain 
[2005] ECR I-2911, para 26; Case C-503/03 Commission v Spain [2006] ECR I-1097 para 41; 
Case C-441/02 Commission v Germany [2006] ECR I-3449 para 109; and Case C-291/05 Eind 
[2007] ECR 1-0000, para 44) 
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health and that ‘such a refusal will be based on an individual examination of the 
particular case’1132 or where there has been an ‘abuse of rights or fraud, such as 
marriages of convenience’.1133 The issue here in terms of legal reasoning is that 
the CJEU is free to choose between incommensurable legal principles; legal rules 
do not determine the issues.  So, where the Directive 2004/38 is silent on such 
issues, and the EU is acting on the edge of its competence such as in the areas of 
welfare and immigration, there is a need for the CJEU to include a subsidiarity 
and proportionality review.  Furthermore, the CJEU should be explicit in its 
reasoning of how it had considered subsidiarity, weighed up the seriousness of the 
national measure at issue against the need to balance the interests of society with 
those of individuals and groups as well as demonstrating a respect for localism by 
giving more weight to the Member State’s right to regulate. Even where there is 
no change in case outcomes an explicit explanation of how the CJEU had 
considered subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning would help to improve the 
quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy of 
the CJEU’s ruling.1134 
 
With regard to the second question raised in the Metock case concerning whether 
the benefit of the provisions of Directive 2004/38 for third country national 
spouses of an EU citizen arise irrespective of when and where the marriage took 
place and of the circumstances in which she entered the host Member State, the 
CJEU stressed the importance of ensuring that national legislation was compatible 
with the objectives of the internal market. 
1135
  In particular it stressed that 
‘establishing an internal market implies that the conditions of entry and residence 
of a Union citizen in a Member State whose nationality he does not possess are 
the same in all the Member States.’  So, for example, it emphasised that Directive 
2004/38 should not be interpreted restrictively so as to deprive the Directive of its 
effectiveness.
1136
  It also pointed out how there was no requirement in the 
                                                             
1132 Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock & Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform (Metock & Others), 3 CKLR 39 (2008) para 74. 
1133 Ibid., para 75. 
1134 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
 
1135 Ibid., para 84. 
1136 Ibid. 
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Directive that a Union citizen must already have founded a family at the time 
when he moves to the host State in order for his third country family members to 
be able to enjoy the rights pursuant to Directive 2004/38. Secondly, that Directive 
2004/38 did not contain any requirement as to where a Union citizen and a third 
country national should be married.
1137
 
However, examination of the CJEU’s ruling in this case also reveals that there is 
no explicit discussion of whether there is a minimum core of EU rights of an EU 
citizen that are sacrosanct that there is therefore no need to consider if there is any 
actual cross-border element.  Rather the CJEU focuses in its reasoning on the 
importance of ensuring that the effectiveness of the Directive was not diminished 
by the existence and retention of the national legislation at issue in this case.
1138
 
Subsidiarity would suggest that the issue of lawful entry should, at least have been 
subject to explicit competence discussion, rather than the standard approach of the 
effectiveness of the internal market.  Furthermore, there is no discussion by the 
CJEU of whether there is a minimum core of EU rights for EU citizens that are 
sacrosanct and how balancing of such core rights with other competing rights and 
legitimate government objectives with reference to ECHR standards. Even where 
the CJEU is taking an expansionary approach that seems rights-based, it then 
introduces the idea of effectiveness of the internal market to support its 
conclusion, which is not a rights-based criterion, and rather it reflects an economic 
and political objective. 
On the other hand, EU citizenship is unique in that it is additional to national 
citizenship and constrained by the limits of competence imposed by the Treaties 
themselves and subsidiarity and its inherent respect for localism in conjunction 
with the national identity clause.  Clearly, the CJEU in such cases are faced with a 
conflict between autonomous concepts in the Charter and the ECHR and 
subsidiarity with subsidiarity working as a counter balance to this and subsidiarity 
favouring constitutional traditions of the Member States.  
However, in Metock, despite this case involving shared competence areas as well 
as the sensitivity of defining of rights sharpening the subsidiarity concern, it is 
surprising that the CJEU paid little attention to subsidiarity in this ruling.  This is 
particularly so where the Directive 2004/38 is silent on such issues and the EU is 
                                                             
1137 Ibid., paras 93 and 98-99. 
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acting on the edge of its competence such as in the areas of welfare and 
immigration.  Thus, it is submitted here that there is an even greater need for the 
CJEU to include a subsidiarity and proportionality review and to include 
discussion of this in its reasoning to help improve the quality of the reasoning of 
the CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling.1139 
  
In particular, the CJEU should be explicit in its reasoning of how it had 
considered subsidiarity, weighed up the seriousness of the national measure at 
issue against the need to balance the interests of society with those of individuals 
and groups as well as demonstrating a respect for localism by giving more weight 
to the Member State’s right to regulate. The CJEU needs to do this much more 
systematically. Such an approach would not only be respectful of the rule of law 
but would improve quality of decision making by the CJEU thus enhancing the 
legitimacy of the CJEU in the eyes of the national courts of the Member States. 
Any such review should include considering firstly, what is the overall degree of 
competence that has been transferred to the EU in this context.  This would 
include considering both the general and the specific competence and whether 
competence involves a consideration of the limits of shared competence in the 
internal market and the extent to which the EU is acting on the edge of its 
competence in relation to interfering with the Member States’ laws in the context 
of national immigration law. In particular here the CJEU should contain an 
explicit discussion in its reasoning of how it had considered the effects of 
intrusion upon immigration competence, which remains with the Member States. 
 
This should include discussion of any views from the national court what the 
potential impact might be on immigration for that particular Member State of 
giving third country national family members of EU citizens where the Directive 
2004/38 is silent on such issues. This is particularly so where the EU is acting on 
the edge of its competence such as in the areas of welfare and immigration where 
there may be significant public policy and financial considerations.  
                                                             
1139 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
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Access to data or discussion that the national referring court had submitted about 
the public policy implications and cost could be helpful here in informing the 
CJEU’s consideration of this issue.1140 Far-reaching effects into immigration of a 
Member State, for example, would suggest the CJEU is intruding upon 
immigration competence, which remains with the Member States.  
Any views of the national court in this context and their reasons for favouring 
local law-making over centralised action should be explicitly stated.  For, and as 
Kumm has pointed out, the advantages of local law-making over centralised 
action are three fold and encompass efficiency, democracy and preserving the 
identities of citizens of the Member State which is easier at a local level than a 
European level.
1141
 
But on the other hand, the CJEU would also need to demonstrate that it had 
considered whether the justice provisions in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
had been respected by the national authorities when considering the extent to 
which the substance of the rights of a family member of an EU citizen had been so 
compromised.  By explicitly including in its judgement such sector-specific 
criterion it had employed when weighing up such issues in this case and the 
weight given by the CJEU to each criterion, this would anchor subsidiarity.  With 
this in mind, the next section turns to consider how although subsidiarity has been 
reaffirmed by the Treaty of Lisbon, there has also been a strengthening of 
residence rights attaching to EU citizens by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
3.5 The reaffirming and strengthening of the residence rights attaching to EU 
citizens by the Treaty of Lisbon in light of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights 
Although EU citizenship has been accused of being symbolic and largely 
aspirational,
1142
 recently there have been some developments to not only enhance 
the symbolism of citizenship by linking it to notions of justice  and fundamental 
                                                             
1140 See also Rasmussen’s conclusion that the CJEU needed to take into account more socio-
economic date in aits adjudication: H. Rasmussen, On Law and Policy of the European Court of 
Justicel, (Kluwer 1986)]   
1141 Kumm Op Cit 581. 
1142  See for example J.d’Oliveira, ‘Union Citizenship: Pie in the Sky?’, in A.Rosas and E.Antola, 
(eds) A citizens’ Europe: In search of a New Order (Sage, 1995). 
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rights but also to make EU citizenship ‘effective in practice’1143.  Firstly, in 2009 
the Treaty of Lisbon has reaffirmed and strengthened citizenship and the rights 
attaching to EU citizenship with Article 20 (2) providing that, 
 ‘Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties 
provided for in the Treaties.  They shall have, inter alia:  
(a) The right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States 
(b) The right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the 
European Parliament and in municipal elections in their Member State 
of residence, under the same conditions as nationals of that State; 
(c) The right to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which the 
Member State of which they are nationals is not represented, the 
protection fo the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member 
State on the same conditions as the nationals of that State; 
(d) The right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the 
European Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and advisory 
bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a 
reply in the same language.’ 
In respect of the new right to petition the European Parliament in Article 121(4) 
TEU and Article 24 (1) TFEU, these were two completely new articles introduced 
by the Treaty of Lisbon which the Preamble to the Treaty of Lisbon emphasises 
are aimed at enhancing democracy within the EU. 
However, with regard to the reference to EU citizens rights inter alia in Article 
20(2) and the insertion of inter alia does beg the question as to whether that means 
that the list of rights is limited to what is already in the Treaties or whether the list 
of rights is exhaustive.  This is an important point of textual interpretation in 
determining the degree of legitimate flexibility of the CJEU in its case law in this 
context.  For where the CJEU bases its interpretation on equality only, not on the 
text, this is very expansionary as the limits of equalisation are hard to draw: 
equality could extent to apply to all the benefits of Article 7 of Regulation 
492/2011 to economically inactive citizens even though, and consistent with the 
                                                             
1143
 This term was coined by the EC Commission in its Report, ‘Dismantling the obstacles to EU 
citizens rights’, COM (2010) 603 final at 3. 
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Preamble to Regulation 492/2011
1144
, the rules on employment and equality of 
treatment
1145
 and in respect of workers families
1146
 apply to those EU migrant 
citizens who are economically active.   
 
In addition to this provision, there are also other key citizenship provisions 
currently located in Article 20 (1) and 21 TFEU and Article 11(4) TEU. Article 
20(1) states that ‘citizenship of the Union is hereby established.  Every person 
holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.  
Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national 
citizenship. As Shuibhne points out, ‘EU citizenship is now described as being 
‘additional to’ national citizenship (under Article 17 EC, European citizenship 
was considered to ‘complement’ national citizenship).1147  The significance of 
such a change in wording is open to debate
1148
 but the use of the words ‘additional 
to’ suggests that EU citizenship is parallel to national citizenship rather than being 
complementary to national citizenship as previously i.e. it subtly seems to 
strengthen EU citizenship vis-à-vis national citizenship and which arguable could 
provide some support for the wide approach it adopts to the interpretation of the 
citizenship Treaty provisions where the CJEU has moved away from requiring a 
cross border element are the cases of Rottman,
 1149
 Zambrano
1150
 and Dereci.
1151
 
For in these cases the CJEU considered the fundamental status of citizens but 
without elaborating when are the substance of rights compromised such that it 
does not need to consider any cross-border element.  They will be discussed 
further in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
In respect of Article 21(1), this states that ‘Every citizen of the Union shall have 
the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 
                                                             
1144 It states, ‘Freedom of movement for workers should be secured within the Union. The 
attainment of this objective entails the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality 
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of work and employment, as well as the right of such workers to move freely within the Union in 
order to pursue activities as employed persons subject to any limitations justified on grounds of 
public policy, public security or public health’. 
1145 Article 7 - 9 Regulation 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 
2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union. 
1146 Ibid., at Article 10. 
1147 See N.Shuibhne, ‘EU Citizenship after Lisbon’, in D.Ashiagbor, N.Countouris and I.Lianos, 
(eds) The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon, (Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 139. 
1148 Ibid. 
1149 Case C-135/08, [2010] ECR I-1449 Rottmann.   
1150 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office Nationale de L’emploi (ONEM) [CJEU, 08 
March 2011). 
1151 Case C-256/11, Dereci and others v Bundesministerium für Inneres, [2011] ECR I-0000. 
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subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the 
measures adopted to give it effect’.  The latter part of this article therefore 
confirms that EU citizenship is subject to the existing law of the EU.  On the other 
hand, there is a new paragraph 3 to Article 21 which enables the Council, to act 
under the special legislative procedure and after consulting the European 
Parliament to ‘adopt measures concerning social security or social protection’.  As 
Shuibhne explains, 
 ‘it will be interesting to see if/how the Council realises this competence.  It 
may seem like a door ajar to elements of harmonisation, but it may also 
give hope to states perceiving that the Court of Justice has unduly 
progressed the market value of free movement over national regulation of 
sensitive (and expensive) aspects of social policy’.1152  
This is because it suggests any extension of social protection is for the legislature, 
and not for the CJEU. 
Article 11(4) provides that, 
 ‘not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant 
number of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the European 
Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any 
appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of 
the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’.   
Article 24 TFEU then enables the Council and the European Parliament to adopt 
regulations to give effect to any such initiative. 
Furthermore, and as Shuibhne points out, ‘there is a stream of references in the 
revised TEU and TFEU that either enhances what we could term procedural 
citizenship rights or gives expression to the more human, people-focused 
dimension of EU objectives’, the latter especially reflected in Article 2 TEU 
which provides in paragraph 1 that ‘The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its 
values and the well-being of its peoples’.1153 The inclusion of Article 6(2) TEU, 
which provides explicit competence for the EU’s accession to the ECHR, 
demonstrates the EU’s commitment to fundamental human rights for its peoples 
                                                             
1152 See N.Shuibhne, ‘EU Citizenship after Lisbon’, in D.Ashiagbor, N.Countouris and I.Lianos, 
(eds) The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon, (Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 141. 
1153 Ibid., at 143 for further discussion of examples. 
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in addition to the existing recognition by the CJEU of the ECHR and its case law 
as a source of inspiration for fundamental rights protection in EU law.
1154
 It also 
challenges the EU to accept an external standard, compared to the Court’s 
previous largely discretionary references to the ECHR.  This suggests that 
citizenship is more about human rights rather than judicial extension of economic 
rights. 
Thirdly, following the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 6 TEU, gives legal force to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000.
 1155
   
The giving of legal effect to the Charter in EU law, more generally, has been 
regarded by Raucea as, 
 ‘a major step forward in the promotion of fundamental rights within EU 
law, indeed a milestone also in the delicate architecture of European 
citizenship. Because of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union has been granted with the same binding 
legal force as the Treaties, becoming a more visible catalogue of 
parameters that should be considered in testing the legal validity of the 
Union's legislative acts and policy actions.’1156 
As the Preamble to the Charter explains, ‘conscious of its spiritual and moral 
heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human 
dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity’, this Charter ‘places the individual at the 
heart of its activities, by establishing a citizenship of the Union and by creating an 
area of freedom, security and justice’.  However, as Dickson has pointed out, it is 
difficult to ascertain precisely ‘what is the nature or ontological status of these 
common values and principles’.1157  Furthermore, she points out that the inclusion 
                                                             
1154 Article 6 (3) TEU and CJEU case law which has referred to the ECHR as a source of 
inspiration e.g. C-299/95 Kremzow v Austria [1997] ECR I-2629 para 14. 
1155 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2007] OJ C 303/1 and reissued 
with the Lisbon Treaty, [2010] OJ C83/2.  E.Guild, ‘The European Union after the Treaty of 
Lisbon, fundamental rights and EU Citizenship’, Global Jean Monnet /EC Association world 
conference 25-26 May 2010 <http://ec.europa.eu/education/jean-
monnet/doc/ecsa10/guild_en.pdf>accessed 21.5.13.  See also her comment that ‘Poland and the 
UK have opted for a limited national effect of the charter and the Czech Republic has been 
permitted to joint them in this limitation’ 
1156 C. Raucea, ‘Fundamental Rights: The Missing Pieces of European Citizenship?’,  [2014] 14 
(10) German Law Journal 2021-2040 at 2026. 
1157 J.Dickson and P.Eleftheriadis, The Philosophical Foundations of the European Union, (OUP, 
2012) at 192. 
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of rights in the Charter regarding human dignity
1158
 and respect for private and 
family life
1159
 ‘give rise to deeply moral questions concerning the meaning and 
import of such things’.1160  On the other hand, the inclusion of such rights in this 
particular Charter is unique in that the Charter has been created at a supranational 
rather than an international or national level and depends on a supranational court, 
the CJEU, rather than international (which have less impact on national legal 
systems) or national courts for its interpretation but will have effect at a national 
level as well as a supranational level.
1161
 
The Charter itself consists of seven chapters,
1162
 each chapter containing a set of 
rights that EU citizens are entitled to.  In respect of the scope of the rights in the 
Charter, this is much wider than the rights contained in the European Convention 
on Human Rights.  These rights, Guild explains, come from two sources: 
‘first rights, which already existed in EU law, such as for citizens of the 
Union and the right of free movement (Article 45); secondly, the European 
Convention on Human Rights (and its protocols). Here the Charter 
specifically states that in so far as it contains rights that correspond to 
those in the ECHR, the meaning and scope of the Charter rights shall be 
the same as those of the ECHR rights’.1163  
As this means that there will be two concurrent systems of protection for 
fundamental rights in Europe Guild points out that on account of the  inclusion of 
an Article 52(3) that, ‘this provision expressly does not prevent Union law 
providing more extensive protection.  So, for example, this means, for instance, 
that the ambit of Article of the Charter, the right to respect for private and family 
life must extend at least as far as the European Court of Human Rights judgement 
                                                             
1158 Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C 303/1 and reissued with the 
Lisbon Treaty, [2010] OJ C83/2. 
1159 Ibid at Article 33. 
1160 J.Dickson and P.Eleftheriadis, The Philosophical Foundations of the European Union, (OUP, 
2012) at 192. 
1161 See E.Guild, ‘The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon, fundamental rights and EU 
Citizenship’, Global Jean Monnet /EC Association world conference 25-26 May 2010 
<http://ec.europa.eu/education/jean-monnet/doc/ecsa10/guild_en.pdf>accessed 21.5.13. at 6-7 and 
also for a discussion of how ‘what the Charter reveals in the wider picture of the transformation 
that is the EU is a desegregation of the elements of the Weberian state.  Instead people are entitled 
to rights that emanate from multiple sources and which are enforced through a variety of 
mechanisms, now most importantly for this discussion, the charter of Fundamental Rights.’ 
1162 The chapters are (i) dignity, (ii) Freedoms, (iii) Equality, (iv) solidarity, (v) Citizens Rights, 
(vi) Justice, (vii) General Provisions. 
1163 Guild Op.Cit. 
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in Gillan and Quintan v UK’.1164 As the European Court of Human Rights ruled in 
paragraph 61,  
 ‘As the Court has had previous occasion to remark, the concept of “private 
life” is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the 
physical and psychological integrity of a person. The notion of personal 
autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its 
guarantees. The Article also protects a right to identity and personal 
development, and the right to establish relationships with other human 
beings and the outside world. It may include activities of a professional or 
business nature. There is, therefore, a zone of interaction of a person with 
others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of 
“private life”. There are a number of elements relevant to a consideration 
of whether a person's private life is concerned in measures affected outside 
a person's home or private premises. In this connection, a person's 
reasonable expectations as to privacy may be a significant, though not 
necessarily conclusive, factor, where the applicant was subjected to a 
forced search of her bag by border guards, the Court held that “any search 
effected by the authorities on a person interferes with his or her private 
life”.’ 1165 
The broader Charter context could also have been taken into account in the cases 
considered earlier of Metock
1166
 and Akrich
1167
.  This would have affected the 
balance of reasoning in both those cases.  For in addition to considering the 
importance of ensuring national legislation was compatible with the objectives of 
the internal market there would also need to be a consideration of the minimum 
core of EU citizenship rights in relation to Article 8 of the Charter that are so 
sacrosanct that there is no need to consider whether a cross border element was 
present. 
Clearly such a Bill of Rights for European citizens is also going to provide fertile 
ground for judicial consideration of EU citizens rights in a wide variety of other 
                                                             
1164 Guild Op.Cit. at 4 citing Gillan and Quintan v UK no 4158/05 [2010] ECHR 28 (12 January 
2010) para 61. 
1165 The European Court of Human Rights in Gillan and Quintan v UK no 4158/05 [2010] ECHR 
28 (12 January 2010) para 61. 
1166 Case C-109/01, Akrich, [2003] ECR I-9607. 
1167 Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock & Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform (Metock & Others), 3 CKLR 39 (2008). 
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contexts
1168
  although to date there has been a rather limited use of the Charter by 
the CJEU
1169
 to justify its interpretation of the scope of the citizenship Treaty 
provisions.  This will be considered further in chapter 5 in the context of the 
CJEU and the determination of the residency rights of non-economically active 
citizens. 
Furthermore, in light of the impending accession of the EU to the ECHR, there is 
the possibility of overlap between them.  The possibility for interaction between 
the EU Charter and the ECHR and the use of the ECHR as a guide to the 
interpretation of the Charter is anticipated firstly in the inclusion of Article 6(1) 
which provides that the ‘rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be 
interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter 
governing its interpretation and application and with due regard to the 
Explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those 
provisions’.  Secondly, examination of the explanations that accompany the 
Charter reveal many references to ECHR standards when explaining the substance 
of the rights of the Charter and at the end of the Explanations, 12 provisions are 
listed as corresponding with the ECHR. On the other hand, demonstrating a 
respect for subsidiarity and the limits of the EU’s competence, there is a clear 
warning in Article 6(1) that ‘the provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any 
way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties’.  Such a clear 
warning has the potential to place limits on the extent to which the CJEU is able 
to expansively interpret the scope of EU citizenship and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights where the competence of the Union is restricted. 
Thus this section has explained how following the Treaty of Lisbon there have 
been various developments to not only enhance the symbolism of competence by 
linking it to the notion of justice and fundamental rights but also to make 
European citizenship more effective in practice. The next section turns to consider 
how despite the attempts by the CJEU to enhance citizenship rights to non-
economically active citizens, there has been a failure by the CJEU to undertake a 
                                                             
1168 See M.Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts’, (2008) 45 Common 
Market Law Review 617-703 at 664 for a general discussion of how the Charter might impact on 
the implementation of EU law and a discussion of how the CJEU might treat the Charter when 
interpreting EU law. 
1169 For further discussion see P.Craig, ‘The Charter, the CJEU and National Courts’, in 
D.Ashiagbor, N.Countouris and I.Lianos, (eds) The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 78. 
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subsidiarity review when determining the residency rights of EU citizens 
following the Treaty of Lisbon.   
 
4. The  failure of the CJEU to undertake  a subsidiarity review when 
determining the residency rights of EU citizens following the Treaty of 
Lisbon 
Perhaps the practically most far-reaching  move to enhance EU citizenship
1170
 has 
come from the CJEU post 2009 in considering non-economically active citizens 
and third country national family members in relation to residence rights. For, the 
CJEU, by adopting a dynamic and radical interpretation of the citizenship Treaty 
provisions,
1171
 it has shifted the emphasis of citizenship from a market focus 
involving a cross-border element towards a more rights based approach in three 
key cases with no attempt to identify the limits to competences through 
subsidiarity analysis.  This is of particular concern in cases where the CJEU has 
moved away from requiring a cross border element: Rottman,
 1172
 Zambrano
1173
 
and Dereci.
1174
 For in these cases the CJEU considered the fundamental status of 
citizens but without elaborating when are the substance of rights compromised 
such that it does not need to consider any cross-border element.   
Furthermore, despite these cases concerning shared policy areas, the CJEU failed 
to undertake any subsidiarity and proportionality review applied to competences.  
This is surprising as the shift in emphasis in the CJEU’s case law in conjunction 
with the Citizenship articles and the Charter of Fundamental Rights post the 
Treaty of Lisbon, while they may seem rhetorically attractive, however, have the 
potential to lead the CJEU into controversial territory with the Member States.  
This is particularly so in cases involving policy areas where the EU is on the edge 
of its competence and in light of the reaffirmation in the Treaty of Lisbon of 
                                                             
1170 See also the moves by the European Commission not only to raise awareness of citizenship 
rights but also proposing actions to improve the daily life of citizens, as most recently evidenced 
by the 2013 European Year of the Citizen initiatives  < http://europa.eu/citizens-2013/en 
>accessed 3.1.13. 
1171 See D.Kochenov, ‘EU citizenship: from an incipient form to an incipient substance? The 
discovery of the treaty text’, (2010) 37 (4) European Law Review 369. 
1172 Case C-135/08, [2010] ECR I-1449 Rottmann.   
1173 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office Nationale de L’emploi (ONEM) [CJEU, 08 
March 2011). 
1174 Case C-256/11, Dereci and others v Bundesministerium für Inneres, [2011] ECR I-0000. 
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subsidiarity and its inherent respect for localism especially when considering the 
residence rights of non-economically active EU citizens.   
It also raises two questions. Firstly how could the CJEU operationalise a 
subsidiarity and proportionality review applied to competences in this context.  
Secondly, with reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights whether it is 
possible to identify a minimum core of EU rights for all EU citizens that are so 
sacrosanct that they need to be preserved for EU migrant citizens too irrespective 
of the cross-border requirements and how this impacts upon the division of 
competence between the EU and the Member States.  Using the cases of Rottman,
 
1175
 Zambrano
1176
 and Dereci 
1177
 as case examples, the next chapter will consider 
these questions further and in particular how the CJEU could consider the limits 
of EU competences through subsidiarity analysis in this particular context. This 
would help to improve the quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently 
enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling.1178 
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has explained how, following the Treaty of Lisbon, the residence 
rights attaching to EU citizenship have been reaffirmed and strengthened.  
Secondly, how there have been some developments following the Treaty of 
Lisbon to not only enhance the symbolism of EU citizenship by linking to  justice 
and fundamental rights but also to make EU citizenship more effective in practice.  
Finally, there was a critical discussion of the post Treaty of Lisbon case law in 
relation to non-economically active citizens in relation to residence rights of 
citizens.  In particular, it was pointed out how the shift in emphasis in the CJEU’s 
case law in conjunction with the Citizenship articles and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights post the Treaty of Lisbon, while they may seem rhetorically 
attractive; however, have the potential to lead the CJEU into controversial 
territory with the Member States.  This is particularly so in cases involving policy 
                                                             
1175 Case C-135/08, [2010] ECR I-1449 Rottmann.   
1176 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office Nationale de L’emploi (ONEM) [CJEU, 08 
March 2011). 
1177 Case C-256/11, Dereci and others v Bundesministerium für Inneres, [2011] ECR I-0000. 
1178 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
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areas where the EU is acting in shared competence areas or on the edge of its 
competence and in light of the reaffirmation in the Treaty of Lisbon of 
subsidiarity and its inherent respect for localism. For examination of the case law 
on the CJEU on residency rights of EU citizenship in the next chapter will reveal 
how the CJEU’s incremental and piecemeal approach with no real reference to 
subsidiarity and a respect for localism has allowed the CJEU to extend EU 
competence in this context.  Furthermore, the CJEU has failed to identify a 
minimum core of EU rights for all EU citizens that are so sacrosanct that they 
need to be preserved for EU migrant citizens too irrespective of the cross-border 
requirements and how this impacts upon the division of competence between the 
EU and the Member States. 
With this in mind, the next chapter forms a case study which illustrates the 
theoretical framework in this thesis by proposing a normative argument of how a 
subsidiarity and proportionality review applied to competences could by anchored 
by the CJEU when determining the residency rights of EU citizens who are non-
economically active with particular reference to the cases of  Rottman,
 1179
 
Zambrano
1180
 and Dereci. 
1181
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1179 Case C-135/08, [2010] ECR I-1449 Rottmann.   
1180 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office Nationale de L’emploi (ONEM) [CJEU, 08 
March 2011). 
1181 Case C-256/11, Dereci and others v Bundesministerium für Inneres, [2011] ECR I-0000. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The anchoring of a subsidiarity and proportionality review by the CJEU 
when determining the residency rights of EU citizens following the Treaty of 
Lisbon 
 
1.Introduction 
2.The shift in the case law of the CJEU from discrimination to the 
fundamental status of Citizenship 
3.Could a subsidiarity and proportionality review be helpful here and, if so, 
what criteria should such a review involve?   
4.How should the CJEU more meaningfully engage with subsidiarity in its 
judicial reasoning  
5.Conclusion 
 
1.Introduction 
CJEU cases involving the rights of EU citizens who are economically inactive
1182
 
frequently involve sensitive immigration issues on the borderline of EU 
competences.
1183
  Such EU citizenship cases, such as the case of Zambrano
1184
 
considered in both chapter 4 and in section 2 of this chapter, can also have 
subsequent relevance for national cases involving immigration issues.
1185
  Despite 
this, the CJEU has paid little attention to subsidiarity and proportionality applied 
to the clear delineation of competences or to demonstrate much respect for local 
immigration laws in citizenship cases concerning the rights of EU citizens who 
are economically inactive.
1186
 It was therefore argued in the previous chapter that 
                                                             
1182 See for example Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern, [1998] ECR I-2691 
1183 See Chapter 4 and 5 for further discussion.   
1184 Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office Nationale de L’emploi, (ONEM) 8 March 
2011. 
1185 As evidenced recently in the UK in the case of Sanneh  & Ors v Secretary of State for Work 
and Pensions and Others, [2015] EWCA Civ 49. 
1186 See for example Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern, [1998] ECR I-2691 
280 
 
if the CJEU were to undertake a subsidiarity and proportionality review which 
involved a consideration of the limits and scope of EU competence in a particular 
shared competence area especially where sensitive immigration issues on the 
border line of EU competences are concerned, this would demonstrate its 
adherence to the rule of law,
1187
 the latter being enshrined in Article 2 TEU.
1188
  
Adhering to the rule of law is an important issue for the CJEU to demonstrate its 
respect for a core value commonly associated with democracy
1189
 and with the 
validity of law itself.
1190
  
A subsidiarity review undertaken by the CJEU involving the CJEU checking 
whether the Union has competence to act (conferral) and in cases concerning 
areas of shared competence would help to improve the quality of the reasoning of 
the CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling even 
where there is no change in case outcomes.
1191
 This is consistent with the EU’s 
overarching aim to have democratic, transparent and efficient institutions through 
the adherence to values commonly associated with democracy
1192
 and the problem 
of ultra vires EU action lacking legitimacy in the Member States eyes.
1193
 
On the other hand, it also was explained how there are also difficult questions as 
to the intensity of any proportionality review in EU migrant citizen residency 
cases where EU migrant citizens are unable to support themselves.
1194
 Such 
                                                             
1187 For further discussion see B.Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
1188 See also K.Lenaerts, ‘Upholding Union Values in Times of Societal change: the Role of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union’. 
<https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/deli/events/annual%20lecture%202014/Lenaerts_2014_Durham
.pdf >accessed 1.7.14. 
1189 For further discussion see B.Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
1190 See further L.Fuller, Inner Morality of Law, (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 
1964). 
1191 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
 
1192 Laeken Declaration <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-01-902_en.htm > accessed 
4.7.14.  
1193 Brunner v The European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57.  
1194 Relatedly it has also led to complaints of social tourism by the UK as evidenced in the 
Telegraph 7.10.13 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/10361971/Britain-
admits-it-has-no-figures-on-EU-welfare-tourist-numbers.html> accessed 14.2.15 as well as 
criticism by the EU of the UK for such views e.g. ‘Migration plan risks UK being seen as nasty 
country, The Guardian, 27 November 2013 <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2013/nov/27/migration-uk-nasty-country-eu-commissioner >accessed 14.2.15. On the other 
hand, for a factual analysis into the impact of EU economically inactive migrants on national 
welfare and healthcare budgets of the Member States by the European Commission see the 
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difficult questions involve not only the level of deference that the CJEU should 
articulate in its reasoning but also what role the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
should play in both contexts and the possible overlapping role of the ECHR 
especially as ‘any ECHR decisions will be binding on the Union as a matter of 
international law’.1195  Furthermore, as the EU can only have responsibility for its 
actions on the basis of a valid competence to carry them out, under the rules of 
attribution of responsibility in international law, which the European Court of 
Human Rights applies,
 1196
   there could be challenges to the Court’s autonomy to 
interpret EU law in that the ‘The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
might attribute responsibility to and apportion it between the EU and its Member 
States.’1197 This is particularly problematic here argues Eckes in light of ‘the 
complex and dynamic task division between the EU and its Member States 
[which] could lead the ECtHR to offer an interpretation of substantive EU law 
binding on the Court of Justice’.1198   The particular challenges she cites are firstly 
the unique way in which EU law is often implemented at a national level by the 
Member States with a degree of discretion as to the means of implementation of 
                                                                                                                                                                       
European Commission, A fact finding analysis on the impact on the Member States' social security 
systems of the entitlements of non-active intra-EU migrants to special non-contributory cash 
benefits and healthcare granted on the basis of residence, Final report submitted by ICF GHK in 
association with Milieu Ltd, Brussels, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 14 October 
2013 (revised on 16 December 2013) which concludes at ii that ‘Overall, it can be concluded that 
the share of non-active intra-EU migrants is very small, they account for a similarly limited share 
of SNCB recipients and the budgetary impact of such claims on national welfare budgets is very 
low. The same is true for costs associated with the take-up of healthcare by this group. 
Employment remains the key driver for intra-EU migration and activity rates among such migrants 
have indeed increased over the last 7 years’. 
1195 C. Eckes, ‘One Step Closer: EU Accession to the ECHR ‘ Const. L. Blog (2nd May 2013) 
(available at <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org> last accessed 14.2.15). 
1196 International Law Commission, Draft articles on the law of Treaties between States and 
International Organsiations or between international organisations with commentaries, (1982).  
For<http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_2_1982.pdf> last accessed 
29.1.14.  See also the case of Loizidou v Turkey, (1995) ECHR 10.  See also most recently the 
CJEU’s opinion 2/13 Opinion 1/13 8.12.14 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=160882&pageIndex=0&doclan
g=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=40247> accessed 8.1.15 regarding the EU’s 
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights where the CJEU has emphasised the need 
to preserve the autonomy of EU law when considering human rights protection. 
1197 C. Eckes, ‘One Step Closer: EU Accession to the ECHR ‘ Const. L. Blog (2nd May 2013) 
(available at <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org> last accessed 14.2.15). 
1198 Ibid. 
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Directives in order to be directly effective.
1199
  Secondly, the relationship that 
exists between the courts of the Member States and the CJEU through the 
preliminary reference system whereby the CJEU depends not only on the national 
courts to refer questions to it but also upon the national court to give effect to the 
CJEU’s preliminary ruling when ultimately deciding a particular case.1200  This 
she concludes ‘boils down to the question of how integrated and irreversibly 
interlocked the EU and national legal orders and judicial systems really are in the 
face of an external challenge, such as confirmation by a well-respected external 
judicial authority that the EU breaches human rights. Will such a finding of the 
ECtHR flare up resistance towards EU law by national courts or public 
opinion?’1201 Such tensions have a particular resonance when one considers the 
determination of the residency rights of EU migrant citizens and especially in 
relation to the intensity of any proportionality review in EU residency cases where 
EU migrant citizens are unable to support themselves. These are very politically 
charged questions as evidenced recently following the accession of new Member 
States of Bulgaria and Romania where transitional arrangements, laid down in the 
Accession Treaties of those new Member States,
1202
 permitted Member States to 
restrict the free movement of persons from those acceding countries for a 
specified period, came to an end.
1203
  Such difficult questions also involve not 
only the level of deference that the CJEU should articulate in its reasoning but 
also what role the Charter of Fundamental Rights should play in both contexts and 
the possible overlapping role of the ECHR especially a  s ‘any ECHR decisions 
will be binding on the Union as a matter of international law’.1204   
                                                             
1199 Ibid. 
1200 Ibid. 
1201 Ibid. 
1202 Annexes VI and VII to the Accession Treaty, between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, 
the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, 
the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 
the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of 
Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland (Member States of the European Union) and the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania 
concerning the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union, Official 
Journal of the European Union, vol 48, 21 June 2005. 
1203 A.Travis and S.Malik, ‘European watchdog accuses Britain of shameful rhetoric on migrants’, 
29 March 2013 the Guardian at http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/mar/29/eu-watchdog-britain-
shameful-rhetoric-migrants> accessed 23.9.14. 
1204 C. Eckes, ‘One Step Closer: EU Accession to the ECHR ‘ Const. L. Blog (2nd May 2013) 
(available at <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org> last accessed 14.2.15). See also the recent CJEU’s 
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The purpose of this chapter is to consider how a subsidiarity and proportionality 
review applied to competences, and the criteria that the CJEU should take into 
account when balancing competing interests, would enable the CJEU to anchor 
subsidiarity when determining the residency rights of non-economically active EU 
citizens.  Such discussion has particular reference to the case of Zambrano
1205
 
where the CJEU dispensed with the need for a cross border element and ruled 
that, ‘Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of 
depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the 
rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union.’ 1206 
Furthermore, the CJEU in this case failed to explain why EU citizenship should be 
allowed to take priority over national citizenship or to flesh out what the 
substance of those rights should be.  On the other hand, more recent case law, the 
CJEU has adopted a stricter approach.  For example, when considering whether 
there has been a cross border element in the case of Dereci the CJEU focused 
more heavily on the cross border element requirement when it ruled in para 54 
that ‘a Union citizen who has never exercised his right of freedom of movement 
and has always resided in a Member State of all which he is a national is not 
covered by the concept of beneficiary for the purposes of that provision without 
elaborating the meaning of what constitutes ‘the genuine enjoyment of the rights 
conferred by virtue of his status as a Union citizen’.1207 This case will be 
considered further in section 2.
1208
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
opinion 2/13 Opinion 1/13 8.12.14 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=160882&pageIndex=0&doclan
g=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=40247> accessed 8.1.15 regarding the EU’s 
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights where the CJEU has emphasised the need 
to preserve the autonomy of EU law when considering human rights protection. 
1205 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office Nationale de L’emploi (ONEM) [CJEU, 08 
March 2011). 
1206 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office Nationale de L’emploi (ONEM) [CJEU, 08 
March 2011) para 42.  Subsequent cases of Case C-434/09 McCarthy v Home Secretary [2011] 
ECR I-0000 Case C-434/09 McCarthy v Home Secretary [2011] ECR I-0000 and Case C-256/11, 
Dereci and others v Bundesministerium fur Inneres, discussed further in section 2 of this chapter, 
have resurrected the cross border rule through adopting a more restrictive approach to the 
interpretation of the invocation of the citizenship provisions in purely internal situations. 
1207 For the most recent examples of the CJEU adopting a stricter approach towards EU migrant 
citizens who are economically inactive in cases in relation to the interpretation of Directive 
2004/38 in particular see Case C-87/12, Kreshnik Ymeraga and Others v Ministre du Travail, 
de ;Emploi et de l’Immigration para 33 where the CJEU ruled that ‘It follows that Directives 
2003/86 and 2004/38 are not applicable to third-country nationals who apply for the right of 
residence in order to join a family member who is a Union citizen and has never exercised his right 
of freedom of movement as a Union citizen, always having resided as such in the Member State of 
which he holds the nationality’; Case C-333/13, Elisabeta Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, where the 
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The adoption of a subsidiarity and proportionality review applied to competences 
would, however, enable the CJEU to flesh out what are sacrosanct rights for EU 
citizens that should be respected and protected in light of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. For, on the one hand, the question of residence rights for 
non-economically active EU citizens raises difficult and topical issues relating to 
the cost of a Member State supporting EU migrants who have no means of 
support and who are a burden on the Member States welfare system. 
1209
 
However, on the other hand, in cases involving the determination of EU citizens’ 
residency rights and the distinction drawn between economically active and non-
economically active EU citizens this has led to what O’Brien has termed ‘a 
perforated personhood patchwork’1210 where ‘gaps in this patchwork can tip non-
nationals into destitution, suggesting a fairly loose commitment to social 
protection and social justice for non-nationals’.1211  There are also wide 
differences in approaches to a safety net of social protection
1212
 and difficult 
questions as to who should bear the cost of social protection and social welfare 
                                                                                                                                                                       
CJEU held in para 76 that ‘Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38 seeks to prevent economically 
inactive Union citizens from using the host Member State’s welfare system to fund their means of 
subsistence’. 
1208 Case C-256/11 Dereci and others v Bundesministerium fur Inneres, [2011] ECR I-0000. 
1209 See for example The Guardian, 29.7.14 outlining a proposal that EU migrants to Britain will 
only be able to claim welfare for three months under plans designed to head off criticism of 
immigration failures.  See also the CJEU case of C-333/13 Elisabeta Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig 
where the CJEU ruled that economically inactive EU citizens who go to another Member State 
solely to obtain social assistance may be excluded from certain social benefits. 
1210 C. O’Brien, ‘I Trade, therefore I am: Legal Personhood in the European Union’, (2013) 50 
Common Market Law Review 1643-1684 at 1649.   
1211 Ibid at 1660. 
1212 See The Telegraph, Benefits in Europe: country by country which details the benefits a 30-
year-old EU migrant could access in each member state 
< http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/10391238/Benefits-in-Europe-country-by-
country.html >accessed 21.9.14.  See also  Council of the EU, Social Dimension of the EU –
Adequate protection for long-term care needs in an aging society report (Brussels, 2014) and who 
highlight how differences between Member States in respect of long term care for the elderly is 
especially pronounced <http://ec.europa.eu/health/ageing/docs/ev_20140618_co04_en.pdf 
>accessed 21.9.14 and the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, Socially 
responsible restructuring: effective strategies for supporting redundant workers, (Luxembourg, 
2010) <http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/EN/Files/6107_en.pdf >accessed 21.9.14 and who point out 
how ‘across the oldest Member States (EU-15) there seems to be a common recognition that 
socially responsible practice requires some ‘safety net’ of support for employees to be made 
redundant or who are at risk of redundancy. However, there are considerable contrasts in what the 
expectations and provisions are for safety nets even where, for example, employment protection or 
stability legislation exist. While this may include codified periods of redundancy notification, a 
defined statutory entitlement to retraining, referral guarantees (to labour employment offices, for 
example), or legislative entitlement to ‘buffer’ periods for work adjustment and job search, the 
scope and content of these varies, often greatly, between countries. However, there is also no 
common view across Member States of what role career guidance should play within safety nets’. 
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tourism.  However, such an approach by the CJEU O’Brien further argues risks 
accusations that it genders economic mobility in that non-economically active EU 
citizens who are carers for children, the elderly or disabled are unable to claim the 
same rights as economically active EU citizens.
1213
  In addition, following the 
case of Zambrano in particular, the CJEU has also drawn a distinction between 
economically inactive EU citizens who are adults and an economically inactive 
EU citizen who is a child of a third country national.  It has also enabled a third 
country national family member of an EU citizen to rely on EU law where there 
was no cross-border element.
1214
 
With this latter case in mind and in order to contextualise this discussion, the 
chapter commences with how the CJEU when considering travel and residence 
rights of citizens in Zambrano as well as other various key cases have moved 
away from a focus on eliminating discrimination and requiring a cross-border 
element to an emphasis on the fundamental status of citizenship (Zambrano
1215
).  
This will also highlight firstly in Zambrano how despite the emphasis on the 
fundamental status of EU citizenship and the existence of the Charter, which is 
extolled as a holy grail of EU citizens rights,
1216
  there was no reference by the 
CJEU to the Article 33 right to reconciliation of work and family life in the 
Charter or Article 7 and the right to respect for private and family life or, where 
EU citizens are children, was there any discussion of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.
 1217
   The normative weight of these different and potentially 
competing considerations is not made clear. Secondly, despite the obvious conflict 
between the fundamental status of EU citizenship and the difficulties for the 
CJEU of straying into the realms of the Member States’ legal and policy decision 
                                                             
1213 C. O’Brien, ‘I Trade, therefore I am: Legal Personhood in the European Union’, (2013) 50 
Common Market Law Review 1643-1684.  See also her discussion at 1665 that ‘pregnancy and 
maternity do not feature in Article 7(3) of Directive 2004/38 as a permitted temporary break 
during which worker status may be retained.’ 
1214 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office Nationale de L’emploi (ONEM) [CJEU, 08 
March 2011). 
1215 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office Nationale de L’emploi (ONEM) [CJEU, 08 
March 2011). 
1216 See for example Vice-President Viviane Reding, the EU’s Commissioner for Justice, 
Fundamental Rights and Citizenship and who writes, ‘I am glad to see the Charter is now fully 
alive serving as a real safety net for our citizens and as a compass for EU institutions, Member 
States and courts alike. I could imagine that one day citizens in the Member States will be able to 
rely directly on the Charter – without the need for a clear link to EU law. The Charter should be 
Europe's very own Bill of Rights.’ <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-422_en.htm 
>accessed 31.7.14. 
1217 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3,   <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html 
>accessed 15 July 
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making particularly where there is no cross border element, there was little debate 
by the CJEU in the cases selected as to when are the substance of rights 
compromised such that it does not need to consider any actual cross-border 
element.  The CJEU, demonstrating a pro-union interpretative tendency, 
introduced the shift without explicitly justifying an extension of EU competence. 
Nor was there any discussion of the minimum core of rights that needs to be 
preserved irrespective of the linking factors. Thirdly, following on from the 
normative considerations in chapter 4 and in particular where it was pointed out 
how despite the reaffirmation of subsidiarity following the Treaty of Lisbon how 
the CJEU has failed to undertake any subsidiarity review in shared policy cases 
concerning the determination of residency rights of EU citizens, this chapter 
adopts a normative approach and includes a discussion of how the CJEU could 
apply a subsidiarity and proportionality review in this context with particular 
reference to three particular cases: Zambrano
1218
, Dereci
1219
 and MacCarthy
1220
. 
The reason for the choice of such cases is that they involve contentious issues for 
the CJEU when performing judicial review.  Firstly, as EU law in this context is 
an area of shared competence between the EU and the Member States this leads to 
difficult questions for the CJEU as to where the balance is to be drawn in cases 
concerning EU citizens’ residency rights where those EU citizens are 
economically inactive in light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This 
inevitably requires the CJEU strike a balance between competing political and 
economic interests and which can be especially difficult when the CJEU is 
required to consider the residency rights of EU citizens who are economically 
inactive where they are, for example, children in light of Article 24 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights
1221
 and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
1222
 
                                                             
1218 C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de L’Emploi (ONEM), [2011] ECR I-
1177. 
1219 Case C-256/11 Dereci and others v Bundesministerium fur Inneres, [2011] ECR I-0000 
1220 Case C-434/09 McCarthy v Home Secretary [2011] ECR I-0000. 
1221
 This provides that ‘1. Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary 
for their well-being. They may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into 
consideration on matters which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity. 2. In all 
actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child’s 
best interests must be a primary consideration’.   
3. Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct 
contact with both his and her parents, unless that is contrary to his or her interests. 
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Here there is a spill over with areas of national competence where the EU has only 
a complementary role such as social protection of children. 
However,  the aim of Article 24 has been proclaimed ‘to protect children’s’ core 
interests - specifically their right to care and protection, their right to express their 
views freely, and to maintain a regular relationship with both their parents. 
Recognition of children’s rights at the EU level follows the recognition given at 
the international level by the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’.
1223
 
The latter Convention has not been ratified by the EU although most member 
States have. Consequently although it is not legally binding on the EU ‘the CJEU 
enjoys a strong normative influence on its 47 States, given that the Court’s 
judgements are legally binding in these states’.
1224
 
Secondly, drawing upon an argument by Craig that ‘proportionality should be 
used as a general principle of judicial review that can be used both in cases 
concerned with rights and in non-rights based cases, albeit with varying intensity 
of review’,1225 there are also difficult questions as to the intensity of any 
proportionality review in this context.  For example, should the CJEU articulate in 
its reasoning when undertaking a subsidiarity and proportionality review a higher 
level of deference to the national judgements in cases involving EU migrant 
citizens who are economically inactive?  Furthermore, what role should the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights play when determining the ‘sacrosanct’ or a non-
derogable core of rights 
1226
 of EU citizens in situations that fall within EU law 
                                                                                                                                                                       
1222 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3,   <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html 
>accessed 15 July.  2014.  See also H.Morgan and H.Stalford, ‘Disabled people and the EU: equal 
citizens?’, chapter 7 adapted from C.Barnes and G.Mercer (eds.,) The Social Model of Disability 
and Europe and the Majority world (Leeds Disability Press, 2005) for a discussion of the 
difficulties facing other EU citizens when they are economically inactive and disabled and Article 
26 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights which provides that ‘The Union recognises and respects 
the right of persons with disabilities to benefit from measures designed to ensure their 
independence, social and occupational integration and participation in the life of the community’. 
1223 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3,   <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html 
>accessed 15 July 
1224 T.Koivurova in ‘Jurisdiction of the ECHR regarding Indiginous peoples: Retrospects and 
Prospects’ in M.Fitzmarice and P.Merkouris, (eds), The Interpretation and Application of the 
ECHR, Legal and Practial Implications, (Martinus Nyhoff Publishers, 2013). 
1225 P.Craig, ‘'Proportionality, Rationality and Review', (2011) Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 5/2011. 
1226 See further The European Commission for Democracy Through law, Report ‘Are there 
differentiations Among Human Rights: Jus Cogens, Core Human Rights, Obligations Erga Omnes 
and Non-Derogability?’, 
<http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-UD(2005)020rep-e  
>accessed 21.9.14 at 14 -15 which looks to  the core human rights texts, the United Nations 
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when undertaking a subsidiarity and proportionality review and what are the 
specific criteria that it should take into account when striking the balance in such 
cases? 
Thirdly, there are questions as to how to achieve a structured approach to a 
proportionality review here.  There has already been some debate concerning 
proportionality or rationality as the preferred test for judicial review.
1227
  In 
respect of the latter, at national level, Elliott has argued that to achieve a 
structured approach when reviewing the exercise of governmental authority the 
court should focus on two distinct questions.  Firstly, 
‘to determine what should constitute the operative standard of justification 
in the particular circumstances of the case.  What, in other words, should 
be the justificatory burden under which the decision-maker is placed, and 
which will have to be discharged if the decision is to be found by the 
reviewing court to be lawful?’1228  
However, as was highlighted in chapter 2, examination of a selection of well 
documented CJEU case law on proportionality reveals that there is a considerable 
variety in the degree of intensity and application by the CJEU of proportionality 
tests as well as differences in the amount of guidance it gives to the Member 
States in this context without the CJEU developing any systematic approach. Thus 
the use of proportionality also needs to be accompanied by a clear, consistent and 
principled approach to its content and structure in order to provide a clear 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Charter, The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) and Geneva Conventions, for guidance on what constitutes core human rights.  In 
particular, the Preamble to the United Nations Charter 
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml > accessed 21.9.14 states that ‘save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold 
sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to 
establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and 
other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better 
standards of life in larger freedom, and for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in 
peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international 
peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, 
that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international 
machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples’.  See also 
ibid at 15 the rights and obligations for contracting parties specified in the area of economic, social 
and cultural rights in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/cescr.aspx >accessed 21.9.14.   
1227 P.Craig, ‘'Proportionality, Rationality and Review', (2011) Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 5/2011. 
1228 Ibid., at 1. 
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doctrinal test that the CJEU can utilise in its case law.  This relates to the rule of 
law principles of certainty and predictability.
1229
   
Secondly, Elliott explains how the court needs to consider the rationality of the 
decision with reference to whether a fair balance has been struck between 
conflicting interests.  This question he accepts ‘reduces, at least to some extent, to 
a value judgement, the acceptability of the balance struck between two 
incommensurable variables being impossible to determine unless those variables 
are first invested with values that are inherently contestable’. 1230  Thus Elliott 
here is highlighting a key issue here that of the problem of weighing importance 
and identifying the weighing process. 
On the other hand, Craig argues that ‘proportionality should be used as a general 
principle of judicial review that can be used both in cases concerned with rights 
and in non-rights based cases, albeit with varying intensity of review’.1231 The 
present author agrees with the latter approach and further argues firstly that in 
order to illustrate how a subsidiarity and proportionality review could be anchored 
by the CJEU in this context, there is also a compelling case for determining what 
specific criteria can be identified by the CJEU in its reasoning in order to anchor a 
subsidiarity review. This is necessary in order to address the incommensurability 
problem, which is another way of stating the problem of objectivity/subjectivity. 
Secondly, that each shared policy area requires different criteria to be taken into 
account by the CJEU when undertaking any review in order to take account of the 
different shared policy contexts and to acknowledge the competing interests 
relevant to a particular policy sector that require balancing.  Engaging more 
meaningfully with subsidiarity will not necessarily prevent the CJEU from 
continuing to display a pro-union tendency,
1232
 especially as subsidiarity is itself a 
contested concept and is characterised by a degree of vagueness.
1233
  However, by 
adopting such an approach, it is submitted that this would help improve the 
quality of the CJEU’s reasoning in the context thus enhancing the legitimacy of 
                                                             
1229 For further discussion see B. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
1230 Ibid.  See also M. Elliott, ‘Justification, Calibration and Substantive Judicial Review: Putting 
Doctrine in its Place’, UK Const. L. Blog (17th September 2013) 
< http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/tag/basis-of-judicial-review/ > accessed 20.6.14. 
1231 Ibid. 
1232 This was argued in section 5 of chapter 2. 
1233 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
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the CJEU in a key symbolic area of its relationship with national law. 
1234
  The EU 
can only have responsibility for its actions on the basis of a valid competence to 
carry them out, under the rules of attribution of responsibility in international law, 
which the European Court of Human Rights applies.
 1235
  In order to introduce this 
discussion, the next section considers how the CJEU when considering travel and 
residence rights of citizens in various key cases has moved away from a focus on 
eliminating discrimination and requiring a cross-border element to an emphasis on 
the fundamental status of citizenship.
1236
  Secondly, some recent cases are 
examined where the CJEU has tended to reassert the importance of having a cross 
border element when considering the residency rights of EU citizens.
1237
 
 
2. The shift in the case law of the CJEU from discrimination to the 
fundamental status of Citizenship 
The first case where the CJEU, displaying a pro-union interpretative tendency, 
relaxed its approach towards the requirement that a cross-border element must be 
satisfied in order for EU law to be operative was the case of Rottmann.
1238
  Dr 
Rottmann, an Austrian national who was to be prosecuted by the Austrian 
authorities, moved to Germany as an EU citizen and was granted German 
naturalization. Subsequently, Germany withdrew his German naturalization which 
in conjunction with a loss of Austrian citizenship on the grounds he was unable to 
recover his Austrian citizenship  meant that he had no national citizenship status 
that his EU citizenship could be attached to. As the CJEU ruled,  
‘It is clear that the situation of a citizen of the Union who…is faced with 
a decision withdrawing his naturalization.. placing him…in a position 
capable of causing him to lose that status conferred by Article 17 EC 
                                                             
1234 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
 
1235 International Law Commission, Draft articles on the law of Treaties between States and 
International Organsiations or between international organisations with commentaries, (1982).  
For<http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_2_1982.pdf> last accessed 
29.1.14. 
1236 See for example Case C-135/08, [2010] ECR I-1449 Rottmann. 
1237 See for example Case C-256/11 Dereci and others v Bundesministerium fur Inneres, [2011] 
ECR I-0000. 
1238 Case C-135/08, [2010] ECR I-1449 Rottmann   
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[now 9 TEU] and the rights attaching thereto falls, by reason of its nature 
and its consequences, within the ambit of EU law’.1239  
There was no specific mention of the requirement of a cross-border element for 
EU law to become operative, the latter being a key and well-established 
requirement of EU free movement law.  However, and as Kochenov points out, 
‘To decide the case on the basis of cross-border logic would essentially have 
created two different statuses of EU citizenship’.1240 This would be problematic 
for example on the grounds inconsistency of treatment between EU citizens, 
although it would only do so in the sense that free movement would have to be 
exercised first, which would apply to anyone who as an EU citizen. However, 
Kochenov has argued that such differing and inconsistent treatment of EU citizens 
would also devalue the symbolic status of EU citizenship
1241
 in that it would be 
contrary to the close tie that citizenship has with that of equality.  As Lehring in 
his essay writes, ‘citizenship focuses on equality’ and is concerned with 
‘expanding and enriching the notion of equality by extending its scope through 
civil, political and social rights’.1242 The problem with over extending equality 
though is that conceptually this could lead to the complete harmonisation of all of 
the rights of citizens.  If the only connecting basis with EU competence is the 
principle of equality, there are no limits to the EU’s competence when it comes to 
citizenship.  Shared competence should remain with the Member State only so 
long as the EU does not exercise it.  It is hard to see the limits of shared 
competence if equality is the underpinning conceptual basis, equality itself 
already having been subject to much debate in academic literature regarding the 
differing contested conceptions of equality
1243
 that there are and by Western that 
                                                             
1239 Case C-135/08, [2010] ECR I-1449 Rottmann  para 42.  See also M.Gower, See also 
M.Gower, ‘Deprivation of British citizenship and withdrawal of passport facilities – Commons 
Library Standard Note’, <http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-
papers/SN06820/deprivation-of-british-citizenship-and-withdrawal-of-passport-facilities> 
accessed 23.10.14 regarding UK legislation section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981 (as 
amended), and  section 66 of the Immigration Act 2014, which came into effect on 28 July 2014 
and who writes ‘In recent years there has been an increasing use of powers to deprive people of 
their British citizenship and withdraw British passport facilities, particularly in respect of those 
who may be involved in fighting, extremist activity or terrorist training overseas’. 
1240 See D.Kochenov, ‘A Real European Citizenship: A New Jurisdiction Test: A Novel Chapter in 
the Development of the Union in Europe’, (2011) 18 Columbia Journal of European Law 79.  
1241 Ibid at 393 for a discussion of the problems associated with the CJEU’s rulings in this case. 
1242 P.B. Lehning, ‘European Citizenship: Towards a European Identity?,    (2001), 29 Law and 
Philosophy 239-282. 
1243
 S.Fredman, Women and the Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) at 2 for an outline of the 
different conceptions of equality. 
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equality is just ‘an empty concept’. 1244   Is the status of being an EU citizen itself 
a complementary competence of the EU? If EU citizenship is applied on the basis 
of equality to shared competence, effectively all EU competences could become 
shared, giving the EU the capacity to pre-empt national competence. 
An outright rejection of a cross border element was also made by the CJEU in the 
Zambrano
1245
 case. In this latter case, where the CJEU was called upon to 
consider whether EU citizenship of two children enabled parents to have a right to 
reside and work within Belgium, there was no cross-border element present as the 
two EU citizens here had not moved.  Therefore there was no cross-border 
element.  However, despite this, the CJEU held that EU citizenship is not wholly 
bound up with movement between the Member States.  The CJEU then went on to 
rule that the refusal was an obstacle to the enjoyment of an EU citizens rights and 
that ‘Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of 
depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the 
rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union’. 1246 Thus the 
third country nationals had the right to stay where they are the parents of Union 
citizens who are minors. 
As Craig and de Búrca  point out, 
‘certain factual situations which might otherwise have been considered as 
purely internal situations, are now considered to have a sufficient 
connection with EU law due to the impact on certain rights enjoyed by 
virtue of the status of EU citizenship even in circumstances involving a 
member state national who has never exercised rights of movement outside 
that member State, that situation will no longer be characterised as a wholly 
internal situation’.1247  
                                                             
1244 P.Westen, in ‘The empty idea of equality’, (1992) 95 (3) Harvard Law Review. 
1245 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office Nationale de L’emploi (ONEM) [CJEU, 08 
March 2011). 
1246 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office Nationale de L’emploi (ONEM) [CJEU, 08 
March 2011) para 42. 
1247
 P.Craig,  and  G.de Búrca,  EU Law: Test, Cases and Materials. (5th ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 833. 
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Furthermore, and as Wiesbrock points out, such a judgement is ‘sure to trigger 
lively discussions about…the demarcation of competences between the Union and 
the Member States’.1248 
On the other hand, Arcarazo and Murphy try to justify the CJEU’s ruling in this  
case by arguing that, 
‘The crisis in, and incoherence of, EU citizenship law is a direct result of 
the Court’s efforts to do justice in the face of an EU law that creates 
injustice (the purely internal situation rule).  Therefore the judgement in 
Ruiz Zambrano, which may appeal more to the heart than to the head, 
stretches to the limits our existing understanding of what it means to be a 
European citizen’.1249 
Interestingly, however, despite the move away from requiring a cross border 
element and the language used regarding the substance of rights of EU citizens, 
which some commentators have argued signalled ‘a fundamental change in the 
logic used by the Court’,1250 there was no mention of human rights/Charter and 
right to family life or consideration of the symbolic status of EU citizenship
1251
 or 
the importance of enriching the notion of equality by extending its scope through 
civil, political and social rights.’1252 Furthermore, not only was there no 
subsidiarity and proportionality review applied to competences undertaken to 
justify the CJEU reasoning in this case to justify its straying into the realms of the 
Member States’ legal and policy decision making particularly where there is no 
cross border element, the CJEU also failed to consider any ‘evidence to support its 
factual assumptions’.1253  This is a significant omission.  For as Hailbronner and 
Thymm point out, ‘the Court should give reasons for major innovations of its 
dynamic jurisprudence if it wants to be taken seriously as a legal actor’.1254 
                                                             
1248 A.Wiesbrook, ‘Union Citizenship and the Redefinition of the internal Situations rule: the 
Implications of Zambrano’,  [2011] 12(11) German law Journal  2094  
1249 D.Arcarazo and C.Murphy, EU Security and Justice Law after Lisbon and Stockholm, (Hart 
Publishing, 2014) 13. 
1250 D.Kochenov, ‘A Real European Citizenship: A New Jurisdiction Test: A Novel Chapter in the 
Development of the Union in Europe’, (2011) 18 Columbia Journal of European Law 55 at 68. 
1251 Ibid., at 393 for a discussion of the problems associated with the CJEU’s rulings in this case. 
1252 Ibid. 
1253 N.Shuibhne, ‘Some of the Kids are All Right’, (2012) Common Market Law Review 249-380 
at 349. 
1254 K.Hailbronner and D.Thym, ‘Case note Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office Nationale de 
L’emploi (ONEm)’, (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1253-1270 at 1259. 
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The current author proposes that when the CJEU undertakes a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review that there is a need for the CJEU to act as an arbiter in this 
context and to include in its reasoning firstly how it has addressed competence 
issues in its reasoning in every case concerning an area of shared competence.  
For this could help to counter claims that the CJEU displays an unjustified 
emphasis in its case law on the need to pursue an ‘ever closer Union’ which 
deprives Member States of their competencies and is at the expense of the legal 
systems of the Member States.
1255
  It would also be consistent with subsidiarity 
and its inherent respect for localism in conjunction with the national identity 
clause in Article 4 (2) TEFU
1256
 By eroding national competence, the CJEU is 
open to being accused of undermining the rights inherent in the democratic 
process at national level. Even though engaging more meaningfully with 
subsidiarity will not necessarily prevent the CJEU from displaying a pro-Union 
interpretative tendency
1257
 an explicit explanation of how the CJEU had 
considered subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning would help to improve the 
quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy of 
the CJEU’s ruling.1258 So the first step is making all these considerations much 
more explicit. 
Secondly, the CJEU needs to identify what rights of EU citizens are sacrosanct in 
light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights when dealing with cases involving the 
residency rights of EU citizens. This is an important question in light of the 
impending accession of the EU to the ECHR and also feeds into wider discussions 
about the judicial approach to fundamental rights post Lisbon
1259
 and the 
difficulties of balancing subsidiarity applied to competences and a respect for 
localism with other conflicting principles of EU law.  As Konstadinides and 
O’Meara point out, 
                                                             
1255 Ibid. 
1256 For further discussion of the identity clause see D.Leczykiewicz, ‘The national identity clause 
in the EU Treaty: a blow to supremacy of Union law?’, 
http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/06/21/dorota-leczykiewicz-the-national-identity-clause-in-the-
eu-treaty-a-blow-to-supremacy-of-union-law/> accessed 10.5.13  
1257 This will be considered further in section 2.2 of chapter 3. 
1258 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
 
1259 See S. Morano-Foadi and S.Andreadakis, ‘Reflections on the Architecture of the EU after the 
Treaty of Lisbon: The European Judicial Approach to Fundamental Rights’, (2011) pp 595-610 at 
595 and who argues that the post-Lisbon era is characterized by firstly the impact of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights following Article 6(1) of the TEU and secondly the future accession to the 
ECHR of the EU pursuant to Article 6(2) TEU. 
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‘The value of accession in reinforcing the centrality of fundamental rights 
protection in the EU legal order, and on a practical level, subjecting the EU 
to external scrutiny should not be underestimated.  The relationships 
between the European Court of Human Rights and the CJEU may be tested, 
and emerging case law closely scrutinised in cases involving overlap 
between core Charter and Convention rights, with draft legislation coming 
under renewed scrutiny for compatibility with the Charter and the ECHR.  
Commissioner Reding’s statement that EU accession will increase the 
perception of the European Court of Human Rights as the European capital 
of fundamental rights protection does not diminish the duties of all courts to 
robustly adjudicate in defence of fundamental rights protection.’1260  
However, the identification of what rights of EU citizens are sacrosanct in this 
context is difficult question for the CJEU.  For as Schibhne explains when 
considering cases involving fundamental rights what this  
‘reflect[s] more broadly is a sense that when questions about the protection 
of fundamental rights emerge, there should be a ‘line’ somewhere between 
the reach of Community law and the internal values and priorities of the 
States. The most basic expression of this line occurs within the purely 
internal situation, where no link to Community law at all exists. There, a 
State’s behaviour in the field of fundamental rights may engage the 
jurisdiction of the ECtHR, but it should be outwith the competence of 
Luxembourg. The more typical yet often indistinct line exists when 
Member States take/are given some internal space within which their own 
expressions of fundamental rights protection trump/are allowed to trump 
the requirements of Community free movement law’1261. 
Finally, as in the present author’s view that each shared policy area requires 
different criteria to be taken into account by the CJEU when undertaking any 
review in order to take account of the different policy contexts, that specific 
criteria should be identified by the CJEU when considering the right of residence 
cases for non-economically active citizens where there is no cross border element. 
                                                             
1260 T.Konstadinides and N.O’Meara, ‘Fundamental Rights and Judicial Protection’ in D.Arcarazo 
and C.Murphy, EU Security and Justice Law after Lisbon and Stockholm, (Hart Publishing, 2014) 
83. 
1261 Nic Shuibhne, N 2009, 'Margins of Appreciation: National Values, Fundamental Rights and 
EC Free Movement Law’, 32(2) European Law Review, 230-56 at 241.   
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Even if the CJEU in the past has approached interpretation from a certain pro-
union perspective, if the CJEU adopted the above approach, this will enable the 
CJEU to anchor subsidiarity and proportionality and help ensure the proper 
respect for the division of power between the EU and the Member States.  
 
Thus with reference to three particular cases of Zambrano
1262
, Dereci
1263
 and 
MacCarthy
1264
, it is proposed that the reasoning of the CJEU should include the 
CJEU explaining why it is important to protect the symbolic status of EU 
citizenship.
 1265
  For example, it could have explained that EU citizenship plays an 
important role in helping to foster a perception of shared European identity, the 
latter being identified as a ‘pre-requisite for a functioning democratic European 
Policy’.1266  This would include highlighting the symbolic status of EU citizenship 
and how it has close ties to equality of treatment for all EU citizens in respect of 
core civil, political and social rights.   
On the other hand, the CJEU would also need to justify why in any particular 
matter, EU citizenship should be allowed to take priority over national citizenship.  
This would include elaborating in its reasoning as to what the substance of the EU 
citizenship rights were in this case.  It would then need to justify in its ruling that 
in this case that the substance of the right was so compromised so as not to need 
to consider any cross-border element.  In other words, the CJEU needs to identify 
a threshold of seriousness in respect of breach of the substance of an EU 
citizenship right and why national constitutional law should not be allowed to deal 
with such a situation.   
Furthermore, it is proposed that the CJEU should then include in its reasoning the 
factors in this particular case that it had used to inform its judgement and to justify 
                                                             
1262 C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de L’Emploi (ONEM), [2011] ECR I-
1177. 
1263 Case C-256/11 Dereci and others v Bundesministerium fur Inneres, [2011] ECR I-0000 
1264 Case C-434/09 McCarthy v Home Secretary [2011] ECR I-0000. 
1265 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office Nationale de L’emploi (ONEm) [CJEU, 08 
March 2011) paragraph 41 the CJEU ruled that ‘As the Court has stated several times, citizenship 
of the Union is intended to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’.   
1266 M.Kumm, ‘The Idea of Thick Constitutional Patriotism and its implications for the role and 
structure of European Legal History’, (2005) 6 (2) German law Journal 319.  See also at 320 for a 
discussion of the importance of identifying a basis for a common European identity and who 
argues that the constitutional commitment to human rights, democracy and rule of law could be the 
basis for a common European identity. 
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it concluding that the substance of an EU citizens rights was so compromised 
there was no need to consider any cross-border element.  The relevant factors in 
Zambrano could have, for example, included discussion of the fact that here the 
EU citizen was a young child,
1267
 the vulnerability of a young child and their 
dependence on their parents for care and the emotional ties involved between the 
two child EU citizens and their parents with reference to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the UN Convention on Rights of the Child.
1268
  The 
addition of such extra reasoning would have provided evidence of the CJEU 
considering how the substance of EU citizens rights were so compromised here so 
as not to need to consider any cross-border element.  It would also provide further 
support for the existing final part of the Zambrano ruling which  concluded in 
paragraph 45 that, ‘the answer to the questions referred is that Article 20 TFEU is 
to be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a Member State from refusing a 
third country national upon whom his minor children, who are European Union 
citizens, are dependent, a right of residence in the Member State of residence and 
nationality of those children, and from refusing to grant a work permit to that third 
country national, in so far as such decisions deprive those children of the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the rights attaching to the status of European Union 
citizen’.  
More generally, the CJEU in the future in citizenship cases needs to do as a 
minimum is to outline the core substance of rights that is to be protected 
regardless of the degree of EU competence. For the CJEU to decide on a 
minimum floor of rights, though, is difficult as De Búrca   questions whether the 
CJEU’s ‘self referential, formulaic and often minimalist style of reasoning is 
appropriate to this expanded role’.1269  However, the rights contained in the 
European Convention of Human Rights
1270
  could be a basis for the CJEU to rely 
upon.  For the rights in the European Convention provide a set of minimum 
                                                             
1267 See H.Stalford, Children and the EU, (2012, Hart Publishing) chapter 3 for a more general 
discussion of protection of children’s rights to family life in EU law. 
1268 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3,   <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html 
>accessed 15 July 2014. 
1269 G. De Burca, ‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Human 
Rights Adjudicator?’, (2013) 20 (2) Maastrict Journal  168. 
1270 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950 European Treaty Series  No. 05.  See 
also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml> accessed 30.1.14. 
298 
 
standards
1271
 in a Convention that all the Member States of the EU have signed up 
to.  In addition, the EU too is currently in the process of acceding to the European 
Convention of Human Rights.
1272
  Thus, it is submitted that CJEU as a minimum 
should outline the core substance of rights
1273
 that are to be protected in EU 
citizenship cases regardless of the degree of EU competence drawing upon the 
rights contained in the European Convention of Human Rights. 
However, in more recent case law of the CJEU in the cases of MacCarthy
1274
 and 
Dereci,
1275
 this reveals that the CJEU is resurrecting the cross border rule through 
adopting a slightly more restrictive approach to the interpretation of the 
invocation of the citizenship provisions in purely internal situations. This in turn 
begs the question firstly as to whether their reasoning in these EU citizenship 
cases invoked in purely internal situations reveals the difference with the earlier 
case law.  Secondly, what is the ambit of the substance of rights that has to be 
impaired to remove the need for a cross-border element, the latter question already 
having been implicitly raised in the earlier case of Zambrano. 
In respect of the case of MacCarthy,
1276
  this was the first citizenship case invoked 
in a purely internal situation where the CJEU considered relaxing the cross-border 
rule.  Here Mrs MacCarthy, a mother of three children one of whom was disabled, 
was an EU citizen who, although she had never moved, sought to gain a right of 
residency for her husband, a third-country national, in the UK on account of EU 
                                                             
1271 For a more general  discussion of the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
approach of the European Court of Human Rights in balancing the rights in the ECHR with 
subsidiarity, proportionality and primarity pursuant to the European Convention on Human Rights 
see J.Christofferson, Fair Balance: A Study of Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the 
European Convention on Human Rights, (Brill, 2009) and in particular his contention that there is 
an obligation on the Contracting Parties to implement the Convention into domestic law as a 
complement to subsidiarity. 
1272 See Article 6(2) TEU which declares that the EU shall accede to the ECHR. See also the 
CJEU’s opinion 2/13 Opinion 1/13 8.12.14 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=160882&pageIndex=0&doclan
g=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=40247> accessed 8.1.15  regarding the EU’s 
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights where the CJEU has emphasised the need 
to preserve the autonomy of EU law when considering human rights protection. 
1273 See J.Christofferson, Fair Balance: A Study of Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in 
the European Convention on Human Rights, a PhD thesis 
<http://www.humanrights.dk/files/pdf/Disputats%20_Endelig%202008%2004%2017_%20(2).pdf
> accessed 14.1.14 at 129 referring to the partly dissenting judgement of Judge Matscher, 
Guzzardi v Italy (6 Nov 1980, Series A, No 39)  for a discussion of how although the ECHR talks 
of the very essence of rights of the ECHR and later at 131 that ‘the greatest obstacle to a proper 
discussion of the analysis of the core of rights is the lack of specificity in the definition or 
description of the right that may or may not contain an inviolable core’. 
1274 Case C-434/09 McCarthy v Home Secretary [2011] ECR I-0000. 
1275 Case C-256/11, Dereci and others v Bundesministerium fur Inneres. 
1276 Case C-434/09 McCarthy v Home Secretary [2011] ECR I-0000. 
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citizenship and Directive 2004/39/EC in order to afford her husband residence in 
the UK.  She was also never economically active and was always in receipt of 
State benefits.
1277
 
The CJEU however ruled that the Directive here was not able to be relied upon in 
purely internal situations and that Article 20 TFEU could not be invoked because 
the national measure at issue in this case did not have the effect of depriving a 
citizen of their genuine enjoyment of the substance of her citizen rights.
1278
  
 
In particular the CJEU emphasised in paragraph 49 of its judgement that, 
‘no element of the situation of Mrs McCarthy, as described by the national 
court, indicates that the national measure at issue in the main proceedings has 
the effect of depriving her of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the 
rights associated with her status as a Union citizen, or of impeding the 
exercise of her right to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, in accordance with Article 21 TFEU’. 
The CJEU then went on to distinguish this case from previous case law.  Firstly, it 
stated in para 50 that the case differed firstly with Zambrano, in that ‘the national 
measure at issue in the main proceedings in the present case does not have the 
effect of obliging Mrs McCarthy to leave the territory of the European Union. 
Indeed, as is clear from paragraph 29 of the present judgment, Mrs McCarthy 
enjoys, under a principle of international law, an unconditional right of residence 
in the United Kingdom since she is a national of the United Kingdom’. 
Secondly, the CJEU then went on to distinguish the case with Avello in para 51 on 
the grounds that ‘in that judgment, the Court held that the application of the law of 
one Member State to nationals of that Member State who were also nationals of 
an other Member State had the effect that those Union citizens had different 
surnames under the two legal systems concerned, and that that situation was liable 
to cause serious inconvenience for them at both professional and private levels 
resulting from, inter alia, difficulties in benefiting, in one Member State of which 
they are nationals, from the legal effects of diplomas or documents drawn up in 
                                                             
1277 Ibid., at para 14. 
1278 Ibid., paras 44-56. 
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the surname recognised in the other Member State of which they are also 
nationals’. Here therefore the CJEU is attempting to justify its reasoning in this 
case that there was no cross border element by distinguishing it with Avello.
1279
 In 
this latter case involving economically active EU citizens, the CJEU managed to 
find a link with EU law on account of the difficulties that was caused to 
professional and personal lives of Union citizens having different surnames under 
two legal systems.
1280
  Although the CJEU’s reasoning here does seem artificial, it 
does imply that the CJEU was less willing in this case to find a link with EU law 
when the case involves an economically inactive EU citizen. 
Thirdly, the Court noted in Grunkin and Paul,
1281
  
‘in circumstances such as those examined in Garcia Avello, what mattered 
was not whether the discrepancy in surnames was the result of the dual 
nationality of the persons concerned, but the fact that that discrepancy was 
liable to cause serious inconvenience for the Union citizens concerned that 
constituted an obstacle to freedom of movement that could be justified only 
if it was based on objective considerations and was proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued (see, to that effect, Grunkin et Paul, paragraphs 23, 
24 and 29)’.  
Fourthly, the CJEU in para 53 stated ‘that in both Ruiz Zambrano and García 
Avello, ‘the national measure at issue had the effect of depriving Union citizens of 
the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of that 
status or of impeding the exercise of their right of free movement and residence 
within the territory of the Member States’. 
It then referred to paragraph 49 of the present judgment, in the context of the main 
proceedings in this case and pointed out that, 
                                                             
1279 Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avellov État belge 
1280 Ibid., para 36 where the CJEU ruled that ‘it is common ground that such a discrepancy in 
surnames is liable to cause serious inconvenience for those concerned at both professional and 
private levels resulting from, inter alia , difficulties in benefiting, in one Member State of which 
they are nationals, from the legal effects of diplomas or documents drawn up in the surname 
recognised in another Member State of which they are also nationals. As has been established in 
paragraph 33 of the present judgment, the solution proposed by the administrative authorities of 
allowing children to take only the first surname of their father does not resolve the situation of 
divergent surnames which those here involved are seeking to avoid’. 
1281 Case C-353/06 Grunkin and Paul [2008] ECR I-7639. 
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‘the fact that Mrs McCarthy, in addition to being a national of the United 
Kingdom, is also a national of Ireland does not mean that a Member State has 
applied measures that have the effect of depriving her of the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of her status as a 
Union citizen or of impeding the exercise of her right of free movement and 
residence within the territory of the Member States. Accordingly, in such a 
context, such a factor is not sufficient, in itself, for a finding that the situation 
of the person concerned is covered by Article 21 TFEU’. 
 
Finally, it concluded in para 55 that there was no cross border element present in 
this case and that therefore Article 21 TFEU was not applicable here. This really 
repeated the thrust of the other points. 
However, although the CJEU attempted to distinguish this case from previous 
case law,
1282
 there was no elaboration in its reasoning of the scope of the meaning 
of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of citizenship rights or the criteria upon 
which it had formulated its reasoning regarding the meaning of this test or what 
was the real difference.  Nor was there any reference to the EU’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights or consideration of subsidiarity and proportionality applied to 
competences despite the CJEU being called upon in this case to consider national 
measures which deprive an EU citizen of the genuine enjoyment of the substance 
of their citizen rights in policy areas on the edge of the EU’s competence.  
Proportionality here relates to the genuine substance: genuine substance implies a 
breach of proportionality: is it conceptually any different to subsidiarity though?  
Subsidiarity seems to be prior to proportionality.  Subsidiarity seems to directly 
relate to the cross-border element requirement as it goes to very exercise of EU 
competence. 
                                                             
1282 See N.Shuibhne, ‘Some of the Kids are All Right’, (2012) Common Market Law Review 249-
380 at 358 who points out that the CJEU also ‘referred to the contrasting, in its view, 
surname/identity decisions in Garcia Avello and (later) Grunkin and Paul, noting that the serious 
inconvenience that stemmed from dual nationality in those cases was liable to constitute an 
obstacle to free movement, and did have the effect of depriving Union citizens of the genuine 
enjoyment of their rights – but this was materially different in the Court’s view from the situation 
faced by Mrs McCarthy’. 
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With regard to the Demirci case,
1283
 this case was brought before the CJEU 
following references raised by 5 different national courts where citizenship was 
invoked again in a purely internal situation.  Again the CJEU confirmed in para 
58 that Directive 2004/38 is not applicable to third country nationals ‘who apply 
for the right of residence in order to join their European Union citizen family 
members who have never exercised their right to free movement and who have 
always resided in the Member State of which they are nationals’. The situation is 
different for third country nationals where they are recognised family members of 
an EU citizen who has exercised their free movement.
1284
  For example, the 
Commission guidance on Directive 2004/38 advises that ‘third country family 
members should be issued as soon as possible and on the basis of an accelerated 
procedure with a free of charge short-term entry visa…..as the right to be issued 
with an entry visa is derived from the family link with the EU citizen, Member 
States may require only the presentation of a valid passport and evidence of the 
family link
1285
 (and also dependency, serious health grounds, durability of 
partnerships, where applicable).  No additional documents, such as a proof of 
accommodation or of sufficient resources, an invitation letter or return ticket, can 
be required.’1286  Furthermore,  in the case of Metock, the CJEU ruled that 
Directive 2004/38 prohibited a host Member State from requiring prior lawful 
residence in another Member State for a third country national spouse of an EU 
citizen [e.g. of sham marriages after free movement exercised) in another Member 
State.
1287
 However, it is unclear from the case law as to the extent of the scope of 
the Directive when considering, for example, where EU citizens move to another 
Member State whether a third country national family would automatically get all 
European rights that are available to an EU migrant citizen.  There is also little 
discussion in Demirci as to what extent free movement might be necessary and 
whether there is a de minimis threshold. 
1288
 Interestingly,  Janssen and Kallimo 
                                                             
1283 Case C-256/11, Dereci and others v Bundesministerium für Inneres, [2011] ECR I-0000. 
1284 Article 5(2) Directive 2004/38. 
1285 Article 8(5) and 10(2) Directive 2004/38. 
1286 EC Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right 
of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States’ at P.6 
1287 Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock & Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform (Metock & Others), 3 CKLR 39 (2008) para 72.  This case was also considered in section 
3.4 of chapter 4 in this thesis. 
1288 Although the Commission did point out in Demirci  para 40 that ‘neither is there a barrier to 
the exercise of the right conferred on Union citizens to freedom of movement and residence within 
the territory of the Member States’. See also the area of competition law the use of the de minimus 
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have already argued for a de minimus threshold in relation to movement of goods 
and that there is evidence already of the CJEU applying a hypothetical de 
minimus test in the free movement context.
1289
  Furthermore, they propose that in 
relation to free movement of goods cases concerning the restrictive effects on 
market access that ‘restrictive effects on market access could potentially be 
differentiated from restrictive effects on trade at large by defining market access 
as an expression that reflects a de minimis rule. Minimal restrictive effects that 
only reduce trade do not create an effect on market access, while restrictions on 
trade that are severe enough to actually hinder a trader from entering a market, or 
force an established trader to leave a market, would have an effect on market 
access. The de minimis threshold thus would distinguish what is “severe enough”. 
Without a distinction, the notion of “hindering market access” itself could be 
plagued by the very problem of an indefinite scope, which the Keck
1290
, 
Trailers
1291
 and Mickelson
1292
 cases sought to solve for non-discriminatory 
measures’.  
On the other hand, in the case of Demirci,
 1293
 the CJEU was also called upon to 
consider the criterion for the effect of depriving a citizen of the enjoyment of the 
substance of their rights involved.  However, the CJEU ruled that this was only a 
consideration where an EU citizen was ‘[leaving] not only the territory of the 
Member State in which he is a national but also the territory of the EU as a 
whole’.1294 So, for example, this might arise where the spouse of an EU citizen 
was being expelled from his or her own Member State in accordance with the 
laws of that Member State on the grounds of national or public security.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                       
principle is included in Article 101(1) where ‘ If agreements have an a “negligible effect 
on competition they may therefore not be prohibited by Article 101(1).” See also Commission 
Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under 
Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (de minimis) 
1289 M.Jansson and H.Kalimo, ‘De minimis meets “market access”: Transformation in the 
substance – and the symtax- of EU Free Movement Law, (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 
523-558 at 548 referring to the cases of Case C-69/88, H. Krantz GmbH & Co. v. Ontvanger der 
Directe Belastingen andNetherlands State, [1990] ECR I-583 in relation to the free movement of 
goods, and Case C-190/98, Volker Graf v. Filzmoser MaschinenbauGmbH, [2000] ECR I-493 in 
relation to the free movement of workers. 
1290  Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91, Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel 
Mithouard (Keck), [1993] ECR I-6097. 
1291 Case C-110/05, Commission v. Italian Republic (Trailers), [2009] ECR I-519. 
1292 CaseC-142/05, Åklagaren v. Percy Mickelsson and Joakim Roos (Mickelsson), [2009] ECR I-
427. 
1293 Case C-256/11, Dereci and others v Bundesministerium für Inneres, [2011] ECR I-0000. 
1294 Ibid., at  Para 66.  For further discussion of this case see D.Kochenov, ‘A Real European 
Citizenship: A New Jurisdiction Test: A Novel Chapter in the Development of the Union in 
Europe’, (2011) 18 Columbia Journal of European Law 55 at 86-91. 
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latter situation would lead to difficult questions as to the effect of such a 
deportation on other family members such as a spouse or children especially 
where the spouse or children are financially and emotionally dependent on the EU 
citizen facing deportation and the question of balancing what degree of financial 
and or emotional dependence is involved against other public concerns and the 
CJEU justifying how it has balanced such issues.   The CJEU has already been 
faced balancing competing interests in the context of the freedom to provide 
services when expelling a carer of a child who was a European citizen in the case 
of Carpenter
1295
.   
In undertaking the balance in this case the CJEU recognised the importance of 
protection of family life
1296
 and in para 39 that to separate 
‘Mr and Mrs Carpenter would be detrimental to their family life and, 
therefore, to the conditions under which Mr Carpenter exercises a 
fundamental freedom. That freedom could not be fully effective if Mr 
Carpenter were to be deterred from exercising it by obstacles raised in his 
country of origin to the entry and residence of his spouse’. 
The CJEU then continued in para 40 that, 
 ‘A Member State may invoke reasons of public interest to justify a national 
measure which is likely to obstruct the exercise of the freedom to provide 
services only if that measure is compatible with the fundamental rights 
whose observance the Court ensures (see, to that effect, Case C-260/89 ERT 
[1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph 43, and Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] 
ECR I-3689, paragraph 24)’. 
 
The CJEU also referred to Article 8 of the of the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ruling that even though protection of 
family life was a fundamental right,
1297
 ‘that the removal of a person from a 
country where close members of his family are living may amount to an 
infringement of the right to respect for family life as guaranteed by Article 8(1) of 
the Convention’. It then ruled that an infringement will, 
                                                             
1295 Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-62709; 
1296 Ibid., para 38. 
1297 Ibid., para 41. 
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‘infringe the Convention if it does not meet the requirements of paragraph 
2 of that article, that is unless it is in accordance with the law, motivated 
by one or more of the legitimate aims under that paragraph and necessary 
in a democratic society, that is to say justified by a pressing social need 
and, in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, in 
particular, Boultif v Switzerland, no. 54273/00, §§ 39, 41 and 46, ECHR 
2001-IX)’.1298 
In light of the above reasoning, the CJEU then ruled in para 43 that ‘A decision to 
deport Mrs Carpenter, taken in circumstances, such as those in the main 
proceedings, does not strike a fair balance between the competing interests, that 
is, on the one hand, the right of Mr Carpenter to respect for his family life, and, on 
the other hand, the maintenance of public order and public safety.’ However, the 
CJEU did not justify its balance here or consider what the threshold for effect was 
on free movement here. Rather it simply concluded in para 45 that the decision to 
deport Mrs Carpenter was ‘disproportionate to the objective pursued’. 
Interestingly, in Demirci, too in paragraph 69 points out that in cases involving 
the questions relating to residence rights and keeping the family of an EU citizen 
together that ‘this must be tackled in the framework of the provisions on the 
protection of fundamental rights which are applicable in each case’.  However, the 
CJEU in this case does not itself consider explicitly whether refusal of right of 
residence undermines the right for respect for private and family life provided by 
Art 7 of the Charter. Rather it ruled that, 
‘if the referring court considers, in the light of the circumstances of the 
disputes in the main proceedings, that the situation of the applicants in the 
main proceedings is covered by EU law, it must examine whether the 
refusal of their right of residence undermines the right to respect for 
private and family life provided for in Article 7 of the Charter.  On the 
other hand, if it takes the view that that situation is not covered by EU law, 
it must undertake that examination in light of Article 8(1) ECHR’.1299 
Thus the CJEU brought the situation within the scope of EU law, but left the 
determination for national courts, thereby adopting an expansionary approach to 
                                                             
1298 Ibid., para 42. 
1299 Ibid., at para 72. 
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the scope of EU law, while being careful to maintain some jurisdictional 
deference to national authorities who are already bound by the ECHR when 
deciding cases.  This it is submitted is a more valid approach in light of 
subsidiarity but still without substantive criterion or criteria to determine the 
correctness of the national court’s possible different decisions. 
More recently in the case of O and S
1300
 the CJEU has provided some specific 
guidance for the national court when assessing whether the refusal of a residence 
permit for a male spouse of a mother of a Union citizen is ‘liable to undermine the 
effectiveness of the Union citizenship enjoyed by the Union citizens 
concerned.’1301 
The case involved two references concerning third country applicants for resident 
permits in Finland where those applicants lived with a third country national 
spouse who had a child who was a Union citizen.
1302
 
However, the case here was distinguished from Zambrano by the CJEU on the 
grounds that the male spouses were not the biological fathers of the child Union 
citizen
1303
 and did not have custody of the child Union citizen.  Nor were the child 
Union citizens dependent on them.
1304
 In addition, the child Union citizen had 
never made use of their right of free movement and had always lived in the 
Member State of which they were nationals.
1305
 
The CJEU then ruled that the principle established in Zambrano that ‘Article 20 
TFEU precludes national measures….which have the effect of denying Union 
citizens the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by their 
status’1306, only applies in exceptional circumstances but  that ‘it does not follow 
from the Court’s case-law that their application is confined to situations in which 
there is a blood relationship between the third country national for whom a right 
of residence is sought and the Union citizen who is a minor from whom that right 
of residence might be denied’.1307 
                                                             
1300 Joined Cases C 356/11 and C 357/11, Judgment - O, S v Maahanmuuttovirasto (C-356/11), 
and Maahanmuuttovirasto v L (C-357/11) 
1301 Ibid., para 53. 
1302 Ibid., para 36. 
1303 Ibid., para 38. 
1304 Ibid., para 39. 
1305 Ibid., para 42. 
1306 Ibid., para 42. 
1307 Ibid., para 55. 
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Secondly, drawing on point 44 of the opinion of the Advocate General in this case 
it advised the national court to take into account, on the one hand, the nature of 
the relationship of dependence between the child Union citizen and the third 
country national denied a right of residence taking into account.  However, on the 
other hand, it also put forward a caveat that the Member States must ensure that 
its interpretation of the national law at issue in this case did not conflict with EU 
fundamental rights
1308
 as at the end of the day it is the national court who has ‘to 
make a balanced and reasonable assessment of all the interests in play, taking 
particular account of the interests of the children concerned.’1309 
However, is such an approach by the CJEU whereby it leaves to the Member 
States’ national court matters raising fundamental rights issues such as whether 
refusal of a right of residence undermines the Charter right to respect for family 
life and the reasoning to support such an approach a justifiable one?  On the one 
hand, it could be argued that citizenship following the Treaty of Lisbon and the 
giving of legal effect to a Bill of Rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
demands that the CJEU at least engages on the grounds of fairness and justice in 
its reasoning with the practical realisation of EU citizenship for all EU citizens 
and their family members irrespective of whether they have crossed a border or 
not.
1310
 The problem is it is not possible to draw any line in the approach of the 
Court and the justification of the exercise of EU competence at all, which is 
central to subsidiarity, cannot really be made out on this basis. 
Furthermore, the radical and dynamic nature of this line of case law and the 
CJEU’s reasoning, especially in cases concerning what residence rights are 
available to family members of EU citizens has been criticised.  For although EU 
citizenship is a key concept in EU law, the CJEU has failed to provide a definitive 
answer as to  what EU citizenship means and it is also unclear to citizens as to 
when they can rely on the citizenship provisions. As Kochenov argues, ‘while the 
infringement of some EU citizenship rights triggers automatic application of EU 
law no matter what and allows drawing concrete benefits from the possession of 
the status of EU citizenship-like the work and residence rights for a third-country 
                                                             
1308 Ibid., para 78. 
1309 Ibid., para 81 and para 79 where the CJEU stated that the Member States still retain a margin 
of appreciation when considering applications for residence by third country nationals. 
1310 See further D. Kochenov, ‘The Right to have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of 
Clarification’,  (2013) 19 European Law Journal 3 at 15 who argues that ‘in the absence of any 
decipherable test, the only source of substance of rights of EU citizenship is thus the case-law of 
the ECJ itself, where such rights are presumably named’. 
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national parent of static EU citizen children in Ruiz Zambrano
1311
- other, 
alarmingly similar factual situations produce a contrary result – like the lacking 
EU residence right of a third-country national spouse of a mother of static citizen 
children in a family touched by child disability in McCarthy.’1312  Here the key 
question is about drawing the limits of the EU’s competence.  The CJEU in its 
citizenship case law has indicated that economic self-sufficiency
1313
 is subject to 
nationals not being an unreasonable burden, - but this is very open ended.
1314
 
Most recently, in the Ida case
1315
 the CJEU has been called upon again to consider 
the Zambrano case.  However, the case of Zambrano was again distinguished by 
the CJEU from the facts at issues in this case in that ‘the present case displays a 
peculiarity in that the third-country national is not applying for a right of 
residence in the Member State in which his daughter, the Union citizen, is 
living’1316 even though this case involved Mr Ida arguing that he retained a right 
to stay in Germany on the basis of his daughter’s right to a family life where the 
daughter had moved to Austria.  Furthermore, the CJEU when considering 
whether an EU citizen is deprived of the general enjoyment of the substance of 
their rights appears implicitly to reassert its emphasis on the fundamental 
precondition of the existence of a cross border situation for the application of the 
free movement rules
1317
 when it rules, 
‘It must be recalled that the purely hypothetical prospect of exercising the 
right of freedom of movement does not establish a sufficient connection 
with European Union law to justify the application of that law’s provisions 
                                                             
1311 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office Nationale de L’emploi (ONEm) [CJEU, 08 
March 2011). 
1312 Case C-434/09 McCarthy v Home Secretary.  See also D.Kochenov, ‘The Right to Have What 
Rights: EU Citizenship in Need of Clarification’, (2013) 19 European Law Journal at 3. 
1313 See also Article 7 European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member Stateswhich includes that Union citizens are only entitled to reside in the 
host Member State for more than three months if they are either economically active or have 
sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social 
assistance system of the host Member State and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in 
that State. 
1314 For example, in Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v Centre Public D’Aide Sociale D’Ottignies-
Louvain-La-Neuve [2012] 1 CMLR 19 para 31 the CJEU ruled that it could rely on a non-
discrimination clause in claiming a social advantage provided this did not place an unreasonable 
hindrance on the welfare system of the host State’.   
1315 Case C-40/11 Yoshikazu lida, 8.11.12. 
1316 Case C-40/11 Yoshikazu lida, 8.11.12 Advocate General Opinion at para 1. 
1317 Ibid., para 77. 
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(see Case C-299/95 Kremzow [1997] ECR I-2629, paragraph 16). The 
same applies to purely hypothetical prospects of that right being 
obstructed’.  
This contrasts with the CJEU’s approach to potential free movement obstacles in 
Dassonville where the CJEU stated that, ‘All trading rules enacted by Member 
States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or 
potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered as measures having an 
effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions.’1318 
On the other hand, in respect of consideration of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights to the facts at issue in the Ida case, significantly,  the Advocate General  in 
delivering his opinion in this case heavily relied upon the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights ruling in para 88 that, 
‘in light of …Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, a 
parent who has a right of custody and is a third-country national can, in 
order to maintain a personal relationship and direct parental contact on a 
regular basis, have a right of residence in the member State of origin of his 
child who is a Union citizen under Article 20 TFEU and 21 TFEU, if the 
child has moved from there to another Member State, exercising his right of 
free movement.  For such a right of residence to exist, the denial thereof 
must have a restrictive effect on the child’s right to freedom of movement 
and must be regarded as amounting to a disproportionate interference with 
fundamental rights in the light of the abovementioned fundamental rights.’ 
He then assigned the actual weighing up of this to the national court. 
The CJEU, on the other hand,  emphasised in its reasoning the limits of the scope 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights when it ruled in paragraph 78, 
                                                             
1318 Case 8/74, Dassonville [1974] ECR 837.   See also Case C 415/93 Union royale belge des 
sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v Jean-Marc 
Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc 
Bosman where the CJEU ruled in paras 99 – 100 ‘that in relation to transfer rules applying to the 
transfer of football players between clubs belonging to different national associations within the 
same Member State that these rules ‘are likely to restrict the freedom of movement of players who 
wish to pursue their activity in another Member State by preventing or deterring them from leaving 
the clubs to which they belong even after the expiry of their contracts of employment with those 
clubs. Since they provide that a professional footballer may not pursue his activity with a new club 
established in another Member State unless it has paid his former club a transfer fee agreed upon 
between the two clubs or determined in accordance with the regulations of the sporting 
associations, the said rules constitute an obstacle to freedom of movement for workers’. 
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 ‘As to the fundamental rights mentioned by the referring court, in particular 
the right to respect for private and family life and the rights of the child, laid 
down in Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter respectively, it must be borne in 
mind that, in accordance with Article 51(1) of the Charter, its provisions are 
addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing European 
Union law. Under Article 51(2) of the Charter, it does not extend the field of 
application of European Union law beyond the powers of the Union, and it 
does not establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers 
and tasks as defined in the Treaties’.  
This then raises the problem that the CJEU is not always clear in its general case 
law on the limits of EU powers e.g. between general and specific powers. 
The CJEU also ruled in paragraph 81 that, 
‘the German authorities’ refusal to grant Mr Ida a residence card of a family 
member of a Union citizen ‘does not fall within the implementation of 
European Union law within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter, so that 
its conformity with fundamental rights cannot be examined by reference to 
the rights established by the Charter’.   
Thus the CJEU felt unable to consider the conformity of this measure with 
reference to Charter rights.  It therefore concluded that ‘outside situations 
governed by the Directive 2004/38 and where there is no other connection with 
the provisions on citizenship of European Union law, a third-country national 
cannot claim a right of residence derived from a Union citizen’.1319 This was even 
though Directive 2004/38 does provide that the Member State should be required 
before refusing a right of residence to a family member of an EU citizen
1320
 to 
                                                             
1319 Case C-40/11 Yoshikazu lida, 8.11.12 para 82. 
1320 Article 2 (2) of Directive 2004/38 provides that ‘Family member’ means: 
(a) the spouse; 
(b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered partnership, on the 
basis of the legislation of a Member State, if the legislation of the host Member State 
treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage and in accordance with the 
conditions laid down in the relevant legislation of the host Member State; 
(c) the direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependants and those of the 
spouse or partner as defined in point (b); 
(d) the dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and those of the spouse or partner as 
defined in point (b).’ 
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‘undertake an extensive examination of the personal circumstances and shall 
justify any denial of entry of residence to these people.’1321 
 
Again, therefore, the CJEU is  leaving to the Member States’ national court 
matters raising fundamental rights issues with little mention of fairness and justice 
in its reasoning regarding the practical realisation of EU citizenship for all EU 
citizens and their family members irrespective of whether they have crossed a 
border or not.
1322
 Furthermore, there is inconsistency across the cases considered 
in respect of considering limits of EU competences. Nor was there any 
consideration by the CJEU of subsidiarity and proportionality applied to 
competences despite the case involving a shared competence area and involving 
the CJEU to strike a difficult balance between EU citizens’ residency rights where 
they are economically inactive and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
Similarly, in the more recent case of Alokpa and Moudoulou case,
1323
  the CJEU 
has again made no reference to subsidiarity applied to competences when dealing 
with cases involving areas of shared competence but rather left to the Member 
States’ national court matters raising fundamental rights issues where there has 
been no cross border element.  The case itself concerned a Mrs Alokpa, a third 
country national, who had twins prematurely in Luxembourg.  Although Mrs 
Alokpa was a third country national, the twins were however EU citizens as they 
were French nationals on account of their father being a French national.  
                                                             
1321 Article 3 (2) of Directive 2004/38 provides ‘Without prejudice to any right to free movement 
and residence the persons concerned may have in their own right, the host Member State shall, in 
accordance with its national legislation, facilitate entry and residence for the following persons: 
(a) any other family members, irrespective of their nationality, not falling under the definition in 
point 2 of Article 2 who, in the country from which they have come, are dependants or members of 
the household of the Union citizen having the primary right of residence, or where serious health 
grounds strictly require the personal care of the family member by the Union citizen; 
(b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship, duly attested. 
The host Member State shall undertake an extensive examination of the personal circumstances 
and shall justify any denial of entry or residence to these people’. 
1322 See further D. Kochenov, ‘The Right to have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of 
Clarification’,  (2013) 19 European Law Journal at 15 who argues that ‘in the absence of any 
decipherable test, the only source of substance of rights of EU citizenship is thus the case-law of 
the ECJ itself, where such rights are presumably named’. 
1323 Case C-86/12, Adzo Domenyo Alokpa, Jarel Moudoulou,Eja Moudoulouv Ministre du Travail, 
de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration. 
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However, as it was the mother who was the sole carer of the twins as the father 
had absconded, Mrs Alokpa therefore applied for an extension of temporary 
discretionary residence in Luxembourg that was granted to her on account of her 
twins requiring care due to their prematurity.
1324
 However she was denied 
continual residence on the grounds that she did not fall within the permitted 
categories of an EU citizen’s family member as this ‘is restricted to dependent 
relatives in the direct ascending line’, and secondly, the twins had not exercised 
their right of free movement.
1325
 The national court therefore referred the 
following question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling:- 
‘Is Article 20 TFEU – if necessary, read in conjunction with Articles 20, 21, 
24, 33 and 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights [of the European 
Union], or with one or more of those provisions read separately or in 
conjunction – to be interpreted as precluding a Member State from refusing 
a third-country national, with sole responsibility for his or her minor 
children who are citizens of the European Union, residence in the Member 
State of residence of the children, where they have been living with that 
person since birth, without having that nationality, while refusing the third-
country national a residence permit, or even a work permit? Are such 
decisions to be regarded as being in the nature of decisions depriving those 
children, in their country of residence, in which they have lived since birth, 
of effective enjoyment of the substance of the rights attaching to the status 
of citizen of the European Union also in the situation where their other 
direct ascendant, with whom they have never shared family life, is resident 
in another Member State of the European Union, of which that person is a 
national?’1326 
However, despite the explicit reference by the national court to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in conjunction with Articles 20, 21, 24, 33 and 34 TFEU, the 
CJEU made no reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Rather it simply 
ruled that it was for the national court to decide whether, pursuant to Article 7 (1) 
(b) of Directive 2004/38  the children, as EU citizens, had sufficient resources and 
comprehensive sickness insurance cover either ‘on their own or through their 
                                                             
1324 Ibid., paras 13-16 
1325 Ibid., para 18. 
1326 Case C-86/12, Adzo Domenyo Alokpa, Jarel Moudoulou,Eja Moudoulouv Ministre du Travail, 
de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration para 19. 
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mother’.1327   If such conditions were not met, according to the CJEU, the national 
court was able to refuse residence.
1328
  Nor did the CJEU make any reference to 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
1329
 
The CJEU, referring to previous specific case law,  did, though,  add a caveat in 
para 33 about ensuring the genuine enjoyment of the substance of EU citizens 
rights in that, 
'if the referring court holds that Article 21 TFEU does not preclude Mrs 
Alokpa from being refused a right of residence in Luxembourg, that court 
must still determine whether such a right of residence may nevertheless be 
granted to her, exceptionally – if the effectiveness of the Union citizenship 
that her children enjoy is not to be undermined – in light of the fact that, as a 
consequence of such a refusal, those children would find themselves obliged 
in practice to leave the territory of the European Union altogether, thus 
denying them the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred 
by virtue of that status’. 
 
The CJEU also pointed out in para 34 that as the twins were already French 
citizens that the mother could, 
‘as sole carer of those children since their birth, could have the benefit of a 
derived right to reside in France’ that in these circumstances refusal by the 
Luxembourg authorities would not ‘deprive those citizens of effective 
enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of the status of 
European Union citizenship, a matter which is to be determined by the 
referring court’.1330  
The facts of the case here therefore differed to Zambrano in that the twins did not 
live in the country of their nationality although surely requiring the mother of the 
twins to move away from this particular Member State to another Member State is 
a significant disruption to the effective enjoyment of the substance of the rights of 
                                                             
1327 Ibid., para 30. 
1328 Ibid., para 31.  
1329 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3,   <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html 
>accessed 15 July 2014. 
1330 Case C-86/12, Adzo Domenyo Alokpa, Jarel Moudoulou,Eja Moudoulouv Ministre du Travail, 
de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration  para 36. 
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those child EU citizens. So here the CJEU seemed to say EU citizenship could 
apply in default of any protection at national level, and it did not scrutinise 
possible rights under French law, it just noted the possibility – this suggests a 
certain deference consistent with subsidiarity, but not articulated as such. 
The cases examined above concerning the protecting the rights of citizens and 
their family members reveal that the reasoning employed by the CJEU show a 
lack of convincing justification for each ruling with no explicit consideration of 
subsidiarity applied to competences at all. Even where there is no change in case 
outcomes an explicit explanation of how the CJEU had considered subsidiarity in 
the CJEU’s reasoning would help to improve the quality of the reasoning of the 
CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling.1331 
 
The question was then posed as to whether a subsidiarity review might be helpful 
here to the CJEU when considering citizenship cases involving the residency 
rights of EU citizens and family members of EU citizens? On one hand, should 
the CJEU utilise subsidiarity in its reasoning in this context and provide evidence 
of the need to respect for Member State regulatory regimes consistent with 
subsidiarity and a respect for localism. But on the other hand, when the CJEU 
scrutinises aspects of Member State regulatory regimes is there is a need for it act 
as an arbiter between respect for the Member States law and protecting the 
residence rights of EU citizens and their family members (with reference to the 
Charter) and ensuring fairness and justice. 
As a supranational court primarily experienced in matters of European integration, 
this role is taking the CJEU out of its comfort zone (though the CJEU has a broad 
comfort zone given its very expansive interpretation of EU competences and its 
pro-union interpretative tendency)
1332
 and straying into issues that have either 
been the preserve of national constitutional courts at a national level or 
fundamental human rights at an international level.
1333
 
                                                             
1331 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
 
1332 This is discussed in chapter 3 section 2.2. 
1333 Competence and rights protection issues can also overlap as evidenced recently in the case of 
C 399/09 Landtova 22 June 2011 nyr and discussed in a case note by R.Zbiral, ‘Restoring Tasks 
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3. Could a subsidiarity and proportionality review be helpful here and, if so, 
what criteria should such a review involve?   
The previous section has highlighted how cases involving the rights of EU 
citizens who are economically inactive
1334
 frequently involve sensitive 
immigration issues
1335
 or entitlement to welfare issues
1336
 on the borderline of EU 
competences.
1337
  Despite this, it was also explained how the CJEU, displaying a 
pro-union interpretative tendency, has paid little attention to subsidiarity and 
proportionality applied to the clear delineation of competences or to demonstrate 
much respect for local laws in citizenship cases concerning the rights of EU 
citizens who are economically inactive.
1338
 Furthermore, it was explained in 
section 2 how these cases all fall short in explaining the limits of EU law 
requirements, especially regarding the substance of rights, purely internal 
situations and what unreasonable burden means re financial implications. A key 
argument of this thesis is that if the CJEU were to undertake a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review which involved a consideration of the limits and scope of 
EU competence in a particular shared competence area, this would demonstrate its 
                                                                                                                                                                       
from the EU to the Member States: A Bumpy Road To An Unclear Desitination’, (2012) 49 
Common Market Law Review 1475-1492 regarding the Czech constitutional Court annulling an 
EU act on the grounds of ultra vires conduct of the EU institutions and the challenge this posed to 
the CJE’s traditional concern with integration. 
1334 See for example Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern, [1998] ECR I-2691 
1335 For further discussion see HM Government, Review of the Balance of Competences between 
the United Kingdom and the European Union Asylum and Migration  (HM Government, 2014)  
and who outline in  section 1.5 how ‘the EU’s power in immigration and asylum issues has 
increased over the last 15 years’ and how  ‘The 2009 Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) saw further changes to the scope for EU action allowing the development of 
common EU policies on asylum and on the immigration of third country nationals generally rather 
than merely minimum standards. It constituted a significant widening of the EU’s competences in 
this area. The Lisbon Treaty collapsed the pillar structure and moved Title IV into a new Title V: 
the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ of the TFEU. ’Policies on Border Checks, Asylum and 
Immigration’ was incorporated as Chapter two of this new Title V, retaining the Opt In Protocol. 
This is an area of shared competence between the EU and its Member States’.  
1336 The EU shares competence with the Member States in the field of social welfare policy.  See 
also HM Government, Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and 
the European Union Social and Employment Policy (HM Government, 2014) which discusses how 
in ‘1.28 In the field of social policy, the Lisbon Treaty made some important changes. It included 
in the objectives of the Union, listed by Article 3 TFEU, the ‘well being of its people’; the 
establishment of a ‘highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and 
social progress’; its commitment to ‘combat social exclusion and discrimination’; to ‘promote 
social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations 
and protection of rights of the child’. 
1337 See Chapter 4 and 5 for further discussion. 
1338 See for example Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern, [1998] ECR I-2691 
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adherence to the rule of law,
1339
 the latter being enshrined in Article 2 TEU.
1340
  
Even if the CJEU in the past has tended to display a pro-union interpretative 
tendency, adhering to the rule of law is an important issue for the CJEU to 
demonstrate its respect for a core value commonly associated with democracy
1341
 
and with the validity of law itself.
1342
   
 
Subsidiarity is prior to proportionality and relates to identification of limits of EU 
competence.  Any subsidiarity review should involve the CJEU checking whether 
the Union has competence to act (conferral) and in cases concerning areas of 
shared competence the undertaking of such a review an explicit explanation of 
how the CJEU had considered subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning would help to 
improve the quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the 
legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling.1343This is consistent with the EU’s overarching 
aim to have democratic, transparent and efficient institutions through the 
adherence to values commonly associated with democracy
1344
 and the problem of 
ultra vires EU action lacking legitimacy in the Member States eyes.
1345
 
In respect of the proportionality element of the review, this needs to relate to the 
actual consideration and weighing up by the CJEU of the competing interests 
identified in this context.  This requires the CJEU to identify explicitly in its 
reasoning any competing interests that have been weighed up as well as stating 
any other particular factors involved in the balancing and the weight accorded to 
                                                             
1339 For further discussion see B.Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
1340 See also K.Lenaerts, ‘Upholding Union Values in Times of Societal change: the Role of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union’. 
<https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/deli/events/annual%20lecture%202014/Lenaerts_2014_Durham
.pdf >accessed 1.7.14. 
1341 For further discussion see B.Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
1342 See further L.Fuller Inner Morality of Law, (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 
1964). 
1343 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
 
1344 Laeken Declaration <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-01-902_en.htm > accessed 
4.7.14.  
1345 Brunner v The European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57.  
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those factors.  The next section will consider this further in relation to the cases of 
Zambrano
1346
, Dereci
1347
 and MacCarthy?
1348
   
However, the above cases considered in section 2 involving rights of EU citizens 
who are economically inactive
1349
 frequently involve issues relating to the private 
and family life of EU citizens.
1350
 The CJEU therefore needs to consider Article 7 
of the Charter. In respect of the wording of Article 7 of the Charter, this provides 
that ‘everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home 
and communications’.  Examination of the explanatory memorandum to the 
Charter includes an explanation of how the word ‘communications’ has been used 
rather than correspondence to ‘take account of developments in technology’.  
Furthermore, the explanatory memorandum invites comparison with the ECHR 
equivalent in respect of the meaning and scope of these rights as it includes that, 
‘the meaning and scope of this right are the same as those of the corresponding 
Article of the ECHR.  Consequently, the limitations which may legitimately be 
imposed on this right are the same as those allowed by Article 8 ECHR:  
‘1.Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home       
and his correspondence. 
2.There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others’.  
With this in mind, how therefore should the CJEU more meaningfully engage 
with subsidiarity in its judicial reasoning when striking a balance between 
competing issues of immigration or welfare on the one hand and, on the other, 
the Charter rights of EU citizens?  This is an important question as 
subsidiarity relates to competence but proportionality goes to the extent of the 
                                                             
1346 C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de L’Emploi (ONEM), [2011] ECR I-
1177. 
1347 Case C-256/11 Dereci and others v Bundesministerium fur Inneres, [2011] ECR I-0000 
1348 Case C-434/09 McCarthy v Home Secretary [2011] ECR I-0000. 
1349 See for example Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern, [1998] ECR I-2691 
1350 See for example C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de L’Emploi (ONEM), 
[2011] ECR I-1177 
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CJEU’s exercise in the facts of a particular case. The next section considers 
firstly how the CJEU could more meaningfully engage with subsidiarity in its 
judicial reasoning.  Secondly, in respect of the proportionality element of the 
review how it could be explicit in its reasoning as to how it has struck a 
balance between competing issues of immigration or welfare on the one hand 
and, on the other, the Charter rights of EU citizens.
1351
   
4. How should the CJEU more meaningfully engage with subsidiarity and 
proportionality in its judicial reasoning  
As subsidiarity is prior to proportionality, any subsidiarity and proportionality 
review in cases concerning the residence rights of EU citizens including those 
who are economically inactive should at the very least involve the CJEU making 
explicit reference in its reasoning to firstly how it has respected subsidiarity and 
demonstrated a respect for localism in the particular case at issue.  In particular, 
this would involve the CJEU including in its reasoning a clear justification of EU 
competence in this context so as to draw out the limits of EU competence.  As 
subsidiarity in these types of cases relates to the cross border requirement, the 
CJEU should be explicit about departing from the purely internal rule as well as 
explaining the substance of rights of EU citizens. 
 
The proportionality element of the review relates to the actual consideration and 
weighing up by the CJEU of the competing interests identified in this 
context.  This requires the CJEU to identify explicitly in its reasoning any 
competing interests that have been weighed up as well as stating any other 
particular factors involved in the balancing and the weight accorded to those 
factors. This should include considering the financial implications and what 
potential impact might be on immigration for that particular Member State of 
ruling that particular national legislation is contrary EU law. Access to socio-
economic data or discussion with the national referring court could be helpful here 
in informing the CJEU’s consideration of this issue1352 and being more specific 
about ‘unreasonable burden’.  The CJEU has ignored Rasmussen’s critique of its 
                                                             
1351 Case C-434/09 McCarthy v Home Secretary [2011] ECR I-0000. 
1352 See also : H. Rasmussen, On Law and Policy of the European Court of Justice (Kluwer 1986)]   
Rasmussen and his conclusion that the ECJ needed to take into account more socio-economic date 
in aits adjudication. 
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role in this respect, but it has all the more relevance in a subsidiarity context. Far-
reaching economic effects, for example, would suggest the CJEU is intruding 
upon fiscal competence, which remains with the Member States. Any views of the 
EU institutions in this context and their reasons for favouring local law-making 
over centralised action should be explicitly stated.  For, and as Kumm has pointed 
out, the advantages of local law-making over centralised action are three fold and 
encompass efficiency, democracy and preserving the identities of citizens of the 
Member State which is easier at a local level than a European level.
1353
 The CJEU 
could be encroaching on fiscal competence of the Member States through an 
expansive interpretation of rights. 
But on the other hand, in cases concerning a the residence rights of economically 
inactive EU citizens and their family members, the CJEU would also need to 
demonstrate that it had taken account of Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights as well as considering if the substance of an EU citizens rights had been 
compromised such that it does not need to consider any actual cross-border 
element.  By explicitly including in its judgement the sector-specific criterion it 
had employed when weighing up such issues in citizenship cases where there are 
issues relating to Article 7 and the weight given by the CJEU to each criterion, 
this would anchor subsidiarity.   
It is therefore proposed that for the CJEU to more meaningfully engage with 
subsidiarity and proportionality in its judicial reasoning this should include the 
CJEU adding the following to its reasoning:- 
 
Firstly, in respect of the subsidiarity element of the review, what is the overall 
degree of competence that has been transferred to the EU in private and family 
life?  This would include considering both the general and the specific 
competence and whether competence involves an internal market provision. This 
is an important question as the CJEU has frequently adopted an expansionary 
approach when approaching competence in internal market cases and as Davies 
writes prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, ‘Alas, as every Community lawyer knows, 
there could hardly be more open‐ended and ambiguous competences than those 
                                                             
1353 Kumm Op. Cit. 581. 
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assigned to the Community.’  1354Furthermore, Conway writes that ‘the conceptual 
pull of the concept of ‘internal market’ or ‘common market’ make defining the 
limits of EU competence very difficult as almost any national rules on any subject 
can be considered an obstacle to free movement’. 1355 
Yet following the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 5 TEU clearly defines the EU as an 
organization of conferred and shared powers. Craig highlights ‘the Laeken 
Declaration and subsequent discussion of Treaty reform was premised there were 
concerns voiced about ‘competence creep’, more especially in relation to two of 
the most general Treaty provisions,  Article 95 and 308 EC’. 1356 However, Craig 
then explains that despite the Treaty of Lisbon, ‘problems still remain’   and that, 
‘the Treaty of Lisbon will….. do little if anything to alleviate problems of 
‘competence creep’ in the terrain covered by Article 114 TFEU (ex Article 95 
TEC)’.1357 This is because the limits of the internal market and the relationship 
between general and specific competences are not addressed in the Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
On the other hand, Craig does point out that the new Impact Assessment strategy 
‘constitutes a framework within which to address concerns as to competence 
anxiety’ which he concludes should make easier judicial review in that the CJEU 
could examine the Commission’s discussion from any Impact Assessment 
undertaken.
1358
 He does however sound a note of caution when he writes ‘the 
Impact assessment strategy is not some panacea that will magically dispel 
concerns as to competence creep or competence anxiety.  It is nonetheless central 
to addressing these concerns’.1359 Nevertheless, the current author agrees with 
Craig that it is still an important source of evidence of justification of EU action 
and consideration of the level of added value of EU action.
1360
  Furthermore, the 
current author also agrees with Craig that ‘if the verification or justification for 
EU action contained in the Impact Assessment appear merely formal, scant, or 
                                                             
1354 Gareth Davies, Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, In the Wrong Place, At the Wrong Time, (2006) 
43 Common Market Law Review, 63-84 at 65. 
1355 G.Conway ‘Conflicts of Competence Norms in EU Law and the Legal Reasoning of the ECJ’ 
11 (9) German Law Journal at 967-1005 at 970. 
1356 P.Craig, (2010) The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press)    
1357 Ibid., at 188 
1358 Ibid., at 191. 
1359 Ibid., at 191. 
1360 Ibid., at 191-2. 
321 
 
exiguous than the [CJEU] should not hesitate to so conclude, thereby indicating 
that the enhanced role accorded to subsidiarity in the Lisbon Treaty will be taken 
seriously’.1361 Consequently, it is vital that the CJEU needs to ensure that in 
performing judicial review that it rigorously reviews any relevant Impact 
Assessments when considering the terrain covered by Article 114 TFEU. 
The  CJEU also needs to consider what the minimum standards have been 
established under the European Convention on Human Rights on this and to 
include in its reasoning why it is not enough just to rely on these. Here 
subsidiarity can be related to the divide between international law and EU law: the 
CJEU needs to explain why it is not leaving human rights to the ECHR.
1362
 Here 
the CJEU could draw upon an argument by Schütze that there has been a 
conceptual shift of emphasis in EU federal philosophy from a dual federalism to 
co-operative federalism and that the latter encompasses the idea that the EU and 
Member States work together in a shared legal sphere.
 1363
 Thus when the EU 
accedes to the ECHR it has a duty in conjunction with the Member States to 
ensure compliance in the shared legal sphere with ECHR standards rather than 
simply leaving the matter to the ECHR court. 
On the other hand, the CJEU would also need to  demonstrate to the Member 
States’ that there has been  proper respect when weighing up conflicting issues to  
the division of power between the EU and the Member States in cases involving 
protecting the private and family rights of EU citizens/carers of EU citizens.  By 
adopting such an approach the CJEU would be acting as an arbiter in this context. 
It would therefore need to identify the specific criteria it had relied upon when 
weighing up conflicting issues in this context i.e. relative to particular 
competences. This would help to anchor subsidiarity and help ensure the proper 
respect for the division of power between the EU and the Member States.  Even 
where there is no change in case outcomes an explicit explanation of how the 
CJEU had considered subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning would help to improve 
                                                             
1361 Ibid. 
1362 See further R.Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of 
European Law, (2009, OUP) 
1363 Ibid for a consideration of the federal philosophy that informs the EU’s legal structure and in 
particular an argument of how the EU legal system has evolved from dual federalism (which 
encompasses the philosophical idea of dual sovereignty where both governmental bodies are co-
equals) to co-operative federalism (which encompasses the philosophical idea that two 
governmental bodies work together in a shared legal sphere). 
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the quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy 
of the CJEU’s ruling.1364 
Where cases involve EU citizens who are children such as in the case of 
Zambrano
1365
, the CJEU should acknowledge in its reasoning the limits of EU 
competence in that, 
‘the substantive family law remains under the sole competence of EU 
countries although the EU is empowered to take measures concerning 
family law with cross-border implications on the basis of a special 
legislative procedure: all EU countries should agree (unanimity) and the 
European Parliament must be consulted’.1366 
The anchoring of a subsidiarity and proportionality review is an important issue is 
an important issue to help deflect criticism of a pro-union interpretative tendency 
as the CJEU’s case law has developed to date incrementally in a wide variety of 
different shared policy contexts such as free movement and family rights, social 
security entitlements for adults, social security entitlements for child dependents.  
It is very probable that other policy contexts will find their way before the CJEU 
when considering EU citizens rights and the CJEU will again be drawn into acting 
as an arbiter between fundamental rights of EU citizens and local law.  There is 
also potential for questions to be raised in connection with EU citizens rights 
before the CJEU in light of existing debates that have already been raised at 
national level such as the debate that arose in Ireland where the national court was 
required to consider educational rights for disabled Irish citizens and the 
interpretation of Article 42.4 of the Constitution of Ireland 1937 in the case of 
Sinnott v Minister for Education.
1367
 This raises controversial issues such as could 
EU law be used to require Member States to provide certain kinds of educational 
                                                             
1364 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
 
1365 C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de L’Emploi (ONEM), [2011] ECR I-
1177. 
1366 European Commission, ‘Family matters and succession’ < 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/family-matters/index_en.htm > accessed 8.2.15. 
1367 Sinnott v. Minister for Education [2001] IESC 63; [2001] 2 IR 505 (12th July, 2001) and the 
interpretation of Article 42.4 of the Constitution of Ireland which provides, inter alia, that ‘the 
State shall provide for free primary education¦ and, when the public good requires it, provide other 
educational facilities or institutions,’ in relation to the education rights for the disabled. 
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benefit without a strong cross-border element.  More generally, the CJEU needs to 
be clear about the division between general internal market (i.e. competition and 
free movement) and specific competences otherwise the idea of distinguishing 
categories of competence breaks down.  For example, social welfare is clearly 
primarily for the Member States, but the CJEU is gradually drawing aspects of it 
in without being explicit about the competence delimitation problem. 
In respect of the proportionality element of the review, it is submitted that an 
important issue the CJEU needs to address in all such cases is when are the 
substance of rights compromised such that it does not need to consider any actual 
cross-border element.  The CJEU needs to identify a minimum threshold although 
arguably the presumption must be against this being necessary in most cases, 
because the European Convention on Human Rights has already done this. This 
would involve firstly a consideration of whether it is possible to identify whether 
there is a minimum core of EU rights that are so sacrosanct that there is no need to 
consider any actual cross border element and the relationship with the European 
Convention on Human Rights and national constitutional traditions.  The CJEU 
needs to do this much more systematically. Furthermore, for example as in the 
Zambrano case,
1368
  the CJEU should have contextualised its reasoning here with 
a consideration of Article 7 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights at the very 
least. 
Secondly, in respect of considering the national measure at issue, use could be 
made of a test suggested by Alexy.
1369
  He proposed that a graduated scale for 
national measures which contained three levels – serious, moderate and minor – 
could be applied when considering national measures although such an approach 
does run the risk of opening up more potential for judicial discretion e.g. where on 
the scale is the line drawn between a minor and a more serious measure.
1370
  This 
would provide a clearer basis for weighing the relative importance of a particular 
measure. 
                                                             
1368 C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de L’Emploi (ONEM), [2011] ECR I-
1177. 
1369 R.Alexy, A Theory of constitutional Rights,  translated by J.Rivers, (OUP, 2002) 401-414.  See 
also J. Habermas Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
andDemocracy (1998) 259-260; K. Moller, ‘Proportionality: Challenging the Critics’, (2012) 
10(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 709 for a critique of Alexy’s theory of balancing 
as subjective. 
1370 R.Alexy, A Theory of constitutional Rights,  translated by J.Rivers, (OUP, 2002) 401-414.   
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Thirdly, to consider how the CJEU approaches balancing the tension between a 
citizens rights in a particular policy context and any legitimate objectives of the 
Member States in a particular context.   Here, the CJEU could draw inspiration 
from the ECHR approach in this context and ask a series of questions about the 
national legislation at issue
1371
.  Such questions could include asking whether 
there is a legitimate aim for a particular national measure and, if so, whether the 
particular national measure was both a necessary and proportionate way to 
implement that legitimate aim.  It would also entail the CJEU weighing up the 
seriousness of the national measure at issue against the need to balance the 
interests of society with those of individuals and groups.  In addition, and as 
Alexy points out, it is crucial for judges when balancing to assess the level of 
interference with a particular right and that where there is considerable 
interference that this requires the CJEU to demand good and valid reasons to 
justify such great interference.
1372
 
Finally, it would also be important for the CJEU to list the factors that it has taken 
into consideration when undertaking such a balancing exercise
1373
 in order to 
provide evidence of the CJEU has considered how the substance of EU citizens 
rights were so compromised here so as not to need to consider any cross-border 
element. The relevant factors in Zambrano could have, for example, included 
discussion of the fact that here the EU citizen was a young child,
1374
 the 
vulnerability of a young child and their dependence on their parents for care and 
the emotional ties involved between the two child EU citizens and their parents 
with reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the UN Convention on 
Rights of the Child.
1375
  The addition of such extra reasoning would have provided 
evidence of the CJEU considering how the substance of EU citizens rights were 
so compromised here so as not to need to consider any cross-border element 
                                                             
1371 See  also de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and 
Housing, [1999] 1 AC 69,80 where the Privy Council defined the questions generally to be asked 
in deciding whether a measure is proportionate are, ‘whether (1) the legislative objective is 
sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet 
the legislative objective are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right 
or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective’. 
1372 R.Alexy, A Theory of constitutional Rights,  translated by J.Rivers, (OUP, 2002) 401-414. 
1373 See the recent case of Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department Kashmiri v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2007] UKHL 11 at  para 19-20 where the HL 
controversially said that the national courts should be doing the balancing here. 
1374 See H.Stalford, Children and the EU, (2012, Hart Publishing) chapter 3 for a more general 
discussion of protection of children’s rights to family life in EU law. 
1375 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3,   <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html 
>accessed 15 July 2014. 
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By adopting a structured approach to subsidiarity and proportionality this would 
help ensure the proper respect for the division of power between the EU and the 
Member States. This would be especially important in areas where the EU is 
acting on the edge of its competence such as in relation to social security or 
immigration.  Here the need for the CJEU to include a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review and be explicit in its reasoning of how it had considered 
subsidiarity, weighed up the seriousness of the national measure at issue against 
the need to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and groups as 
well as demonstrating a respect for localism by giving more weight to the 
Member State’s right to regulate is the most compelling. This would involve the 
CJEU adopting a more systematic approach to competences: identifying more 
clearly the limits of EU competence, the importance of special competence over 
general competences, such as Article 114 TFEU (ex Article 95 TEC) and taking a 
more deferential approach to matters raising fiscal implications for Member States 
in order to respect the fiscal competence of the Member States. These are 
important considerations as the cases considered in section 2 all fall short in 
explaining the limits of EU law requirements, especially re the substance of rights, 
purely internal situations and what unreasonable burden means re financial 
implications.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The previous chapter 4 of this thesis focused on particular shared policy context – 
determining the rights of EU citizens as a lens to explore how a subsidiarity 
review by the CJEU could address shared competence issues.  It also included 
explaining  how despite in this particular shared policy context the introduction of 
EU citizenship by the Treaty of Maastricht being primarily concerned with the 
market rights of citizens that the CJEU has played an important role in fleshing 
out the meaning of citizenship and moving towards a more rights based approach 
to reflect the fundamental status of EU citizenship in EU law, albeit at the same 
time there is ambiguity in the case law about the relationship between rights and 
the general interests of the internal market.  More recently, the fundamental status 
of EU citizenship has been enhanced by the giving of legal effect to a Bill of 
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Rights for citizens.  Such a development provides fertile ground for the CJEU to 
draw inspiration from when reasoning in cases involving the realisation of 
citizenship rights for EU citizens. 
On the other hand, chapter 4 also explained how EU citizenship following the 
Treaty of Lisbon remains parasitic on national citizenship in that in order to be an 
EU citizen you just first be a national of a Member State.  Citizenship, therefore, 
is complementary, but on the approach of the CJEU it impacts on competence 
generally. Furthermore, EU citizenship is constrained by the limits of EU 
competence in areas of shared competence and subsidiarity.  Respect for the latter 
principle, which has an inherent respect for local law-making, taken in 
conjunction with the national identity clause, should be a powerful constraint on 
the CJEU when interpreting in this area.  The CJEU should also ensure that when 
weighing up criteria in the specific context of protecting private and family rights 
that it makes explicit reference to the Charter and right to respect for family life as 
well as taking into account any limitations which may legitimately be imposed on 
this right. As chapter 4 was based on normative considerations, this chapter 
explained how this normative approach could be applied.  
 
In light of the wide range of potential number of policy contexts that citizenship 
rights could be an issue, it was submitted that an important issue the CJEU needs 
to address in all such cases is when are the substance of rights compromised such 
that it does not need to consider any actual cross-border element.  This would 
involve firstly a consideration of whether it is possible to identify whether there is 
a minimum core of EU rights in relation to where a situation falls within EU law 
that are so sacrosanct that there is no need to consider any actual cross border 
element.  
Secondly, in respect of considering the national measure at issue, use could be 
made of a test suggested by Alexy
1376
  who proposed that a graduated scale for 
national measures which contained three levels – serious, moderate and minor – 
could be applied when considering national measures
1377
  Alexy’s test does not 
exhaust the problem of making value judgements about relative degrees of 
                                                             
1376 R.Alexy, A Theory of constitutional Rights,  translated by J.Rivers, (OUP, 2002) 401-414. 
1377 Ibid. 
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importance of different interests, but it provides a basis for a more explicit 
articulation, something that the CJEU tends to be quite poor at. 
Thirdly, to consider how the CJEU approaches balancing the tension between a 
citizens rights in a particular policy context and any legitimate objectives of the 
Member States as well as the general interest of the internal market, and how such 
questions could include asking whether there is a legitimate aim for a particular 
national measure and, if so, whether the particular national measure was both a 
necessary and proportionate way to implement that legitimate aim.  The CJEU 
needs to systematically set out the scope of shared competences and apply rights 
within them when the EU has exercised competence legislatively, rather than 
using rights as a vehicle for expanding EU competences, which it has tended to do 
by dropping the cross-border element.  Further, the CJEU needs to relate its own 
attempts at rights protection to both the European Convention on Human Rights 
and national constitutional traditions. 
Finally, it would also be important for the CJEU not only to demand good and 
valid reasons to justify considerable interference with a particular right when 
weighing this against a particular national legitimate aim but also to list the 
factors that it has taken into consideration when undertaking such a balancing 
exercise
1378
 in order to anchor subsidiarity and proportionality and help ensure the 
proper respect for the division of power between the EU and the Member States. 
This would be especially important in areas where the EU is acting on the edge of 
its competence such as in relation to social security or immigration.  Here the 
need for the CJEU to include a subsidiarity and proportionality review and be 
explicit in its reasoning of how it had considered subsidiarity, weighed up the 
seriousness of the national measure at issue against the need to balance the 
interests of society with those of individuals and groups as well as demonstrating 
a respect for localism by giving more weight to the Member State’s right to 
regulate is the most compelling. 
The sequence of how the CJEU should apply a subsidiarity and proportionality 
review of the CJEU is summarised as follows:- 
                                                             
1378 See the case of Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department Kashmiri v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, [2007] UKHL 11 at  para 19-20 where the House of Lords 
controversially said that the national courts should be doing the balancing here. 
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As subsidiarity is prior to proportionality the CJEU should include first in its 
reasoning in these types of cases a clear justification of EU competence in this 
context so as to draw out the limits of EU competence.  As subsidiarity in these 
types of cases relates to the cross border requirement, the CJEU should be explicit 
about departing from the purely internal rule as well as explaining the substance 
of rights of EU citizens. 
The proportionality element of the review relates to the actual consideration and 
weighing up by the CJEU of the competing interests identified in this 
context.  This requires the CJEU to identify explicitly in its reasoning any 
competing interests that have been weighed up as well as stating any other 
particular factors involved in the balancing and the weight accorded to those 
factors. 
In summation, therefore, the main contribution of this chapter is to argue that 
there is a need for the CJEU to act as an arbiter in this context and that specific 
criteria should be identified in order to anchor subsidiarity and proportionality and 
help ensure the proper respect for the division of power between the EU and the 
Member States.  Subsidiarity can be anchored much more fully than the CJEU 
acknowledges.  
 
The case for identifying what specific criteria should be identified in order to 
anchor a subsidiarity and proportionality review in this context is compelling.
1379
 
For such an approach would help improve the quality of the CJEU’s reasoning in 
the context thus enhancing the legitimacy of the CJEU.  It would also demonstrate 
to the Member States that it respects subsidiarity and localism and demonstrate its 
adherence to the rule of law, the latter being enshrined in Article 2 TEU. Although 
engaging more meaningfully with subsidiarity will not necessarily prevent the 
CJEU from continuing to display a pro-Union interpretative tendency especially 
as subsidiarity itself is a contested concept and characterised by a degree of 
vagueness.
 1380
  Nevertheless, even if the CJEU inevitably approaches 
interpretation from a certain perspective, the adoption of a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review would help to demonstrate the procedural legitimacy of the 
                                                             
1379 This is necessary in order to address the incommensurability problem, which is another way of 
stating the problem of objectivity/subjectivity. 
1380 This was argued in section 5 of chapter 2. 
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CJEU’s ruling. This would help to legitimise the CJEU’s ruling to the Member 
States and address the problem of ultra vires EU action lacking legitimacy in the 
perspective of the Member States eyes.
1381
 The quality of the CJEU’s reasoning is 
also becoming an increasingly important matter in light of the impending 
accession of the EU’s accession to ECHR.1382  For following accession of the EU 
to the ECHR, the CJEU will be measured against human rights standards in its 
case law and does not want to be found lacking in its reasoning when balancing 
competing rights and interests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1381 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
1382 Council of Europe, Accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, < 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/default_en.asp> accessed 14.1.14. 
See also most recently the CJEU’s opinion 2/13 Opinion 1/13 8.12.14 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=160882&pageIndex=0&doclan
g=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=40247> accessed 8.1.15 regarding the EU’s 
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights where the CJEU has emphasised the need 
to preserve the autonomy of EU law when considering human rights protection. 
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Chapter 6  Conclusion 
This thesis has explored subsidiarity and proportionality as key twin constitutional 
concepts in EU law for mediating the balance of power between the EU and the 
Member States in areas of shared competence.  Its primary objective was to 
consider the extent to which subsidiarity as an essentially contested concept could 
be anchored by the CJEU in EU law when determining the residency rights of EU 
citizens who are economically inactive in order to enhance the legitimacy of 
CJEU rulings.
1383
 An explicit explanation of how the CJEU had considered 
subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning in this context would help to improve the 
quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy of 
the CJEU’s ruling.1384 
This particular type of case has been chosen as the determination of residency 
rights of EU citizens who are economically inactive involves an area of shared 
competence between the EU and the Member States. This is novel and timely 
research.   For subsidiarity has recently been reaffirmed in the Treaty of Lisbon as 
a key constitutional principle of EU law to guide EU law-making in shared 
competence areas.
1385
  Its use by all the EU law making institutions when law-
making in shared policy areas helps to demonstrate the legitimacy of the exercise 
of the EU’s legislative power to the Member States as well demonstrate its 
adherence to the  rule of law,
1386
 the latter being enshrined in Article 2 TEU. 
At a theoretical level, the thesis has added to existing academic debate concerning 
subsidiarity by testing whether subsidiarity is a contested concept with reference 
to a set of conditions put forward by Gallie.
1387
 Subsidiarity as a concept clearly 
                                                             
1383 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’. 
1384 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
 
1385 Article 5 TEU. 
1386 For further discussion see B.Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
1387 W.B.Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, (1956)  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
167-98. 
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meets the various conditions that Gallie has argued must be fulfilled in order for a 
concept to be deemed as an essentially contested concept,
1388
  that it has a core 
meaning that can inform legal reasoning by the Court of Justice. 
It was then further argued that such conceptual dissonance favours judicial 
discretion on how it should be applied even though as explained in chapter 3 the 
CJEU has made little use of it in its case law to date.  This in turn raised the 
question of how subsidiarity, as a contested concept could be anchored in EU law 
by the CJEU to help ensure the proper respect for the division of power between 
the EU and the Member States in areas of shared competence by determining 
what could be agreed upon at European level.  Anchoring subsidiarity by using 
exemplars in order to demonstrate what is nearer to the heart of subsidiarity, this 
helps to minimise the risk of a dispute as to how it should be operationalized in 
adjudication.  This has the advantage of directly addressing a key concern raised 
by Gallie’s theory that essentially contested concepts are at continual risk of being 
disputed as well as providing provide a useful conceptual framework in this thesis 
for helping to identify the core of values of subsidiarity.  
On the other hand, despite the contested nature of subsidiarity there have been 
attempts by the EU institutions to put subsidiarity into practice by the introduction 
of a system of ex ante monitoring by the national Parliaments
1389
 following the 
Treaty of Lisbon.  The relevant provisions setting out the new ex ante monitoring 
role of the national Parliaments are located in several Treaty articles and one 
European Parliament Resolution.  Firstly in Article 5 TEU the potential remit of 
subsidiarity monitoring is extended to include national level.
1390
  It provides that, 
‘Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at 
central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or 
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level’.  Secondly, a 
new European Resolution further widens the subsidiarity monitoring to include 
                                                             
1388 Ibid. 
1389 Article 12 (b) TEU provides that ‘National Parliaments shall contribute actively to the good 
functioning of the Union […] by seeing to it that the principle of subsidiarity is respected in 
accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. See also Article 7 of Protocol No 2 on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
1390 European Parliament Resolution of 13 September 2012 on the 18th Report on better legislation 
– Application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 2010. 
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regional and local levels of Member States by requiring national Parliaments to 
consult regional and local governmental bodies.  Thirdly, Article 12b TEU, in 
conjunction with the Protocol on the application of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, sets out how the ex ante system for monitoring subsidiarity is to 
be operationalized through an early warning system.  When this system is 
activated, the relevant instrument under review will be further scrutinised by the 
Commission, a group of Member States or the relevant EU institution with a view 
to either keeping, amending or rejecting outright with reasons a particular 
instrument.   
The CJEU too has considered subsidiarity when considering judicial review. 
Chapter 3 therefore reviewed a selection of key cases where the CJEU has paid 
attention to subsidiarity when undertaking judicial review of EU legislative 
action.  In all the cases examined the CJEU is progressively paying more attention 
to subsidiarity when reviewing EU legislative action by the EU institutions.  
However such review of EU legislative action by the CJEU is invariably light 
touch, with the CJEU frequently employing a very cursory approach to its 
examination of the EU institutions’ decision that harmonizing legislation is 
required.  The CJEU, displaying a pro-union interpretative tendency, relates 
subsidiarity to the idea of the internal market and treats advancement of the 
internal market as an end in itself, which is bound to neutralise subsidiarity. In the 
cases selected, the judgments of the CJEU are also characterized by a formalistic 
approach when considering if the EU institutions have paid proper attention to 
subsidiarity, with little consideration of the substantive evidence that Union 
harmonization is needed. 
Adopting a doctrinal perspective, the thesis then added to this existing scholarship 
in chapter 3 by agreeing with and developing, in light of the Treaty of Lisbon, an 
argument by de Búrca that as the CJEU is a law-making institution
1391
 it is bound 
by subsidiarity when interpreting in shared areas of competence.  In particular, it 
proposed that following the Treaty of Lisbon and in conjunction with the national 
identity clause and the Preamble and Article 1 of the revised TEU, which further 
emphasise that decisions regarding EU law-making are taken as closely as 
                                                             
1391 For discussion of the role of the CJEU as a law-maker see for example P.Neill,  The European 
Court of Justice: A Case Study in Judicial Activism,  (London: European Policy Forum, 1995) at 2; 
T.Hartley, ‘The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of the European Union’, 
(1996) 11 2 Law Quarterly Review 411-423; 
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possible to the citizens of Europe, there is now an even greater need for the 
CJEU
1392
 to utilise subsidiarity in its interpretation of shared policy areas in order 
to improve the quality of the reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the 
legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling.1393 
The existing light touch approach of the CJEU to subsidiarity in this context is 
problematic as not only is such an approach not fully consistent with the principle 
of conferral, it also demonstrates the CJEU adopting a pro-union interpretative 
tendency in its interpretation of shared policy areas. 
The thesis also has added to existing scholarship in chapter 3 by considering how 
Kumm treats proportionality as the third aspect of competence and how the CJEU 
could operationalize subsidiarity through developing a proposal by Kumm of how 
the CJEU could employs subsidiarity and proportionality as an aspect of 
subsidiarity applied to competences as a tool of judicial review.  This includes 
considering whether there is a single test in different areas or can more sector-
specific criteria be identified especially where there are policy areas which already 
involve the CJEU considering other competing interests or EU law concepts that 
are essentially contested such as EU citizenship. In particular, it was argued that 
as each policy area has different financial and symbolic considerations that the 
CJEU needs to identify the sector specific criteria for each policy area in addition 
to considering the degree of transfer of competence in specific areas. 
Chapter 4 then pointed out that the reasoning in the CJEU cases selected for 
examination concerning the residency rights of EU citizens reveal a pro-union 
interpretative tendency and a failure of the CJEU to undertake a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review.  It was then proposed that a subsidiarity /proportionality 
review by the CJEU could be useful/helpful here.  On one hand, such a 
subsidiarity and proportionality review would enable the CJEU to operationalize 
subsidiarity’s inherent respect for localism in its reasoning in this context and 
                                                             
1392 For  a discussion of the role of the CJEU and European legal integration see for example 
J.Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick,  and L.Moral Soriano, ‘Integration and Integrity in the Legal 
Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’ in de Búrca, G. and Weiler, J.H.H. (eds) The 
European Court of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 43- 86; M.Cappelletti, 
M.Seccombe, J.H.H.Weiler,  Integration through Law: European and the American Federal 
Experience: Vol 1: Methods, Tools and Institutions (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1985) 
86. 
1393 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
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provide evidence of the need to respect for Member State regulatory regimes. An 
explicit explanation of how the CJEU had considered subsidiarity in the CJEU’s 
reasoning would also help to improve the quality of the reasoning of the CJEU 
and consequently enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s ruling.1394 
 
But on the other hand, when the CJEU when undertaking a subsidiarity and 
proportionality review applied to competences and then scrutinises aspects of 
Member State regulatory regimes which also concern fundamental rights it could 
also act as an arbiter between respect for Member States law and protecting the 
residence rights of EU citizens with reference to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.  This is to examine the competence of the CJEU and its institutional 
placing at a supranational level as suited to adjudication of citizenship residency 
rights. 
It was then contended that as a minimum that the CJEU should firstly explicitly 
address competence issues in its reasoning in every case in this context.  For this 
could help to counter claims that the CJEU displays an unjustified emphasis in its 
case law on the need to pursue an ‘ever closer Union’ which deprives Member 
States of their competencies and is at the expense of the legal systems of the 
Member States.
1395
  It would also be consistent with subsidiarity and its inherent 
respect for localism in conjunction with the national identity clause in Article 4 
(2) TEU.  For this provision provides that , 
‘The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties 
as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, 
political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-
government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including 
ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and 
                                                             
1394 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
 
1395 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308. 
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safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the 
sole responsibility of each Member State’.1396 
The question of competence is especially important in the undertaking of any 
subsidiarity and proportionality review as the EU is bound by the principle of 
conferral which denotes a system where the EU institutions can exercise only 
competence attributed to it.
1397
  Where the EU is dealing with shared competence 
this is provided for in Article 2 (2) TFEU. This provides that ‘the Member States 
shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its 
competence’.  As Schütze outlines following the Treaty of Lisbon, these shared 
competences ‘remain the ordinary competences of the European Union unless the 
Treaties expressly provide otherwise, an EU competence will be shared.’1398 On 
the other hand, where the EU is on the edge of its competence, the EU can only 
have responsibility for its actions on the basis of a valid competence to carry them 
out, under the rules of attribution of responsibility in international law. 
1399
 
Secondly, it was contended that in undertaking any subsidiarity and 
proportionality review the criteria used by the CJEU in a balancing test should be 
sector specific and therefore particular criteria needed to be identified when the 
CJEU is dealing with cases involving the residency rights of EU citizens. Some 
areas need particular sensitivity because of their financial implications or their 
symbolic importance for the Member States or because they are close to matters 
where the CJEU has merely complementary competence. As a supranational court 
primarily experienced in matters of European integration and frequently in the 
past displaying a pro-union interpretative tendency
1400
, this role will inevitably 
take the CJEU out of its comfort zone and straying into issues that have either 
been the preserve of national constitutional courts at a national level or 
fundamental human rights at an international level. This is particularly so in the 
                                                             
1396 For further discussion of the identity clause see D.Leczykiewicz, ‘The national identity clause 
in the EU Treaty: a blow to supremacy of Union law?’, 
http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/06/21/dorota-leczykiewicz-the-national-identity-clause-in-the-
eu-treaty-a-blow-to-supremacy-of-union-law/> accessed 10.5.13  
1397 Article 2  TFEU. 
1398 R.Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law, 
(2009, OUP) at 5. 
1399 International Law Commission, Draft articles on the law of Treaties between States and 
International Organsiations or between international organisations with commentaries, (1982).  
For<http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_2_1982.pdf> last accessed 
29.1.14. 
1400 This was argued in section 5 of chapter 2. 
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context of EU citizenship as EU citizenship is not a shared competence but the 
rights associated with EU citizenship can be related to different categories of 
competence. 
In respect of subsidiarity, this latter article contains the principle that the CJEU as 
an EU law-making institutions is required to demonstrate that not only is there a 
need for legislation at a supranational level but that there are distinct advantages 
of legislative action at a supranational level over and above Member State 
legislative action or inaction at a national level. With regard to proportionality, 
this too is concerned with the appropriate means to achieve a need but unlike 
subsidiarity it is concerned with how competence is exercised rather than the EU 
legislative institutional process of determining the level for exercise of 
competence. 
 
Together, subsidiarity and proportionality must comply with a key tenet of the 
rule of law, the requirement of formal legality.
1401
 Chapters 4 and 5 then focus on 
one specific shared policy area – the residency rights of EU citizens who are 
economically inactive -.  Furthermore, that in respect of any subsidiarity and 
proportionality review undertaken by the CJEU, this should  at the very least 
involve the CJEU making explicit reference in its reasoning to, on the one hand, 
how it had identified limits to the competences through subsidiarity analysis in 
any particular case.    Furthermore, the CJEU also should include in its reasoning 
considering the financial implications and what potential impact might be on 
immigration for that particular Member State of ruling that particular national 
legislation is contrary EU law.  Access to socio-economic data or discussion with 
the national referring court could be helpful here in informing the CJEU’s 
consideration of this issue.
1402
  The CJEU has ignored Rasmussen’s critique of its 
role in this respect, but it has all the more relevance in a subsidiarity context. Any 
views of the EU institutions in this context and their reasons for favouring local 
law-making over centralised action should be explicitly stated.  For, and as Kumm 
has pointed out, the advantages of local law-making over centralised action are 
three fold and encompass efficiency, democracy and preserving the identities of 
                                                             
1401 J.Waldron,  ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?’, (2002) 21(2) 
Law and Philosophy 154-5. 
1402 See also Rasmussen’s conclusion that the CJEU needs to take into account more socio-
economic date in its adjudication: H. Rasmussen, On Law and Policy of the European Court of 
Justice, (Kluwer, 1986)]   
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citizens of the Member State which is easier at a local level than a European 
level.
1403
 
 
By explicitly including in its judgement the sector-specific criterion it had 
employed when weighing up such issues in citizenship cases where there are 
issues relating to the Charter and the weight given by the CJEU to each criterion, 
this would anchor subsidiarity.  By adopting such an approach the CJEU would be 
acting as an arbiter in this context in issues that could be considered political, but 
it would establish its legitimacy by developing a more coherent and specified 
framework for identifying the boundaries of competences.  Citizenship is an 
inherently political concept. 
The thesis then concluded with a case study in chapter 5 which developed a 
normative approach (as the critique in chapter 4 is based on normative 
considerations) and explored how a subsidiarity review could be anchored in EU 
law to address competence issues when the CJEU is considering fundamental 
principles of EU law and residency rights of EU citizens who are economically 
inactive. In particular, it was pointed out that in light of the wide range of 
potential number of policy contexts that citizenship rights could be an issue that 
an important issue the CJEU needs to address in all such cases is when the 
substance of rights is compromised such that it does not need to consider any 
actual cross-border element.  This would involve firstly a consideration by the 
CJEU of whether it is possible to identify whether there is a hierarchy of 
minimum core of EU rights, such as the prohibition of torture
1404
 or the right to 
liberty and security of the person
1405
 that are so sacrosanct that there is no need to 
consider any actual cross border element.  
Secondly, in respect of considering the national measure at issue, use could be 
made of a test suggested by Alexy.
1406
  He proposed that a graduated scale for 
                                                             
1403 Kumm Op. Cit. 581. 
1404 Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
1405 Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  See also in the UK para 39 of the Magna 
Carta which provides 39 that ‘No freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in 
any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of 
his peers or by the law of the land’. 
1406 R.Alexy, A Theory of constitutional Rights,  translated by J.Rivers, (OUP, 2002) 401-414.  See 
also J. Habermas Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (1998) 259-260; K. Moller, ‘Proportionality: Challenging the Critics’, (2012) 10(3) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 709 for a critique of Alexy’s theory of balancing as 
subjective. 
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national measures which contained three levels – serious, moderate and minor – 
could be applied when considering national measures
1407
 although such an 
approach does run the risk of opening up more potential for judicial discretion e.g. 
where on the scale is the line drawn between a minor and a more serious 
measure.
1408
   Nonetheless, it makes the reasoning more explicit and thus 
transparent and open to scrutiny. 
Thirdly, that the CJEU when balancing the tension between citizens’ rights in a 
particular policy context and any legitimate objectives of the Member States could 
draw inspiration from the ECHR approach and ask a series of questions about the 
legitimacy and necessity of the aim of the national legislation at issue as well as 
the proportionality of the implementation of that aim
1409
.  It would also entail the 
CJEU weighing up the seriousness of the national measure at issue against the 
need to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and groups.  For 
as Alexy points out, it is crucial for judges when balancing to assess the level of 
interference with a particular right and that where there is considerable 
interference that this requires any court to demand good and valid reasons to 
justify such great interference.
1410
 In the context of the CJEU and determining 
what kind of substantive reasons are within the legitimate scope of the CJEU 
reasoning when balancing a fundamental right, such as the exercise of freedom of 
expression against the fundamental freedom of movement of goods, the CJEU has 
already in the case of Schmidberger took the following kind of substantive 
reasons into account.  Firstly, the interference with free movement of goods had 
taken place following a request for authorisation for such interference to the 
Austrian authorities and after the Austrian authorities had decided not to ban the 
demonstration.
1411
 Secondly, on the grounds that the demonstration took place 
only once, on a single route and for a limited time unlike in the Commission v 
France case where there had been serious disruption over a period of time.  
                                                             
1407 R.Alexy, A Theory of constitutional Rights,  translated by J.Rivers, (OUP, 2002) 401-414 at 
402 and who cites for example of ‘the duty of tobacco producers to place health warnings about 
the dangers of smoking on their products is a relatively minor interference with freedom of 
profession.  By contrast, a total ban on all tobacco products would be a serious interference’. 
1408 Ibid. 
1409 See  also de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and 
Housing, [1999] 1 AC 69,80 where the Privy Council defined the questions generally to be asked 
in deciding whether a measure is proportionate are, ‘whether (1) the legislative objective is 
sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet 
the legislative objective are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right 
or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective’. 
1410 R.Alexy, A Theory of constitutional Rights,  translated by J.Rivers, (OUP, 2002) 401-414. 
1411 Case 112/ 00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659 (CJEU) para 84. 
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Thirdly, that the Austrian citizens’ purpose here was in exercising their right to 
freedom of expression rather than to restrict the free movement of goods as in the 
Commission v France case where the French farmers were seeking to obstruct the 
free movement of goods.
1412
 Fourthly, that the Austrian authorities had taken steps 
to mitigate the disruption by putting in place various administrative and 
supporting measures.
1413
 Thus in this case we see the CJEU actually performing a 
proportionality review and balancing the interests involved in order to assess 
whether the right balance had been achieved even though in practice Jans argues 
the CJEU generally does not carry out the balancing.
1414
 Ultimately, any 
balancing of fundamental rights involving human rights might involve the CJEU 
deferring to the European Court of Human Rights in human rights matters once 
the EU accedes to the ECHR.
1415
  
Fourthly, it was highlighted how it is important for the CJEU in its reasoning to 
list the factors that it has taken into consideration when undertaking such a 
balancing exercise
1416
 in order to anchor subsidiarity and proportionality and to 
demonstrate that its decision is not arbitrary. Such an approach would also help to 
demonstrate to the Member States a proper respect for both the rule of law and the 
division of power between the EU and the Member States. This would be 
especially important in areas where the EU is acting on the edge of its competence 
such as in relation to the residency rights of EU citizens where the EU citizens are 
economically inactive and which could have significant financial or fiscal 
implications for the Member State concerned or significant human rights 
implications for the deportation of vulnerable EU citizens.   
In summation, it is hoped that the research in this thesis of how the CJEU could 
utilise subsidiarity to justify its reasoning in cases in this context will convince 
sceptics of the need of the CJEU to utilise subsidiarity to justify its interpretation 
in this context. An explicit explanation of how the CJEU had considered 
subsidiarity in the CJEU’s reasoning would help to improve the quality of the 
reasoning of the CJEU and consequently enhance the legitimacy of the CJEU’s 
                                                             
1412 Ibid., para 86 
1413 Ibid., para 87. 
1414 Jans Op.Cit. at 248. 
1415 Council of Europe, Accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, < 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/default_en.asp> accessed 14.1.14. 
1416 See the recent case of Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department Kashmiri v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2007] UKHL 11 at  para 19-20 where the HL 
controversially said that the national courts should be doing the balancing here. 
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ruling.
1417
 More importantly, however, this research provides a structured 
approach of how subsidiarity, which is an essentially contested concept, could be 
anchored by the CJEU so as to ensure a proper respect for rule of law when 
undertaking a subsidiarity and proportionality review applied to competences 
when determining the residency rights of EU citizens. Subsidiarity, despite its 
political context, can be a justiciable tool when a satisfactory conceptual 
framework is developed to support it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1417 N.Everling,‘The ECJ as a Decision Making Authority’ (1992) 82 Michigan Law Review, 1294 
at 1308 and who points out how courts create their own legitimacy by the quality of their 
decisions.’ 
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